I do not think that the existence of God can be proved or even that the main justification for the belief can be found in argument in the ordinary sense of that term, but I think two of the three which have, since Kant at least, been classified as the traditional arguments of natural theology have some force and are worthy of serious consideration. This consideration I shall now proceed to give. I cannot say this of the remaining one (...) of the arguments, the ‘ontological proof’, which I shall therefore not discuss here. (shrink)

This paper argues that an examination of the ontology that underpins Descartes’s Fifth Meditation ontological proof of God’s existence will contribute to a better understanding of the nature and structure of the proof. Attention to the Cartesian meditator’s development of this ontology in earlier meditations also makes clear why this proof could not have been asserted before the Fifth Meditation. Finally, it is argued that Kant’s objections against the ontological proof have no force against Descartes’ particular version of the (...) proof. (shrink)

Shortly after the appearance of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant’s claim that the ontological proof of God’s existence contains all the probative force of the cosmological argument was discussed at great length by J. F. Flatt, J. F. v. Abel and J. A. Eberhard. These early criticisms do not seem to have received the attention they deserve, even though they are extremely relevant, cogent, and difficult to dispute. Regardless of whether their assumptions are accepted, these objections point out (...) certain obscurities and flaws in Kant’s argument, casting doubt, from a logical standpoint, on the success of the main Kantian criticism of the cosmological proof. (shrink)

This paper argues that an examination of the ontology that underpins Descartes’s Fifth Meditation ontological proof of God’s existence will contribute to a better understanding of the nature and structure of the proof. Attention to the Cartesian meditator’s development of this ontology in earlier meditations also makes clear why this proof could not have been asserted before the Fifth Meditation. Finally, it is argued that Kant’s objections against the ontological proof have no force against Descartes’ particular version of the (...) proof. (shrink)

A resurgence of scholarly work on proof of God?s existence is noticeable over the past decade, with considerable emphasis on attempts to provide?analytic proof? based on the meanings and logic of various identity statements which constitute premises of the syllogisms of the?proof?. Most recently perhaps, Emmanuel Rutten?s?modal-epistemic proof? has drawn serious academic attention. Like other?analytic? and strictly logical proofs of God?s existence, Rutten?s proof has been found flawed. In this paper I discuss the possibility of an?ethics-based? identity (...) proof of God?s existence. Such a proof, the first version of which, I believe, has been offered, indirectly, by Nikolai Lossky, utilizes the form and structure of the analytic proof, but fundamentally rests on the perception of moral values we associate with God and Godliness. The nature of the proof shifts the focus of the very attempt to?prove? God?s existence from what I believe is an unreasonable standard, unattainable even in?proving? the existence of the more mundane world, towards a more functional, practical and attainable standard. The proof proposed initially by Lossky, and in a more systematic form here, I believe, shows the indubitable existence of God in the sense of his moral presence in the lives of the faithful, at least with the same degree of certainty as the presence or?existence? of anything else that can be epistemically proven in principle. (shrink)

What determines whether the procedures for proving the affirmative statement of God's existence may be called a proof? Certainly, it is necessary that all premises be true and that a reliable inference schemata be applied. One premise appears to be the most critical in the theistic argument. This premise is the principle of sufficient reason. I hold the view that the principle of sufficient reason cannot be found among the premises of any metaphysical explanation of reality, so I (...) suggest that the terms “proof” and “argument” not be used. Instead, we could speak of ways of acquiring discursive knowledge of God and ways of indirect substantiation of God's existence. (shrink)

What determines whether the procedures for proving the affirmative statement of God's existence may be called a proof? Certainly, it is necessary that all premises be true and that a reliable inference schemata be applied. One premise appears to be the most critical in the theistic argument. This premise is the principle of sufficient reason. I hold the view that the principle of sufficient reason cannot be found among the premises of any metaphysical explanation of reality, so I (...) suggest that the terms “proof” and “argument” not be used. Instead, we could speak of ways of acquiring discursive knowledge of God and ways of indirect substantiation of God's existence. (shrink)

Commentators almost universally agree that Locke denies the possibility of thinking matter in Book IV Chapter 10 of the Essay. Further, they argue that Locke must do this in order for his proof of God’s existence in the chapter to be successful. This paper disputes these claims and develops an interpretation according to which Locke allows for the possibility that a system of matter could think (even prior to any act of superaddition on God’s part). In addition, the paper (...) argues that this does not destroy Locke’s argument in the chapter, instead it helps to illuminate the nature of it. The paper proceeds in two main stages. First, Locke denies that matter can produce thought. A distinction between two senses of “production” shows that this claim is compatible with the existence of thinking matter. Second, Locke denies that God could be a system of randomly moving particles. Most commentators take this to mean that such a system could not think. But Locke is better interpreted as denying that such a system could have the wisdom and knowledge of God. (shrink)

Two questions concerning Anselm of Canterbury’s theistic argument provided in Proslogion Ch. 2 are asked and answered: is the argumentvalid? under what conditions could it be sound? In order to answer thequestions the argument is formalized as a first-order theory called AP2. Theargument turns out to be valid, although it contains a hidden premise. Theargument is also claimed not to be ontological one, but rather an a posteriori argument. One of the premises is found to be false, so the argument (...) isclaimed not to be sound and to fail to prove its conclusion. (shrink)

‘The Five Ways’ has been used as a translation of the phrase quinque viae which is used by Aquinas in Summa Theologiae I, 2, 3. I have put it in inverted commas because I think that it is a poor translation of the Latin. Aquinas’s use of the word via is sufficiently rich to confront us with a choice of English equivalents. There is no reason why in this context we should opt for ‘way’. Since we are not being invited (...) in ST I, 2, 3 on any journey in space, the initial presumption must be that ‘way’ should be used only if we fail to turn up anything more fitting. However, there is no difficulty in providing a more suitable English equivalent. Via is used by Aquinas in the sense of ‘a method of arguing’ or, more specifically, as designating particular arguments. When he considers the two viae by which Aristotle arrived at a certain conclusion, Aquinas clearly distinguishes an argument based on Physics VII from that based on Physics VIII. And in the same context Aquinas uses rationes as an equivalent of viae. Ratio is frequently used by Aquinas in the sense of the English word ‘argument’, as, for instance, in ST I, 30, 2 or ST III, 55, 5. Hence it seems to me that quinque viae should be translated as ‘five arguments’. (shrink)

Igor Agostini, La démonstration de l’existence de Dieu. Les conclusions des cinq voies de saint Thomas d’Aquin et la preuve a priori dans le thomisme du XVIIe siècle, The Age of Descartes / Descart...

Esta reflexão pretende mostrar o discurso racional cartesiano na segunda prova da existência de Deus. Para tanto, Descartes se depara com uma pergunta central: qual a causa da existência da res cogitans que é finita e possui a ideia de infinito? A resposta é encontrada na desproporcionalidade ontológica entre o finito e o infinito. Essa desproporcionalidade é elucidada mediante dois conceitos: o princípio de causalidade que determina que a causa deve ser igual ou superior a coisa causada e o princípio (...) de criação contínua em que a causa que criou o ser não é menor do que aquela que o conserva em sua existência. As objeções destacadas no texto contra os argumentos cartesianos foram escolhas deliberadas que servem para elucidar a importância da racionalidade como fundamento para a prova da existência de Deus. A relação entre o entendimento e a liberdade, apresentada no texto sucintamente, justifica a impossibilidade da res cogitans ser causa de si mesma. Palavras-chave: Infinito; finito; causalidade; criação contínuaThis essay aims to show the rational Cartesian discourse on the second proof of God’s existence. In order to do so, Descartes faces a core question: which is the cause for the existence of the res cogitans that is finite in front of the idea of the infinite? The answer is found in the ontological disproportionality between the finite and the infinite. This disproportionality is elucidated through a couple crucial concepts: the principle of causality, which determines that the cause must be equal or superior to the caused thing and the principle of continuous creation, in which the cause that created the being is not inferior than the one that preserves its existence. The objections highlighted in the text against the Cartesian arguments were deliberated choices, to elucidate the relevance of rationality as the foundation for the proof of God’s existence. The relation between the understanding and the liberty, showed on the text even if succinctly, justifies the impossibility of the res cogitans to be the cause of itself. Key words: Infinite; finite; causality; creation continuous. (shrink)

Edward Feser defends the ‘Neo-Platonic proof ’ for the existence of the God of classical theism. After articulating the argument and a number of preliminaries, I first argue that premise three of Feser’s argument—the causal principle that every composite object requires a sustaining efficient cause to combine its parts—is both unjustified and dialectically ill-situated. I then argue that the Neo-Platonic proof fails to deliver the mindedness of the absolutely simple being and instead militates against its mindedness. Finally, I uncover (...) two tensions between Trinitarianism and the Neo-Platonic proof. (shrink)

Henry, his parents, and his dog Mudge take a vacation out West, where they enjoy tumbleweeds, desert animals, souvenirs, and the wide open spaces.

Even though Hegel rejects Kant’s criticism of the classical proofs for God’s existence, he is far from joining the followers of St. Anselm.What is needed, he suggests, is the rational account of the transition from the final notion to the infinite Being. The Lectures in its central treatment of the Cosmological proof present us with an explanation in rational terms of the fact of religion, i.e., the elevation of the finite spirit to infinite God, rather than with a (...) proof in a narrow logical sense. Hegel is not so much asking the question ‘Does Godexist?’ but rather ‘How is the elevation of the finite spirit to God possible?’ The Hegelian ‘proof,’ I argue, consists in a demonstrationof the necessity of movement from finiteness to infinity, that is, the demonstration of the necessity of religion itself. Religious faith in this context is not juxtaposed to reason, but appears as a mode of imperfect knowledge, which is superseded by the further development of the rational concept. (shrink)

The essay collection "Kant on Proofs for God's Existence" provides a highly needed, comprehensive analysis of the radical turns of Kant's views on proofs for God's existence.— In the "Theory of Heavens" (1755), Kant intends to harmonize the Newtonian laws of motion with a physico-theological argument for the existence of God. But only a few years later, in the "Ground of Proof" essay (1763), Kant defends an ontological ('possibility' or 'modal') argument on the (...) basis of its logical exactitude while he praises the physico-theological argument for its beauty and appeal to the common sense. In the first "Critique" (1781/7), Kant replaces traditional constitutive ontological, cosmological, and physico-theological proofs with his own regulative theoretical and moral-practical religious arguments. He continues to defend a moral argument in the second "Critique" (1788). But in the third "Critique" (1790), Kant reintroduces a physico-theological besides an ethicotheological argument in order to unify the critical system of philosophy. Kant develops further moral arguments and arguments from evil in the "Theodicy" essay (1791) and the "Religion" (1793/4), and still searches for the right kind of proof for God's existence in the "Opus postumum" (1796–1804).—Part one of this volume is dedicated to an analysis of Kant's proofs for God's existence in their historical order that explains which proofs Kant favors or rejects in various periods of his thought. Part two contains a systematic classification of main kinds of proof for God's existence in Kant that outlines the argumentative structure of particular kinds of proof and discusses Kant's potential reasons for their variations and modifications. The essay collection speaks to Kant specialists, philosophers, and theologians, but introduces the topic to non-academic readers also. -/- Contributers: Uygar Abaci (Pennsylvania State University), Craig Bacon (University of South Carolina), Andrew Chignell (Princeton University), Eckart Förster (Humboldt University, Johns Hopkins University), Ina Goy (Beijing Normal University) Paul Guyer (Brown University), Graham Oppy (Monash University), Lara Ostaric (Temple University), Stephen Palmquist (Independent Scholar), Lawrence Pasternack (Oklahoma State University), Konstantin Pollok (University of Mainz), Oliver Sensen (University of Tulane), Allen Wood (Bloomington University, Stanford University). (shrink)

This paper uses a paradox inherent in any solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness to argue for God’s existence. The paper assumes we are “thought machines”, reading the state of a relevant physical medium and then outputting corresponding thoughts. However, the existence of such a thought machine is impossible, since it needs an infinite number of point-representing sensors to map the physical world to conscious thought. This paper shows that these sensors cannot exist, and thus thought cannot (...) come solely from our physical world. The only possible explanation is something outside, argued to be God. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to examine the nature of and the relation between Descartes's three proofs of God's existence in the "Meditations". Within this aim I want to pursue and argue three interrelated theses: that Descartes's three proofs of God's existence in the "Meditations" are in fact deductive demonstrations, that all three proofs are logically independent of each other, and that the ordering of the three proofs in the "Meditations" was (...) for psychological rather than logical or methodological reasons. (shrink)

This paper explains a way of understanding Kant's proof of God's existence in the Critique of Practical Reason that has hitherto gone unnoticed and argues that this interpretation possesses several advantages over its rivals. By first looking at examples where Kant indicates the role that faith plays in moral life and then reconstructing the proof of the second Critique with this in view, I argue that, for Kant, we must adopt a certain conception of the highest good, and (...) so also must choose to believe in the kind of God that can make it possible, because this is essentially a way of actively striving for virtue. One advantage of this interpretation, I argue, is that it is able to make sense of the strong link Kant draws between morality and religion. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to investigate the legitimacy of the principle, "The per accidens necessarily implies the per se," as it is found in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Special emphasis will be placed upon the function of this principle in the proofs for God's existence. The relevance of the principle in this latter context can be seen at once when it is observed that it is the key to the solution of the well (...) known "prob lem of infinite regress. " The investigation of the principle in question will be divided into two Parts. A preliminary examination of the function of the principle will be made in Part I: Domains Other Than That of Creature-God. The domains to be considered in this Part are those of accident-substance, change, and knowledge. Employing what is learned of the function of the principle in these areas of application, Part II: The Domain of Creature-God will analyze the role of the principle in the proofs for God's existence. This latter Part will constitute the greater portion of the book, since the domain of creatures in their relation to God is the most significant application of the principle in the writings of St. Thomas. In the course of this investigation, relevant analyses by St. Thomas' commentators - both classical and contemporary - will be considered. Finally, in light of the insights offered by St. (shrink)

The paper examines the meaning of a Hegelian expression: “the ascension of the human spirit to God”, which was formulated in the philosopher’s 1829 summer course dedicated to the proofs of God’s existence. We argue that the Hegelian formula describes a double movement: the first one refers to the departure of thinking from the Phenomenon and its arrival to the Ideal, and the second one describes the opposite movement, in which thinking crosses the barrier between the Ideal and (...) the Phenomenon. (shrink)

Philosophers of religion debate what is meant by the word 'God,' in the conclusion of proofs of God's existence. If'God' is a proper name, there seems to be no good proof that a non-empirical entity has this name. If it is a common name, it seems that it must mean what classical theists mean by 'God' - and the existence of such a being is hard to prove. I defend a third possibility: that 'God' names a (...) common name that is the least prescriptive possible, while being sufficient to signify one kind of thing different from all others. (shrink)

This paper is not going to offer any criticism of the way Gaven Kerr treats Aquinas’ argument. Instead, it offers an alternative way of reconstructing Aquinas’ argument, intending to strengthen especially those controversial aspects of it that Kerr’s reconstruction left untreated or in relative obscurity. Accordingly, although the paper’s treatment will have to have some overlaps with Kerr’s, it will deal with issues essential to adequate replies to certain competent criticisms of his argument untreated by Kerr. For the sake of (...) the “formally inclined” reader, the paper’s treatment will also include an Appendix offering a formal reconstruction of both the main argument and its sub-arguments to demonstrate the formal rigor of Aquinas’ original. (shrink)

In order to understand the importance of the demonstrations of God‟s existencein the second quaestio of the Summa Theologiae, we need to follow theguidelines of interpretation that Aquinas himself provides in the chaptersprevious to the account of the five ways.1Otherwise we cannot understand thetext properly. Indeed, we naturally expect universal validity and necessity froman argument labeled as a proof. But things are not as simple as that in the SummaTheologiae. In this paper, I would like to argue that, in order (...) to evaluate thedemonstrations of God‟s existence in the Summa Theologiae, it is necessary tounderstand the idea of scientia, which Aquinas develops in his commentary onAristotle‟s Posterior Analytics. Helpful for my reasoning was John I. Jenkins,Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas.2In a further step, I would like to turnto the principle of any scientia, the intellect, and elaborate how Aquinas's wholemetaphysics of being can serve as a proof of God's existence. (shrink)

The possibility of proving the existence of God has fascinated thinkers and believers throughout the centuries. This book critically analyzes both sides of the contemporary debate between the two most important living philosophers of religion--Richard Swinburne and D.Z. Phillips--and constructs an alternative solution. Instead of taking sides on the issue of God's existence, Messer argues that behind each thinkers' work, and their attitudes toward proving the existence of God, lies fundamental trust. A positive discussion of relativism (...) leads to a fresh analysis of the arguments for God's existence, particularly the ontological argument. In this way, Messer concludes that they are indeed worthwhile, although not for the traditional reasons. (shrink)

A science of metaphysics adhering to Immanuel Kant's critical demands as set forth in his "Critique of Pure Reason", and "Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic...." The work includes an Appendix that quotes Kant's most relevant remarks in this regard, along with his criterion for objective validity that, given the technical jargon, can be next to impossible to interpret even for those most familiar with Kant. The Appendix allows Kant to interpret himself, the point being that many secondary works enter into (...) conflict with Kant. This can be seen most notably with respect to the somewhat understandable notion that Kant was opposed to speculative metaphysics; but Kant's criterion for objective validity undermines this closed-to-speculative-metaphysics interpretation. As a science in the Kantian sense this work (in this latest edition there is a 2/3 page abstract diagram of the science that makes it more conceptually clear) offers an opportunity for those inclined to shy away from speculative metaphysics to reexamine their interpretations. The objectives are as Kant mentions in the introduction to his CPR: God, Freedom, and Immortality; and that these problems can be dealt with rationally can be seen in this work; and without fear of violating Kant's justifiable strictures, the main one being that where anything offered in the name of pure reason is concerned, it must be such that it helps us to make sense of our phenomenal world. And as to Kant's prerequisite: "How are synthetic cognitions, a priori possible?" I refer to my essay "Beyond Kant and Hegel ..." in "The Review of Metaphysics", March 2013. The premise advanced in the essay is the same as in this booklet. This first part forms the groundwork for the second part, "Rational Theism, Part Two: The Problem of Evil, and God's Omnibenevolence (A Biblical Exegesis)," which notwithstanding its title, is philosophically grounded as a dissertation that can stand on its own. This secondary work is not secondary in importance, but primary in that it provides a rational answer to the problem of evil; and that answer can be found in the pages of the Bible. It is an answer that has escaped the notice of theologians and apologists and philosophers who have sought for an answer to the problem outside the sacred texts wherein the sole answer to the problem can be found, at least for anyone who cares to examine the relevant texts with care and attention. In this short work there are over five dozen scriptures taken into account that support the answer given; and the answer is both very clear, and rational. (shrink)