Examino Acerca del cielo (De caelo) I 2 con el fin de mostrar allí la presencia de la demostración científica. Este desarrollo pretende aportar nueva evidencia en favor de la no discrepancia entre teoría y praxis científica en Aristóteles (Barnes, 1969) y de relativizar la interpretación de que el método real y únicamente usado es la dialéctica (cuyo antecedente se remonta a Owen, 1980). Además, siguiendo la propuesta hermenéutica de Gotthelf (1987) y Detel (1993 y 1997), mostraré de qué modo (...) se utiliza la demostración científica en la prueba de la existencia del cuerpo simple o éter. Ofreceré también una reconstrucción de las pruebas mediante la elaboración de un esquema que abarque el conjunto de las deducciones. Estos últimos desarrollos constituyen el aporte más novedoso del presente artículo. I examine On the Heavens (DC) 12 in order to show there the presence of scientific demonstration. This development tries to contribute new evidence in favor of the not discrepancy between theory and scientific practice in Aristotle (Barnes, 1969) and to make the interpretation that method real and solely used is dialectic relative (whose precedent goes back to Owen, 1980). In addition, following the hermeneutic proposal of Gotthelf (1987) and Detel (1993 and 1997), I will show how scientific demonstration is used in the proof of simple body (ether) existence. I will offer also a reconstruction of the proof by means of the elaboration of a scheme that includes the set of deductions. The latter developments constitute the most new contribution of the present paper. (shrink)

Tomamos como texto de referencia Sobre la generación y la corrupción 2. 10 para establecer el uso de la demostración científica. Aristóteles establece los principios de la generación en GC 1 pero en adelante construye genuinas demostraciones científicas apoyándose precisamente en aquellos principios. Reconstruiremos un pasaje puntual de GC 2. 10 para defender la hipótesis del uso real de la demostración científica en los tratados científicos. La particularidad específica de este trabajo es que esta demostración científica apunta a hacer explícita, (...) dentro del marco de la cuádruple causalidad aristotélica, la causalidad eficiente del fenómeno de la generación. (shrink)

En el célebre libro inicial de la Política Aristóteles aborda diferentes temas entre los que se destaca el estudio de la economía y la crematística (Pol. A 8-11). Un elemento clave de su argumento consiste en distinguir en primer lugar entre las dos disciplinas y, a continuación, entre dos tipos diversos de crematística (crematística1 y crematística2). El eje sobre el que se asienta su argumento para discriminar entre ellas consiste en señalar que la crematística1 persigue la riqueza genuina (o verdadera, (...) ἀληθινὸς πλοῦτος, Pol. A 8, 1256b30-1), mientras que la crematística2 va más allá de los límites razonables al no tener un fin delimitado en la persecución de los bienes materiales. Nuestra investigación pretende mostrar que la justificación última de la riqueza verdadera se encuentra en la definición de ciudad que fue desarrollada en los capítulos iniciales (Pol. A 1-2). De este modo, pretendemos defender como hipótesis general que Aristóteles utiliza las definiciones propuestas en los tramos iniciales del libro como auténticos principios explicativos y, así, que todo el argumento se encuentra orquestado de acuerdo con dichas asunciones. (shrink)

La discusión actual sobre el método expositivo de Aristóteles en el área de la filosofía práctica ha perseguido revertir el otrora predominante paradigma exegético que encontraba como único camino de investigación a diversas formas de la dialéctica (Owen, Aubenque, Barnes). Tal paradigma ha sido sometido a una revisión crítica y se ha invocado alternativamente el uso del “método de los _Analíticos_” en las obras éticas (Natali, Karbowski). Nuestra lectura de _Política_ I asume esta nueva línea interpretativa, pero pretende ir más (...) allá para prestar atención a la forma en que Aristóteles se ocupa de explicar diversos fenómenos (de allí la descripción), elaborar principios (definiciones) y luego construir demostraciones (explicaciones). En efecto, nuestra hipótesis de lectura es que en los capítulos iniciales de _Política_ I se elaboran un conjunto de definiciones que están en la base, _sc_., son las premisas, de las demostraciones ulteriores. Estas definiciones se configuran a partir de una particular base empírica, pero adquieren su validez de principios sólo en los desarrollos donde pueden ser el fundamento de las diferentes explicaciones o demostraciones. (shrink)

I intend to show that Aristotle follows some of the main guidelines of the Analytics in his investigation about the nature of the city in Politics I. I assume that Pol. I sets out the causes of the city and that the book responds to the four questions presented in APo. II.1. I demonstrate that Aristotle’s methodology follows a φυσικῶς standard. In addition, I assume that dialectic plays a secondary – refutative – role, as opposed to the opinion of Owen (...) (1961) and Barnes (1980) that dialectic was the main methodology applied in practical philosophy. (shrink)

La premisa que guía nuestra investigación es que Poética es un tratado científico, i. e., que la investigación desarrollada en dicha obra se corresponde con el examen de una téchne. Defendemos que el método utilizado se corresponde con el método general de investigación denominado “salvar las apariencias”. Tal método es expuesto con más detalle en otras obras del corpus pero lo presuponemos utilizado en Poética. Si bien el método presupone la recolección de datos, no se limita a eso puesto que (...) el paso ulterior consiste en la caracterización de las diferencias y la exposición de las cuatro causas del fenómeno. De este modo, expondremos por un lado la base fenoménica de Poética y, por otro, sus cuatro causas. (shrink)

En Acerca del cielo I se encuentran cuatro pruebas fundamentales de la cosmología aristotélica, a saber: la prueba de la existencia del éter, la prueba de la finitud del universo, la prueba de su unicidad y la prueba de su ingenerabilidad e incorruptibilidad. Ofrecemos una reconstrucción parcial del conjunto de estas cuatro pruebas para poner en evidencia que ellas utilizan un grupo semejante de premisas y definiciones. En efecto, nuestro propósito es mostrar que dicho conjunto de pruebas utiliza los mismos (...) principios y, de este modo, que en una reconstrucción axiomática del total de pruebas podemos hallar un número semejante, o incluso mayor, de premisas que de conclusiones. Así, encontramos una forma alternativa para una axiomatización posible en Acerca del cielo de Aristóteles. In On The Heavens there are four crucial proofs of Aristotelian cosmology, namely: proof of the aether existence, proof of the finitude of the universe, proof of its unicity and proof of its ungenerability and its indestructibility. We do a partial reconstruction of the hole of these four proofs to show that they use a similar set of premises and definitions. In fact, our goal is to show that such set of proofs uses the same principles and, in this way, that in a axiomatic reconstruction of the hole of proofs we can find a similar number, even higher, of premises than conclusions. Thus, we find an alternative way for a possible axiomatization on Aristotle's On The Heavens. (shrink)

La noción estándar de axiomática que se atribuye a Aristóteles supone un conjunto de proposiciones básicas a partir del cual se infiere un conjunto numéricamente mayor de proposiciones derivadas. Esto se conoce como parsimonia de los principios. Además, el conocimiento de los principios se reduce a una captación intelectual directa. Se pretende mostrar que tales atribuciones no son correctas para el caso de _Acerca del cielo _I. Se brindan elementos para una alternativa de lo que puede entenderse por axiomatización en (...) Aristóteles. Para ello se trabajara en la reconstrucción de los argumentos de algunos pasajes de _Acerca del cielo _I. (shrink)

La noción estándar de axiomática que se atribuye a Aristóteles supone un conjunto de proposiciones básicas a partir del cual se infiere un conjunto numéricamente mayor de proposiciones derivadas. Esto se conoce como parsimonia de los principios. Además, el conocimiento de los principios se reduce a una captación intelectual directa. Se pretende mostrar que tales atribuciones no son correctas para el caso de Acerca del cielo I. Se brindan elementos para una alternativa de lo que puede entenderse por axiomatización en (...) Aristóteles. Para ello se trabajará en la reconstrucción de los argumentos de algunos pasajes de Acerca del cielo I. The standard notion of axiomatics attributed to Aristotle presupposes a set of basic propositions on the basis of which a larger set of derived propositions is inferred. This is known as the principle of parsimony. Moreover, the knowledge of principles is limited to direct intellectual apprehension. Our objective is to demonstrate that said attributions are not correct in the case of On the Heavens I and to provide elements for what could be understood as axiomatization in Aristotle. To that effect we reconstruct the arguments set forth in some passages of On the Heavens I. (shrink)

“The Cognitive Role of φαινόμενα and its Scientific Use in Aristotle’s Treatises of Science”. We examine a classical discussion about the meaning of the term φαινόμενα in Aristotle. We criticize G. E. L. Owen’s interpretation who identifies its meaning with that of opinion ( ἔνδοξα ). Based on Aristotle’s treatises of science we propound another interpretation about this topic. Thus, we may emphasize the cognitive role that φαινόμενα have; for this, we highlight the functionthat they have while there are source (...) of the knowledge of principles ( cf. APr . I 30) as well as that they are judges of theoretical proposal with which they are in contradiction. In effect, one of the problems to be resolved is how is it possible that a contradiction exists between the principles of a science and the φαινόμενα. (shrink)

Examinamos una discusión ya clásica sobre el sentido del término φαινόμενα en Aristóteles. Criticamos la interpretación de G. E. L. Owen, quien identifica su significado al de opinión (ἔνδοξα). Con base textual en los tratados de ciencia de Aristóteles, proponemos otra interpretación sobre este tópico. Así,podremos enfatizar el rol cognitivo que poseen los φαινόμενα; para ello, destacamos la función que tienen en tanto que son fuente del conocimiento de los principios (cf. APr. I 30) así como en cuanto se erigen (...) en jueces de propuestas teóricas con las cuales entran en contradicción. En efecto, uno de los problemas a resolver es precisamente cómo es posible que exista una contradicción entre los principios de una ciencia y los φαινόμενα. (shrink)

El objetivo del trabajo consiste en realizar una lectura pormenorizada de Ética nicomáquea II con el propósito de esclarecer cuál es la metodología que utilizó en su escritura el Estagirita. En el marco de la polémica acerca de si sus escritos son de carácter dialéctico, tal como opinó la visión preponderante desde los años 1960, o si respetan los lineamientos metodológicos de los Segundos Analíticos, defendemos una interpretación integracionista que contempla la presencia de aspectos de la dialéctica así como del (...) método de los Analíticos. (shrink)

The main concern of this paper is the problem of method in De Caelo, which has been recently invigorated by the supposition of Aristotle’s acceptance of two standards of justification. Whereas the φυσικῶς argument comes close to demonstrative knowledge, the εὐλόγως argument relies on more general assumptions and allegedly points towards argumentative justification. With a view to better understanding how empirical criteria for theories, teleological principles, and the resolution of difficulties are laid down to provide as much causal explanations as (...) possible, we take side here in the debate about the very purpose of Aristotle’s using of justification by argument in scientific contexts. Our main claim is that although only reasonable proofs can be worked out in empirically underdetermined domains, this in no way amounts to endorsing an alternative to the norms of inquiry Aristotle upholds in natural science. (shrink)

En la presente reseña realizamos una breve presentación de la estructura del texto. Luego presentamos una descripción de los contenidos dividiendo el trabajo en tres partes: (i) primero tenemos en cuenta la introducción y luego (ii) los contenidos desarrollados en la primera y (iii) segunda parte de la obra, incluida la conclusión.

In her last known piece of work Lady Mary Shepherd’s Metaphysics (1832), Mary Shepherd writes that “mind, may inhere in definite portions of matter […] or of infinite space” (LMSM 699). Shepherd thus suggests that a mind – a “capacity for sensation in general” (e.g., EPEU 16) – may have a spatial location. This is prima facie surprising given that she is committed to the view that the mind is unextended. In this paper, we argue that Shepherd can consistently honor (...) both of these commitments. We argue, first, that even though finite minds, due to their unextendedness cannot, to use Shepherd’s term, ‘occupy’ space as material bodies do, such minds can nonetheless be said to have a spatial location in virtue of what we call their presence, or what Shepherd calls ‘inherence’, in a material body. Second, we argue that, in a similar way, the divine mind is present throughout the whole of space and is thus omnipresent. We then argue that, in contrast to finite minds, the divine mind does not require a body to be present in space. Rather, we contend, God’s omnipresence might be best understood in a ‘holenmerist’ sense, where the divine mind is wholly present in every part of creation. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for a novel interpretation of Shepherd’s notion of selfhood. In distinction to Deborah Boyle’s interpretation, I contend that Shepherd differentiates between the mind and the self. The latter, for Shepherd, is an effect arising from causal interactions between mind and body – specifically those interactions that give rise to our present stream of consciousness, our memories, and that can unite these two. Thus, the body plays a constitutive role in the formation of the self. The (...) upshot of this interpretation is that it can dissolve the problem of individuating mind that Boyle identifies. Briefly, the problem consists in Shepherd seemingly individuating minds in terms of their associated bodies and bodies in terms of the minds they are united with. My interpretation, however, allows to see that Shepherd neither wants nor needs to individuate the mind in isolation of the body and to read the passages, in which the problem seems to arise, as being about what makes living beings individual – with mind and body both playing a crucial role in this context. (shrink)

This paper examines Margaret Cavendish’s ecological views and argues that, in the Appendix to her final published work, Grounds of Natural Philosophy (1668), Cavendish is defending a normative account of the way that humans ought to interact with their environment. On this basis, we argue that Cavendish is committed to a form of what, for the purposes of this paper, we will call ‘deep ecology,’ where that is understood as the view that humans ought to treat the rest of nature (...) as something of intrinsic value. (shrink)

Theoretical tools aimed at making explicit the injustices suffered by certain socially disadvantaged groups might end up serving purposes which were not foreseen when the tools were first introduced. Nothing is inherently wrong with a shift in the scope of a theoretical tool: the popularization of a concept opens up the possibility of its use for several strategic purposes. The thesis that we defend in this paper is that some public figures cultivate a public persona for whom the conditions of (...) the notion of testimonial injustice might be taken to apply, and this situation is exploited to their advantage, as a means to advance their political agendas. More specifically, they take advantage of this to generate situations of crossed disagreements, which in turn foster polarization. (shrink)

In this paper I defend an intermediate position between the ‘bare mathematical results’ view and the ‘transmission’ view of mathematical explanations of physical phenomena (MEPPs). I argue that, in MEPPs, it is not enough to deduce the explanandum from the generalizations cited in the explanans. Rather, we must add information regarding why those generalizations obtain. However, I also argue that it is not necessary to provide explanatory proofs of the mathematical theorems that represent those generalizations. I illustrate this with the (...) bridges of Königsberg case. -/- . (shrink)

When public opinion gets polarized, the population’s beliefs can experience two different changes: they can become more extreme in their contents or they can be held with greater confidence. These two possibilities point to two different understandings of the rupture that characterizes political polarization: extremism and radicalism. In this article, I show that from the close examination of the best available evidence regarding how we get polarized, it follows that the pernicious type of political polarization has more to do with (...) radicalism than with extremism. Reinforcing the confidence in the core beliefs of the group we identify with makes our beliefs immune to the reasons coming from the other political side. Finally, I also suggest that the rise of political polarization is not necessarily the result of an irrational process. (shrink)

Until quite recently, almost no philosophers trained in the continental tradition saw anything of value in realism. The situation in analytic philosophy was always different, but in continental philosophy realism was usually treated as a pseudo-problem. That is no longer the case. In this provocative new book, two leading philosophers examine the remarkable rise of realism in the continental tradition. While exploring the similarities and differences in their own positions, they also consider the work of others and assess rival trends (...) in contemporary philosophy. They begin by discussing the relation between realism and materialism, which DeLanda links closely but which Harman tries to separate. Part Two covers the many different meanings of realism, with the two authors working together to develop an expanded definition of the term. Part Three features a spirited exchange on the respective virtues and drawbacks of DeLanda's realism of attractors and singularities and Harman's object-oriented theory. Part Four shifts to the question of the knowability of the real, as the authors discuss whether scientific knowledge does full justice to reality. In Part Five, they shift the focus to space, time, and science more generally, and here Harman offers a defence of actor-network theory despite its obvious anti-realist elements. Lively, accessible and engaging, this book is the best attempt so far to clarify the different paths for realism in continental philosophy. It will be of great value to students and scholars of continental philosophy and to anyone interested in the cutting-edge debates in philosophy and critical theory today. (shrink)

Neil Levy (2007) argues that empirical data shows that psychopaths lack the moral knowledge required for moral responsibility. His account is intriguing, and it offers a promising way to think about the significance of psychopaths for work on moral responsibility. In what follows we focus on three lines of concern connected to Levy's account: his interpretation of the data, the scope of exculpation, and the significance of biological explanations for anti-social behavior.

The Bayesian brain hypothesis, predictive processing, and variational free energy minimisation are typically used to describe perceptual processes based on accurate generative models of the world. However, generative models need not be veridical representations of the environment. We suggest that they can be used to describe sensorimotor relationships relevant for behaviour rather than precise accounts of the world.

According to the partisan cheerleading view, numerous political disagreements that appear to be genuine are not authentic disputes, because partisans _deliberately_ misreport their beliefs to show support for their parties. Recently, three arguments have been put forth to support this view. First, contemporary democracies are characterized by affective rather than ideological polarization. Second, financial incentives indicate that partisans often deliberately misreport their beliefs to express their attitudes. Third, partisans have inconsistent and unstable political beliefs, so we should not take these (...) attitudes seriously. In this paper, I examine these arguments and present an alternative view, which I call the partisan conviction view. According to it, partisans are not necessarily insincere in their political judgments, and they are in genuine disagreement. (shrink)

Recent years have seen recurring episodes of tension between proponents of freedom of speech and advocates of the disenfranchised. Recent survey research attests to the ideological division in attitudes toward free speech, whereby conservatives report greater support for free speech than progressives do. Intrigued by the question of whether “canceling” is indeed a uniquely progressive tendency, we conducted a vignette-based experiment examining judgments of offensiveness among progressives and conservatives. Contrary to the dominant portrayal of progressives and conservatives, our study documented (...) ideological symmetry in their evaluations of offensive speech. When faced with utterances whose content matters to them, both conservatives and progressives viewed outgroup speakers as more offensive than ingroup speakers. A second contribution of this chapter is to provide a deeper understanding of the cognitive mechanism implicated in evaluating outgroup speech as more offensive than ingroup speech. Our results suggest that perception of offensiveness is mediated by ascriptions of intent: we tend to attribute negative intent to the speaker whenever we deem their utterances to be offensive, even against the explicitly stated speaker’s background attitudes. (shrink)

Frente a las concepciones del Derecho como norma, como hecho o como valor , se propone aquí un cuarto enfoque que consiste en ver el Derecho como argumentación . Sin embargo, no hay una única forma de entender la argumentación jurídica. Aunque conectadas entre sí, en el trabajo se distinguen tres concepciones: la formal, la material y la pragmática o dialéctica; muchas cuestiones que se plantean en el ámbito de la teoría de la argumentación jurídica pueden resolverse -o aclararse- teniendo (...) en cuenta esa triple perspectiva. (shrink)

Nomy Arpaly rejects the model of rationality used by most ethicists and action theorists. Both observation and psychology indicate that people act rationally without deliberation, and act irrationally with deliberation. By questioning the notion that our own minds are comprehensible to us--and therefore questioning much of the current work of action theorists and ethicists--Arpaly attempts to develop a more realistic conception of moral agency.

The main aim of this article is to reflect on the impact of biases related to artificial intelligence (AI) systems developed to tackle issues arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, with special focus on those developed for triage and risk prediction. A secondary aim is to review assessment tools that have been developed to prevent biases in AI systems. In addition, we provide a conceptual clarification for some terms related to biases in this particular context. We focus mainly on nonracial biases (...) that may be less considered when addressing biases in AI systems in the existing literature. In the manuscript, we found that the existence of bias in AI systems used for COVID-19 can result in algorithmic justice and that the legal frameworks and strategies developed to prevent the apparition of bias have failed to adequately consider social determinants of health. Finally, we make some recommendations on how to include more diverse professional profiles in order to develop AI systems that increase the epistemic diversity needed to tackle AI biases during the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond. (shrink)

Las herramientas teóricas destinadas a señalar las injusticias que sufren ciertos grupos socialmente oprimidos pueden acabar siendo utilizadas con propósitos completamente opuestos a los iniciales. Modificar el alcance de una herramienta teórica no es necesariamente problemático: la popularización de un concepto abre las puertas a que se utilice estratégicamente para diferentes fines. La tesis que defendemos en este artículo es que algunos personajes públicos cultivan una imagen particular de sí mismos que parece satisfacer los requisitos de la noción de injusticia (...) testimonial y utilizan esta situación como medio para obtener beneficio político de ella. Más concretamente, estos personajes públicos se benefician de esta condición para generar situaciones de desacuerdos cruzados, que están estrechamente relacionados con el aumento de la polarización. (shrink)

The current economic crisis, unsustainable growth, and financial scandals invite reflection on the role of universities in professional training, particularly those who have to manage businesses. This study analyzes the main factors that might determine the extent to which Spanish organizational management educators use corporate social responsibility (CSR) or business ethics stand-alone subjects to equip students with alternative views on business. A web content analysis and non-parametric mean comparison statistics of the curricula of undergraduate degrees in all universities in Spain (...) were conducted. The main conclusion of this paper is related to the Bologna effect in Spanish universities. Comparing our results with prior research in this matter, it is demonstrated that the main reason that explains the increase of CSR and ethical education in Spain is the Bologna process and its adaptation to the European Higher Education Area. Also, private universities in Spain are more likely to require an ethics course than public universities. Other factors, such as size, political orientation, or related to CSR chairs are not statistically explanatory of CSR and ethical education. (shrink)

The bridges of Königsberg case has been widely cited in recent philosophical discussions on scientific explanation as a potential example of a structural explanation of a physical phenomenon. However, when discussing this case, different authors have focused on two different versions, depending on what they take the explanandum to be. In one version, the explanandum is the _failure_ of a given individual in performing an Eulerian walk over the bridge system. In the other version, the explanandum is the _impossibility_ of (...) performing an Eulerian walk over the bridges. The goal of this paper is to show that only the latter version amounts to a real case of a structural explanation. I will also suggest how to fix the first version, and show how my remarks apply to other purported cases of structural explanations. (shrink)

“Bajo los adoquines la playa...”Símbolo de Mayo del 68. Se lucha, se vive, siempre hay esperanzas de una sociedad más libre, más lúdica. La historia de tantos jóvenes que prefirieron el abrazo confortable del asfalto, y otros tantos que siguieron soñando con la arena, no claudicando en su rebeldía y en la construcción de una contra-cultura.Daniel Cohn-Bendit, el líder del movimiento 22 de marzo de 1968, que colocó en jaque al gobierno de De Gaulle y desató la explosión juvenil mundial (...) más im.. (shrink)

El autor propone la elaboración de una nueva racionalidad jurídica-educativa que integre la perspectiva de género en la educación jurídica y no en la educación legal, señalando que los desarrollos en esta área en Latinoamérica no han sido suficientes, debido a la compartimentación y fragmentación en los enfoques cognitivos. Postula por ello una deconstrucción discursiva, metodológica y práctica que pueda constituir una interpelación de tal profundidad que obligue a una mirada global sobre la matriz civilizatoria.

Desde la convicción de un escenario de crisis de paradigmas, el autor reseña los modelos socioculturales de dependencia -que invariablemente refiere a un sujeto dominador y a un sujeto dominado- y de independencia -que tiene el individualismo como única referencia- para señalar que ambos excluyen un concepto genuino de participación que sí contiene el modelo de inter-dependencia. Tras clarificar las falsas acepciones de participación, desarrolla el tercer modelo aplicado al ámbito del desarrollo local, argumentando que éste ofrece un instrumento válido (...) para avanzar en un proceso de construcción de poder ciudadano. (shrink)