In post-Gricean pragmatics, communication is said to be successful when a hearer recovers a speaker’s intended message. On this assumption, proposals for ‘what is said’ – the semantic, propositional meaning of a speaker’s utterance – are typically centred around the content the speaker aimed to communicate. However, these proposals tend not to account for the fact that speakers can be deliberately vague, leaving no clear proposition to be recovered, or that a speaker can accept a hearer’s misconstrual even though the (...) speaker didn’t intend it. In such cases, identifying ‘what is said’ is more contentious, even though communication is arguably no less successful. Building on recent interactionist approaches to meaning, this chapter offers a proposal for ‘what is said’ that can account for cases of ‘imperfect’ communication in which the recovery of a speaker’s intention goes awry. This involves taking ‘what is said’ as the co-constructed meaning that the speaker and hearer jointly agree on, giving ‘grounded meanings’ – those mutually and manifestly accepted into the discourse by speaker and hearer – higher precedence in a theory of communication than simply the speaker’s intended meaning. In such cases, rather than speaker and hearer converging at the level of explicit utterance content, communication is expected to be successful as long as the hearer recovers a proposition which is compatible with the speaker’s higher-order discursive goal. The hearer’s uptake is then allowed to override the content of the speaker’s intended meaning in the process of negotiating ‘what is said’. (shrink)

This paper aims to bridge the relationship between metalinguistic if you like as a non-propositional discourse marker and its conditional counterparts. This paper claims that metalinguistic if you like is polysemous between a hedge that denotes the speaker’s reduced commitment to some aspect of the main clause, and an optional yet potential conditional reading that interlocutors can legitimately draw on in interaction which is brought about due to the ‘if p, q’ sentence form. That is, although the metalinguistic reading is (...) most likely obtained automatically by default, it also carries an available conditional reading that is akin to other metalinguistic conditional clauses such as if you see what I mean. Next, a semantic representation of metalinguistic if you like is developed that takes on board a characterization of conditionality that departs from lexico-grammatical conventions, such that conditionals of the form ‘if p, q’ no longer bear a one-to-one correspondence with “conditional” truth conditions. Employing a radical contextualist semantic framework in which the unit of truth-conditional analysis is not constrained to the sentence form, utterances employing metalinguistic if you like are given a semantic representation such that the if-clause does not contribute propositional content, yet they also maintain their status as conditionals as the sentence form gives rise to a potential conditional secondary meaning. (shrink)

This book proposes a semantic theory of conditionals that can account for (i) the variability in usages that conditional sentences can be put; and (ii) both conditional sentences of the form ‘if p, q’ and those conditional thoughts that are expressed without using ‘if’. It presents theoretical arguments as well as empirical evidence from English and other languages in support of the thesis that an adequate study of conditionals has to go beyond an analysis of specific sentence forms or lexical (...) items. The resulting perspective on conditionals is one in which conditionality is located at a higher level than that of the sentence; namely, at the level of thought. The author argues that it is only through adopting such a perspective, and with it, a commitment to context-dependent semantics, that we can successfully represent conditional utterances as they are used and understood by ordinary language users. It will be of interest to students and scholars working on the semantics of conditionals in the fields of linguistics (especially semantics and pragmatics) and philosophy of language. (shrink)

The present study examined gender differences in the distribution of creative abilities through the lens of the greater male variability hypothesis, which postulated that men showed greater interindividual variability than women in both physical and psychological attributes. Two hundred and six undergraduate students in Hong Kong completed two creativity measures that evaluated different aspects of creativity, including: a divergent thinking test that aimed to assess idea generation and a creative problem-solving test that aimed to assess restructuring ability. The present findings (...) extended the research of greater male variability in creativity by showing that men generally exhibited greater variance than women in the overall distribution of the creativity scores in both divergent thinking and creative problem solving, despite trivial gender differences in mean scores. The findings further enriched the discourse of the greater male variability hypothesis by showing interesting domain-specific gendered patterns: greater male variability was more likely to occur in figural forms of creativity, with larger effect sizes, when compared to the variability in verbal forms of creativity; and mixed gendered patterns were found in the upper tails of the creativity score distribution with respect to the verbal domain but not the figural one, despite greater male representation being consistently observed in the lower tail of the distribution. Possible underlying mechanisms and implications were discussed. (shrink)

The present study aimed to conduct a cross-cultural comparison of creative thinking among Chinese middle school students from the rice- and wheat-growing areas in China through the lens of the rice theory, which postulates that there are major psychological differences among the individuals in these agricultural regions. Differences in cultural mindsets and creativity between the rice group and the wheat group were identified using the Chinese version of the Auckland Individualism and Collectivism Scale and the Test for Creative Thinking–Drawing Production, (...) respectively. Interesting findings were obtained. The results of latent mean analyses indicate that the rice group showed significantly more collectivism and adaptive creativity than the wheat group but less individualism and innovative and boundary-breaking creativity. However, the two groups showed no significant differences in their overall creative performance, as reflected in the TCT–DP composite score. Moreover, results of hierarchical multiple regression analyses revealed that collectivism was positively related to adaptive creativity but negatively related to innovative and boundary-breaking creativity; however, a reverse pattern was found for individualism. These findings enrich the discourse regarding the rice theory and shed important light on the effect of culture on creativity. (shrink)

In this wide-ranging interview, Dave Elder-Vass discusses his main contributions to critical realist theory over two decades. In the first half, he explains his early work on emergence, agency, str...

Based on a rather simple thesis that we can learn from our mistakes, Karl Popper developed a falsificationist epistemology in which knowledge grows through falsifying, or criticizing, our theories. According to him, knowledge, especially scientific knowledge, progresses through conjectures (i.e. tentative solutions to problems) that are controlled by criticism, or attempted refutations (including severely critical tests). As he puts it, ‘Criticism of our conjectures is of decisive importance: by bringing out our mistakes it makes us understand the difficulties of the (...) problem which we are trying to solve. This is how we become better acquainted with our problem, and able to propose more mature solutions: the very refutation of a theory... is always a step forward that takes us nearer to the truth. And this is how we can learn from our mistakes’ (1989, p. vii). Since criticism plays such a crucial role in Popper's falsificationist methodology, it seems natural to envisage his heuristic as a helpful resource for developing critical thinking. However, there is much controversy in the psychological literature over the feasibility and utility of his falsificationism as a heuristic. In this paper, I first consider Popper's falsificationism within the framework of his critical rationalism, elucidating three core and interrelated concepts, viz. fallibilism, criticism, and verisimilitude. Then I argue that the implementation of Popper's falsificationism means exposing to criticism various philosophical presuppositions that work against criticism, such as essentialism, instrumentalism, and conventionalism; it also means combating what seems a common tendency of humans to be biased towards confirmation. I examine the confirmation bias, to which Popper did not give much attention: its pervasiveness and various guises, some theoretical explanations for it, and the role of teachers in undermining its strength and spread. Finally, I consider the question whether students can and should be taught to use disconfirmatory strategies for solving problems. (shrink)

Most contemporary metaphysicians are sceptical about the reality of familiar objects such as dogs and trees, people and desks, cells and stars. They prefer an ontology of the spatially tiny or temporally tiny. Tiny microparticles 'dog-wise arranged' explain the appearance, they say, that there are dogs; microparticles obeying microphysics collectively cause anything that a baseball appears to cause; temporal stages collectively sustain the illusion of enduring objects that persist across changes. Crawford L. Elder argues that all such attempts to (...) 'explain away' familiar objects project downwards, onto the tiny entities, structures and features of familiar objects themselves. He contends that sceptical metaphysicians are thus employing shadows of familiar objects, while denying that the entities which cast those shadows really exist. He argues that the shadows are indeed really there, because their sources - familiar objects - are mind-independently real. (shrink)

In _Real Natures and Familiar Objects_ Crawford Elder defends, with qualifications, the ontology of common sense. He argues that we exist -- that no gloss is necessary for the statement "human beings exist" to show that it is true of the world as it really is -- and that we are surrounded by many of the medium-sized objects in which common sense believes. He argues further that these familiar medium-sized objects not only exist, but have essential properties, which we (...) are often able to determine by observation. The starting point of his argument is that ontology should operate under empirical load -- that is, it should give special weight to the objects and properties that we treat as real in our best predictions and explanations of what happens in the world. Elder calls this presumption "mildly controversial" because it entails that arguments are needed for certain widely assumed positions such as "mereological universalism". Elder begins by defending realism about essentialness. He then defends this view of familiar objects against causal exclusion arguments and worries about vagueness. Finally, he argues that many of the objects in which common sense believes really exist, including artifacts and biological devices shaped by natural selection, and that we too exist, as products of natural selection. (shrink)

In _Real Natures and Familiar Objects_ Crawford Elder defends, with qualifications, the ontology of common sense. He argues that we exist -- that no gloss is necessary for the statement "human beings exist" to show that it is true of the world as it really is -- and that we are surrounded by many of the medium-sized objects in which common sense believes. He argues further that these familiar medium-sized objects not only exist, but have essential properties, which we (...) are often able to determine by observation. The starting point of his argument is that ontology should operate under empirical load -- that is, it should give special weight to the objects and properties that we treat as real in our best predictions and explanations of what happens in the world. Elder calls this presumption "mildly controversial" because it entails that arguments are needed for certain widely assumed positions such as "mereological universalism". Elder begins by defending realism about essentialness. He then defends this view of familiar objects against causal exclusion arguments and worries about vagueness. Finally, he argues that many of the objects in which common sense believes really exist, including artifacts and biological devices shaped by natural selection, and that we too exist, as products of natural selection. (shrink)

This paper opposes universal mereological composition. Sider defends it: unless UMC were true, he says, it could be indeterminate how many objects there are in the world. I argue that there is no general connection between how widely composition occurs and how many objects there are in the world. Sider fails to support UMC. I further argue that we should disbelieve in UMC objects. Existing objections against them say that they are radically unlike Aristotelian substances. True, but there is a (...) stronger objection. This is that they are characterized by no properties, and so fail to be like anything – even themselves. (shrink)

Is there an alternative course to one which sets up hypotheses as to the nature of poetry and then proceeds to illustrate them? Happily, there is. Rather than beginning with the hypothesis we may begin with the fact, and let what may emerge. That is, rather than beginning with some notion of the nature of poetry, we may begin with individual poems and discover what we may of their nature or form. This procedure evidently involves four phases: examination of the (...) characteristics of individual poems, discovery, by comparison with other poems, of likenesses and differences, decision as to which of these likenesses and differences are relevant to poetic form, and the statement of form itself. Once we have discovered a given form, we shall be in a position to discuss the principles underlying the construction of such form, the various possibilities of such construction, and what constitutes excellence in a given form. Elder Olson, poet, critic, and Distinguished Service Professor in the department of English at the University of Chicago, is the author of six volumes of verse, including Collected Poems and Olson's Penny Arcade, and of numerous works of literary criticism. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are "The Poetic Process" and "On Value Judgments in the Arts", the title essay on his most recent collection of criticism. Among the many awards which he has received are the Academy of American Poets award, the Longview Foundation award, the Emily Clark Balsh award and, for Olson's Penny Arcade, the Society of Midland Authors award. Both his poetry and his criticism are the subject of a book by Thomas E. Lucas. Part II of "A Conspectus of Poetry" will appear in the Winter 1977 issue of Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

In response to Hansson Wahlberg, this paper argues, first, that he misunderstands the redescription principle developed in my book The Causal Power of Social Structures, and second, that his criticisms rest on an ontological individualism that is taken for granted but in fact lacks an adequate ontological justification of its own.

The far reaching changes in man's social and personal life taking place in our lifetime underline the need for a sound ethical evaluation of our rights and duties and of human behaviour both on the individual level and in the political society. On many issues judgments of value vary widely and a consultation of the thought of Thomas Aquinas on the basic questions will be helpful, the more since he is not only one of the greatest philosophers but also succeeded (...) in integrating in his moral philosophy the wisdom of the ancients, in particular of Aristotle and the Stoa. This book presents Aquinas's thought on such central questions as man's happiness, how to determine the morality of our actions, the natural law and the main virtues, as well as on the common good, war, human labour, love and friendship. Throughout the book the intellectual character of this moral philosophy is pointed out and problems are set in a historical perspective. (shrink)

Is there an alternative course to one which sets up hypotheses as to the nature of poetry and then proceeds to illustrate them? Happily, there is. Rather than beginning with the hypothesis we may begin with the fact, and let what may emerge. That is, rather than beginning with some notion of the nature of poetry, we may begin with individual poems and discover what we may of their nature or form. This procedure evidently involves four phases: examination of the (...) characteristics of individual poems, discovery, by comparison with other poems, of likenesses and differences, decision as to which of these likenesses and differences are relevant to poetic form, and the statement of form itself. Once we have discovered a given form, we shall be in a position to discuss the principles underlying the construction of such form, the various possibilities of such construction, and what constitutes excellence in a given form. Elder Olson, poet, critic, and Distinguished Service Professor in the department of English at the University of Chicago, is the author of six volumes of verse, including Collected Poems and Olson's Penny Arcade, and of numerous works of literary criticism. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are "The Poetic Process" and "On Value Judgments in the Arts" , the title essay on his most recent collection of criticism. Among the many awards which he has received are the Academy of American Poets award, the Longview Foundation award, the Emily Clark Balsh award and, for Olson's Penny Arcade, the Society of Midland Authors award. Both his poetry and his criticism are the subject of a book by Thomas E. Lucas. Part II of "A Conspectus of Poetry" will appear in the Winter 1977 issue of Critical Inquiry. (shrink)

In general, discussions of the poetic process have tended to fall into one of three classes. The first of these, generalizing the process, analyzes the faculties or the activities supposedly involved and arranges these in their logical order, to produce distinct stages or periods of the process. The second kind describes the working habits of an individual poet in terms of characteristic external or internal circumstances or conditions. The third kind gives us, in the same terms, the history of the (...) composition of a particular poem. To illustrate these in reverse order: W. D. Snodgrass' essay The Finding of a Poem tells us how he discovered the meaning—for him—of the elements entering into a particular poem; Paul Valéry's essays on his own poetry—Poésie et pensée abstraite, for example—generally describe his working habits and his experiences while at work; and the following passage gives a typical account of the poetic process as a series of logically ordered stages: "There is, first, a period of hard thinking, during which the mind explores the problems; then a period of relaxation, during which the rational processes of the mind are withdrawn from this particular problem; then the flash of insight which reveals the solution, organizes the symbols, or directs the thinking, during which the formula is tested, the work of art shaped and developed...Graham Wallas calls the four stages Preparation, Incubation, Illumination, and Verification..." [Wilbur L. Schramm, "Imaginative Writing," 1941] Elder Olson, poet and critic, has received numerous awards for his work. He is the author of, among other works, Penny Arcade, a collection of poetry, and of criticism, On Value Judgment in the Arts and Other Essays. His contributions to Critical Inquiry are "On Value Judgments in the Arts" , Part 1 of a "Conspectus of Poetry" , and Part 2 of a "Conspectus of Poetry". (shrink)

Tony Lawson’s book The Nature of Social Reality is an impressive overview of a philosophically coherent social ontology that he has been developing for at least a decade. The book, and the earlier...

In the summer of 1997 one could scarcely enter a bookstore in Beijing without encountering Wang Xiaobo's pensive and defiant look on the cover of dozens of books displayed at the entrance. Wang had suddenly died in the spring of that year at the age of forty-five. Born in Beijing in 1952 to a family of intellectuals, he remained attached to China's capital despite periods of separation, such as during the Cultural Revolution, when he was sent to Yunnan to "learn (...) from the peasants" and taught in a "people-run-school" in Shandong, and also during the 1980s, when he studied in the United States . Wang always returned to Beijing, in the late 1970s to study economy and business at the People's University and in the late 1980s to teach there. After retiring in 1993, he devoted his time to writing: poetry, novels, essays, non-fiction, and a movie script. (shrink)

This paper outlines a relational variety of the theory of emergence and claims that it can be applied more fruitfully to sociology than the functional variety advocated by Keith Sawyer. Sawyer argues that the wildly disjunctive multiple realizability of social properties justifies a nonreductive approach to causal explanation in the social sciences (but also ontological individualism). In response, this paper argues, first, that the social properties he discusses are not wildly disjunctive, and secondly, that we can explain their causal significance (...) more effectively with a relational emergence theory linked to the critical realist account of causal powers. Although these properties are multiply realizable, they are not emergent because they are multiply realizable, but despite being so. (shrink)

Based on a rather simple thesis that we can learn from our mistakes, Karl Popper developed a falsificationist epistemology in which knowledge grows through falsifying, or criticizing, our theories. According to him, knowledge, especially scientific knowledge, progresses through conjectures that are controlled by criticism, or attempted refutations . As he puts it, ‘Criticism of our conjectures is of decisive importance: by bringing out our mistakes it makes us understand the difficulties of the problem which we are trying to solve. This (...) is how we become better acquainted with our problem, and able to propose more mature solutions: the very refutation of a theory ... is always a step forward that takes us nearer to the truth. And this is how we can learn from our mistakes’ . Since criticism plays such a crucial role in Popper's falsificationist methodology, it seems natural to envisage his heuristic as a helpful resource for developing critical thinking. However, there is much controversy in the psychological literature over the feasibility and utility of his falsificationism as a heuristic. In this paper, I first consider Popper's falsificationism within the framework of his critical rationalism, elucidating three core and interrelated concepts, viz. fallibilism, criticism, and verisimilitude. Then I argue that the implementation of Popper's falsificationism means exposing to criticism various philosophical presuppositions that work against criticism, such as essentialism, instrumentalism, and conventionalism; it also means combating what seems a common tendency of humans to be biased towards confirmation. I examine the confirmation bias, to which Popper did not give much attention: its pervasiveness and various guises, some theoretical explanations for it, and the role of teachers in undermining its strength and spread. Finally, I consider the question whether students can and should be taught to use disconfirmatory strategies for solving problems. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas and His Predecessors takes us on a voyage through the history of philosophical thought as present in the works of Thomas Aquinas. It is a synthetic presentation of the works and thought of the great predecessors of Aquinas, as he kne.

Tuukka Kaidesoja’s new book is a welcome addition to the literature on critical realism. He shows good judgement in defending Roy Bhaskar’s argument for causal powers while criticising its framing as a transcendental argument. In criticising Bhaskar’s concept of a real-but-not-actual ontological domain, however, he discards an essential element of a realist ontology, even a naturalised one: a recognition of the transfactual aspect of causal power.

In 1859, Harvard botanist Asa Gray (1810–1888) published an essay of what he called “the abstract of Japan botany.” In it, he applied Charles Darwin’s evolutionary theory to explain why strong similarities could be found between the flora of Japan and that of eastern North America, which provoked his famous debate with Louis Agassiz (1807–1873) and initiated Gray’s efforts to secure a place for Darwinian biology in the American sciences. Notably, although the Gray–Agassiz debate has become one of the most (...) thoroughly studied scientific debates, historians of science remain unable to answer one critical question: How was Gray able to acquire specimens from Japan? Making use of previously unknown archival materials, this article scrutinizes the institutional, instrumental, financial, and military settings that enabled Gray’s collector, Charles Wright (1811–1885), to travel to Japan, as well as examine Wright’s collecting practices in Japan. I argue that it is necessary to examine Gray’s diagnosis of Japan’s flora and the subsequent debate about it from the viewpoint of field sciences. The field-centered approach not only unveils an array of historical significances that have been overshadowed by the analytical framework of the Darwinian revolution and the reception of Darwinism, but also places a seemingly domestic incident in a transnational context. (shrink)

Beginning in his PhD program, and over a period of years in the 1960s, Richard Paul thoughtfully examined and deliberately critiqued existing theories of logic and reasoning. He took what was a very narrow conception of reasoning and broadened it to more accurately represent human thinking when people reason. He captured the idea of universal intellectual standards by exploring standards typically used by skilled reasoners, and assembled these standards into a constellation of ideas that is easily understandable. Following the tradition (...) of Socrates, Paul continually emphasized the importance of developing conceptual understandings based in foundational ideas and principles of analysis, and tested through life experience. His work laid the groundwork for what may be termed first principles in critical thinking and for a legitimate field of critical thinking studies. (shrink)

This paper opposes universal mereological composition (UMC). Sider defends it: unless UMC were true, he says, it could be indeterminate how many objects there are in the world. I argue that there is no general connection between how widely composition occurs and how many objects there are in the world. Sider fails to support UMC. I further argue that we should disbelieve in UMC objects. Existing objections against them say that they are radically unlike Aristotelian substances. True, but there is (...) a stronger objection. This is that they are characterized by no properties, and so fail to be like anything – even themselves. (shrink)

In the introductory first chapter the author states his conviction that Aristotle’s theory of learning, at the center of which stands the apodeictic syllogism, is inadequate because partial. Chapter 2 is a balanced survey of Aristotle’s syllogistic, which does not serve the purpose of discovery, but is intended to turn into science knowledge already acquired. All learning proceeds from preexisting knowledge which is structured by demonstration. Next Bauman turns to Plato’s theory of learning as present in the Meno: learning is (...) remembering. His account of the Socratic method of making a disciple see the truth by pertinent questions is excellent. He warns us to avoid extreme interpretations of ἀνάμνησις. According to Aristotle, Plato confounded the process of remembering with induction. The process of learning consists in the passing from opinion to knowledge. Aristotle’s theory as explained in the Posterior Analytics widely differs from Plato’s. In chapter 5, Bauman examines whether the syllogism based on a universal major is a petitio principii, a charge laid against it ever since antiquity and repeated by John Stuart Mill. For Mill, induction is the only form of real inference, but Bauman shows that Mill’s position is not correct. Aristotle sets up a method which allows us to understand why things are the way they are and to pass on knowledge. In chapter 6, Bauman compares Aristotle’s method with what teachers usually do and with how textbook authors conceive the passing on of knowledge. Some previous knowledge is necessary for all teaching. Aristotle focused on how the sciences should be taught, showing how conclusions are implicitly contained in principles or can be deduced from them. Bauman thinks that this is restricting learning far too much and remains unsatisfactory. He disagrees with Aristotle’s statement that all scientific knowledge is expressible in propositions in the indicative mood. The syllogism cannot be the only mode for all teaching. This difficulty, however, can be solved when one keeps in mind what strictly scientific knowledge in the Aristotelian sense is, and that there are other forms of knowledge such as opinion, factual knowledge, and dialectic. Furthermore one should also consider that the syllogism is basic to all forms of reasoning, even if there are syllogisms of different types. A printing mistake on page 191, line 13 should be corrected.—Leo J. Elders, Institute for Philosophy, “Rolduc,” Kerkrade, The Netherlands. (shrink)

The Physics is a most remarkable work, and profoundly influenced Medieval Philosophers. Thomas Aquinas wrote a detailed, impressive commentary. This essay studies in particular the composition of the Physics as Thomas saw it, his thorough study of Aristotle’s way of arguing and the important distinction he made between disputative arguments, which are only partially true, and arguments which determine the truth. Aristotle frequently uses proofs which are wrong when one considers the proper nature of bodies, but possible considering their common (...) nature. Thomas accepts proofs in the field of physics but discards those related to a certain mathematization of nature. Aristotle holds the unlimited possibility of movements becoming faster or slower, but according to Aquinas he is considering things in general : when we consider specific bodies there is a fastest movement. Thomas speaks of a way of reading a text which is according the intention of Aristotle, and proposes an understanding of particular texts based on the general doctrine of the Stagirite. Sometimes he goes beyond the text, as when defending the unity of time as dependent on the unity of the First Mover. The essay shows that in the commentary a coherent philosophy of nature shaping up. In some places Aquinas brings in God’s causality: nature is nothing else but the plan of divine art, placed within things. The study of nature shows that there is a first principle of the whole nature which is above everything, sc. God who gives being to things. (shrink)

This book stakes out a position in the area of metaphysics that deals with modality. But is this even a legitimate area of inquiry? Chapter 1 begins by confronting scepticism on this score. Some hold that the logical positivists sharpened “Hume’s fork”— either “relations of ideas” or “matters of fact”—and thereby discredited metaphysics in general. Others hold that Wittgenstein discredited the specific metaphysical position known as essentialism. But both readings of the record are mistaken, McLeod argues. Hume did not himself (...) oppose metaphysics in general; he affirmed the value of “abstruse metaphysics”, and considered himself a practitioner. Positivist elaborations of Hume’s fork moreover were not enough to indict metaphysics in general. As for Wittgenstein, he himself engaged in essentialist speculation in the Tractatus. His question there was what about the world explains that the world is capable of being represented. The only answer possible must point to what the world by nature is like. (shrink)

The text argues against the Stoics that the soul is incorporeal and is not in a subject. Pages 127–50 of the Greek text are concerned with vision and reject the different theories of the pre-Socratics. The last part explains how seeing comes about according to Aristotle. Alexander then passes to a study of man’s basic inclinations and of virtue, correcting views of the Stoa. With thirty-seven arguments he shows that virtue alone is not enough for happiness and also reminds the (...) reader that female and male are not different species. The closing sections on luck and fate are preceded by an interesting consideration of what depends on us, that is, those things about which we deliberate. The paragraph on luck sets forth Aristotle’s doctrine of Physics 2; the pages on fate bring together material from Alexander’s De fato: what is in accordance with fate is in accordance with nature. (shrink)

In 1997 an international conference on Aristotle and modern science took place in Thessaloniki. Aristotle’s view of nature—his criticism of the atomists, on the one hand, and modern science, on the other—seem to be widely opposed, but in recent years science has changed so much that scientists resort to certain basic notions of Aristotle’s natural philosophy to underpin their theories and make material nature more intelligible. In a first paper Hilary Putnam argues against Victor Gaston that Aristotle’s theory of cognition (...) is a “ direct realism” and not as many say a theory based on representation. Perception and thinking are in direct contact with things and their properties. In a charming comparison Bas C. van Fraassen argues that both tragedy and science are subspecies of representation. As in poetry, in science the inexplicable is kept off stage. John P. Anton is confident that the revival of Aristotle’s model of science can provide a solution to the question of the unity of the various sciences. He levels a stinging attack at Putnam’s interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of cognition. Lambros Couloubaritsis voices amazement that in Physics IV Aristotle says nothing about the creative capacity of time, but believes that the notion of “appropriate time” will bring this out. James R. Brown argues that the main stream of science stemming from the seventeenth century is a fusion of the Platonic and mechanic traditions, but that in recent years Aristotle has made an impressive comeback. He examines to what extent the notion of potentiality may be in agreement with and help explain certain physical facts perceived by common sense observation, although it does no justice to quantum “ bizarreness”. He sees better help in the Platonic account of formal causality. Speaking about levels of reality Basarab Nicolescu believes that the universe is self-creating, showing an open structure. A flow of information traverses the various levels of reality. The notion of potency, we are told by Ephtichios Bitsakis, exercises quite some attraction on scientists. Indeed, Aristotle is a precursor of scientific realism, but his theories are marred by many inconsistencies: the Prime Mover, final causality, and entelechy contradict his dynamic view of nature and should be abandoned. In the transformation of massive particles into nonmassive ones the actual mass becomes potential. Thomas M. Olshewsky points out that Aristotle has a differentiated notion of prime matter and rejects absolute prime matter. Jagdish Hattiangadi suggests giving up the idea of substance. Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou also tackles “the always actual question” of what matter is for Aristotle. Nowadays the idea of stable particles has disappeared and we have to deal with what is potentially real. (shrink)

In academic circles, Aristotle’s Politics languished in the shadow cast by Plato’s Republic, book 8 was even believed by some to be uncharacteristic of Aristotle’s thought. Professor Curren makes it the central theme of his study, as he hopes to find in it arguments in defense of public education. It is not difficult to argue that according to Aristotle good public life is not possible without the right kind of public education. However it is an entirely different story to transpose (...) educational principles, which Aristotle wanted to apply to the model, as he saw it, of an ideal Greek city-state of the fourth century B.C., to the situation in the present day United States of America or other Western countries. Undaunted by this formidable difficulty, Curren sets out on a journey through Greek educational policies dealing with Socrates’ and Plato’s views in this regard to discuss next what Aristotle says about forms of government. He understands book 5 as an attempt to provide statesmen with arguments for a reform of their respective constitutions laying special stress on education. In fact living under good laws contributes to human flourishing. The state is a multitude to be made into a unity by education. (shrink)

In the introduction to this important study Bowlin draws attention to the fact that contemporary students of ethics often resort to Aristotle, but overlook Aquinas, one of the more able interpreters of the Aristotelian moral tradition. He intends to correct this situation by concentrating on a particular point of Thomas’s moral theory: the contingencies of various kinds which we must confront. Bowlin argues that Thomas’s treatment of the moral virtues is largely functional: they help to cope with contingencies, although he (...) leaves the connection between the virtues and these contingencies largely undeveloped. Chapter 1 deals with the difficulties caused by the different passions such as concupiscence, fear, and others. The next chapter takes us into the heart of the problem, the contingency of the human good. In Bowlin’s view this contingency results from the fact that circumstances can modify the morality of our actions. Given this variability, prudence and justice must help us to decide what is right to do. Bowlin’s treatment of justice is surprising: this virtue is viewed in the light of contingency, whereas for Aquinas it proceeds basically in an objective way. (shrink)

The aim of the translator is to make his readers experience the freshness and novelty of the Greek text which, he believes, was not written for specialists, but for generally educated people... who are willing to think hard. Sachs sets out on a difficult task because the Metaphysics abound in plainly contradictory statements. According to Sachs, the main obstacle to the understanding of the Metaphysics is the fact that it has come to us via the Latin translations and versions influenced (...) by them. For this reason he avoids the use of certain traditional terms such as substance, actuality, sensation, principle, induction, and so forth, replacing them by terms such as thinghood, being-at-work, perception, source, and example. (shrink)

In this volume Mueller and Gould present the translation of Alexander’s commentary on chapters 14–22 of the first book of the Prior Analytics. These chapters deal with modal logic as applied to contingent propositions and to combinations of unqualified premises and of one assertoric proposition. In the 58 page introduction Professor Mueller presents first a survey of Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistic to turn next to combinations with a contingent premise in the three figures. He then passes to modal syllogistic without contingency. (...) Modal syllogistic can be understood as an extension of assertoric syllogistic. Aristotle seeks to determine which modal propositions related to first figure assertoric syllogisms are true syllogisms. The translation of Alexander’s text is excellent. (shrink)

It is not without a certain emotion that one opens this book devoted to the memory of a great scholar of medieval thought who worked and lived in the certainty that there cannot be a conflict between the Christian faith and science. In a significant essay, Benedict M. Ashley defends the idea of the philosophy of nature as continuous or identical with natural science. Ashley does allow, however, for so many divergences between philosophy of nature and natural science due to (...) later developments in science that this identification must be qualified. Steven E. Baldner points out some of the contradictions of Hartshorne's atomism: Hartshorne denies change and real causality. Anthony J. Celano recalls that Robert Kilwardby was very much aware that happiness as described by Aristotle is quite different from the beatitude promised by the Christian faith. The order of the divine entitative attributes in the Summa theologiae I, qq. 3-11 has baffled many a commentator. Lawrence Dewan connects it with some texts of Aristotle's Metaphysics. Jeremiah Hackett studies Roger Bacon's Moralis philosophia. Dealing with Luther's attitude toward St. Thomas, Denis R. Tanz accepts Erasmus's verdict that the weight given to Thomas in theology was an important factor in propelling Luther out of the Roman Catholic orbit. This opinion, however, confounds appearances with the real reason for leaving, namely, estrangement from several central positions of Catholic doctrine. It is a tribute to the Catholicity of Thomas that after 1519 Luther came to identify the Pope, the Church and all scholastic doctors with the Thomists and said that the Church had become the synagogue of the papists and the Thomists: Thomas had been made the arbiter of heresy. Mark F. Johnson stresses the sapiential character of the sacra doctrina. Mark D. Jordan wrestles with the question why Thomas wrote his Aristotelian commentaries. Arguing in the line of Owens's interpretation he reduces their importance with regard to Thomas's own positions. Jordan seems to think that Thomas's philosophy cannot be formulated without his theology, an explanation which is hardly satisfactory. Armand Maurer submits some reflections on St. Thomas's notion of presence. The question to what extent Albert the Great contributed to Aquinas's treatises of the morality of human acts and of natural law is examined by Ernest J. McCullough. Walter H. Principe points out how, according to Aquinas, food is assimilated into the veritas humanae naturae. Eric A. Reitan retraces Weisheipl's analysis of Aristotle's Physics and of St. Thomas' Commentary: the axiom, "whatever is moved, is moved by another" can be understood only within the context of the general science of nature. In his Liber de causis et processu universitatis Albert came to hold the same position as Thomas on the demonstrability of creation and of its beginning in time. Two final articles concern the difficulties underlying Aristotle's arguments in Physics 7 and 8, and Aquinas and Newton on causality: William Wallace connects Newton's universal gravitation with the axiom that nothing acts on itself. (shrink)

Many years after the translation by Richard Robinson of books 3 and 4 of Aristotle’s Politics, Professor David Keyt now presents a translation with an extensive commentary of books 5 and 6, the main topics of which are equality, democracy, oligarchy, tyranny, and revolution. The text attempts to describe these different political regimes and the causes of their disintegration. According to Keyt books 4, 5, and 6 form a unit and discuss less ideal constitutions and political instability. Keyt defends the (...) traditional order of the books instead of switching around 5 and 6 as some editors have done. He acknowledges nevertheless that the logical order is to place 7 and 8 before 4, 5, and 6. For his translation he used the Greek edition by A. Dreizehnter. Reading the text in a clear and pleasant translation makes us admire the sharpness of Aristotle’s insight and the actuality of what he says. Besides indicating the lines of the Bekker edition, Keyt divided the text into mostly short paragraphs, which make consultation easy. The commentary on Book V runs from page 55 to 190, on VI from 191 to 239, followed by a concise bibliography, a glossary, an index locorum, and a general index. Keyt is very consistent in his translation of Greek terms. He anticipates the difficulty some readers might experience with his translation of στάσις by “faction” and στασιᾳζειν by “to split into factions.” In 1308b20 it is better to translate “who bring about a new order because of their private lives” than “who seek a new order.” Likewise, one should perhaps translate ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς by “in leading positions.” In a few places, for instance at 1308b40, Keyt adds a clarifying phrase such as “if one could insure that offices are not a source of profit.”. (shrink)

Dr. Oguejiofor argues that Aquinas’s philosophical anthropology “is not much more than his philosophy of the human soul.” In his well-documented book he first gives a survey of the positions of philosophers on our question during the earlier part of the thirteenth century paying special attention to Albert the Great. Albert hesitated to accept Aristotle’s definition of the soul as the act of the body, believing that it is not compatible with the soul’s immortality. The second chapter explains this definition (...) and stresses the fact that the soul is immaterial and therefore subsistent. The author might have argued from the fact that it does not share its intellectual activity with the body. Surprisingly he thinks that many of M. Kelly’s remarks against the main argument of the mind’s immateriality—the mainstay of Thomas’s theory—are correct. The third, central chapter deals with Aquinas’s proofs of the soul’s immortality. It examines in their chronological order passages from six works of Thomas where they are put forward, paying special attention to chapters 79 to 81 of the Summa contra gentiles, II. The argument from man’s natural desire is linked to the immateriality of intellectual knowledge. The main arguments are: thought is immaterial and therefore the soul as its source also is; the rational soul transcends the contrary qualities responsible for corruption; the natural desire to exist for ever cannot be in vain. (shrink)

Lester Embree is very concerned with the issue of culture in his philosophical thinking. Besides his preoccupation with the cultural disciplines, he explores the notions of culture in Schutz and Gurwitsch. He even brings up the term “phenomenology of culture.” With inspirations from Embree, the present paper intends to explore culture as a phenomenological theme. Starting with elaboration on the concept of cultural object in both Husserl and Schutz, the paper focuses on the question of cultural difference and universalism. I (...) contend that despite apparent differences between Schutz and Husserl, there is close positioning between them. In the final part of my paper, I make a deeper reflection on the problem of cultural difference.Lester Embree está muy preocupado con el tema de la cultura en su pensamiento filosófico. Además de su preocupación por las disciplinas culturales, explora las nociones de cultura en Schutz y Gurwitsch. Incluso menciona el término "fenomenología de la cultura". Con inspiraciones de Embree, el presente documento pretende explorar la cultura como un tema fenomenológico. Comenzando con la elaboración del concepto de objeto cultural tanto en Husserl como en Schutz, el artículo se centra en la cues-tión de la diferencia cultural y el universalismo. Sostengo que a pesar de las aparentes diferencias entre Schutz y Husserl, existe un posicionamiento cercano entre ellos. En la parte final de mi trabajo, hago una reflexión más profunda sobre el problema de la diferencia cultural. (shrink)

Throughout the late 1840s and the early 1850s, Harvard botanist Asa Gray and his close friend George Engelmann of St. Louis engaged themselves with recruiting men who sought to make a living by natural history collecting, sending these men into the field, searching for institutions and individuals who would subscribe to incoming collections, compiling catalogs, and collecting subscription fees. Although several botanists have noted Gray and Engelmann’s bold experiment as having introduced America to a mode by which European naturalists had (...) devised to organize scientific expeditions, historians of science have not taken the “subscription mode” seriously. I argue that it was specifically by undertaking the labor of cataloging species and charging subscription fees for the cataloged species that Gray established himself as a metropolitan botanist. One crucial consequence of Gray’s rising profile was that he acquired sufficient “cataloging power” to secure his status as an authoritative cataloger of species, and as a kind of “mint” or “storehouse” :1–28, 2001a) who produced well-pruned lists of American species to enable transactions between American and European botanists. But this essay is not focused on the Europeanization of American taxonomy. Drawing on work by scholars who place emphasis on how new forms of knowledge get produced when knowledge travels, my focus here is the evolution of the subscription mode when Gray and Engelmann adapted it to American natural history. My conclusion examines what historian of science Vanessa Heggie :318–334, 2014) identifies as the “danger of category dominance” in today’s historiography of science and shows how a kind of “assemblage thinking” may help historians cope with this danger. (shrink)

In the Kaizo articles, written between 1922 and 1924, Husserl drew on the intercultural relationship between Europe and non-Europe. The viewpoints he held in these articles do not deviate much from that in the Vienna lecture 1935, which is later included in Crisis. It is in the latter that Husserl delineates systematically what he thinks of the idea of Europe and what makes Europe different from the other parts of the world. Notably, these viewpoints were already disclosed in the Kaizo (...) articles, though in very different contexts. As is well known, the background of Crisis is the concern about the modern science which deviates more and more from the concrete lifeworld, whereas the Kaizo articles focus mainly on the ethical problems. Nevertheless both of them touch on the cultural as well as intercultural problematic, that Husserl deals with more and more intensively in his late philosophy. My essay will discuss the following questions: On what grounds does Husserl think that the philosophical rationality of Europe deserves being recommended to other cultures? How does he come to this conclusion in his discourse on ethics? In order to come to terms with these questions I will unfold my essay in three steps: first, I will sketch how Husserl understands ethics; secondly, explain the connection between ethics and philosophical rationality, and thirdly how these ethical thoughts have intercultural relevance. (shrink)

Our great leader and mentor Chairman Mao repeatedly taught us that we must build China into a modern socialist power in a comparatively short period. In accordance with Chairman Mao's instructions at the Third and Fourth National People's Congresses, our respected and beloved Premier Chou called for building China into a socialist power before the end of the century, which would mean implementing the modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, science and technology in order to put our national economy among (...) those of the advanced countries in the world. He pointed out that we must break through the barrier to the modernization of science and technology to ensure the modernization of agriculture, industry and national defense. Obviously, without modern science and technology, there would be no modern agriculture, industry or national defense. According to Chairman Mao's teaching that "theory should be in the vanguard of practice," Premier Chou specifically pointed out, "Natural science researchers should link research with practice and enable the research work to head up production and construction." His directive expounded the dialectical relations between natural science and the practice of production and emphasized the impetus given by natural science to production. With the criminal aims of usurping the Party, seizing power, and restoring capitalism, the "Gang of Four," the root of all evils, openly acted against Chairman Mao's consistent teachings, slandered Premier Chou's directive as "revisionism" and the "theory that science determines everything," and minimized and denied the role of natural science in socialist construction. In areas and organizations where the "Gang of Four" seized the Party and political power, scientific research programs were discarded, the scientific research force was dismantled, people's thought was confused, and our task of socialist construction was seriously damaged. In order to accelerate the modernization of science and technology and improve scientific research work, we should make sweeping criticisms of the fallacies spread by the "Gang of Four," clarify the thought confused by it, rectify the theories with which it tampered, and offset the damage caused by it. (shrink)