Xenophon of Athens was a pupil of Socrates and a philosopher in his own right. He wrote two of the texts included in this volume, the Hiero and the Constitution of the Spartans. The third, the Constitution of the Athenians, is found under Xenophon's name alongside the other two in the manuscripts. The works represent three distinct types of government, but there are common features throughout. This volume presents an introduction discussing Xenophon's views on government in the context of his (...) general political thought, drawing particularly on his Socratic work Memorabilia, and a commentary on the Greek text of each work aimed primarily at advanced undergraduates and graduate students. (shrink)

This article surveys Xenophon’s evidence for Socrates’ views on democracy. It offers a more balanced and complete reading of the evidence in Xenophon’s Memorabilia, and takes account of new ways to assess the definition of what is democratic. It argues that Xenophon’s basic image of Socrates is democratic in the broadest sense through an investigation of topics such as Socrates’ attitudes towards democratic laws, and the use of dokimasia and the ballot, as well as his views on oligarchic and democratic (...) regimes of his time, the ‘royal art’ of rule, the assembly and its decisions, and the role of the wealthy in democracy. It also argues against the general view that Xenophon’s own views on democracy as expressed in his other works show no support for democracy. (shrink)

This article surveys Xenophon's evidence for Socrates' views on democracy. It offers a more balanced and complete reading of the evidence in Xenophon's Memorabilia, and takes account of new ways to assess the definition of what is democratic. It argues that Xenophon's basic image of Socrates is democratic in the broadest sense through an investigation of topics such as Socrates' attitudes towards democratic laws, and the use of dokimasia and the ballot, as well as his views on oligarchic and democratic (...) regimes of his time, the 'royal art' of rule, the assembly and its decisions, and the role of the wealthy in democracy. It also argues against the general view that Xenophon's own views on democracy as expressed in his other works show no support for democracy. (shrink)

Le Socrate de Xénophon et la démocratie présente une interprétation nuancée du témoignage de Xénophon sur l’attitude de Socrate à l’endroit de la démocratie athénienne. Cette étude conteste les interprétations qui ont été trop restrictives dans le choix des témoignages et trop négatives dans leurs conclusions. Elle tient compte, d’une part, des différents paramètres qui permettent de définir la démocratie ; d’autre part, des réalités de la démocratie athénienne. Les principaux textes pertinents proviennent des Mémorables. Nous traitons de la nature (...) de cet ouvrage et de la façon dont il expose l’attitude de Socrate à l’endroit des lois et des institutions du régime démocratique, notamment l’assemblée et le tirage au sort. Cette étude présente enfin une interprétation plus nuancée de la propre attitude de Xénophon à l’endroit de la démocratie, attitude qui a elle-même influé sur la façon dont on a, par le passé, évalué l’attitude de son Socrate.Xenophon’s Socrates and Democracy offers a balanced interpretation of Xenophon’s evidence for Socrates’ attitude to the Athenian democracy, arguing against interpretations that have been too selective in their evidence and too negative in their conclusions. It takes due account of the various parameters that define democracy and the realities of Athenian democracy. The main evidence is from Memorabilia. There is discussion of nature of this work, and then of how it expresses Socrates’ attitude to the laws of the democracy and other processes such as sortition and the assembly. The paper also offers a more balanced interpretation of Xenophon’s own attitude to democracy, which has influenced past assessments of the attitude of his Socrates. (shrink)

The work is proven to have a unified and sustained rhetorical argument. It imitates the philosophical process that it attributes to Socrates.

In an article in an earlier issue of this journal Vivienne Gray sought to challenge my claim that Xenophon's account of Prodicus' narrative concerning the Choice of Heracles represents ‘a very close approximation to Prodicus’ actual wording'. Since that time, Gray's article has been cited approvingly by Louis-André Dorion and David Wolfsdorf, both of whom consider that Gray has settled the matter, at least as far as the linguistic aspect of my argument is concerned. In view (...) of this, I feel it necessary to point out that Gray's argument is fundamentally flawed. In addition, I should like to take this opportunity to show that the arguments of Dorion and Wolfsdorf, which are aimed at other aspects of the case that I made for Xenophon's faithfulness to Prodicus' text, are likewise invalid. (shrink)

From dogs to gods, the science of understanding mysterious minds--including your own. Nothing seems more real than the minds of other people. When you consider what your boss is thinking or whether your spouse is happy, you are admitting them into the "mind club." It's easy to assume other humans can think and feel, but what about a cow, a computer, a corporation? What kinds of mind do they have? Daniel M. Wegner and Kurt Gray are award-winning psychologists who (...) have discovered that minds--while incredibly important--are a matter of perception. Their research opens a trove of new findings, with insights into human behavior that are fascinating, frightening and funny. The Mind Club explains why we love some animals and eat others, why people debate the existence of God so intensely, how good people can be so cruel, and why robots make such poor lovers. By investigating the mind perception of extraordinary targets--animals, machines, comatose people, god--Wegner and Gray explain what it means to have a mind, and why it matters so much. Fusing cutting-edge research and personal anecdotes, The Mind Club explores the moral dimensions of mind perception with wit and compassion, revealing the surprisingly simple basis for what compels us to love and hate, to harm and to protect. (shrink)

Talk about time travel is puzzling even if it isn't obviously contradictory. Philosophers however are divided about whether time travel involves empirical paradox or some deeper metaphysical incoherence. It is suggested that time travel requires a Parmenidean four-dimensionalist metaphysical conception of the world in time. The possibility of time travel is addressed (mainly) from within a Parmenidean metaphysical framework, which is accepted by David Lewis in his defence of the coherence of time travel. It is argued that time travel raises (...) formidable difficulties which are not satisfactorily resolved by Lewis's ingenious defence of time travel. Objections to time travel considered include: (1) travel to other times is impossible because there is nowhere (or “nowhen”) to go to; (2) the problem that upon setting out on a journey to the past a time machine will collide with itself; (3) time travel generates a mysterious temporal dualism between experiential time and physical time; (4) travel to the past permits reverse causation, raising the possibility of causal loops and attendant problems arising, for example, from the prospect of empirical contradiction and the possibility of someone being one of their ancestors. (shrink)

First published in 1997. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The moral status of future persons is problematic. It is often claimed that we should take the interests of the indefinite unborn very seriously, because they have a right to a decent life. It is also claimed (often by the same people) that we should allow unrestricted access to abortion, because the indefinite unborn have no rights. In this paper I argue that these intuitions are not in fact inconsistent. The aim is to provide an account of trans-temporal concern which (...) resolves the prima facie inconsistency between commonly held intuitions about our obligations to future persons. I argue that our intuitions can be reconciled provided that we explicate obligations to the future in terms of impersonal principles subject to retroactive person-affecting constraints. (shrink)

This important new book analyses these core issues and reviews the evidence from both introspection and experiment.