This book builds on the vast clinical experience of Joseph L. Henderson, who became interested in initiatory symbolism when he began his analysis with Jung in 1929. Henderson studied this symbolism in patients' dreams, fantasies, and active imagination, and demonstrated the archetype of initiation in both men and women's psychology. After Henderson’s book was republished in 2005 Kirsch, Beane Rutter and Singer brought together this collection of essays to allow a new generation to explore the archetype of (...) initiation. _Initiation: The Living Reality of an Archetype_ demonstrates how the archetype of initiation is seen clinically today. Divided into distinct parts, the book explores the archetype of initiation in Dr Henderson’s own life, as well as suggesting its importance in: clinical practice culture aging and death. The chapters in this book amplify and extend the archetype of initiation from the earliest historical periods up to the present day. The editors argue that initiation symbolism often underlies contemporary phenomena, but is rarely recognized; _Initiation _helps to bring a new understanding to these experiences. This book will be of interest to psychotherapists with an interest in psychoanalysis and analytical psychology, as well as those training at analytic institutes. (shrink)

Resumen. La congregación fundada por Vicente de Paúl y Luisa de Marillac ha estado ligada al cuidado y, por su formación y método de trabajo, pueden ser consideradas como pioneras de los cuidados de enfermería, ya que su objetivo ha sido y es cubrir las necesidades básicas de la persona, teoría que postularía en 1960 Virginia Henderson. En este trabajo se pretende dar a conocer cómo las Hijas de la Caridad han estado ligadas al cuidado de la salud (...) desde sus inicios y la labor socio sanitaria que durante casi 150 años lleva prestando en Zaragoza la Casa de Amparo. Desde su inauguración el 5 de marzo de 1871, y gracias al apoyo económico del Ayuntamiento de Zaragoza, esta Institución proporciona asilo y cuidados a toda persona mayor que carece de recursos necesarios. Desde el primer momento se encargaron de ello las Hijas de la Caridad que, sin apenas recursos ni conocimientos, cuidaron de los asilados. Con el paso del tiempo, estos cuidados han ido evolucionando y profesionalizándose hasta que, en la actualidad, están siendo procurados por personal sanitario especializado; a pesar de ello, las hermanas siguen presentes en la vida de la residencia prestando su ayuda aquellos que lo necesitan. Palabras clave: Hijas de la Caridad, beneficencia, salud, enfermería, Casa de Amparo, Zaragoza, siglos XIX-XXI.. The congregation founded by Vicente de Paul and Luisa de Marillac has been linked to care and, because of their training and working method, they can be considered as pioneers of nursing care, since their objective has been and is to cover the basic needs of the person, a theory that Virginia Henderson would postulate in 1960. This paper aims to make known how the daughters of charity have been linked to health care since its inception and the social and health work that the Casa de Amparo has been providing in Zaragoza for almost 150 years. Since its inauguration on March 5, 1871, and thanks to the economic support of the City Council of Zaragoza, this Institution provides asylum and care for all older people who lack the necessary resources. From the first moment the daughters of the charity took care of it, who, without scarce resources or knowledge, took care of the asylees. With the passage of time, these cares have been evolving and professionalizing until, at present, they are being procured by specialized health personnel; In spite of this, the sisters are still present in the life of the residence, helping those who need it. Key words: Daughters of Charity, charity, health, nursing, Casa de Amparo, Zaragoza, 19th-21th centuries. (shrink)

People develop and deploy epistemic norms – normative sensibilities in light of which they regulate both their individual and community epistemic practice. There is a similarity to folk's epistemic normative sensibilities – and it is by virtue of this that folk commonly can rely on each other, and even work jointly to produce systems of true beliefs – a kind of epistemic common good. Agents not only regulate their belief forming practices in light of these sensitivities, but they make clear (...) to others that they approve or disapprove of practices as these accord with their sensibilities – they thus regulate the belief forming practices of others in an interdependent pursuit of a good – something on the order of a community stock of true beliefs. Such general observations suggest ways in which common epistemic norms function as social norms, as these are characterized by Cristina Bicchieri's (2006) discussion of various kinds of norms. I draw on this framework – together with an important elaboration in Bicchieri (2017) – as it affords an analysis of the various related ways in which normative sensibilities function in communities of interdependent agents. The framework allows one to probe how these normative sensibilities function in the various associated choice situations. I argue that epistemic norms are fundamentally social norms, and, at the same time, they also are widely shared sensibilities about state-of-the-art ways of pursuing projects of individual veritistic value. The two foundations suggest the analogy of an arch. (shrink)

In "Epistemic Norms and the 'Epistemic Game' They Regulate", we advance a general case for the idea that epistemic norms regulating the production of beliefs might usefully be understood as social norms. There, we drew on the influential account of social norms developed by Cristina Bicchieri, and we managed to give a crude recognizable picture of important elements of what are recognizable as central epistemic norms. Here, we consider much needed elaboration, suggesting models that help one think about epistemic communities (...) and, ultimately, the temptations confronted in one's epistemic life. We suggest that once "the epistemic game" is embedded into a wider set of gains and losses, one can understand the epistemic choice situation as a form of mixed-motive game. This allows one to understand epistemic games more straightforwardly using Bicchieri's framework for thinking about social norms. That is, once the choice situation denominated only in terms of classical epistemic gains and losses is embedded in a wider accounting of goods that may compete with the production of true beliefs, one can see how an agent's individual and community epistemic project can be furthered by social norms regulating epistemic practices. We recommend thinking of epistemic norms as analogous to social norms for hygiene. (shrink)

Disagreement affords humans as members of epistemic communities important opportunities for refining or improving their epistemic situations with respect to many of their beliefs. To get such epistemic gains, one needs to explore and gauge one’s own epistemic situation and the epistemic situations of others. Accordingly, a fitting response to disagreement regarding some matter, p, typically will turn on the resolution of two strongly interrelated questions: (1) whether p, and (2) why one’s interlocutor disagrees with oneself about p. When one (...) has high intellectual respect for one’s interlocutor, answering question (2) involves arriving at a sympathetic explanatory understanding of the interlocutor’s own epistemic attitude toward p. Sorting out (2) is an abductive matter. Further, so far as the abductive explanation conditions one’s epistemic take regarding (1), there will be an abductive character to one’s epistemic position with respect to whether p—even where one’s initial purchase on whether p was not an abductive matter. We explain here how this can be managed naturally and tractably. (shrink)

In codifying the methods of translation, several writers have formulated maxims that would constrain interpreters to construe their subjects as (more or less) rational speakers of the truth. Such maxims have come to be known as versions of the principle of charity. W. V. O. Quine suggests an empirical, not purely methodological, basis for his version of that principle. Recently, Stephen Stich has criticized Quine's attempt to found the principle of charity in translation on information about the probabilities of various (...) sorts of mistakes. Here 1 defend Quine's approach. These issues have important implications for the supposed a priori status of human rationality. (shrink)

By a macro-level feature, I understand any feature that supervenes on, and is thus realized in, lower-level features. Recent discussions by Kim have suggested that such features cannot be causally relevant insofar as they are not classically reducible to lower-level features. This seems to render macro-level features causally irrelevant. I defend the causal relevance of some such features. Such features have been thought causally relevant in many examples that have underpinned philosophical work on causality. Additionally, in certain typical biological cases, (...) we conceive of causally relevant features at various compatible levels of analysis. When elaborated, these points make a strong prima facie case for macro-level causal relevance. However, we might abandon both the philosophical guideposts and the corresponding explanatory practice in the special sciences were we convinced that no reflective philosophical account could provide for the causal relevance there supposed. I show that such drastic measures are not necessary, for we can make sense of macro-level causal relevance by drawing on Paul Humphreys' recent work in ways suggested by the concrete examples considered here. (shrink)

After characterizing the general outlines of Davidson's criticism of the idea of conceptual schemes, the specifics of his argument are examined and evaluated. It is argued that his argument against radically different conceptual schemes does mark out plausible limits to what might be thought of as differences against conceptual schemes, but it is doubtful that those he mentioned as proponents of the idea envisions such differences. It is argued that the stylized character of Davidson's arguments against the less radical variants (...) of the idea fail to foreclose the possibility of differences that many would find interesting. (shrink)

Algebraic Art explores the invention of a peculiarly Victorian account of the nature and value of aesthetic form, and it traces that account to a surprising source: mathematics. Drawing on literature, art, and photography, it explores how the Victorian mathematical conception of form still resonates today.

The problem of unknowing is central to the theory and practice of psychoanalysis. This paper argues that psychoanalysis is a contemporary site of apophatic discourse. Pseudo-Dionysius observed that: “If one considers these texts with a reverent eye one will see something that brings about unity and manifests a single empathy.” By casting a “reverent eye” on psychoanalysis, we can see that psychoanalytic theory and practice are saturated with apophatic maneuvers. The intuition of apophasis at work in each of the traditions (...) of psychoanalysis accounts for their family resemblance. (shrink)

Accounts of theistic faith according to which it does not involve referring to or believing in God as existing independently of the life of faith are instances of theistic reductionism. Theistic reductionism, in holding that ‘God’ does not refer to reality outside the life of believers, holds thereby that theism is not rightly to be regarded as true or false. Such accounts may be proposed or used as defenses of theistic faith. They ‘defend’ faith insofar as they describe the form (...) of life faith involves and show that the human and cultural functions it performs are valuable. Examining several reductionist accounts, ordered from weaker to stronger, I argue that they fail as defenses of theistic life and language. Whereas the reductionist views claim to leave the practice of theism as it is, I argue that in fact they imply a different form of life from the one theism actually is. Thus reductionist defenses of religious practice fail and fail precisely where they insist on treating God in some way other than as existing outside of religious life. From this I infer that theism as it exists can only be defended in ways that include taking ‘God’ as referring to a God who is real outside the life which recognizes him. The religious reductionists discussed include R.B. Braithwaite, P.F. Schmidt, Paul Holmer, Paul van Buren, Gordon Kaufman, and D.Z. Phillips. (shrink)

Accounts of theistic faith according to which it does not involve referring to or believing in God as existing independently of the life of faith are instances of theistic reductionism. Theistic reductionism, in holding that ‘God’ does not refer to reality outside the life of believers, holds thereby that theism is not rightly to be regarded as true or false. Such accounts may be proposed or used as defenses of theistic faith. They ‘defend’ faith insofar as they describe the form (...) of life faith involves and show that the human and cultural functions it performs are valuable. Examining several reductionist accounts, ordered from weaker to stronger, I argue that they fail as defenses of theistic life and language. Whereas the reductionist views claim to leave the practice of theism as it is, I argue that in fact they imply a different form of life from the one theism actually is. Thus reductionist defenses of religious practice fail and fail precisely where they insist on treating God in some way other than as existing outside of religious life. From this I infer that theism as it exists can only be defended in ways that include taking ‘God’ as referring to a God who is real outside the life which recognizes him. The religious reductionists discussed include R.B. Braithwaite, P.F. Schmidt, Paul Holmer, Paul van Buren, Gordon Kaufman, and D.Z. Phillips. (shrink)

Yoshida considers two broad understandings of how social scientists can and should “describe and explain other cultures or their aspects under concepts of rationality” . In the one corner is a family of approaches that Yoshida finds deeply flawed: cultural interpretivist approaches. Five authors representative of this family are given fine chapter length examinations: Winch, Taylor, Geertz, Sahlins, and Obeyesekere. In the other corner is Yoshida’s favored approach: critical rationalism. This approach is associated with the intellectual descendants of Karl Popper—notably (...) Jarvie and Agassi. It is presented in outline and treated as the clear winner. By virtue of not having the defects that are diagnosed in the interpretivist approaches, critical rationalism is presented as the fitting approach in the social sciences. This dialectical structure has two notable weaknesses: First, showing that one item, A, lacks the problems found in another item, B, should not be take .. (shrink)

Ovid's two versions of his encounter with a woman at the races in the Circus Maximus are re-read together as celebrations of the spectacle of the spectators in the arena. The analytical approaches of "Everyday Life" collage and "Foucauldian panopticism" structure are shown to "over-achieve." Ovid dramatizes personal politics at the Circus in a sustained display of the self-reflexive poetics of erotic metaphor. When elegiac amor is acted out as a race, victory and favor are eroticized, steering between crude explicitness (...) and bland circumlocution, into an expert triumph of sexual asymmetry. Ovid finds a version of femineus amor which brings his poem to a climax, and a climax to his poem, in spite of public decency and myriad spectators. Every quirk, routine, or landmark of the ludi circenses, including the parade of the gods, is included as a challenge for Ovid's poetic chariot, another lap in the race-or another race, re-run according to a fresh strategy. Re-playing the meta-literary terms of poetic genre, Amores 3.2 gives an "epinician" turn to Amores 3, playing games on Callimachean strategies for re-starting a work on a new lap. (shrink)

By a macro-level feature, I understand any feature that supervenes on, and is thus realized in, lower-level features. Recent discussions by Kim have suggested that such features cannot be causally relevant insofar as they are not classically reducible to lower-level features. This seems to render macro-level features causally irrelevant. I defend the causal relevance of some such features. Such features have been thought causally relevant in many examples that have underpinned philosophical work on causality. Additionally, in certain typical biological cases, (...) we conceive of causally relevant features at various compatible levels of analysis. When elaborated, these points make a strong prima facie case for macro-level causal relevance. However, we might abandon both the philosophical guideposts and the corresponding explanatory practice in the special sciences were we convinced that no reflective philosophical account could provide for the causal relevance there supposed. I show that such drastic measures are not necessary, for we can make sense of macro-level causal relevance by drawing on Paul Humphreys' recent work in ways suggested by the concrete examples considered here. (shrink)

Aristophanes, Lysistrate 256–65 271–80 runs as follows. I print the muchdiscussed and frequently emended2 lines 260–65 275–80 as they appear in the manuscripts and testimonia, and shall argue that they are sound with the exception of 264, for which I suggest an emendation.

Volume 19, Issue 11, November 2019, Page 42-44.

The word “beautiful” plays a surprisingly unimportant part in the language of sophisticated artistic appreciation; I mean in the informed criticism and comparison of specific works of art. Though in ordinary conversation it can be used naturally and easily, it does not serve readily as a technical term in expert writing or discussion. To become a technical term of this kind it would have to be definable, and definable in terms which commanded sufficient agreement: but attempts to define “beauty” and (...) “beautiful” may well have become restrained by the popularity of philosophical discussion about the significance of these words. No philosophical question is discussed more commonly or from more firmly held opposite positions than the question whether beauty is “objective” or not. Discussion of this and related topics, however, not being the monopoly of professed philosophers but being familiar amongst artists and art critics themselves, tends to remove all shadow of technicality from the crucial terms discussed. Other terms come to serve for the “objective” features of works of art, and others again for the impressions which works of art may make upon us: “beauty” and “beautiful” tend to fall away between these two classes. (shrink)

In 1963 Duchamp described his vertical installation of three Readymades at the Pasadena Art Museum as “readymade talk of what goes on in the Large Glass.” Elsewhere, he spoke of the Readymades as “vehicles for unloading ideas,” and during the years 1912-15 his mind was filled with ideas as he invented the “playful physics” for his techno-scientific allegory of quest, The Bride Stripped Bare by Her Bachelors, Even [The Large Glass]. This essay argues that the “ideas” being unloaded in the (...) Readymades were rooted in his extensive study of contemporary science and technology as well as the biographical experience of his stay at Herne Bay on the English seacoast during August 1913. Readymades addressed include the Bicycle Wheel, With Hidden Noise, Paris Air, and Fresh Widow. Central themes include string or thread, traced from his preoccupation with tennis during his holiday, and the impact of the electrical spectacle of the illuminated Pier Pavilion at Herne Bay. (shrink)

Kelly Aguirre, Phil Henderson, Cressida J. Heyes, Alana Lentin, and Corey Snelgrove engage with different aspects of Robert Nichols’ Theft is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory. Henderson focuses on possible spaces for maneuver, agency, contradiction, or failure in subject formation available to individuals and communities interpellated through diremptive processes. Heyes homes in on the ritual of antiwill called “consent” that systematically conceals the operation of power. Aguirre foregrounds tensions in projects of critical theory scholarship that aim for dialogue (...) and solidarity with Indigenous decolonial struggles. Lentin draws attention to the role of race in undergirding the logic of Anglo-settler colonial domination that operates through dispossession, while Snelgrove emphasizes the link between alienation, capital, and colonialism. In his reply to his interlocutors, Nichols clarifies aspects of his “recursive logics” of dispossession, a dispossession or theft through which the right to property is generated. (shrink)

Virginia Held assesses the ethics of care as a promising alternative to the familiar moral theories that serve so inadequately to guide our lives. The ethics of care is only a few decades old, yet it is by now a distinct moral theory or normative approach to the problems we face. It is relevant to global and political matters as well as to the personal relations that can most clearly exemplify care. This book clarifies just what the ethics of (...) care is: what its characteristics are, what it holds, and what it enables us to do. It discusses the feminist roots of this moral approach and why the ethics of care can be a morality with universal appeal. Held examines what we mean by "care," and what a caring person is like. Where other moral theories demand impartiality above all, the ethics of care understands the moral import of our ties to our families and groups. It evaluates such ties, focusing on caring relations rather than simply on the virtues of individuals. The book proposes how such values as justice, equality, and individual rights can "fit together" with such values as care, trust, mutual consideration, and solidarity. In the second part of the book, Held examines the potential of the ethics of care for dealing with social issues. She shows how the ethics of care is more promising than Kantian moral theory and utilitarianism for advice on how expansive, or not, markets should be, and on when other values than market ones should prevail. She connects the ethics of care with the rising interest in civil society, and considers the limits appropriate for the language of rights. Finally, she shows the promise of the ethics of care for dealing with global problems and seeing anew the outlines of international civility. (shrink)