Beardsley's exposition of his large subject shows lucidity, objectivity, deftness, and a good sense of proportion; and these virtues become more apparent the closer his history approaches the complex diversity of contemporary aesthetic speculation. Especially skillful are the succinct accounts of those aspects of each philosopher's thought which, though not directly concerned with aesthetics, are necessary for a full understanding of his aesthetic theories. Beardsley himself remains neutral, arguing neither for nor against the theories he analyzes. Some may feel that (...) the visual arts are slighted, but this is a minor criticism of a very informative and illuminating book.—W. B. K. (shrink)

Allen begins with a general survey of "atheism and atheists" in the Renaissance, gives brief sketches of six individual "atheists"—Pomponazzi, Cardano, Vanini, Montaigne, Charron, Bodin—devotes chapters to rational theology against atheism and to reason and immorality, and closes with a portrait of the "atheist redeemed" in the person of the Earl of Rochester, the arch-rake of the Restoration who was converted during his final illness. He points out that during this period "atheist" usually meant no more than a person whose (...) theology did not agree fully with that of the name-caller, and that none of the thinkers he mentions merited the term in any strict sense. The book is a wide-ranging, erudite survey without much attempt at either analysis in depth or synthesis, but Allen's somewhat Voltairean point of view helps give it form.—W. B. K. (shrink)

This historical study of the responses that man has tried to give to the problem of death-"If I must some day die, what can I do to satisfy my desire to live?" as defined by Fr. Dunne—is occasionally turgid but more often provocative and enlightening. From the dawn of history in Mesopotamia to the present, the book investigates the political and literary consequences of different answers to this question and of different attitudes toward death in general. Although the book's organization (...) is chronological, it is explicitly oriented to contemporary concerns, with Nietzsche's statement that "God is dead" serving as a unifying leit-motif. The most rewarding sections are the discussions of Homer's epics and the analysis of the confusions between the right to life and the right over life that are traced from Calvin, Luther, Hobbes, and Rousseau to modern totalitarianism.—W. B. K. (shrink)

West takes his title from Camus, and quotes Camus' definition of absurdity: "the division between the mind that desires and the world that disappoints." The essays, which originally appeared in periodicals, discuss Yeats, Lawrence, Sartre, Camus, Simon Weil, Graham Greene, Santayana, and other modern writers. There is no analysis, either philosophical or literary; West attempts overall estimates of each writer's contribution to the problem of absurdity, but succeeds in providing neither insights for those already familiar with the problem nor useful (...) introductions for the uninitiated. Nor, despite the expectations aroused by the preface, do we get a very strong impression of an individual's encounter with the thinkers from whom he has learned most. In vino vacuitas.—W. B. K. (shrink)

These essays were originally presented at the first of an annual series of seminars in the humanities at John Hopkins. To avoid imposing an artificial unity on the subject, the contributors were deliberately left unguided in their choice of subject and method. The result of this policy is a rich and stimulating collection ranging from gardens to musicology. Reproductions of paintings and copious printings of musical scores show that no expense was spared to make the book as useful as possible. (...) Of greatest interest to philosophers are George Boas's witty demolition of "the age of reason" as a description for the period, J. A. Passmore on "the malleability of man," Isaiah Berlin's long reconsideration of Herder, Alfred Cobban on "the Enlightenment and the French Revolution," and Henry Guerlac on Newton's place in intellectual history.—W. B. K. (shrink)

In this paper, a modified form of Collatz conjecture for neutrosophic numbers n ∈ (Z U I) is defined. We see for any n ∈ (Z U I) the related sequence using the formula (3a + 1) + (3b + 1)I converges to any one of the 55 elements mentioned in this paper. Using the akin formula of Collatz conjecture viz. (3a- 1) + (3b -1)I the neutrosophic numbers converges to any one of the 55 elements mentioned with appropriate modifications. (...) Thus, it is conjectured that every n ∈ (Z U I) has a finite sequence which converges to any one of the 55 elements. (shrink)

In this book, for the first time, authors try to introduce the concept of linguistic variables as a continuum of linguistic terms/elements/words in par or similar to a real continuum. For instance, we have the linguistic variable, say the heights of people, then we place the heights in the linguistic continuum [shortest, tallest] unlike the real continuum (–∞, ∞) where both –∞ or +∞ is only a non-included symbols of the real continuum, but in case of the linguistic continuum we (...) generally include the ends or to be more mathematical say it is a closed interval, where shortest denotes the shortest height of a person, maybe the born infant who is very short from usual and the tallest will denote the tallest one usually very tall; however this linguistic continuum [shortest, tallest] in the real continuum will be the closed interval say [1 foot, 8 feet] or [1, 8] the measurement in terms of feet. So, the real interval is a subinterval with which we have associated the real continuum in terms of qualifying unit feet and inches in this case. (shrink)

In this book, the authors systematically define the new notion of linguistic graphs associated with a linguistic set of a linguistic variable. We can also define the notion of directed linguistic graphs and linguistic-weighted graphs. Chapter two discusses all types of linguistic graphs, linguistic dyads, linguistic triads, linguistic wheels, complete linguistic graphs, linguistic connected graphs, disconnected linguistic graphs, linguistic components of the graphs and so on. Further, we define the notion of linguistic subgraphs of a linguistic graph. However, like usual (...) graphs, we will not be able to arbitrarily connect any two linguistic words of a linguistic set associated with a linguistic variable. They can be related or adjacent depending on the linguistic variable associated with the linguistic set. This is an exceptional feature of a linguistic graph. (shrink)

The notion of linguistic geometry is defined in this book. It is pertinent to keep in the record that linguistic geometry differs from classical geometry. Many basic or fundamental concepts and notions of classical geometry are not true or extendable in the case of linguistic geometry. Hence, for simple illustration, facts like two distinct points in classical geometry always define a line passing through them; this is generally not true in linguistic geometry. Suppose we have two linguistic points as tall (...) and light we cannot connect them, or technically, there is no line between them. However, let's take, for instance, two linguistic points, tall and very short, associated with the linguistic variable height of a person. We have a directed line joining from the linguistic point very short to the linguistic point tall. In this case, it is important to note that the direction is essential when the linguistic variable is a person's height. The other way line, from tall to very short, has no meaning. So in linguistic geometry, in general, we may not have a linguistic line; granted, we have a line, but we may not have it in both directions; the line may be directed. The linguistic distance is very far. So, the linguistic line directed or otherwise exists if and only if they are comparable. Hence the very concept of extending the line infinitely does not exist. Likewise, we cannot say as in classical geometry; three noncollinear points determine the plane in linguistic geometry. Further, we do not have the notion of the linguistic area of well-defined figures like a triangle, quadrilateral or any polygon as in the case of classical geometry. The best part of linguistic geometry is that we can define the new notion of linguistic social information geometric networks analogous to social information networks. This will be a boon to non-mathematics researchers in socio-sciences in other fields where natural languages can replace mathematics. (shrink)

In this book, the authors introduce the linguistic set associated with a linguistic variable and the structure of matrices, which they define as linguistic matrices. The authors build linguistic matrices only for those linguistic variables which yield a linguistic continuum or an ordered linguistic set. This book is organised into three chapters. The first chapter is introductory, in which we introduce all the basic concepts of linguistic variables and the associated linguistic set to make this book self-contained. Chapter two introduces (...) linguistic matrices and develops basic properties associated with them, like types of matrices, transpose of matrices and diagonal matrices. Most of the properties enjoyed by real or complex matrices are satisfied by these linguistic matrices. Chapter three deals with operations on the linguistic matrices. (shrink)

This book extends the concept of linguistic coordinate geometry using linguistic planes or semi-linguistic planes. In the case of coordinate planes, we are always guaranteed of the distance between any two points in that plane. However, in the case of linguistic and semi-linguistic planes, we can not always determine the linguistic distance between any two points. This is the first limitation of linguistic planes and semi-linguistic planes.

Algebraic structures on linguistic sets associated with a linguistic variable are introduced. The linguistics with single closed binary operations are only semigroups and monoids. We describe the new notion of linguistic semirings, linguistic semifields, linguistic semivector spaces and linguistic semilinear algebras defined over linguistic semifields. We also define algebraic structures on linguistic subsets of a linguistic set associated with a linguistic variable. We define the notion of linguistic subset semigroups, linguistic subset monoids and their respective substructures. We also define as (...) in case of deals in classical semigroups, linguistic ideals in linguistic semigroups and linguistic monoids. This concept of linguistic ideals is extended to the case of linguistic subset semigroups and linguistic subset monoids. We also define linguistic substructures. (shrink)

The new notions of super column FRM model, super row FRM model and mixed super FRM model are introduced in this book. These three models are introduced specially to analyze the biased role of the print media on 27 percent reservation for the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in educational institutions run by the Indian Central Government.

The concept of supermatrix for social scientists was first introduced by Paul Horst. The main purpose of his book was to introduce this concept to social scientists, students, teachers and research workers who lacked mathematical training. This book introduces the concept of fuzzy super matrices and operations on them. The author has provided only those operations on fuzzy supermatrices that are essential for developing super fuzzy multi expert models. This book will be highly useful to social scientists who wish to (...) work with multi expert models. (shrink)

The new classes of super special codes are constructed in this book using the specially constructed super special vector spaces. These codes mainly use the super matrices. These codes can be realized as a special type of concatenated codes.

In this book, authors, for the first time, introduce the new notion of special subset linguistic topological spaces using linguistic square matrices. This book is organized into three chapters. Chapter One supplies the reader with the concept of ling set, ling variable, ling continuum, etc. Specific basic linguistic algebraic structures, like linguistic semigroup linguistic monoid, are introduced. Also, algebraic structures to linguistic square matrices are defined and described with examples. For the first time, non-commutative linguistic topological spaces are introduced. The (...) notion of a linguistic special subset of doubly non-commutative topological spaces of linguistic topological spaces is introduced in this book. (shrink)

Beardsley's exposition of his large subject shows lucidity, objectivity, deftness, and a good sense of proportion; and these virtues become more apparent the closer his history approaches the complex diversity of contemporary aesthetic speculation. Especially skillful are the succinct accounts of those aspects of each philosopher's thought which, though not directly concerned with aesthetics, are necessary for a full understanding of his aesthetic theories. Beardsley himself remains neutral, arguing neither for nor against the theories he analyzes. Some may feel that (...) the visual arts are slighted, but this is a minor criticism of a very informative and illuminating book.—W. B. K. (shrink)

Designed to complement the editors' earlier selection, The Social and Political Philosophy of Jacques Maritain, this book arranges its material in six sections: theory of knowledge, metaphysics, ethics, esthetics, politics, and philosophy of history, with the editors contributing a one-page or two-page introduction to each section. The texts, taken from some fifteen of Maritain's works and in some cases published for the first time in English, are well chosen and interesting in themselves, but are too brief to present fully developed (...) arguments. This raises the question of the audience being aimed at. The book is not coherent enough to serve as a serious introduction to Maritain or to modern Thomism; it is rather a "sampler," and might be most useful as a kind of bedside book for those already acquainted with Maritain.--W. B. K. (shrink)

Allen begins with a general survey of "atheism and atheists" in the Renaissance, gives brief sketches of six individual "atheists"—Pomponazzi, Cardano, Vanini, Montaigne, Charron, Bodin—devotes chapters to rational theology against atheism and to reason and immorality, and closes with a portrait of the "atheist redeemed" in the person of the Earl of Rochester, the arch-rake of the Restoration who was converted during his final illness. He points out that during this period "atheist" usually meant no more than a person whose (...) theology did not agree fully with that of the name-caller, and that none of the thinkers he mentions merited the term in any strict sense. The book is a wide-ranging, erudite survey without much attempt at either analysis in depth or synthesis, but Allen's somewhat Voltairean point of view helps give it form.—W. B. K. (shrink)

Although the essays in this book vary a good deal in quality, they all distort the eighteenth century to some extent by concentrating on its "modernity," about the scope of which, to increase the confusion, none of the authors is very explicit. One essay treats the emergence of scientific thought quite superficially; another presents Jacobi as an anti-type of Goethe and a fore-runner of existentialism. Herbert Dieckmann argues against the common "from classic to romantic" view of eighteenth-century aesthetic history. Ernest (...) Mossner characterizes "the enlightenment of David Hume," seeing him as a liberator of the mind from its various idols and reiterating his view that Hume was only a "mitigated sceptic." Dietrich Ritschl emphasizes Semler's contribution to the historical study of the Bible; his essay also contains, but only implicitly, some warnings for today's aggiornamento theologians.—W. B. K. (shrink)

Father Etcheverry examines four varieties of humanism: rationalist-idealist, existentialist, Marxist, and Christian. For each of the first three varieties he centers his analysis on one or two individuals: Leon Brunschvicg, Sartre and Camus, and Marx and Engels respectively. He writes as a committed Christian humanist, arguing that only a relationship with God enables man to become truly man. All other varieties of humanism prevent this full development by raising to absolute status one or another of man's essential properties—reason, liberty, matter, (...) sociability, etc.—and subordinating him too exclusively to that property alone.—W. B. K. (shrink)

This historical study of the responses that man has tried to give to the problem of death-"If I must some day die, what can I do to satisfy my desire to live?" as defined by Fr. Dunne—is occasionally turgid but more often provocative and enlightening. From the dawn of history in Mesopotamia to the present, the book investigates the political and literary consequences of different answers to this question and of different attitudes toward death in general. Although the book's organization (...) is chronological, it is explicitly oriented to contemporary concerns, with Nietzsche's statement that "God is dead" serving as a unifying leit-motif. The most rewarding sections are the discussions of Homer's epics and the analysis of the confusions between the right to life and the right over life that are traced from Calvin, Luther, Hobbes, and Rousseau to modern totalitarianism.—W. B. K. (shrink)

Margolis's main concern is to clarify aesthetic terminology, and especially to distinguish between normative and descriptive uses of such terms as "taste" and "aesthetic." His own definition of a work of art, however, "an artifact considered with respect to its design," hardly improves on the definitions he criticizes. Some of the problems he discusses can be seen as versions of the One and the Many: e.g., the relation between a symphony and its different performances or between a poem and the (...) different interpretations it gives rise to. Among the more interesting chapters are those on figurative language and on "truth and reference in fiction."—W. B. K. (shrink)

Though considerably indebted to Raymond Aron, this book is primarily a distinguished historian's personal statement, on a fairly elementary level, of the meaning of the historian's vocation. Marrou's main principle is that "history and the historian are inseparable," that historical knowledge, like other kinds of knowledge, results from an interaction of subject and object. "Facts" have no meaning apart from the concepts that order them. The positivist position that historical knowledge can and should be "purely objective" produces only an extremely (...) impoverished kind of history. But Marrou has no place for rampant subjectivism. The historian must open himself to the real quiddity of the documents he studies, instead of trying to make them fit his theories; getting to know a document, like getting to know a person, is an existential encounter. Marrou writes repetitiously at times, and the translation is often stiff, but the book is a stimulating introduction.—W. B. K. (shrink)

West takes his title from Camus, and quotes Camus' definition of absurdity: "the division between the mind that desires and the world that disappoints." The essays, which originally appeared in periodicals, discuss Yeats, Lawrence, Sartre, Camus, Simon Weil, Graham Greene, Santayana, and other modern writers. There is no analysis, either philosophical or literary; West attempts overall estimates of each writer's contribution to the problem of absurdity, but succeeds in providing neither insights for those already familiar with the problem nor useful (...) introductions for the uninitiated. Nor, despite the expectations aroused by the preface, do we get a very strong impression of an individual's encounter with the thinkers from whom he has learned most. In vino vacuitas.—W. B. K. (shrink)

BACKGROUND: Alzheimer's disease is intimately tied to amyloid-beta peptide. Extraneuronal brain plaques consisting primarily of Abeta aggregates are a hallmark of AD. Intraneuronal Abeta subunits are strongly implicated in disease progression. Protein sequence mutations of the Abeta precursor protein account for a small proportion of AD cases, suggesting that regulation of the associated gene may play a more important role in AD etiology. The APP promoter possesses a novel 30 nucleotide sequence, or "proximal regulatory element" , at -76/-47, from the (...) +1 transcription start site that confers cell type specificity. This PRE contains sequences that make it vulnerable to epigenetic modification and may present a viable target for drug studies. We examined PRE-nuclear protein interaction by gel electrophoretic mobility shift assay and PRE mutant EMSA. This was followed by functional studies of PRE mutant/reporter gene fusion clones. RESULTS: EMSA probed with the PRE showed DNA-protein interaction in multiple nuclear extracts and in human brain tissue nuclear extract in a tissue-type specific manner. We identified transcription factors that are likely to bind the PRE, using competition gel shift and gel supershift: Activator protein 2 , nm23 nucleoside diphosphate kinase/metastatic inhibitory protein , and specificity protein 1 . These sites crossed a known single nucleotide polymorphism . EMSA with PRE mutants and promoter/reporter clone transfection analysis further implicated PuF in cells and extracts. Functional assays of mutant/reporter clone transfections were evaluated by ELISA of reporter protein levels. EMSA and ELISA results correlated by meta-analysis. CONCLUSIONS: We propose that PuF may regulate the APP gene promoter and that AD risk may be increased by interference with PuF regulation at the PRE. PuF is targeted by calcium/calmodulin-dependent protein kinase II inhibitor 1, which also interacts with the integrins. These proteins are connected to vital cellular and neurological functions. In addition, the transcription factor PuF is a known inhibitor of metastasis and regulates cell growth during development. Given that APP is a known cell adhesion protein and ferroxidase, this suggests biochemical links among cell signaling, the cell cycle, iron metabolism in cancer, and AD in the context of overall aging. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Spiritual Experience and PsychopathologyMike Jackson and K. W. M. Fulford (bio)AbstractA recent study of the relationship between spiritual experience and psychopathology (reported in detail elsewhere) suggested that psychotic phenomena could occur in the context of spiritual experiences rather than mental illness. In the present paper, this finding is illustrated with three detailed case histories. Its implications are then explored for psychopathology, for psychiatric classification, and for our understanding of (...) the concept of mental illness. It is argued that pathological and spiritual psychotic phenomena cannot be distinguished by 1) form and content alone (as in traditional psychopathology), 2) by their relationship either with other symptoms or with pathological causes (as in psychiatric classification), or 3) by reference to the descriptive criteria of mental illness implied by the “medical” model. The distinction is shown to depend, rather, on the way in which psychotic phenomena themselves are embedded in the values and beliefs of the person concerned. This in turn is shown to have implications for diagnosis (it shows the need for clinicians to attend to the values and beliefs of individual patients), for treatment (it points to a cognitive problem-solving model), and for research in psychopathology (especially as related to the emerging sciences of dynamic brain imaging and cognitive neuroscience).Keywordsfirst rank symptoms, schizophrenia, delusion, hallucination, thought disorder, religious experience, mystical experienceIntroductionThis paper explores some of the conceptual and practical implications of the finding that phenomena which in a medical context would probably be diagnosed as psychotic symptoms, may occur in the context of non-pathological, and indeed essentially benign, spiritual experiences.The existence of non-pathological psychotic experiences of this kind (we will call them “psychotic phenomena” as distinct from “psychotic symptoms”—see also Endnote 1, terminology) was a key finding in a study carried out by one of us (MJ) at the Alister Hardy Research Centre (AHRC) in Oxford. Details are given elsewhere both of the overall empirical findings of the study, including the relationship between spiritual experience and personality variables, and of a hypothetical cognitive problem-solving model of these phenomena (Jackson 1991, and forthcoming a and b). In the present paper, 1) the background to the study is described briefly in relation to earlier work on the possible links between spiritual experience and psychopathology; 2) some of the psychotic phenomena identified are illustrated with three detailed case histories; 3) the significance of these phenomena is reviewed for our understanding respectively of psychopathology, of diagnostic syndromes, and of the concept of mental illness; and 4) some of the practical implications of the study for clinical work and research in psychiatry are indicated.BackgroundIt has long been recognized that there are similarities between spiritual and psychotic experiences. [End Page 41] William James (1902), for example, argued that “in delusional insanity, paranoia as they sometimes call it, we may have a kind of diabolical mysticism, a sort of religious mysticism turned upside down” (426). Other commentators have noted a wide variety of phenomena, such as time distortion, synesthesias, loss of self-object boundaries and the transition from a state of conflict and anxiety to one of sudden “understanding,” all of which are reported in both spiritual and psychotic experiences (Buckley 1981; Watson 1982; Wapnick 1969; and Wootton and Allen 1983).Yet the similarities notwithstanding, the distinction between these two kinds of experience can be crucially important. Spiritual experiences, whether welcome or unwelcome, and whether or not they are psychotic in form, have nothing (directly) to do with medicine (Fulford 1996a). It would be quite wrong, then, to “treat” spiritual psychotic experiences with neuroleptic drugs, just as it is quite wrong to “treat” political dissidents as though they were ill (Fulford, Smirnoff and Snow, 1993). Pathological psychotic experiences, on the other hand, or psychotic symptoms, are by definition a proper object of medical treatment, sometimes even against the wishes of the person concerned. Hence it would be both negligent and, as Wing (1978) put it, morally “repellent,” to leave untreated someone who is genuinely ill (244).Given how much turns on the distinction between spiritual experience and psychopathology, it is perhaps not surprising that scholarly discussion of the relationship between them has at times... (shrink)