1. Problema cunoașterii.--2. Destinul omenirii.--3. Istoria filozofiei moderne. Problema ontologică.--4. Problema cosmologică.

"An imposing edifice of thought. Every one of its twenty chapters will richly repay careful reading. Those passages dealing with ethics, love, the significance of knowledge, and the meaning of life are hard to surpass." - New York Evening Post The title of this book, Tertium Organum, boldly refers no less to a reorganization of all knowledge, but it is primarily a study of psychology, more specifically the psychology of our higher mind. For Ouspensky what we can call the higher (...) mind represents, within a single person, the development of an entirely new way of understanding. In short, psychology is the art of self-study. With remarkable scope and sophistication, Ouspensky shows us in this book, which has been hailed as "a work of genius," just how vast and strange our universe really is. P. D. [PETYR DEMIANOVICH] OUSPENSKY (1878-1947) was a Russian mathematician and philosopher turned mystic, who combined geometry and psychology in his discussion of higher dimensions of existence. After traveling through Europe and the East, seeking unsuccessfully the world's centers where ancient esoteric knowledge and wisdom are not only preserved, but taught to initiates, he returned to Russia where he met and studied under G.I. Gurdjieff. Ouspensky is today best known for his expositions of the early work of this famous Russian mystic. (shrink)

The article deals with various modal versions of the ontological argument from N. Malcolm’s to P. Tichý’s interpretation of Anselm’s second proof. Three key presuppositions of the modal proof are pin-pointed and examined. The principal problem with the proof seems to be the notion of necessary existence attributed to God. More precisely, the question is whether this is not too strong an attribute, for then there would not be a situation, i.e. a possible world, consistently thinkable which precludes the existence (...) of God. However, this seems to be wrong. (shrink)

The article deals with various modal versions of the ontological argument from N. Malcolm’s to P. Tichý’s interpretation of Anselm’s second proof. Three key presuppositions of the modal proof are pin-pointed and examined. The principal problem with the proof seems to be the notion of necessary existence attributed to God. More precisely, the question is whether this is not too strong an attribute, for then there would not be a situation, i.e. a possible world, consistently thinkable which precludes the existence (...) of God. However, this seems to be wrong. (shrink)

The paper attempts to interpret P. van Inwagen’s refutation of Evans’ argument that there cannot be vague objects and defend it against the charge of inconsistency raised by Radim Bělohrad. However, such an interpretation is not without a cost. Therefore another interpretation of van Inwagen’s example of the Cabinet is offered which evades Evans’ charge of inconsistency against indeterminate identity as it does not need the notion at all.

The well-known Ratio Studiorum of 1599 states that logical instruction should follow F. Toletus or P. Fonseca. The latter authored the famous Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo, the former a similar manual, Introductio in Dialecticam Aristotelis. As is often observed, the contrast between the Aristotelian and present symbolic logics is perhaps most striking in their analysis of relational statements. Both authors recognize the relational logical form as independent from the traditional subject-predicate form and see the need to recognize relational inferential rules. (...) They differ in their specific rules, however, so neither of the authors has captured the system of relational syllogism in its entirety. (shrink)

The well-known Ratio Studiorum of 1599 states that logical instruction should follow F. Toletus or P. Fonseca. The latter authored the famous Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo, the former a similar manual, Introductio in Dialecticam Aristotelis. As is often observed, the contrast between the Aristotelian and present symbolic logics is perhaps most striking in their analysis of relational statements. Both authors recognize the relational logical form as independent from the traditional subject-predicate form and see the need to recognize relational inferential rules. (...) They differ in their specific rules, however, so neither of the authors has captured the system of relational syllogism in its entirety. (shrink)

The concept of mimesis has been central to philosophical aesthetics from Aristotle to Kendall Walton: in plain terms, it highlights the links between a fictional world or a representational practice on the one hand and the real world on the other. The present collection of essays includes discussions of its general viability and pertinence and of its historical origins, as well as detailed analyses of various relevant issues regarding literature, film, theatre, images and computer games. The individual papers offer new (...) arguments for the specialist, yet in their sum also provide a solid and helpful survey of the current state of the debate. Contributions by P. Alward, G. Currie, D. Davies, L. Dole el, J. Hamilton, T. Kobli ek, P. Kot'atko, A. Kuzmicova, J. Levinson, A. Meskin, A. Pettersson, M. Pokorny, J. Robson, G. Rossholm, R. M. Sainsbury, F. Stjernberg, E. Terrone, K. Thein, A. Voltolini. (shrink)

In this paper we explore the following question: how weak can a logic be for Rosser’s essential undecidability result to be provable for a weak arithmetical theory? It is well known that Robinson’s Q is essentially undecidable in intuitionistic logic, and P. Hájek proved it in the fuzzy logic BL for Grzegorczyk’s variant of Q which interprets the arithmetic operations as nontotal nonfunctional relations. We present a proof of essential undecidability in a much weaker substructural logic and for a much (...) weaker arithmetic theory, a version of Robinson’s R (with arithmetic operations also interpreted as mere relations). Our result is based on a structural version of the undecidability argument introduced by Kleene and we show that it goes well beyond the scope of the Boolean, intuitionistic, or fuzzy logic. (shrink)

In this paper we explore the following question: how weak can a logic be for Rosser's essential undecidability result to be provable for a weak arithmetical theory? It is well known that Robinson's Q is essentially undecidable in intuitionistic logic, and P. Hajek proved it in the fuzzy logic BL for Grzegorczyk's variant of Q which interprets the arithmetic operations as non-total non-functional relations. We present a proof of essential undecidability in a much weaker substructural logic and for a much (...) weaker arithmetic theory, a version of Robinson's R (with arithmetic operations also interpreted as mere relations). Our result is based on a structural version of the undecidability argument introduced by Kleene and we show that it goes well beyond the scope of the Boolean, intuitionistic, or fuzzy logic. (shrink)

This article addresses the issue of units of analysis and atomistic models in psychology taking creativity research as a case study. A classic typology in this area, initially proposed by Rhodes, distinguishes between the four P's of creativity: person, process, product, and press. Continuing an effort to rewrite this basic language of the discipline from a cultural psychological perspective in the form of five A's, the discussion here focuses on bringing relationships to the fore within this framework and problematising strict (...) distinctions between each of the five elements. A closer look at the five A's of creativity, drawing on theoretical considerations and illustrated by interviews with creators working in different domains, reveals the permeable borders surrounding these units and challenges clear divisions between actors and audiences, action and artefacts, actors and artefacts. In the end, it is argued that creative phenomena cannot be properly understood and studied outside of their integrated and dynamic totality defined as a creativity complex. Implications of adopting this “molecular” perspective for theory and methodology are discussed. (shrink)

We investigate the following weak Ramsey property of a cardinal κ: If χ is coloring of nodes of the tree κ <ω by countably many colors, call a tree ${T \subseteq \kappa^{ < \omega}}$ χ-homogeneous if the number of colors on each level of T is finite. Write ${\kappa \rightsquigarrow (\lambda)^{ < \omega}_{\omega}}$ to denote that for any such coloring there is a χ-homogeneous λ-branching tree of height ω. We prove, e.g., that if ${\kappa < \mathfrak{p}}$ or ${\kappa > \mathfrak{d}}$ (...) is regular, then ${{\kappa \rightsquigarrow (\kappa)^{ < \omega}_{\omega}}}$ and that ${\mathfrak{b}}$ ${(\mathfrak{b})^{ < \omega}_{\omega}}$ and ${\mathfrak{d}}$ ${(\mathfrak{d})^{ < \omega}_{\omega}}$ . The arrow is applied to prove a generalization of a theorem of Hurewicz: A Čech-analytic space is σ-locally compact iff it does not contain a closed homeomorphic copy of irrationals. (shrink)

Łu logic plays a fundamental role among many-valued logics. However, the expressive power of this logic is restricted to piecewise linear functions. In this paper we enrich the language of Łu logic by adding a new connective which expresses multiplication. The resulting logic, PŁ, is defined, developed, and put into the context of other well-known many-valued logics. We also deal with several extensions of this propositional logic. A predicate version of PŁ logic is introduced and developed too.

We prove the existence of p-ideals that are nonmeagre subsets of P(ω) under various set-theoretic assumptions.

Petr Leonidovich Kapitsa, world-renowned physicist, often turns to themes that at first glance seem far removed from the sphere of his basic scientific interests. He is the author of numerous articles and papers on problems of the development of science and the organization of scientific work . Many have read with interest his remarkable recollections of Rutherford, published in Novy mir.

From the editors of Voprosy filosofii: The editors publish herewith the address by the ranking Soviet physicist Academician Petr Leonidovich Kapitsa, Director of the Institute of Physical Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences, at the symposium, organized by UNESCO and held in Ulm, West Germany, in 1978, on the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Albert Einstein. The speech was graciously made available to us by Kapitsa. In it the Academician gives his principal attention to the global problems that (...) have interested him of late, on which he has already expressed himself in the pages of our journal . In the form and manner in which its problems are set forth, this address is designed chiefly for the scientists of Western countries present at the Ulm symposium. (shrink)

At first glance a Russian anarchist’s revolutionary address to the youth of his day made in the late 19th century and the address to youth made by a contemporary French philosopher may appear to have little in common as their context and era are ostensibly very different. How would Petr Kropotkin’s address be understood in our time? Are Kropotkin’s concerns the same as those raised by Bernard Stiegler? Could Kropotkin speak of universal concerns, a sense of elevation and sublimation not (...) governed, undermined or circumvented by digital relations, calculation or algorithmic determination? I find a mutual concern with the coming into maturity of youth, but, I am concerned that as we are passing through an epochal and revolutionary transformation driven by digital and cognitive capitalism and in our toxic and crisis-ridden milieu, Kropotkin’s rhetoric would inevitably fall on deaf ears? Is his rhetoric on revolution anachronistic? How would his rhetoric be crafted for a youth seemingly indifferent to the plight of fellow brethren? Is it conceivable that the humanist-inflected prospects of youth so vaunted by Kropotkin have now been devastated by the inhuman and nihilistic tendencies of the so-called miscreant, ‘blank generation’ as described by Stiegler? True, while it is difficult to calibrate the vision of youth affirmed in Kropotkin with the fear of youth in Stiegler, and, despite differences in episteme, tradition and political orientation, both thinkers I think are concerned with the trials and tribulations of youth and both hold out the prospect of the not-yet of youth, of the coming into being of the maturity of youth, of Aufklärung. It is this shared focus I wish to examine further. (shrink)

Although heavily overshadowed by renewed study of the religious tradition in Russian philosophy, another tradition that paralleled and sometimes intersected with it is also drawing attention among contemporary Russian philosophers interested in mining the intellectual legacy of the past for ideas applicable to their postcommunist situation. This is the tradition of liberalism in Russian political and legal philosophy, neglected thus far in this journal except for an article on Boris Chicherin by Sergei Chizhkov in the Winter 1991-92 issue and an (...) article on Petr Struve by Piama Gaidenko in the Fall 1994 issue. The present issue is entirely devoted to the liberal strain in Russia's philosophical heritage and its implications for the present day. (shrink)

C. Antoniade -- P.P. Negulescu -- Petre Andrei -- Mihai Ralea -- Tudor Vianu.

Studies man in view of what he may become. Describes how a man must work simultaneously on his knowledge and his being to find inner unity.

Analyzing different philosophical and theological components of Aquinas’s view regarding the relation between human agency and divine providence, the monograph shows this view to be compatibilist, based on a determinist conception of causation and an aristocratic understanding of goodness.

Can one extend crisp Peano arithmetic PA by a possibly many-valued predicate Tr(x) saying “xis true” and satisfying the “dequotation schema”for all sentences φ? This problem is investigated in the frame of Łukasiewicz infinitely valued logic.

Reflection Principles are commonly thought to produce only strong axioms of infinity consistent with V = L. It would be desirable to have some notion of strong reflection to remedy this, and we have proposed Global Reflection Principles based on a somewhat Cantorian view of the universe. Such principles justify the kind of cardinals needed for, inter alia , Woodin’s Ω-Logic.

The theological program of Archpriest Georges Florovsky is understood as a conception of the neopatristic synthesis that he developed. From the beginning, its appearance was associated with the participation of its creator in a public discussion about the historical ways of Russia within the framework of the Eurasian movement, then, with his scientific investigations into the history of Russian Orthodoxy and ancient Christian thought and later with his activity in the ecumenical movement. It is noteworthy that the positive content of (...) the program for modern Orthodox theology turned out to be an indirect response to broader challenges of historical and social order. The focus of attention in this case are some peculiarities in the reception of the program in international and Russian contexts, which in turn requires the clarification of the content of its main points, such as a question about a true fatherland or the sense and meaning of Christian Hellenism. The conclusion notes the significant relevance and openness of Florovsky’s ideas for modern Orthodox theology. (shrink)

In the last few decades many formal systems of fuzzy logics have been developed. Since the main differences between fuzzy and classical logics lie at the propositional level, the fuzzy predicate logics have developed more slowly (compared to the propositional ones). In this text we aim to promote interest in fuzzy predicate logics by contributing to the model theory of fuzzy predicate logics. First, we generalize the completeness theorem, then we use it to get results on conservative extensions of theories (...) and on witnessed models. (shrink)

The paper is devoted to Nikolay Lossky who was one of the leading Russian philosophers of the first half of the twentieth century. We demonstrate the interrelationship between three aspects of Lossky’s philosophy: realism in the theory of knowledge, hierarchical personalism, and supra-naturalistic concept of evolution. We pay attention to the contemporary relevance of Lossky, and we discuss and critique his ideas in light of those of other philosophers. Lossky acknowledges that the subject interacts with being itself and that knowledge (...) is not a shadow or copy of being. His ontology is based on intuitivism and epistemological optimism. Its main categories are God, as the super-systematic principle, and monads. In Lossky’s metaphysics, the idea of abstract ideal principles of being is quite harmoniously combined with personalism. Lossky’s ontology has strong ethical underpinnings. He considers that values are rooted in being and that the evolution of the world is directed by God towards the good. Lossky elaborates a supra-naturalistic concept of evolution. He extrapolates principles of teleological determination, which are fundamental to human existence, on the underlying levels of the world as a whole. Many trends of modern thought are in tune with Lossky’s philosophy, including a return to metaphysics, panpsychism, Platonism, and the desire to unite the religious worldview with new scientific discoveries. (shrink)

Humans are remarkably adaptable, and therefore a successful species. There are many speculative answers to the question of why this is so. One of them represents the cultural intelligence hypothesis, which consid-ers cultural learning skills as the key to human success. This work aims to present the hypothesis of cultural intelligence as a viable alternative to more conventional approaches within the debate about the origin of human intelligence, such as the hypothesis of general and improvisational intelligence. Theirmutual comparison shows that (...) cultural intelligence hypothesis must necessarily work with flexible social learning strategies to describe cultural transmission, thus losing part of its explanatory power. As the theory of metacognitive strategies of social learning by cognitive psychologist Cecilia Heyes shows, there is a way to combine the flexibility of human reasoning with the “stupid” process of cultural selection. (shrink)

Environmental anxiety is often thought of as a psychopathological condition. Our paper aims to challenge this narrow understanding by offering an existential-phenomenological interpretation of environmental anxiety that posits it as an _existential attunement_ with a transformative potential, capable of opening the anxious individual to a hopeful and meaningful outlook on the future. In the first part of the paper, we provide a conceptual analysis of environmental anxiety, drawing on current interdisciplinary taxonomies of environmental emotions as well as on existential-phenomenological definitions (...) of anxiety. We then proceed to define the two key existential characteristics of environmental anxiety, firstly (i) its ability to reframe the aesthetic perception of nature, and secondly (ii) its impact on the subjective constitution of meaning. In the second part of the paper, drawing on the work of Kierkegaard and contemporary ecopsychological and ecotheological thinkers, a distinction is made between a naïve and a radical form of environmental hope. It is argued that while the former type of hope leads to inactivity, the latter is capable of motivating individuals to pro-environmental action. (shrink)

Social networks can influence people’s behaviour and therefore it is assumed that central individuals in social networks, also called “opinion leaders”, play a key role in driving change in agricultural and food systems. I analyse the outcomes of an intervention (that encouraged Sulawesi smallholder farmers to take a specific action toward improving the health of their cocoa trees) to assess the impact of engaging opinion leaders in agricultural programs that aim to change farmers’ practices. The intervention has been implemented through (...) (a) 18 opinion leaders identified by interviews and a social network survey of 1885 cocoa farmers; and (b) 18 randomly selected farmers who were not central in local social networks. The obtained social networks and statistical data were quantitatively analysed and the results were interpreted with input from the field staff. Contrary to expectations, the highly socially central opinion leaders were not more effective in promoting the initiative in their communities. On average, randomly selected low-centrality farmers convinced almost twice as many of their peers to take the recommended action as compared to the identified opinion leaders (17.1 versus 8.6) but the variation within the random group was also significantly higher. Importantly, while the identified opinion leaders were mostly senior men, women performed better in influencing others into taking action even when their centrality in local social networks of agricultural advice was lower. I discuss the implications of the conventional selection of perceived opinion leaders as model farmers for achieving sustainable and equitable change at scale in agriculture and propose practical alternatives. (shrink)

Drawing on current debates at the frontiers of economics, psychology, and political philosophy, this book explores the challenges that arise for liberal democracies from a confrontation between modern technologies and the bounds of human rationality. With the ongoing transition of democracy's underlying information economy into the digital space, threats of disinformation and runaway political polarization have been gaining prominence. Employing the economic approach informed by behavioral sciences' findings, the book's chief concern is how these challenges can be addressed while preserving (...) a commitment to democratic values and maximizing the epistemic benefits of democratic decision-making. The book has two key strands: it provides a systematic argument for building a behaviorally informed theory of democracy; and explores how scientific knowledge on quirks and bounds of human rationality can inform the design of resilient democratic institutions. Drawing these together, the book explores the centrality of the rationality assumption in the methodological debates surrounding behavioral sciences as exemplified by the dispute between neoclassical and behavioral economics; the role of rationality in democratic social choice; behaviorally informed paternalism as a response to the challenge of irrationality; and non-paternalistic avenues to increase the resilience of the democratic institutions towards political irrationality This book is invaluable reading for anyone interested in behavioral economics and sciences, political philosophy and the future of democracy. (shrink)

Procedural justifications of democracy emphasize inclusiveness and respect and by doing so come into conflict with instrumental justifications that depend on voters’ competence. This conflict raises questions about jury theorems and makes their standing in democratic theory contested. We show that a type of no-regret learning called meta-induction can help to satisfy the competence assumption without excluding voters or diverse opinion leaders on an a priori basis. Meta-induction assigns weights to opinion leaders based on their past predictive performance to determine (...) the level of their inclusion in recommendations for voters. The weighting minimizes the difference between the performance of meta-induction and the best opinion leader in hindsight. The difference represents the regret of meta-induction whose minimization ensures that the recommendations are optimal in supporting voters’ competence. Meta-induction has optimal truth-tracking properties that support voters’ competence even if it is targeted by mis/disinformation and should be considered a tool for supporting democracy in hyper-plurality. (shrink)