Cet ouvrage interroge le penser épistémologique de K.R. Popper, à la fois dans ses fondements et dans son déploiement, en posant deux questions épistémo-logiques : celle du " paradoxe méthodologique" et celle de " l'exigence d'élargissement de la formule de la croissance du savoir scientifique.".

Il est une actualité de la syllogistique aristotélicienne qui impose encore aujourd'hui les règles de l'argumentation logique dans la production du savoir scientifique. Le moyen terme y régule la structure et la forme du raisonnement — cet ensemble de jugements — élaboré de telle sorte que la conclusion découle nécessairement des prémisses. Chez Aristote, le jugement requiert ainsi une multitude de procédures d'application à la réalité. Or, Boole trouve en cela un problème méthodologique largement négligé par les logiciens et certains (...) historiens des sciences modernes : le problème d'Aristote sur le moyen terme, le moyen terme étant à la fois cause, matière et forme du syllogisme catégorique. Les deux penseurs visent pourtant l'infaillibilité du raisonnement par l'élimination du moyen terme dans les procédures de la recherche de la vérité. Ce qui les divise est à la fois d'ordre méthodologique et de degré. Car, Aristote élimine le moyen terme de la conclusion et selon les lois ultimes de l'objet. Boole, en revanche, élimine le moyen terme du raisonnement symbolique sur la base des lois ultimes de la pensée pure en lui reniant le statut que lui conférait Aristote. Cet article vise à montrer, à la lumière de cette éclipse du moyen terme pour Aristote que, pour Boole, la solution nécessaire au problème d'Aristote est la « théorie générale des signes » qui, elle, consacre l'élimination du moyen terme du raisonnement symbolique. C'est une exigence de la pensée connaissante en ce qu'elle constitue son caractère méta-méthodologique. La théorie générale des signes rendrait ainsi l'actualité de l'aristotélisme plus persistante si tant est qu'il est admis que Boole ne s'en est lui-même pas encore démarqué. (shrink)

Il est une actualité de la syllogistique aristotélicienne qui impose encore aujourd'hui les règles de l'argumentation logique dans la production du savoir scientifique. Le moyen terme y régule la structure et la forme du raisonnement — cet ensemble de jugements — élaboré de telle sorte que la conclusion découle nécessairement des prémisses. Chez Aristote, le jugement requiert ainsi une multitude de procédures d'application à la réalité. Or, Boole trouve en cela un problème méthodologique largement négligé par les logiciens et certains (...) historiens des sciences modernes : le problème d'Aristote sur le moyen terme, le moyen terme étant à la fois cause, matière et forme du syllogisme catégorique. Les deux penseurs visent pourtant l'infaillibilité du raisonnement par l'élimination du moyen terme dans les procédures de la recherche de la vérité. Ce qui les divise est à la fois d'ordre méthodologique et de degré. Car, Aristote élimine le moyen terme de la conclusion et selon les lois ultimes de l'objet. Boole, en revanche, élimine le moyen terme du raisonnement symbolique sur la base des lois ultimes de la pensée pure en lui reniant le statut que lui conférait Aristote. Cet article vise à montrer, à la lumière de cette éclipse du moyen terme pour Aristote que, pour Boole, la solution nécessaire au problème d'Aristote est la « théorie générale des signes » qui, elle, consacre l'élimination du moyen terme du raisonnement symbolique. C'est une exigence de la pensée connaissante en ce qu'elle constitue son caractère méta-méthodologique. La théorie générale des signes rendrait ainsi l'actualité de l'aristotélisme plus persistante si tant est qu'il est admis que Boole ne s'en est lui-même pas encore démarqué. (shrink)

PREFACEProf. Göran Sundholm of Leiden University inspired the group of Logic at Lille and Valparaíso to start a fundamental review of the dialogical conception of logic by linking it to constructive type logic. One of Sundholm's insights was that inference can be seen as involving an implicit interlocutor. This led to several investigations aimed at exploring the consequences of joining winning strategies to the proof-theoretical conception of meaning. The leading idea is, roughly, that while introduction rules lay down the conditions (...) under which a winning strategy for the Proponent may be built, the elimination rules lay down those elements of the Opponent's assertions that the Proponent has the right to use for building winning strategy. It is the pragmatic and ethical features of obligations and rights that naturally lead to the dialogical interpretation of natural deduction.During the Visiting Professorship of Prof. Sundholm at Lille in (2012) the group of Lille started delving into the ways of implementing Per Martin-Löf's Constructive Type Theory with the dialogical perspective. In particular, Aarne Ranta's (1988) paper, the first publication on the subject, was read and discussed during Sundholm’s seminar. The discussions strongly suggested that the game-theoretical conception of quantifiers as deploying interdependent moves provide a natural link between CTT and dialogical logic. This idea triggered several publications by the group of Lille in collaboration with Nicolas Clerbout and Juan Redmond at the University of Valparaíso, including the publication of the book (2015) by Clerbout / Rahman that provides a systematic development of this way of linking CTT and the dialogical conception of logic. However the Clerbout / Rahman book was written from the CTT perspective on dialogical logic, rather than the other way round. The present book should provide the perspective from the other side of the dialogue between the Dialogical Framework and Constructive Type Theory. The main idea of our present study is that Sundholm's (1997) notion of epistemic assumption is closely linked to the Copy-Cat Rule or Socratic Rule that distinguishes the dialogical framework from other game-theoretical approaches. One way to read the present book is as a further development of Sundholm’s extension of Austin's (1946, p. 171) remark on acts of assertion to inference. Indeed, Sundholm (2013, p. 17) gave the following forceful formulation: When I say therefore, I give others my authority for asserting the conclusion, given theirs for asserting the premisses.Per Martin-Löf, in recent lectures, have utilized the dialogical perspective on epistemic assumptions to get out of a certain circle that threatens the explanation of the notions of inference and demonstration. A demonstration may be explained as a chain of (immediate) inferences starting from no premisses. That an inference J1... Jn—————Jis valid means that the conclusion J can be made evident on the assumption that J1, …, Jn are known. The notion of epistemic assumption thus enters in the explanation of valid inference. We cannot, however, in this explanation understand 'known' in the sense of demonstrated, for then we are explaining the notion of inference in terms of demonstration, whereas demonstration has been explained in terms of inference. Martin-Löf suggests that we here understand 'known' in the sense of asserted, so that epistemic assumptions are judgements others have made, judgements for which others have taken the responsibility; that the inference is valid then means that, given that others have taken responsbility for the premisses, I can take responsibility for the conclusion:The circularity problem is this: if you define a demonstration to be a chain of immediate inferences, then you are defining demonstration in terms of inference. Now we are considering an immediate inference and we are trying to give a proper explanation of that; but, if that begins by saying: Assume that J1, …, Jn have been demonstrated – then you are clearly in trouble, because you are about to explain demonstration in terms of the notion of immediate inference, hence when you are giving an account of the notion of immediate inference, the notion of demonstration is not yet at your disposal. So, to say: Assume that J1, …, Jn have already been demonstrated, makes you accusable of trying to explain things in a circle. The solution to this circularity problem, it seems to me now, comes naturally out of this dialogical analysis. […]The solution is that the premisses here should not be assumed to be known in the qualified sense, that is, to be demonstrated, but we should simply assume that they have been asserted, which is to say that others have taken responsibility for them, and then the question for me is whether I can take responsibility for the conclusion. So, the assumption is merely that they have been asserted, not that they have been demonstrated. That seems to me to be the appropriate definition of epistemic assumption in Sundholm's sense. One of the main tenets of the present study is that the further move of relating the Socratic Rule rule with judgemental equality provides both a simpler and more direct way to implement the constructive type theoretical approach within the dialogical framework. Such a reconsideration of the Socratic Rule, roughly speaking, amounts to the following. 1.A move from P that brings-forward a play-object in order to defend an elementary proposition A can be challenged by O. 2.The answer to such a challenge, involves P bringing forward a definitional equality that expresses the fact that the play-object chosen by P copies the one O has chosen while positing A. For short, the equality expresses at the object-languaje level that the defence of P relies on the authority given to O to be able to produce the play-objects she brings forward. More generally, according to this view, a definitional equality established by P and brought forward while defending the proposition A, expresses the equality between a play-object (introduced by O) and the instruction for building a play-object deployed by O while affirming A. So it can be read as a computation rule that indicates how to compute O's instructions. Let us recall that from the strategic point of view, O's moves correspond to elimination rules of demonstrations. Thus, the dialogical rules that prescribe how to introduce a definitional equality – correspond – at the strategic level – to the definitional equality rules for CTT as applied to the selector-functions involved in the elimination rules. So, what we are doing here is extending the dialogical interpretation of Sundholm's epistemic assumption to the rules that set up the definitional equality of a type.The present work is structured in the following way:•In the Introduction we state the main tenets that guide our book•Chapter II contains a brief overview of Constructive Type Theory penned by Ansten Klev with exercises and their solutions. •Chapter III offers a novel presentation of the dialogical conception of logic. In fact, the first two sections of the chapter provide an overview of standard dialogical logic – including solved exercises, slightly adapted to the content of the present volume. The rest of the sections develop a new dialogical approach to Constructive Type Theory. •Chapters IV and V contain the main body of our study, namely the relation between the Socratic Rule, epistemic assumptions, and equality. The chapter provides the reader with thoroughly worked out examples with comments. •After the Final Remarks the book containsa.An appendix containing a an overview of all the rules for the new formulation of dialogical approach to constructive type theory developed in the book; b.a brief outline of Per Martin-Löf's informal presentation of the demonstration of the axiom of choice.c.two examples of a tree-shaped graph of an extensive strategy. Acknowledgments: Many thanks to Mark van Atten (Paris1), Giuliano Bacigalupo (Zürich), Charles Zacharie Bowao (Univ. Ma Ngouabi de Brazzaville, Congo), Christian Berner (Lille3), Michel Crubellier (Lille3), Pierre Cardascia (Lille3), Oumar Dia (Dakar), Marcel Nguimbi ((Univ. Marien Ngouabi de Brazzaville, Congo), Adjoua Bernadette Dango (Lille3 / Alassane Ouattara de Bouaké, Côte d'Ivoire), Steephen Rossy Eckoubili (Lille3), Johan Georg Granström (Zürich), Gerhard Heinzmann (Nancy2), Muhammad Iqbal (Lille3), Matthieu Fontaine (Lille3), Radmila Jovanovic (Belgrad), Hanna Karpenko (Lille3), Laurent Keiff (Lille3), Sébastien Magnier (Saint Dennis, Réunion), Clément Lion (Lille3), Gildas Nzokou (Libreville), Fachrur Rozie (Lille3), Helge Rückert (Mannheim), Mohammad Shafiei (Paris1), and Hassan Tahiri (Lisbon), for rich interchanges, suggestions on the main claims of the present study and proof-reading of specific sections of the text. Special thanks to Gildas Nzokou (Libreville), Steephen Rossy Eckoubili (Lille3) and Clément Lion (Lille3), with whom a Pre-Graduate Textbook in French on dialogical logic and CTT is in the process of being worked out – during the visiting-professorship in 2016 of the former. Eckoubili is the author of the sections on exercises for dialogical logic, Nzokou cared of those involving the development of CTT-demonstrations out of winning-strategies. Special thanks also to Ansten Klev (Prague) for helping with technical details and conceptual issues on CTT, particularly so as author of the chapter introducing CTT. (shrink)

Economics is dominated by model building, therefore a comprehension of how such models work is vital to understanding the discipline. This book provides a critical analysis of the economist's favourite tool, and as such will be an enlightening read for some, and an intriguing one for others.

The metrology literature neglects a strong empirical measurement tradition in economics, which is different from the traditions as accounted for by the formalist representational theory of measurement. This empirical tradition comes closest to Mari's characterization of measurement in which he describes measurement results as informationally adequate to given goals. In economics, one has to deal with soft systems, which induces problems of invariance and of self-awareness. It will be shown that in the empirical economic measurement tradition both problems have been (...) on the agenda for a long while, and that the proposed solutions to these problems provide clues for the directions in which one could develop a measurement theory that takes account of soft systems. (shrink)

The practice of economic science is dominated by model building. To evaluate economic policy, models are built and used to produce numbers to inform us about economic phenomena. Although phenomena are detected through the use of observed data, they are in general not directly observable. To 'see' them we need instruments. More particularly, to obtain numerical facts of the phenomena we need measuring instruments. This paper will argue that in economics models function as such instruments of observation, more specific as (...) measuring instruments. In measurement theory, measurement is a mapping of some class of aspects of characteristics of the empirical world into a set of numbers. The paper's view is that economic modelling is a specific kind of mapping to which the standard account on how models are obtained and assessed does not apply. Models are not easily or simply derived from theories and subsequently tested against empirical data. Instruments are constructed by integrating several theoretical and empirical ideas and requirements in such a way that their performance meets a beforehand chosen standard. The empirical requirement is that the model should take account of the phenomenological facts, so that the reliability of the model is not assessed by post-model testing but obtained by calibration. (shrink)

Introduction Moral concern for animals is commonly formulated in terms of concern for their welfare. Yet, besides the welfare issue, although highly ...

Assessment of error and uncertainty is a vital component of both natural and social science. This edited volume presents case studies of research practices across a wide spectrum of scientific fields. It compares methodologies and presents the ingredients needed for an overarching framework applicable to all.

Communities of Deaf people consider themselves a minority with its own language, Sign Language, and culture. Two basic characteristics of Deaf Culture, its orientation on community and the awareness of an own Deaf worldview different from hearing people's worldview, are often not recognized by Christian Churches. This article tries to find a theological answer on this dramatic situation, formulating a theological foundation of the legitimacy of Deaf people's experience of God's presence in the Deaf community, and the thesis that God's (...) presence can take place even in a very secular environment. The legitimacy of the experience of God's presence in the community is supported by statements of exegetes, Fathers of the Church, spiritual theologians, and Church historians about Jesus' presence amongst two or three. This presence needs of a new Pneumatic religious culture, which is based on the quality of relationship. (shrink)

Apresenta o desenvolvimento sustentável como uma utopia possível. Expõe as reflexões de pesquisadores que levantam críticas e apontam caminhos para a revisão do papel da universidade, da ciência e das políticas públicas.

ZusammenfassungEthik-Cafés in der geriatrischen Langzeitpflege dienen auch der ethischen Weiterbildung und sollen den Beteiligten in ungezwungener Atmosphäre einen offenen Diskurs über moralische Fragen mit Bezug zum Arbeitsalltag ermöglichen. In der Literatur werden ihnen diverse Eigenschaften wie Verbesserung der Analysefähigkeit und der Kommunikation, Erhöhung der ethischen Sensibilität und der Entscheidungskompetenz und weitere zugeschrieben. Diese Eigenschaften resultieren vorwiegend aus theoriegeleiteten Modellen. Gegenstand dieser Studie ist die empirische Untersuchung der Wirksamkeit von Ethik-Cafés innerhalb der Pflegezentren Mattenhof-Irchelpark, Zürich. Des Weiteren geht die Studie der (...) Frage nach, ob sich die subjektiven Einschätzungen der Eigenschaften von Pflegenden und anderen Berufsgruppen unterscheiden. Zur Erfassung der Eigenschaften wurde ein Fragebogen konstruiert, in dem die Teilnehmenden während der Erhebungszeit 16 Aussagen zu bewerten hatten. Die Bewertung konnte mittels einer 5-stufigen Likert-Skala angegeben werden. In einer Untergruppe wurde zwischen „Pflege“ und „Nicht-Pflege“ unterschieden. Zusammenfassend konnte festgestellt werden, dass die postulierten Eigenschaften mit einer sehr hohen Zustimmung bestätigt werden. Die Ethik-Cafés leisten nach Meinung der Befragten einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Befähigung des Personals, schwierige Situationen klarer zu analysieren, ethisch sensibler zu entscheiden und die getroffene Entscheidung zu begründen. Die Interdisziplinarität der Ethik-Cafés fördert das Verständnis für die Sichtweisen und Argumentationen der verschiedenen Bereiche und Hierarchien. Die Unterschiede der Berufsgruppen sind teilweise hoch-signifikant. Es kann festgehalten werden, dass die im Fragebogen attribuierten Eigenschaften von der Pflege generell stärker und bedeutsamer wahrgenommen werden. (shrink)

The development of the individual attributes of ethics of responsibility in conjunction with the principles of civic liberalism in Slovak political thought is associated with the thinking of Ján Palárik. His political ideas published in the second half of the 19th century come out of an effort to characterize and achieve reform of the Habsburg monarchy on the basis of constitutionalism and federalism. These attributes, in Palárik’s opinion, were to bring more effective solutions to the issue of educating people in (...) their mother tongue and the creation of civic culture. A part of Palárik’s approach to the formation of civic skills is also the advocating of free expression, the idea of pluralism and gradualism within the idea of the unity of the different. His realistic approach to politics was framed by knowing and respecting the objective limits when implementing the aims of national civic freedom. Palárik linked the development of the state and the process of acculturation of the people with application of the principles of practical reasonableness and ethics of responsibility. He found its essence in understanding the interconnectedness of political goals and ideals, which were to be reflected in close association with the real limitations of the capabilities of individuals and social circumstances. (shrink)

Inleiding tot het gedachtegoed van de Griekse filosoof die het vermijden van lichamelijke pijn en geestelijke onrust als het hoogste goed beschouwde..

This article follows the discussion begun by Pierre-Marie Beaude on the distinction between singularity and intention in aesthetics, considered in its relation to theology. If it is admitted that an author really has an intention, this may be perceivably different than a particular expression of singularity. Also, the concept of intention can be considered from an analytical perspective based on linguistic criteria, with intention becoming an intentional state and the substantival proposition an intentional object. Propositional attitudes, particularly the attitude of (...) belief, play a primary role in this perspective. This allows for the consideration of theological discourse as a collection of sentences meant to incite to a transfer of belief. (shrink)