This paper proposes an alternative view of the connection between knowledge and truth. Truth is traditionally seen as a semantic notion, i.e. a relation between what we say about the world and the world itself. Epistemologists and philosophers of science are therefore apt to resort to correspondence theories of truth in order to deal with the question whether our theories and beliefs are true. Correspondence theories try to define truth, but, in order to do so, they must choose a truth (...) bearer, i.e. something capable of being true, for instance, propositions, sentences or statements. According to the analysis here proposed, none of these truth bearers can be defined without reference to the others. The pragmatic, alternative view here presented, in its turn, is unaffected by this kind of conceptual difficulty. According to this view, one must focus on the use of truth terms – such as ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘correct’, ‘appropriate’, etc. – and the methodological role such terms play in the investigative practices and research programs to be found both in the sciences and in other, everyday investigative activities, such as forensic and journalistic investigations. (shrink)

The concept of natural kind is center stage in the debates about scientific realism. Champions of scientific realism such as Richard Boyd hold that our most developed scientific theories allow us to “cut the world at its joints” (Boyd, 1981, 1984, 1991). In the long run we can disclose natural kinds as nature made them, though as science progresses improvements in theory allow us to revise the extension of natural kind terms.

Este artigo procura discutir o monismo de Claude Bernard na filosofia da mente e da psicologia. Ele se recusa a aderir tanto ao materialismo quanto ao espiritualismo. Sua doutrina de que a psicologia deriva diretamente da fisiologia das funções do cérebro se destina a promover um tipo de psicologia experimental compatível com a idéia de que os fenômenos vitais devem ser explicados como fenômenos físicos e químicos que ocorrem dentro do organismo, mas regidos por leis biológicas.This paper seeks to discuss (...) Claude Bernard's monism in the philosophy of mind and psychology. Bernard refuses to join both the materialist and the spiritualist camps. His doctrine that psychology stems directly from the physiology of brain functions is intended to promote a type of experimental psychology compatible with his idea that vital phenomena are to be explained as physical and chemical phenomena occurring in the organism, and governed by biological laws. (shrink)

Translated by Luiz Henrique de A. Dutra, UFSC. This is a translation of 'The Puzzle of "Scientific Method"', published in Revue Internationale de Philosophie (Issue on Quine), vol. 51 (1997), pp. 495–505. We thank the author and the editors for their kind permission to publish the present translation.

Este artigo investiga a concepção de Thomas Kuhn acerca do desenvolvimento científico como base para uma teoria social da investigação. Nesse sentido, o autor procura explicar o papel desempenhado pelas comunidades científicas na constituição da prática científica. Esta consiste na investigação dirigida por padrões compartilhados, tais como valores e modelos, que também dirigem e dão forma ao comportamento individual dos cientistas. Desse ponto de vista, o comportamento na investigação das comunidades científicas precede e é mais fundamental do que o dos (...) indivíduos. Na verdade, a investigação de um cientista em particular dá-se sempre, e apenas, dentro do quadro intelectual fornecido pela comunidade científica. /// This paper aims to depict Thomas Kuhn's view of scientific development as the basis for a social theory of scientific investigation. The role played by scientific communities in the constitution of scientific practice is accounted for. Scientific practice consists in inquiry governed by shared standards such as values and models, which also govern and shape the behavior of individual scientists. From this point of view the investigative behavior of scientific communities is prior to and more fundamental than individual scientific behavior. An individual scientists inquiry takes place only within the intellectual setting provided by the scientific community. (shrink)

This paper proposes an alternative view of the connection between knowledge and truth. Truth is traditionally seen as a semantic notion, i.e. a relation between what we say about the world and the world itself. Epistemologists and philosophers of science are therefore apt to resort to correspondence theories of truth in order to deal with the question whether our theories and beliefs are true. Correspondence theories try to define truth, but, in order to do so, they must choose a truth (...) bearer, i.e. something capable of being true, for instance, propositions, sentences or statements. According to the analysis here proposed, none of these truth bearers can be defined without reference to the others. The pragmatic, alternative view here presented, in its turn, is unaffected by this kind of conceptual difficulty. According to this view, one must focus on the use of truth terms – such as ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘correct’, ‘appropriate’, etc. – and the methodological role such terms play in the investigative practices and research programs to be found both in the sciences and in other, everyday investigative activities, such as forensic and journalistic investigations. (shrink)

Since Hume, the problem of induction is viewed as the problem of skeptical doubts concerning our empirical generalizations. In this paper, I argue that this problem is neither a question for epistemology nor a consequence of a skeptical (pyhrronian) view on the matter. Rather I argue that from the point of view of alethic skepticism, Hume´s problem appears to be an issue concerning the pragmatics of investigation, and I try to report some of its most basic aspects. The result is (...) a new image of induction that resembles with Nelson Goodman´s solution, but I avoid any dogmatic commitment to his ideas. (shrink)

This paper aims at dealing with the problem of normativity as regards naturalized epistemologies. According to Quine's view in "Epistemology Naturalized" normativity is to be ruled out from epistemology altogether. However, some other naturalists and Quine himself in later works revise that doctrine. Particularly, Richard Boyd and Alvin Goldman's stances are reviewed here, in addition to Quine's later view according to which normativity concerns "applied" epistemology. Finally, a further solution is proposed, which stems from an analysis of the pragmatics of (...) investigation. According to this view normativity is a feature of our investigations; it is not related to epistemology as a discipline. (shrink)

This paper aims to discuss Quine’s last analysis of propositional attitudes as involving intentionality and as regards human action and the very subject matter of social sciences. As to this problem, Quine acquiesces in both Davidson’s anomalous monism and Dennett’s intentional stance. An alternative analysis is here presented, which is based on Howard Rachlin’s teleological behaviorism. Some problems regarding this approach are also considered. Intentionality and rationality are still to be saved, but they are construed according to a lawful perspective (...) to human behavior and social contexts of action. (shrink)

This paper argues for a version of perspectival realism as to abstract objects. Differently from bodies and mental states, abstract realities are supposed to be always unobservable objects, things never given in perception. Contrary to this received view, this paper tries to show that abstract objects can be perceived, even though people aren’t currently aware of perceiving them. Moreover, in order to perceive abstract objects we must be accordingly equipped. Our equipment to perceive abstract objects involves not only retino-cortical elements, (...) but mental and cultural conditions as well. (shrink)

Este artigo procura interpretar as noções de movimento, com-portamento e ação em relação umas com as outras. Primeiro, argumenta-se que o movimento é um evento nomologicamente descrito por meio de uma teoria mecânica, e seus conceitos e modelos. Igualmente, o com-portamento é o tipo de evento humano funcionalmente des-crito por meio de modelos probabilísticos que relacionam o que fazem diferentes indivíduos em circunstâncias nas quais uma descrição mecâni-ca não é explicativa de forma relevante. Assim compreendido, o compor-tamento é essencialmente um (...) fenômeno social. Finalmente, a ação é o tipo de acontecimento humano que não pode ser explicado nomologi-camente. O conceito de ação defendido deste modo é, fundamentalmen-te, residual em relação aos conceitos de comportamento e movimento.This paper aims at construing the notions of motion, behavior and action in connection with each other. First, it is argued that motion is an event lawfully described by means of some mechanical theory, and its concepts and models. Likewise, behavior is the kind of human event functionally described by means of probabilistic models that connect what different individuals do in circumstances where a me-chanical description is not relevantly explicative. Viewed this way, behav-ior is an essentially social phenomenon. Finally, action is the kind of hu-man occurrence that cannot be lawfully explained. The concept of action thus argued for is fundamentally residual in relation to the concepts of behavior and motion. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to argue that both science, as a specific kind of knowledge, and human knowledge in general are activities of constructing models. In the first part, I present my conception according to which scientific models are abstract entities, and that scientific theories may be interpreted as classes of models as abstract replicas of real settings, in which certain laws apply. In the second part, I try to extend that same conception to ordinary human knowledge, particularly to (...) the case of the cognitive activity of classifying objects of experience. (shrink)

Nota sobre Psicologia Experimental e Natureza Humana: Ensaios de Filosofia da Psicologia, de Hugh Lacey. (Flonanopolis NEL–UFSC, 2001).

Este artigo procura discutir a concepção behaviorista radical de Skinner sobre as regras metodológicas e as leis científicas. Skinner é basicamente simpático ao operacionismo porque, de acordo com essa concepção, as possíveis leis psicológicas não são interpretadas de forma realista (e mentalista), mas como uma forma de controlar e modelar o comportamento. Como a análise do comportamento é aplicada à própria ciência, é natural esperar que os behavioristas defendam uma filosofia operacionista da ciência. Mas Skinner também é um crítico do (...) operacionismo por causa das conexões dessa doutrina com o positivismo. Ora, desse ponto de vista, o problema é como interpretar a ciência como um empreendimento “operacionista,” embora o comportamento dos cientistas não deva ser reduzido a um comportamento dirigido por regras, nem os enunciados científicos a regras metodológicas. Compreendida assim, a filosofia da ciência de Skinner é muito parecida com a de Kuhn, o que vai ser discutido aqui também. Palavras-chave: Skinner, operacionismo, behaviorismo radical, regras metodológicas. (shrink)

Este artigo procura avaliar a contribuição de Claude Bernard para o desenvolvimento da psicologia experimental. Em oposição aos filósofos mentalistas tradicionais, Bernard concebeu a psicologia como um capítulo especial da fisiologia, que trata das funções do cérebro. A doutrina de Bernard sobre a natureza da psicologia é aqui considerada em relação com a obra de I. P. Pavlov, que exerceu grande influência no campo da psicologia experimental, e com o tipo de psicologia empírica desenvolvida por Théodule Ribot, na França, imediatamente (...) após a época de Bernard. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta um modelo do agente livre compatível com as teorias evolutivas e neurofisiológicas da mente e com base especificamente nas noções de liberdade em situação, de Sartre, e de racionalidade limitada, de Simon. Além disso, a noção de agência de controle de Skinner é generalizada, sendo aplicada também ao caso de estruturas cerebrais. O agente livre é descrito como o indivíduo humano cujo eu consciente escolhe e decide no contexto de múltiplas determinações tanto ambientais quanto neurofisiológicas. A autonomia (...) do agente humano é resultado dos processos que levam à aquisição das modalidades da consciência existencial, inclusive a consciência moral. O agente livre é alguém que alcança o autocontrole. (shrink)

In this paper I analyze the relation between ascribing knowledge to a human agent in two kinds of circumstances, namely acting according to environmental contingences and acting according to a rule. My discussion begins with the distinction I put forward between descriptive and explicative hypotheses. After relating the notions of rule and belief, I try to support the idea that modifications in overt behavior are prior to any ascriptions of knowledge to an agent, connecting this topic with processes of investigation. (...) I discuss also if there can be beliefs which do not bring about modifications of behavior, and I argue that in certain circumstances of our investigation about the behavior of people, in order to give it unity, we are to ascribe beliefs of that kind to people. Given those points, I depict epistemology as the theory of the processes of investigation involved in human action. DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n2p279. (shrink)

In this paper I analyze the relation between ascribing knowledge to a human agent in two kinds of circumstances, namely acting according to environmental contingences and acting according to a rule. My discussion begins with the distinction I put forward between descriptive and explicative hypotheses. After relating the notions of rule and belief, I try to support the idea that modifications in overt behavior are prior to any ascriptions of knowledge to an agent, connecting this topic with processes of investigation. (...) I discuss also if there can be beliefs which do not bring about modifications of behavior, and I argue that in certain circumstances of our investigation about the behavior of people, in order to give it unity, we are to ascribe beliefs of that kind to people. Given those points, I depict epistemology as the theory of the processes of investigation involved in human action. • DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n2p279. (shrink)

This paper deals with the questions of emergence and complex (mental and social) systems and with downward determination from the viewpoint of perspectival realism. These are issues concerning the foundations of the human sciences, generally speaking, and particularly psychology and sociology. A criterion is put forward, which distinguish metaphysicalfrom ontological (conceptual) problems, and the notions of complex, hierarchic system and causation that would be suitable for those that defend emergence and perspectivist foundations of the human sciences are discussed. Este artigo (...) trata das questões da emergência de sistemas complexos (mentais e sociais) e da determinação descendente do ponto de vista do realismo perspectivista. Essas são questões sobre os fundamentos das ciências humanas em geral e, em particular, da psicologia e da sociologia. É proposto um critério para distinguir problemas metafísicos de problemas ontológicos (ou conceituais), e são discutidas as noções de sistema complexo hierárquico e de causação que seriam adequadas para uma fundamentação emergentista e perspectivista das ciências humanas. (shrink)

Editorial Note doi: 10.5007 / 1808-1711.2011v15n3p381.

RESUMO Este artigo analisa a questão da causalidade descendente em relação a sistemas emergentes. A partir das considerações de Emmeche, Køppe e Stjernfelt, que são aqui criticadas, e em parte com base naquelas de Pattee, o artigo apresenta uma interpretação do tipo de relação que existe entre as condições de base de um evento e este último, e as relações entre a totalidade de um sistema e suas partes, empregando as noções de comunidade e de finalidade interna, noções essas devidas (...) a Kant. ABSTRACT This paper deals with the question of downward causation in connection with emergent systems. Beginning with the comments offered by Emmeche, Køppe, and Stjernfelt, which are criticized here, and partially based on those of Pattee, the paper puts forward an interpretation of the kind of relation that exists between the basal conditions for a given event and the event itself, and the relations between a given system as a whole and its parts making use of the concepts of community and internal purposiveness, concepts due to Kant. (shrink)

This paper aims at discussing the usage by Davidson as to events of Quine's criterion of ontological commitment. According to Davidson, we are ontologically committed to the existence of events as individuals as we employ literally terms such as ‘Caesar’s death’, for instance. Davidson extends this analysis to actions as well, since actions are human events. One of the consequences of this view is that psychology deals with individual events in a non-lawful way. An alternative view is here proposed, based (...) on a complementary criterion, namely ontological density, according to which from the point of view of a given theory, we can always distinguish between events (or phenomena) and individuals (entities) among the overall occurrences described by the theory. Some consequences of this alternative view of psychology as a science dealing lawfully with general human events are also explored here. (shrink)

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2008v12n1p73 This paper aims at discussing from the point of view of a pragmatic stance the concept of model as an abstract replica. According to this view, scientific models are abstract structures different from set-theoretic models. The view of models argued for here stems from the conceptions of some important philosophers of science who elaborated on the notion of model, such as Suppe, Cartwright, Hempel, and Nagel. Differently from all those authors, however, the conception of model argued for here is (...) typically pragmatic, not semantic, i.e. it has not to do with the interpretation of scientific theories, but with the explanation and construction of given circumstances (both abstract and concrete), from the point of view of the theory. (shrink)

This paper aims at discussing from the point of view of a pragmatic stance the concept of model as an abstract replica. According to this view, scientific models are abstract structures different from set-theoretic models. The view of models argued for here stems from the conceptions of some important philosophers of science who elaborated on the notion of model, such as Suppe, Cartwright, Hempel, and Nagel. Differently from all those authors, however, the conception of model argued for here is typically (...) pragmatic, not semantic, i.e. it has not to do with the interpretation of scientific theories, but with the explanation and construction of given circumstances, from the point of view of the theory. (shrink)

Nesse artigo, procuramos mostrar que duas alternativas célebres aos fundacionalismos tradicionais - o falibilismo de Popper e o naturalismo de Quine - apresentam consequências indesejáveis a respeito do problema da base empírica. Propomos uma terceira alternativa - o ceticismo alético -, que pode lidar adequadamente com esse problema. Além disso, compreendemos o ceticismo alético como uma doutrina diferente do ceticismo pirrônico tradicional (e outras versões antigas e modernas de ceticismo), no que diz respeito ao objetivo da investigação, embora ele coincida (...) com o pirronismo em seu método. O ceticismo alético evita não apenas o naturalismo, mas também o falibilismo. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIan Hacking puts forward a distinction between two kinds of scientific realism. According to scientific realism about theories, scientific theories are accepted as approximately true; according to scientific realism about unobservable entities, the theoretical terms occurring in scientific theories refer to existing, real entities. This article seeks to show that Claude Bernard's philosophy of science is a realist one about scientific theories, but anti-realist about unobservable entities. The term “fictionalism” is used here to stand for this sort of anti-realism about (...) unobservable entities. (shrink)

This paper aims to argue for a lawful, intentional approach to human behavior. Donald Davidson’s idea that an event is mental according to the way it is described is here accepted. However, his nonlawful conception of psychology, in its turn, is rejected. Rather, based on Howard Rachlin’s teleological behaviorism, a lawful, externalist approach to explaining human behavior is adopted, according to which a bit of behavior is to be interpreted in connection with other ones, within a certain social context. It (...) is argued here also that Rachlin’s perspective amounts to a sort of externalization of intentionality. (shrink)

O presente trabalho visa discutir a política exterior brasileira no imediato pós-Segunda Guerra Mundial sob a ótica do conceito de imposição do alinhamento. O fim do conflito trouxe consigo uma nova configuração das relações internacionais. O posicionamento brasileiro durante o período foi alvo de diversas análises que buscavam compreender a maneira como o presidente Eurico Gaspar Dutra conduziu a política externa do país. O momento de disputa por áreas de influência entre Estados Unidos da América e União Soviética poderia (...) lograr vantagens ao Brasil. Entretanto, a postura do governo brasileiro não permitiu que o país alcançasse seus objetivos do ponto de vista da política internacional já que seu alinhamento aos norte-americanos foi automático, diferentemente do que defende a imposição do alinhamento. O conceito sustenta que o atendimento das expectativas do governo dos EUA não era simplesmente sinônimo de subserviência aos interesses estadunidenses, mas uma condição a que o Brasil estava sujeito. (shrink)

Review of "Introdução à Teoria da ciência", de Luiz Henrique de A. Dutra.

Que papel exercem os modelos nas investigações científicas? Que características deve ter um modelo para que seja designado como científico? Como operam os modelos nas ciências humanas e qual seu impacto nas ações humanas? Esses são alguns dos questionamentos que dão ensejo às discussões propostas por Luiz Henrique de Araújo Dutra em sua obra Pragmática de modelos, cuja terceira edição, revista e ampliada, fora recentemente lançada pela Editora Agrya.