According to the so-called "standard account" regarding the problem of material constitution, a statue and a lump of clay that makes it up are not identical. The usual objection is that this view yields many objects in the same place at the same time. Lynne Rudder Baker's theory of constitution is a recent and sophisticated version of the standard account. She argues that the aforementioned objection can be answered by defining a relation of being the same P as (sameP). In (...) this paper I shall examine consequences of her response and show that sameP has wrong formal properties, as a result of which this solution cannot be accepted. (shrink)

Presentism is described as the theory according to which there is an objective time flow and that there is neither past nor future. Roman Ingarden’s ontology of time does not seem to be presentist then, since it supposedly rejects the second component of that doctrine. In this article, I show that this view misconstrues the spirit of Ingarden’s account, and I defend a certain ontology of time (inspired by Ingarden’s works) against several objections (e.g. the ‘how fast does time flow’ (...) question). Since becoming of a process (in the sense of its mode of existence) is just this process’s time, I consider in turn several possible responses to the charge of an infinite regress leveled against Ingarden’s ontology of process. If his original position is set aside, two extreme proposals will remain: the rebuttal of the objectual aspect of a process and giving up the categorial difference between objects enduring through time and processes (i.e. accepting perdurantism). While not discussing in detail the former one, I point out that the adequacy of perdurantism is an open question: in particular, reasons appealing to problems of material constitution, given by perdurantists, are unsatisfactory. (shrink)

In this article, I would like to present a brief overview of Aquinas’s philosophy of mind. I try to express the cognitive processes that this model of the mind describes in more modern terminology (e.g., I interpret ‘an image’ [phantasm] as the binding effect of monomodal representations of a perceived object). Characteristic of this model is the postulation, in the case of the human mind, of intellectual abstraction leading to concepts, which requires assuming the existence of the intellect in its (...) active and passive aspects. In this context, a metaphysical conclusion can be drawn about the immortal nature of this intellect, according to Thomas. On the other hand, this model of the mind is not, to all appearances, a variant of Platonic-Cartesian dualism – Aquinas makes several arguments against dualism understood in this way, at least one of which was still raised by (non-Thomistic) critics of Descartes. In addition, Thomas points to the developmental aspect of the human mind and also attempts to describe the possible functioning of the intellect after death. (shrink)

In this article I consider whether Aquinas’ arguments for the claim that God is His essence are conclusive, and what was his purpose of upholding this thesis. I show his proofs from Summa Theologiae and Summa Contra Gentiles to be problematic and argue that the defense of Aquinas’ views on that matter suggested by certain remarks of P. T. Geach is flawed.

In this paper I criticize substantialism by analyzing two well-known puzzles con-cerning identity and change - Tibbles the Cat puzzle and the fission paradox. All the approaches assuming substantialism I know lead to untenable consequences (e.g. bilocation) and I conclude that we should seriously take the possibility of processual or eventistic picture of our material life world.

In this article in a form of a review I analyze at length A. Pruss’ book One Body, pointing at where I agree with him and stressing several flaws in his arguments. The general line of thought, which is exploring the biblical metaphor of “being one body,” is ultimately sufficient for me from the theological, but not the philosophical point of view.

ON SPINOZA’S PROOFS OF (SPINOZIAN) GOD’S EXISTENCE AND THE PROOF OF THE UNIQUENESS OF THE SPINOZIAN SUBSTANCE In this paper I analyze Spinozian ontological arguments for God’s existence from Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata. I argue that the first proof suffers from circulus vitiosus, whereas the others have at least one non-obvious premise. I also consider P. Gut’s modification of the first proof, reported to me during the conference “The Philosophy of the 17th Century—Its Origins and Continuations” (Gdańsk, 16.06.2011). Meanwhile, I (...) address D. Chlastawa’s remark that theorem 7 and 14 from Ethica… makes Spinoza’s theory inconsistent. Keywords: SPINOZA, GOD’S EXISTENCE, PROOF, UNIQUENESS, SUBSTANCE Discipline: PHILOSOPHY. (shrink)

B. Spinoza w Etyce w porządku geometrycznym dowiedzionej argumentuje za nieśmiertelnością ludzkiej duszy. Bliższa analiza pokazuje jednak, że owa „nieśmiertelność” niewiele ma wspólnego z tą, za którą opowiadała się tradycyjna metafizyka. W artykule badam argumentację Spinozy i wykazuję, że dowody tez, na które się powołuje, są problematyczne.

Braddon-Mitchell and Miller put forward the claim that the relation of being-the-same-person is gradable: a person can be the same person tomorrow as today, but only half the same. To justify their thesis, they propose a model of persons that is intended to be metaphysically neutral. This article sets out to show that such a model implicitly contains strong metaphysical assumptions that run contrary to the authors’ own statements. Using Roman Ingarden’s phenomenological ontology, we aim to demonstrate that within the (...) model in question persons exist intentionally, where this leads to a caricature rather than an adequate account of persons. In opposition to Braddon-Mitchell and Miller, we argue that the justification presented for the thesis of the gradability of the relation of being-the-same-person in fact makes it reasonable to demand that an adequate model of persons be posited. We present Kurt Lewin’s holistic topological-dynamic model, and show that in this context it is not being-the-same-person that is gradable, but rather the characteristic (of persons) that is dimension. Thus, we reject the thesis of the gradability of the relation of being-the-same-person involved in personal identity. (shrink)

Etycy nie poświęcali dotąd wiele uwagi niepewności, koncentrując się często na skrajnie wyidealizowanych hipotetycznych sytuacjach, w których zarówno kwestie empiryczne (np. stan świata, spektrum możliwych decyzji oraz ich konsekwencje, związki przyczynowe między zdarzeniami), jak i normatywne (np. treść norm, skale wartości) były jasno określone i znane podmiotowi. W poniższym artykule – który jest rezultatem projektu dotyczącego różnych typów decyzji w sytuacjach niepewności związanej z postępem w naukach i technologiach biomedycznych – przedstawię analizę sytuacji niepewności normatywnej, czyli takich, w których podmiot (...) musi podjąć decyzję, nie mając pewności co do tego, jaka norma postępowania jest właściwa, np. dlatego, że ma sprzeczne intuicje normatywne na temat dopuszczalności danej decyzji. Stanowisko, które określa się niekiedy mianem komparatywizmu, głosi, że w tego typu sytuacjach należy uwzględniać nie tylko stopnie przekonań podmiotu w kwestii różnych norm, ale także to, na ile możliwe decyzje warte są podjęcia wedle tych norm. Przedstawię tu analizę kilku przypadków niepewności normatywnej, a także charakterystyczny argument przeciwko dotychczasowym wersjom komparatywizmu, wskazujący, że nie uwzględniają one różnych nastawień do ryzyka w sytuacjach niepewności normatywnej, choć dopuszczają jednocześnie różne nastawienia do ryzyka w sytuacjach niepewności empirycznej. Pokażę też, że zasada ostrożności dotycząca statusu moralnego w upraszczający sposób przedstawia sytuacje niepewności normatywnej. (shrink)

In the late 2010s, various international committees, expert groups, and national strategy boards have voiced the demand to ‘open’ the algorithmic black box, to audit, expound, and demystify artificial intelligence. The opening of the algorithmic black box, however, cannot be seen only as an engineering challenge. In this article, I argue that only the sort of transparency that arises from critique—a method of theoretical examination that, by revealing pre-existing power structures, aims to challenge them—can help us produce technological systems that (...) are less deceptive and more just. I relate the question of AI transparency to the broader challenge of responsible making, contending that future action must aim to systematically reconcile design—as a way of concealing—with critique—as a manner of revealing. (shrink)

It is commonplace to formalize propositions involving essential properties of objects in a language containing modal operators and quantifiers. Assuming David Lewis’s counterpart theory as a semantic framework for quantified modal logic, I will show that certain statements discussed in the metaphysics of modality de re, such as the sufficiency condition for essential properties, cannot be faithfully formalized. A natural modification of Lewis’s translation scheme seems to be an obvious solution but is not acceptable for various reasons. Consequently, the only (...) safe way to express some intuitions regarding essential properties is to use directly the language of counterpart theory without modal operators. (shrink)

Palliative care and euthanasia have become the subject of ethical and political debate in Poland. However, the voice of nurses is rarely heard. The aim of this study is to explore the perception of palliative care and euthanasia among recent university bachelor degree graduates and experienced nurses in Poland. Specific objectives include: self-assessment of the understanding of these terms, recognition of clinical cases, potential acceptability of euthanasia, and an evaluation of attitudes towards palliative care and euthanasia. This is an exploratory (...) study. A convenience sample of 206 recent graduates and 252 experienced nurse practitioners were interviewed. A structured questionnaire was used for collecting and interpreting data. Subjective perception of the terms `palliative care' and `euthanasia' was high and consistent with the recognition of clinical cases. The majority of the nurses excluded euthanasia from palliative care. They recognized personal philosophy of life as the most influential factor affecting attitudes towards euthanasia. The importance of the law was valued more highly by the experienced nurses. (shrink)

This paper offers a new perspective on the metaphysical doctrine of non-eliminative ontic structural realism by interpreting the relation of ontic dependence in terms of counterfactual identification rather than in terms of numerical identity/distinctness.

To analyze potential negative consequences of adopting generative AI solutions in the digital afterlife industry (DAI), in this paper we present three speculative design scenarios for AI-enabled simulation of the deceased. We highlight the perspectives of the data donor, data recipient, and service interactant – terms we employ to denote those whose data is used to create ‘deadbots,’ those in possession of the donor’s data after their death, and those who are meant to interact with the end product. We draw (...) on the scenarios to map out several key ethical concerns posed by ‘re-creation services’ and to put forward recommendations on the ethical development of AI systems in this specific area of application. The recommendations, targeted at providers of AI-enabled re-creation services, include suggestions for developing sensitive procedures for retiring deadbots, ensuring meaningful transparency, restricting access to such services to adult users only, and adhering to the principle of mutual consent of both data donors and service interactants. While we suggest practical solutions to the socio-ethical challenges posed by the emergence of re-creation services, we also emphasize the importance of ongoing interdisciplinary research at the intersection of the ethics of AI and the ethics of the DAI. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to refer basic philosophical approaches to the problem of musical meaning and, on the other hand, to describe some examples of the research on musical meaning found in the field of cognitive neuroscience. By looking at those two approaches together it can be seen that there is still no agreement on how musical meaning should be understood, often due to several methodological problems of which the most important seem to be the possibility of inter-theoretical (...) reduction and application of an accurate theory of explanation. I am suggesting that the application of some form of the mechanistic model of explanation might be found useful for clarifying reductionism-antireductionism dispute concerning musical meaning, and more importantly, for providing some answers for the debate in music-as-language controversy. (shrink)

Gideon Rosen described the difficulties faced by those who claim that statements about possible worlds cannot be literally true. According to his argument, if the truth of modal sentences could be explained by referring to the hypothesis of the plurality of possible worlds, which is a sort of fiction for modal irrealists, the position would have antinomic consequence. I argue that the advocate of broad modal fictionalism can avoid such a devastating conclusion. To that end, her position should be given (...) in meta-language describing the necessary and sufficient conditions of accepting modal sentences as true in terms of fiction of possible worlds. I show that there is a coherent way of reading ‘it is accepted as true’ that allows one to maintain that the disjunction of two mutually contradictory propositions can be accepted without accepting either of them. (shrink)

The mathematical notion of a permutation of indices in the state description admits different physical interpretations. Two main interpretations analyzed in this paper are: exchange of essences and exchange of haecceities. It is argued that adopting the essentialist approach leads to the conclusion, contrary to the conventional wisdom, that quantum particles of the same type are sometimes discernible by their properties. The indiscernibility thesis can be supported only by the alternative interpretation in terms of primitive thisness.

It is part of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences that objects seem to be presented to us. The first guide to objects is their perceptual presence. Further reflection shows that we take the objects of our perceptual experiences to be among the causes of our experiences. However, not all causes of the experience are also objects of the experience. This raises the question indicated in the title of this paper. We argue that taking phenomenal presence as the guide to the (...) objects of perception, we can see that at least in two sensory modalities, smell and touch, there is no uniform answer to this question. The objects of olfactory and tactile experiences can move along the causal chain. Accordingly, the content of olfactory and tactile experience may vary. (shrink)

The paper presents a draft model of the relationship between shame, treated as one of the self-conscious emotions, and the identity formation process. Two main concepts of shame have been discussed here: shame as an adaptive emotion, in line with the evolutionary approach, and as a maladaptive emotion, according to cognitive attribution theory. The main thesis of this paper states that shame has an essential, both constructive and maladaptive, importance for identity development and that its effect is indirect as it (...) works through the mechanisms of emotion regulation. The destructive and disrupting influence of shame is not an immanent feature of this emotion, but it is a consequence of malfunctioning mechanisms of shame regulation. The association of shame with identity formation relates to the exploration dimensions - exploration in breadth, exploration in depth and ruminative exploration, as well as to commitment making and identification with commitment. (shrink)

Contemporary development of research methods and tools is often conducive to ambitious art studies, in which the research methodology and study protocol are the result of negotiations between creative and research strategies. The article discusses the key sources, possibilities, and threats of interdisciplinary projects often referred to as practice-as-research. The following comparison of the orders of the scientific methodology and the artistic convention allows one to show the similarities and potential points of contact between science and art, which are independent (...) of the different values and methods of evaluation in both of these areas. The research-based practice model by Pil Hansen and Bruce Barton is also presented as a solution that takes these issues into account. It is also used to present the project of Interdisciplinary Center for New Technologies of the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń and the Art & Science Research Foundation om—organisms and machines in culture (FUNom) the project "Neurophysiology of the Artist in Performance", which is a bold example of the transdisciplinary activities of scientists and researchers. Its content is analyzed through the reports of artists, researchers, and participants taking part in public presentations of the project. (shrink)

The book _Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics_ offers various perspectives on the relation and mutual influence between modern physical theories and analytic metaphysics.

One can often hear that intuitions are standardly “appealed to”, “relied on”, “accounted for”, or “used as evidence” in ethics. How should we interpret these claims? I argue that the typical understanding is what Bernard Molyneux calls “descriptive evidentialism”: the idea that intuition-states are treated as evidence of their propositional contents in the context of justification. I then argue that descriptive evidentialism is false- on any account of what intuitions are. That said, I admit that ethicists frequently rely on intuitions (...) to clarify, persuade, discover, or to support things other than the intuitions’ contents. The contents of intuitions are also commonly used as starting premises of philosophical arguments. However claims about these practices need to be sharply distinguished from the prevalent dogma. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to reconstruct and correct one argument in support of the symmetrization postulate in quantum mechanics. I identify the central premise of the argument as a thesis specifying a particular ontic property of quantum superpositions. The precise form of this thesis depends on some underlying assumptions of a metaphysical character. I compare the exchange degeneracy argument with alternative formal arguments for the symmetrization postulate, and I discuss the role and meaning of labels in the symmetric/antisymmetric (...) representations of the states of many particles. (shrink)

Since our visual perception of physical things essentially involves our identifying objects by their colours, any theory of visual perception must contain some account of the colours of things. The central problem with colour has to do with relating our normal, everyday colour perceptions to what science, i.e. physics, teaches us about physical objects and their qualities. Although we perceive colours as categorical surface properties of things, colour perceptions are explained by introducing physical properties like reflectance profiles or dispositions to (...) cause certain experiences in normal human perceivers. Hence, it seems as if colours as they are experienced by us have no place in the physical world, because they are fundamentally different from the properties which we ascribe to physical objects in scientific accounts of colour perceptions. This special issue on perspectives on colour perception presents new suggestions to solve to this major problem. (shrink)