How much freedom of choice agents have in a society depends on two things: on the relevant alternatives they face, and on their capabilities to judge and make use of these alternatives. In this paper a third condition of freedom of choice is put on the list: relations. Social life very much depends upon the reliable fulfilment of expectations in relations. These expectations direct choice and may restrict or increase freedom. It is argued that not to be in relations of (...) unjustified domination is a further condition of freedom for agents in a society. (shrink)

‚DiskriminierungDiskriminierung‘ istReligionund Diskriminierung meistens synonym mit ‚negativer Diskriminierung‘, einem sozialen Prozess der BenachteiligungBenachteiligung, soziale, Ablehnung und Ausgrenzung von Angehörigen bestimmter Gruppen aus attraktiven sozialen Positionen. Die am Prozess Beteiligten sehen dabei implizit oder explizit Menschen mit einem bestimmten Merkmal als sozial unter anderen stehend an. Dies sind Merkmale wie Religion, Herkunft, sexuelle Orientierung, Geschlecht, langerfristige körperliche, seelische, geistige oder Sinnesbeeinträchtigungen, die für die persönliche Identität von Menschen relevant sind.

RassismusRassismusund SexismusSexismus sind komplexe, wenn nicht sogar diffuse soziale Phänomene. Als rassistisch oder sexistisch werden bestimmte natürliche und rechtliche Personen, deren Überzeugungen, Werteinstellungen, einzelne Handlungen oder Handlungsmuster, verbreitete soziale Praktiken und gesellschaftliche Institutionen gekennzeichnet, aber auch Gegenstände wie Bilder und sprachliche Gebilde – Ausdrücke, Sätze, Texte. Mit beiden Begriffen wird immer etwas moralisch Verwerfliches bezeichnet. Das Kernübel in Fällen von Rassismus und Sexismus ist schwer genau dingfest zu machen. Extensional sind sie gekennzeichnet durch eine nicht gerechtfertigte Verletzung des gleichen moralischen (...) Status durch Geringschätzung oder Geringerschätzung von Personen aufgrund ihrer Zuordnung zu einer bestimmten Herkunft respektive zum weiblichen Geschlecht. (shrink)

Man sollte verzeihen, gegeben bestimmte Bedingungen. Gleichzeitig ist es dem eigenen Gutdünken überlassen, ob man verzeiht. Passt das zusammen? Nein und ja. Wenn man nur einen weiten Begriff von Verzeihen für adäquat hält, dann passt es nicht zusammen. Dann gehört zum Verzeihen begrifflich dazu, das alles wieder gut ist im Zusammenleben. Wenn man einen engen Begriff von Verzeihen davon unterscheidet und ihn für angemessen hält, dann passt es zusammen. Dann kann man verzeihen, ohne dass danach die persönliche Beziehung wieder so (...) ist wie vorher. Man kann verzeihen, ohne sich zu versöhnen. Ersteres fällt in den Bereich des moralischen Sollens, letzteres in das persönliche Gutdünken. Ich plädiere dafür, unsere Praxis des Verzeihens so aufzufassen, dass darin dieser Unterschied zwischen Verzeihen in einem weiteren Sinne und Verzeihen in einem engeren Sinne gemacht wird. (shrink)

Individuals deceive themselves about a wide variety of subjects. In fortunate circumstances, where those who manage to leave self-deception embrace reality, an interesting phenomenon occurs: the formerly self-deceived often confess to having ‘known [the truth] all along’. These post-self-deception judgments are not conceptually innocuous; if genuine, they call into question the core feature of prominent theories of self-deception, namely that self-deceived individuals do not believe the unwelcome truth. In this paper I argue that post-self-deception judgments do not track a belief, (...) but rather a suspicion of the unwelcome truth. I do this by showing that post-self-deception judgments are themselves instances of self-deception where the individual is self-deceived that they believed the unwelcome truth. I then suggest that the motivational cause of the self-deceit is hindsight bias, specifically the kind known as foreseeability, and that as a result, post-self-deception judgments are not reliable because they do not accurately track previous self-deceptive experiences. (shrink)

Although germline editing has been the subject of debate ever since the 1980s, it tended to be based rather on speculative assumptions until April 2015, when CRISPR/Cas9 technology was used to modify human embryos for the first time. This article combines knowledge about the technical and scientific state of the art, economic considerations, the legal framework and aspects of clinical reality. A scenario will be elaborated as a means of identifying key ethical implications of CRISPR/Cas9 genome editing in humans and (...) possible ways of dealing with them. Unlike most other discussions of CRISPR/Cas9 germline editing, which are generally based on deontological arguments, the focus in this case will be on a consequentialistic argument against certain applications of germline and somatic editing that takes not only the potential benefits and risks but also socioeconomic issues into consideration. The practical need for an indication catalogue, guidelines for clinical trials, and for funding of basic research will be pointed out. It will be argued that this need for regulatory action and discussion does not stem primarily from the fact that CRISPR/Cas9 germline editing is revolutionary in terms of its ethical implications and potential for human therapy, although this is the prevailing view in the current discussion. Understanding the value and interest dependency of arguments put forward by different stakeholders and learning from past debates related to similar technologies might prove a fruitful method of reaching judgments and decisions that come closer to a consensus upon which society as a whole can agree - which after all should be the true goal of an ethical debate and of bioethics. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the debate on Composition as Identity—the thesis that any composite object is identical to its parts—is deadlocked because both the defenders and the detractors of the claim have so far failed to take its philosophical core at face value and have, as a result, defended and criticized respectively something that is not Composition as Identity. After establishing how Composition as Identity should properly be understood and proposing for it a new interpretation centered around the (...) novel notion of metaphysical information, I set forth a strategy to defend it that crucially rests on the indefinite extensibility of the domain of quantification. I eventually suggest that “Composition as Analysis” is a name that better reflects the content and theoretical proposal of the thesis that Composition as Identity is supposed to be. (shrink)

Miranda Fricker’s insightful work on epistemic injustice discusses two forms of epistemic injustice—testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when the victim lacks the interpretative resources to make sense of her experience, and this lacuna can be traced down to a structural injustice. In this paper, I provide one model of how to fill the conceptual gap in hermeneutical injustice. First, I argue that the victims possess conceptual resources to make sense of their experiences, namely phenomenal concepts. Second, I (...) show how one might work the way up in a two-step process from a subjective, phenomenal concept to a novel, public concept. Finally, I discuss the conditions that have to be met for this process to be successful. The resulting model shows a way how the victims might alleviate hermeneutical injustice by developing novel concepts, given that the dominant group does not care about their predicament. (shrink)

Recently, the mechanistic framework of active inference has been put forward as a principled foundation to develop an overarching theory of consciousness which would help address conceptual disparities in the field (Wiese 2018 ; Hohwy and Seth 2020 ). For that promise to bear out, we argue that current proposals resting on the active inference scheme need refinement to become a process theory of consciousness. One way of improving a theory in mechanistic terms is to use formalisms such as computational (...) models that implement, attune and validate the conceptual notions put forward. Here, we examine how computational modelling approaches have been used to refine the theoretical proposals linking active inference and consciousness, with a focus on the extent and success to which they have been developed to accommodate different facets of consciousness and experimental paradigms, as well as how simulations and empirical data have been used to test and improve these computational models. While current attempts using this approach have shown promising results, we argue they remain preliminary in nature. To refine their predictive and structural validity, testing those models against empirical data is needed i.e., new and unobserved neural data. A remaining challenge for active inference to become a theory of consciousness is to generalize the model to accommodate the broad range of consciousness explananda; and in particular to account for the phenomenological aspects of experience. Notwithstanding these gaps, this approach has proven to be a valuable avenue for theory advancement and holds great potential for future research. (shrink)

Moral philosophy and psychology have sought to define the nature of right and wrong, and good and evil. The industrial turn of the twentieth century fostered increasingly technological approaches that conjoined philosophy to psychology, and psychology to the natural sciences. Thus, moral philosophy and psychology became ever more vested to investigations of the anatomic structures and physiologic processes involved in cognition, emotion and behavior - ultimately falling under the rubric of the neurosciences. Since 2002, neuroscientific studies of moral thought, emotions (...) and behaviors have become known as – and a part of – the relatively new discipline of neuroethics. Herein we present Part 2 of a bibliography of neuroethics from 2002–2013 addressing the “neuroscience of ethics” – studies of putative neural substrates and mechanisms involved in cognitive, emotional and behavioral processes of morality and ethics. (shrink)

The cognitive phenomenology debate centers on two questions. (1) What is an apt characterization of the phenomenology of conscious thought? And (2), what role does this phenomenology play? I argue that the answers to the former question bear significantly on the answers to the latter question. In particular, I show that conservatism about cognitive phenomenology is not compatible with the view that phenomenology explains the constitution of conscious thought. I proceed as follows: To begin with, I analyze the phenomenology of (...) our sensory experiences and argue for a _weak phenomenal holism_ (WPH) about sensory phenomenology. Next, I explore how WPH can be integrated into the competing accounts of cognitive phenomenology. I argue that, given WPH, conservatism turns out to reduce phenomenal character to a merely concomitant phenomenon that has no explanatory power when it comes to the constitution of conscious thoughts. In contrast, liberalism is explanatorily more powerful in this respect. Finally, I propose a new version of liberalism that explains how phenomenology constitutes conscious thoughts and fits best with WPH. (shrink)

Self-control is normally, if only tacitly, viewed as an inherently practical capacity or achievement: as exercised only in the domain of action. Questioning this assumption, we wish to motivate the...

This publication is an appreciation of the natural philosophy and epistemology of the philosopher Grete (Henry-)Hermann. A student of the mathematician Emmy Noether and the philosopher Leonard Nelson, she was one of the early interpreters of quantum mechanics. Werner Heisenberg memorialized her in his book "The Part and the Whole". For the first time, her writings on natural philosophy and epistemology are collected in one volume. An extensive introduction by various authors introduces the work of Grete Henry-Hermann. This edition is (...) supplemented by excerpts from correspondence on natural philosophical and epistemological topics, including correspondence with Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Werner Heisenberg, and Gustav Heckmann. Contents ● Grete Henry-Hermann's contribution to the interpretation of quantum mechanics ● Grete Henry-Hermann's work on the relationship between modern physics and transcendental philosophy ● Grete Hermann's dissertation: The Question of the Finitely Many Steps in the Theory of Polynomial Ideals (1925) ● Discussions on the question of free will and the significance of behavioral research for the critique of reason ● Excerpts from correspondence from 1925 to 1982. (shrink)

This paper is an empirical investigation of how Agile and Plan-based companies address teamwork. We have performed an investigation interviewing managers of 64 companies, 23 agile (hereafter defined with the term “agile companies”) and 41 non-agile (“plan-based”). The results of the study evidence a quite different approach to teamwork and team organization. Such differences are mainly in the selection of the developers and in the emphasis of the collaboration in the development teams.