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Summary On the prosentential theory of truth, a prosentence, e.g., ‘that’s true’, is substituted for the truth predicate, ‘… is true’, a pro-form forming operator, such that the putative inter-linguistic word-world relation may be replaced with a purely expressive intra-linguistic word-word relation. Since the semantic content of anaphoric antecedents and prosentences presume a relation between a proposition and the world, these truth conditions turn out to be genuine language-independent properties.  Proforms are a category of grammatical devices of which pronouns and proverbs are most familiar. Pronouns function grammatically as nouns and may be substituted for previously mentioned nouns. Proverbs function grammatically as verbs and stand in form previously mentioned actions. Since so many grammatical forms have proforms, it should not be surprising for langauge to have a proform for sentences: prosentences. Prosentences have the grammatical structure of a sentence, and stand in for previous sentences. Jill said, "The taxes the state charged me is too high." "That's true," said the tax assessor, "but you ought to pay it now and dispute it by legal means later." Just as with pronouns and proverbs, the prosentence, "That's true," points back to the previous sentence. This special prosentence inherits content in a similar way that a pronoun such as "he" or "she" relates to and inherits its content from its antecedent. "That's true" is an anaphor for some antecedent. That is all, on the prosentential account, that one needs to know to understand truth. 
Key works The two primary works of the prosentential theory of truth are Grover et al 1975 and Grover 1992.  Both Brandom 1994 and Brandom 2000 expand upon Grover (et al's) work.
Introductions James Beebe's "Prosentential Theory of Truth" is a good introductory summary of the view. Michael Lynch's The Nature of Truth contains a commissioned essay by Dorothy Grover and a fine overview of prosententialism about truth.
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  1. added 2020-05-18
    A Prosentential Theory of Truth.Dorothy Grover - 1992 - Princeton University Press.
    In a number of influential articles published since 1972, Dorothy Grover has developed the prosentential theory of truth. Brought together and published with a new introduction, these essays are even more impressive as a group than they were as single contributions to philosophy and linguistics. Denying that truth has an explanatory role, the prosentential theory does not address traditional truth issues like belief, meaning, and justification. Instead, it focuses on the grammatical role of the truth predicate and asserts that “it (...)
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  2. added 2020-05-18
    On Two Deflationary Truth Theories.Dorothy Grover - 1990 - In J. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 1--17.
  3. added 2020-05-18
    Truth and Language-World Connections.Dorothy Grover - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (12):671-687.
  4. added 2020-05-18
    Truth: Do We Need It? [REVIEW]Dorothy L. Grover - 1981 - Philosophia (Misc.) 40 (1):225-252.
  5. added 2020-05-18
    Truth: Do We Need It?Dorothy Grover - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 40 (1):69-103.
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  6. added 2020-05-18
    Prosentences and Propositional Quantification: A Response to Zimmerman. [REVIEW]Dorothy Grover - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 35 (3):289 - 297.
  7. added 2020-05-18
    Inheritors and Paradox.Dorothy Grover - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (10):590-604.
  8. added 2020-05-18
    'This Is False' on the Prosentential Theory.Dorothy L. Grover - 1976 - Analysis 36 (2):80 - 83.
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  9. added 2019-04-02
    Truth-Predicates Still Not Like Pronouns: A Reply to Salis.Arvid Båve - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (5):1421-1429.
    I here respond to Pietro Salis’s objections against my original critique of the Prosentential Theory of Truth. In addition, I clarify some points regarding the relationship between anaphoric relationships and “general semantic notions” like “equivalence”, “consequence”, and “sameness of content”, and make some further points about ’s ability gto explain pragmatic and expressive features of “true”.
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  10. added 2019-02-04
    Anaphoric Deflationism, Primitivism, and the Truth Property.Pietro Salis - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (1):117-134.
    Anaphoric deflationism is a prosententialist account of the use of “true.” Prosentences are, for sentences, the equivalent of what pronouns are for nouns: as pronouns refer to previously introduced nouns, so prosentences like “that’s true” inherit their content from previously introduced sentences. This kind of deflationism concerning the use of “true” (especially in Brandom’s version) is an explanation in terms of anaphora; the prosentence depends anaphorically on the sentence providing its content. A relevant implication of this theory is that “true” (...)
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  11. added 2018-11-19
    Realism, Inferential Semantics, and the Truth Norm.Nicholas Tebben - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
    Characteristic of neo-pragmatism is a commitment to deflationism about semantic properties, and inferentialism about conceptual content. It is usually thought that deflationism undermines the distinction between realistic discourses and others, and that the neo-pragmatists, unlike the classical pragmatists, cannot recognize that truth is a norm of belief and inquiry. I argue, however, that the distinction between realistic discourses and others can be maintained even in the face of a commitment to deflationism, and that deflationists can recognize that truth is a (...)
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  12. added 2018-04-27
    The Generality of Anaphoric Deflationism.Pietro Salis - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):505-522.
    Anaphoric deflationism is a kind of prosententialist account of the use of “true.” It holds that “true” is an expressive operator and not a predicate. In particular, “is true” is explained as a “prosentence.” Prosentences are, for sentences, the equivalent of what pronouns are for nouns: As pronouns refer to previously introduced nouns, so prosentences like “that’s true” inherit their semantic content from previously introduced sentences. So, if Jim says, “The candidate is going to win the election,” and Bill replies (...)
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  13. added 2017-06-26
    Prosentential Theory of Truth.James R. Beebe - 2004 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Prosentential theorists claim that sentences such as “That’s true” are prosentences that function analogously to their better known cousins–pronouns. For example, just as we might use the pronoun ‘he’ in place of ‘James’ to transform “James went to the supermarket” into “He went to the supermarket,” so we might use the prosentenceforming operator ‘is true’ to transform “Snow is white” into “‘Snow is white’ is true.” According to the prosentential theory of truth, whenever a referring expression (for example, a definite (...)
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  14. added 2017-03-29
    Expressive Versus Explanatory Deflationism About Truth.Robert Brandom - 2002 - In Bradley Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall (eds.), Deflationary Truth. Chicago: Open Court Press. pp. 237-257.
  15. added 2017-03-29
    Truth. [REVIEW]Dorothy L. Grover - 1981 - Philosophia 10 (3-4):225-252.
  16. added 2016-09-01
    The Nature of Truth.M. J. Frapolli - 2013 - Springer.
    The book offers a proposal on how to define truth in all its complexity, without reductionism, showing at the same time which questions a theory of truth has to answer and which questions, although related to truth, do not belong within the scope of such a theory. Just like any other theory, a theory of truth has its structure and limits. The semantic core of the position is that truth-ascriptions are pro-forms, i.e. natural language propositional variables. The book also offers (...)
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  17. added 2016-01-12
    Does the Expressive Role of ‘True’ Preclude Deflationary Davidsonian Semantics?Steven Gross - 2015 - In Steven Gross, Nicholas Tebben & Michael Williams (eds.), Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism. Oxford University Press. pp. 47-63.
    Can one combine Davidsonian semantics with a deflationary conception of truth? Williams argues, contra a common worry, that Davidsonian semantics does not require truth-talk to play an explanatory role. Horisk replies that, in any event, the expressive role of truth-talk that Williams emphasizes disqualifies deflationary accounts—at least extant varieties—from combination with Davidsonian semantics. She argues, in particular, that this is so for Quine's disquotationalism, Horwich's minimalism, and Brandom's prosententialism. I argue that Horisk fails to establish her claim in all three (...)
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  18. added 2015-12-12
    Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert B. Brandom - 1994 - Harvard University Press.
    What would something unlike us--a chimpanzee, say, or a computer--have to be able to do to qualify as a possible knower, like us? To answer this question at the very heart of our sense of ourselves, philosophers have long focused on intentionality and have looked to language as a key to this condition. Making It Explicit is an investigation into the nature of language--the social practices that distinguish us as rational, logical creatures--that revises the very terms of this inquiry. Where (...)
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  19. added 2015-11-15
    Some Arguments for the Operational Reading of Truth Expressions.Jakub Gomułka & Jan Wawrzyniak - 2013 - Analiza I Egzystencja 24:61-86.
    The main question of our article is: What is the logical form of statements containing expressions such as “… is true” and “it is true that …”? We claim that these expressions are generally not used in order to assign a certain property to sentences. We indicate that a predicative interpretation of these expressions was rejected by Frege and adherents to the prosentential conception of truth. We treat these expressions as operators. The main advantage of our operational reading is the (...)
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  20. added 2015-04-14
    Vagueness, Logic and Truth.Mary Elizabeth Cohen - 1987 - Dissertation, The Ohio State University
    Hilary Putnam has suggested that logic and metaphysics are intimately connected so that logic is dependent upon metaphysics. According to Putnam, the validity of classical logic depends upon the truth of metaphysical realism, whereas the truth of metaphysical anti-realism will justify only some alternative to classical logic. Moreover, if Putnam's suggestion is correct, then even an attempt to defend one semantics of vagueness over another must include a defense of some metaphysical view. ;My project began as an attempt to find (...)
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  21. added 2015-02-25
    Ellos o Nosotros?: La Disputa Por la Verdad.Gustavo Agüero - 2006 - In Carlos Balzi & César Marchesino (eds.), Hostilidad/Hospitalidad. Universidad Nacional de Córdoba, Area de Filosofía Del Centro de Investigaciones de la Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades.
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  22. added 2013-04-12
    A Prosentential Theory of Truth.Dorothy L. Grover, Joseph L. Camp & Nuel D. Belnap - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (1):73--125.
  23. added 2013-02-19
    Book Review of 'Teorías del juicio' by Gaetano Chiurazzi. [REVIEW]María G. Navarro - 2009 - Arbor-Ciencia Pensamiento y Cultura 740:1353-1361.
    La tesis que plantea Gaetano Chiurazzi en Teorías del juicio llamará la atención del lector interesado tanto en las cuestiones filosóficas esenciales como en su dilucidación y exposición en el curso de la historia. El profesor de hermenéutica filosófica en la Universidad de Turín plantea el análisis del discurso apofántico que, desde la filosofía aristotélica, se distingue por estar formado por proposiciones en las que, por medio de la función atributiva, se expresa la relación predicativa «S es P». Reparar en (...)
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  24. added 2012-10-14
    Why is a Truth-Predicate Like a Pronoun?Arvid Båve - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):297 - 310.
    I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of "true" in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge that (...)
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  25. added 2012-10-14
    A Deflationary Theory of Reference.Arvid Båve - 2009 - Synthese 169 (1):51 - 73.
    The article first rehearses three deflationary theories of reference, (1) disquotationalism, (2) propositionalism (Horwich), and (3) the anaphoric theory (Brandom), and raises a number of objections against them. It turns out that each corresponds to a closely related theory of truth, and that these are subject to analogous criticisms to a surprisingly high extent. I then present a theory of my own, according to which the schema “That S(t) is about t” and the biconditional “S refers to x iff S (...)
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  26. added 2012-07-25
    'Truth Predicates' in Natural Language.Friederike Moltmann - 2015 - In Dora Achourioti, Henri Galinon & José Martinez (eds.), Unifying Theories of Truth. Springer. pp. 57-83.
    This takes a closer look at the actual semantic behavior of apparent truth predicates in English and re-evaluates the way they could motivate particular philosophical views regarding the formal status of 'truth predicates' and their semantics. The paper distinguishes two types of 'truth predicates' and proposes semantic analyses that better reflect the linguistic facts. These analyses match particular independently motivated philosophical views.
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