Discharges against medical advice (AMA) make up a significant number of hospital discharges in the United States, and often involve vulnerable patients who struggle to obtain adequate medical care. Unfortunately, much of the AMA discharge process focuses on absolving the medical center of liability for what happens to these patients once they leave the acute setting. Comparatively little attention is paid to the ethical obligations of the medical team once an informed decision to leave the (...) acute care setting AMA has been made. Via a case narrative, we offer an ethical framework that we believe can help guide an ethically defensible AMA discharge process. By emphasizing our duty to provide the best care possible under the circumstances, we contend, our ethical obligations to promote the patient's best interests can still be met despite their decision to leave the acute setting against medical advice. (shrink)

Patients are often eager to get out of the hospital; so eager that some decide to leave before their treatment team feels it is medically appropriate for them to do so. This is known as an AMA disc...

Patients who leave the hospital prior to their medically recommended endpoint (i.e., a discharge against medical advice, or “AMA”) typically prompt considerable consternation among physicians and o...

“At-own-risk discharges” or “self-discharges” evidences an irretrievable breakdown in the patient–clinician relationship when patients leave care facilities before completion of medical treatment and against medical advice. Dissolution of the therapeutic relationship terminates the physician’s duty of care and professional liability with respect to care of the patient. Acquiescence of an at-own-risk discharge by the clinician is seen as respecting patient autonomy. The validity of such requests pivot on the assumptions that the patient is fully informed and competent (...) to invoke an at-own-risk discharge and that care up to the point of the at-own-risk discharge meets prevailing clinical standards. Palliative care’s use of a multidisciplinary team approach challenges both these assumptions. First by establishing multiple independent therapeutic relations between professionals in the multidisciplinary team and the patient who persists despite an at-own-risk discharge. These enduring therapeutic relationships negate the suggestion that no duty of care is owed the patient. Second, the continued employ of collusion, familial determinations, and the circumnavigation of direct patient involvement in family-centric societies compromises the patient’s decision-making capacity and raises questions as to the patient’s decision-making capacity and their ability to assume responsibility for the repercussions of invoking an at-own-risk discharge. With the validity of at-own-risk discharge request in question and the welfare and patient interest at stake, an alternative approach to assessing at-own-risk discharge requests are called for. The welfare model circumnavigates these concerns and preserves the patient’s welfare through the employ of a multidisciplinary team guided holistic appraisal of the patient’s specific situation that is informed by clinical and institutional standards and evidenced-based practice. The welfare model provides a robust decision-making framework for assessing the validity of at-own-risk discharge requests on a case-by-case basis. (shrink)

“At-own-risk discharges” or “self-discharges” evidences an irretrievable breakdown in the patient–clinician relationship when patients leave care facilities before completion of medical treatment and against medical advice. Dissolution of the therapeutic relationship terminates the physician’s duty of care and professional liability with respect to care of the patient. Acquiescence of an at-own-risk discharge by the clinician is seen as respecting patient autonomy. The validity of such requests pivot on the assumptions that the patient is fully informed and competent (...) to invoke an at-own-risk discharge and that care up to the point of the at-own-risk discharge meets prevailing clinical standards. Palliative care’s use of a multidisciplinary team approach challenges both these assumptions. First by establishing multiple independent therapeutic relations between professionals in the multidisciplinary team and the patient who persists despite an at-own-risk discharge. These enduring therapeutic relationships negate the suggestion that no duty of care is owed the patient. Second, the continued employ of collusion, familial determinations, and the circumnavigation of direct patient involvement in family-centric societies compromises the patient’s decision-making capacity and raises questions as to the patient’s decision-making capacity and their ability to assume responsibility for the repercussions of invoking an at-own-risk discharge. With the validity of at-own-risk discharge request in question and the welfare and patient interest at stake, an alternative approach to assessing at-own-risk discharge requests are called for. The welfare model circumnavigates these concerns and preserves the patient’s welfare through the employ of a multidisciplinary team guided holistic appraisal of the patient’s specific situation that is informed by clinical and institutional standards and evidenced-based practice. The welfare model provides a robust decision-making framework for assessing the validity of at-own-risk discharge requests on a case-by-case basis. (shrink)

The legal environment -- Regulation of nursing practice -- Nurses in legal actions -- Standards of care -- Defenses to negligence or malpractice -- Prevention of malpractice -- Nurses as witnesses -- Professional liability insurance -- Accepting or refusing an assignment/patient abandonment -- Delegation to unlicensed assistive personnel -- Patients' rights and responsibilities -- Confidential communication -- Competency and guardianship -- Informed consent -- Refusal of treatment -- Pain control -- Patient teaching and health counseling -- Medication administration -- Clients (...) with AIDS and HIV testing -- Abusive situations -- Reproductive services -- Restraints -- Emergency psychiatric admissions -- Organ and tissue donation and transplantation -- Discharge against medical advice -- The medical record and documentation standards -- Electronic health information and communications -- Interdependent nursing functions: verbal orders and telenursing -- Event reporting and compliance -- Quality and safety in nursing practice -- Forensic issues -- Employer and employee rights -- Contracts -- Corporate liability -- Employment contracts and unionization -- Employment status liability -- Staffing issues and floating -- Americans with Disabilities Act -- Employees with AIDS/HIV infection and exposure to bloodborne pathogens -- Impaired nurses -- Sexual harassment in the workplace -- Violence in the workplace -- Intentional torts -- Environmental health and safety -- Ethical decision making -- Professional boundaries and patient relationships -- Moral courage and patient advocacy -- Social media and online professionalism -- Reporting illegal, unethical, or unsafe conduct -- Maternal versus fetal rights -- Futility of care -- Advance directives and end-of-life decisions -- Assisted suicide. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:When Is Enough, Enough?Megan HomsyThis was a case that stuck with many members of our transplant team for a long time. The patient was a 44-year-old Caucasian male evaluated for a liver transplant with a diagnosis of hepatitis C virus (HCV), originally diagnosed 11 years before the transplant evaluation. The patient met the criteria for the following substance use diagnoses: alcohol use disorder moderate in sustained remission, in a (...) controlled environment, opioid use disorder, severe, in sustained remission, on maintenance therapy, in a controlled environment, stimulant use disorder, amphetamine-type, severe, in early remission, in a controlled environment and stimulant use disorder, cocaine-type, severe in early remission, in a controlled environment.The patient had been living in a sober living housing program for approximately ten months prior to his transplant evaluation with me, his social worker. He had also been diagnosed with depression and bipolar disorder. He had been intermittently linked with mental health services and had participated in numerous detox and substance abuse programs over the last ten years, with varying degrees of success. He was in dual diagnosis treatment (i.e., treatment for co-occurring substance use and mental health disorders) through his Suboxone clinic and was completing toxicology screenings on a biweekly basis.After concluding the minimum three months of drug and alcohol treatment set forth by the state's Organ Transplantation Consortium, the patient graduated from his sober living program, moved in with his sister, and was listed for a liver transplant.The patient was transplanted five months after his clinic evaluation. At the time of the surgery, the patient's Suboxone was abruptly discontinued and replaced with IV Dilaudid. Within days of his transplant, the patient frequently expressed concerns about his pain. Several medical services attempted to manage the pain medications, resulting in his pain management plan being changed repeatedly and much confusion over his current medication regimen. During his liver transplant hospitalization, the RN found the patient with a needle in his arm, and after a search of the patient's hospital room, the hospital police found drug paraphernalia and illicit substances. The patient was eventually discharged to an inpatient substance abuse program, which he left before completing the program and against medical advice.During his first year post-transplant, I attempted to arrange other various treatment programs for him (most of which he did not follow through with) and to find housing for him (as he had been forced to leave his sister's home after his relapse). Eventually, the patient was incarcerated on drug-related charges. Numerous times, the patient missed completing his labs and his post-transplant appointments. He did not refill his immunosuppressant medications, and for lengthy periods of time, he was unreachable by the transplant care team, which resulted in my team members and I calling the patient's family, other providers, and the police for safety checks.In the aftermath of these issues, my colleagues and I had to reckon with the realization that we had failed the patient. As a team, our transplant center created a task force to review this case and what to do in the future to prevent such breakdowns in patient care. We created protocols for managing patients who, at the time of their transplant, are on Medication Assisted Treatment (MAT) such as Suboxone and methadone. Staff across the multidisciplinary team attended trainings regarding addiction, pain management, and best practices for MAT services. Additionally, our transplant center collaborated with our hospital's addiction treatment program for a streamlined referral process for transplant patients to addiction services.This patient's case and its sensational nature resulted in many conversations, both professional and unprofessional. Members of the social worker department became aware that personnel within transplant, though not involved in patient care, were inappropriately discussing this patient's case and engaging in unprofessional behavior. Said actions led to the termination of a member of the transplant team. I was placed in the unenviable [End Page E3] position of having to report this behavior to hospital management and legal teams to protect a vulnerable patient.The ethical challenge behind this case really stems from the transplant team attempting to balance two... (shrink)

Patients have the right to refuse their treatment; however, this refusal should be informed. We evaluated the quality of the informed refusal process in Iranian hospitals from patients' viewpoints. To this end, we developed a questionnaire that covered four key aspects of the informed refusal process including; information disclosure, voluntariness, comprehension, and provider-patient relationship. A total of 284 patients who refused their treatment from 12 teaching hospitals in the Isfahan Province, Iran, were recruited and surveyed to produce a convenience sample. (...) Patients' perceptions about the informed refusal process were scored and the mean scores of the four components were calculated. The findings showed that the practice of information disclosure was perceived to be moderate, however, comprehension, voluntariness and provider–patient relationship were perceived to be relatively good. We found that patients, who refused their care before any treatment had commenced, reported a lower quality of information disclosure and voluntariness. Patients informed by nurses and those who had not had a previous related admission, reported lower scores for comprehension and relationship. In conclusion, the process of obtaining informed refusal was relatively satisfactory except for levels of information disclosure. To improve current practices, Iranian patients need to be better informed about; different treatment options, consequences of treatment refusal, costs of not continuing treatment and follow-ups after refusal. Developing more informative refusal forms is needed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Working with Patience:An Insight into Dealing with Difficult EmotionsDavid VilanovaAs the most trusted professionals in the nation, nurses are expected to care for their patients with empathy and freedom from bias. The reality is that nurses are human, and some form of implicit bias is inevitable. In my own experience, this issue has reared its head on several occasions. My nursing background is prominently in cardiac and intensive care. (...) Seeing patients at their most vulnerable has become a regular part of my practice. Among some of the most challenging cases for me have been when I assume care of a patient withdrawing from alcohol. As an adult child with close alcoholic family members, many instances of abuse and pain stick with me today and these are brought to the surface when I care for patients with alcohol use disorder. In most cases, I easily find a healthy balance between remaining an understanding-and-empathetic provider and protecting my emotional and mental health as I navigate ethical and moral issues. However, with this patient population, walking that fine line is especially challenging. How do I navigate and manage intensely personal emotions and biases while providing the high-quality care I vowed to deliver regardless of my patient's life choices, addictions, and illnesses? How do I maintain an appropriate level of neutrality and clarity as this patient's behavior and attitude spark emotional triggers? In other words, how do I take care of someone I don't like?Mrs. H was a middle-aged Hispanic woman, barely coherent, but speaking clearly enough that I could understand her slurred speech. Immediate dread washed over me as I realized my assignment included a patient withdrawing from alcohol. The patient's affect, incoherence, and aggression were all too reminiscent of a traumatic past I still work to heal from. My coworkers couldn't understand her insults and obscenities and were therefore unphased except for noting her unruly and erratic behavior. On the other hand, I could understand much of what she was yelling at me and any other staff who bravely walked into her room. My immediate thoughts were that this woman clearly did not want our help. My every attempt to enter her room, speak with her, and provide care were met with an all too familiar rejection and denial that she even had a problem. Yet here she was in a hospital room, and I was her nurse. She verbalized denial of drinking too much when told that she was being treated for alcohol withdrawal. She stated this denial more to herself than to the health care providers in the room, and it was reminiscent of the denial I have seen in my loved ones. This was ironic, I always thought, as the need for such self-deception in and of itself points to the fact that something may be wrong and worth addressing.But denial or not, today, this patient—Mrs. H, was entrusted into my care. She refused treatments and medications, and this put me in a complex ethical predicament—treating a patient that I do not like for the personal issues she reminds me of, and the treatment of a patient against their refusal, as she was deemed incapable of making her own decisions. The latter of these two issues was easiest to put aside. Legally, this patient needed to be treated through her alcohol withdrawal. Once her mental status cleared up, she could sign out against medical advice or choose to remain until a safe discharge plan was in place. There was a protocol and legal guidelines for this situation. However, no guidelines [End Page 10] truly exist when it comes to the management of a patient that you simply do not like. The result can be a near-instantaneous dread each time you must answer that patient's bed alarm, call light, or most basic needs. A negative bias takes over, and it would be an understatement to say that this affects the quality of care. Patients in situations like this—with providers who judge them as I have been guilty of—can easily become subject to derogatory remarks, health inequities, and biased labeling... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Silent Screams; Lily's StoryEva V. Regel"Trauma is personal. It does not disappear if it is not validated. When it is ignored or invalidated, the silent screams continue internally heard only by the one held captive. When someone enters the pain and hears the scream, healing can begin."—Danielle Bernock, "Emerging Wings; A true story of Lies, Pain and the Love that Heals."Some patients stay with you long after they leave. (...) They appear in your mind when you walk by the hospital room they occupied or when someone mentions their name. There is [End Page 19] something about the narrative of their life and illness that makes you hold on to them. Lily is one such patient for me.Lily was a 45-year-old paraplegic woman who was well known to many providers in the hospital. She had a complex trauma history (childhood physical and sexual abuse, intimate partner violence, domestic violence), homelessness, and multiple psychiatric admissions. In addition, she had a complex medical history, including chronic pain issues and substance use disorder. Many providers considered her to be a "very difficult" or "challenging" patient because she would "dictate" her care, had low distress tolerance and would have explosive angry outbursts requiring frequent visits from Police and Security. To top it off, after months of a challenging stay on a unit, she would eventually leave against medical advice. Everyone involved in her care felt that discharge to a safe setting such as a skilled nursing facility would be her best option. Yet, she was a very "hard" sell to any facility because of her behavioral issues, relatively young age, extensive history of drug use, and medication non-compliance. Even though the unit I worked in was familiar with "difficult" patients like Lily, the floor staff was anxious and concerned about the effect Lily would have on patients, staff, and providers. The combined anticipatory anxiety worsened after we were told that Lily left against medical advice three days before her admission to our unit as a reaction to the staff's attempt to develop a behavioral plan.I remember the day I met Lily. I was working as the clinical social worker on the floor, helping patients with adjustment to coping with hospitalization, addressing mental health issues that usually exacerbate in the acute care setting, and providing support to the staff caring for a psychosocially complex patient population. It was the second day after Lily arrived on the floor, and Police and Security had already come up three times. As I walked out of another patient's room, a bedside nurse stopped me in the hallway. "Can you please talk to her? … Please, just talk to her, or sit with her. I just need a break. I have been in that room since I started my shift. I am exhausted." The nurse had an exasperated and pleading look, and even though I was rushing to a meeting, I decided to meet with Lily instead. When I walked into her room, I saw a thin, small-framed woman with brown hair pulled back into a tight bun. She had freckles peppered all over her round face, neck, and chest. Her features were delicate and small, and her almond-shaped green eyes were her most prominent feature. She was wearing a white tee and jeans. She was sitting in her wheelchair; her makeup bag was lying on the table next to her. I introduced myself and my role on the team, trying not to stumble under a very heavy glare. "Tell them to leave me alone. That nurse is always in my room. Spying. I might not be able to walk, but I can still use my hands. I can call if I need help."And so I did. And when I came back, Lily and I talked a little about her life. And the next day, we talked a little more. And then again. Lily was giving me small glimpses of who she was and the events in her life. Then, one day, in the middle of the conversation about her day and telling me how much she hated to be confined to her hospital room, she looked... (shrink)

The work of a clinical ethicist often focuses on identifying what goals an autonomous patient has for themselves, or on helping identify a surrogate when a patient lacks autonomy for a specific dec...

The model for capacity assessment in the United States and much of the Western world relies upon the demonstration of four skills including the ability to communicate a clear, consistent choice. Yet such assessments often occur at only one moment in time, which may result in the patient expressing a choice to the evaluator that is highly inconsistent with the patient’s underlying values and goals, especially if a short-term factor (such as frustration with the hospital staff) distorts the patient’s preferences (...) momentarily. These challenges are particularly concerning in cases, which arise frequently in hospital settings, in which patients demand immediate self-discharge, often during off-hours, while faced with life-threatening risks. This paper examines the distinctive elements that shape such cases and explores their ethical implications, ultimately offering a model for such situations that can be operationalized. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Tincture of the Doctor's TimeHolland KaplanI first thought of Mr. H as a "difficult patient" while reading the written hand-off I received on him as I was preparing to take over an inpatient general medicine service—"He leaves all the time to smoke." I don't think the statement was meant to imply anything about the patient; if anything, it may have been included for context to prepare me for (...) the patient's intermittent absence. But, reading this, I felt a familiar sense of annoyance rising in my chest. Every few months, I take care of a patient who seems to never be in his room. The patient is consistently out smoking, in the cafeteria, or in another unknown location, seemingly doing an undisclosed activity. This is frustrating because it means I have to work around the patient's schedule of smoke breaks and jaunts to the cafeteria to evaluate the patient on a daily basis. The thoughts inevitably cross my mind: Does this patient even want care in the hospital if he's never in his room? Is he actually sick enough to need to be in the hospital if he's able to spend so much time outside of the hospital? Why is he leaving so frequently—is he doing drugs?This particular patient had been in perfect health until two months before I met him when he was shot multiple times during an encounter at a gas station. One of the bullets had lodged in his back, shattering a vertebra. Another had decimated the bones in his right upper arm, which were now held in place by screws and plates. Several had landed in his abdomen, necessitating the removal of part of his bowel. Finally, a bullet had sliced through the lower part of his right kidney, shredding his ureter and mandating surgical reconstruction of his urinary system. After over a month in the intensive care unit with multiple reparative surgeries, he was discharged to a rehabilitation facility. But he started having fevers and fast heart rates; ultimately, he was admitted to the hospital again for multiple infected fluid collections that had formed at the sites of his surgeries. He left the hospital prior to getting treated for these infections, purportedly "against medical [End Page 12] advice." And now, several weeks later, he was here in the hospital for the same reason.The first time I went to see Mr. H, he was, of course, not in his room. I went to the nursing station to ask if the clerk knew where he was. She knowingly said, "Oh yeah, he goes out a lot. I can give him a call to let him know the doctor is here to see him if you'd like." I assented, thanked the clerk for calling him, and proceeded, annoyed, in seeing the rest of my patients. I considered how I would address Mr. H's behavior when I was finally able to talk to him. I had seen others take many different approaches—negotiation about the timing and frequency of these extramural expeditions, ultimatums about getting discharged, mandating urine drug screens upon return, and silent, frustrated tolerance. I resolved to wait to speak to him to determine which approach might be most suitable. An hour later, I received a call from the clerk that Mr. H had returned to his room to see me.The first time I met Mr. H, he informed me he had taken the bus to midtown to make a run to the grocery store. I was internally incredulous. He felt well enough to go to the grocery store? Why was he in the hospital then? At that moment, I opted not to discuss his frequent departures yet, as I was frustrated and realized I wouldn't be able to identify the best way to address them. I reviewed his medical issues with him, asked specific questions about how he was feeling, performed a physical exam, and reiterated his current plan of care. Mr. H made it very clear that he would like to get out of the hospital as soon as possible. I tried to set the expectation that he... (shrink)

One hundred inpatients on an acute hospital elderly care unit and 43 of their relatives were interviewed shortly before hospital discharge. Eighty per cent of elderly patients and their relatives were aware of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). Television drama was their main source of information. Patients and relatives overestimated the effectiveness of CPR. Eighty-six per cent of patients were willing to be routinely consulted by doctors about their own CPR status, but relatives were less enthusiastic about routine consultation. Patients' and relatives' (...) views about the appropriateness of CPR did not differ significantly. Seventeen percent of patients did not desire CPR. However, 64 per cent of patients were ultimately willing to follow their doctor's advice about the appropriateness of CPR. The conclusion reached is that mentally competent, elderly patients but not their relatives should be routinely consulted about their own desire for CPR in order to avoid resuscitating patients against their wishes. Further research is required to find out how patients would feel about resuscitation if they were terminally ill or chronically confused, and how carers would feel about resuscitating such patients. (shrink)

The discharge of older people from hospital at night is a topical and emotive issue that has recently gained media attention in New Zealand and the United Kingdom, including calls to prevent it occurring. With growing pressures on hospital capacity and ageing populations, normative aspects of hospital discharge are increasingly relevant. This paper therefore addresses the question: Should older people (say, over eighty years old) ever be discharged home from hospital during the night? Or given safety concerns, should regulation (...) class='Hi'>against the night-time discharge of older people be put in place? Employing a principlist lens to bioethics, this paper considers key principles or values involved, including discharge safety concerns, personal preference and consent, the risk of remaining in hospital, and broader considerations around discharge policy. These points act as a possible framework for further research and discussion of normative aspects of hospital discharge. Overall, this paper argues that while discharge safety concerns must be properly acknowledged and addressed, it can still sometimes be appropriate for an older person to leave hospital at night. The option of night-time discharge should therefore remain open to people of all ages. (shrink)

The role of the General Medical Council has changed over the last few years and this paper shows how the GMC now gives advice on good practice, as well as a warning against bad practice.

Proponents of causal decision theories argue that classical Bayesian decision theory (BDT) gives the wrong advice in certain types of cases, of which the clearest and commonest are the medical Newcomb problems. I defend BDT, invoking a familiar principle of statistical inference to show that in such cases a free agent cannot take the contemplated action to be probabilistically relevant to its causes (so that BDT gives the right answer). I argue that my defence does better than those of (...) Ellery Eells and Richard Jeffrey; and that it applies, where necessary, to other types of Newcomb problem. (shrink)

The complexity of cognitive emulation of human diagnostic reasoning is the major challenge in the implementation of computer-based programs for diagnostic advice in medicine. We here present an epistemological model of diagnosis with the ultimate goal of defining a high-level language for cognitive and computational primitives. The diagnostic task proceeds through three different phases: hypotheses generation, hypotheses testing and hypotheses closure. Hypotheses generation has the inferential form of abduction (from findings to hypotheses) constrained under the criterion of plausibility. Hypotheses testing (...) is achieved by a deductive inference (from generated hypotheses to expected findings), followed by an eliminative induction, constrained under the criterion of covering, which matches expected findings against patient''s findings to select the best explanation. Hypotheses closure is a deductive-inductive type of inference very similar to the inferences operating in hypotheses testing. In this case induction matches the consequences of the generated hypotheses against the patient''s characteristics or preferences under the criterion of utility. By using the language exploited in this epistemological model, it is possible to describe the cognitive tasks underlying the most influential knowledge-based diagnostic systems. (shrink)

Euthanasia is not legal in Albania, yet there is strong evidence that euthanising a terminally ill patient is not an unknown concept for the Albanians. The first mentioned case of euthanasia is found in 7th century AD mythology and during the communist regime (1944–1989), allegations of euthanising political prisoners and possible rivals in the struggle for power have widely been formulated. There is a trend among relatives and laymen taking care of terminally ill patients to apply tranquilisers in an abusive (...) dosage, or even against medical advice, aiming at sedating the ailing patient. These actions, the refusal to keep on consistently applying life prolonging treatment, and other data, suggest that covert euthanasia is a practice and legal interventions are needed towards formalising it. This might well improve end-of-life care standards, since the inadequacy of structures, such as hospices and residential asylums, is becoming a major drawback in the struggle for dignity and accessible socio-medical help for third age persons and terminal patients. (shrink)

Clinicians have an obligation to ensure that patients with adequate capacity can make autonomous decisions. Thus, patients who choose to forego treatment and leave hospitals “against medical advice” are typically allowed to do so. But what happens when they require clinicians’ assistance to physically leave? Is it incumbent upon clinicians to not only respect and fulfill patients’ requests with which they disagree, but to physically assist in their fulfillment? We attempt to develop an ethical framework wherein clinicians can (...) honor patients’ wishes without necessarily sacrificing their own moral position. (shrink)

It is commonly said that patients have no right to demand that treatment must be continued when medical carers believe it is “futile” to continue it. There are certainly many judicial statements to this effect, some of which are quoted in this paper. However, there are various ways that courts can intervene, even if they do not order directly that treatment must be provided or continued. First, patients or their representatives may argue the process of decision making was unfair (...) or that they were unfairly discriminated against when treatment has been refused. To date, these arguments have met with limited success so far as enabling patients to have treatment provided or continued against medical advice. More recently, however, some patients have challenged the lawfulness of a proposed treatment regime by advancing human rights arguments, based in turn on a broader aspect of patients’ “best interests” than best medical interests. (shrink)

As physicians, we have seen patients with substance use disorders leave the hospital against medical advice, slipping through the cracks of our health care system. In fact, despite a high burden of life‐threatening illnesses, patients with SUDs are at a nearly threefold increased risk of leaving the hospital against medical advice. Leaving against medical advice is associated with an increased thirty‐day mortality rate as well as an increased rate of hospital readmission. When a patient (...) leaves in this way, the health care system loses the opportunity to engage with someone who is struggling with an SUD and whose health is at imminent risk. Fortunately, there are ways to address some of these challenges within existing organizational frameworks. Addiction consult teams and supervised injection facilities are two interventions that have proven successful. (shrink)

It is commonly said that patients have no right to demand that treatment must be continued when medical carers believe it is “futile” to continue it. There are certainly many judicial statements to this effect, some of which are quoted in this paper. However, there are various ways that courts can intervene, even if they do not order directly that treatment must be provided or continued. First, patients or their representatives may argue the process of decision making was unfair (...) or that they were unfairly discriminated against when treatment has been refused. To date, these arguments have met with limited success so far as enabling patients to have treatment provided or continued against medical advice. More recently, however, some patients have challenged the lawfulness of a proposed treatment regime by advancing human rights arguments, based in turn on a broader aspect of patients’ “best interests” than best medical interests. (shrink)

This paper addresses two examples of overconfident presentations of utilitarian moral conclusions. First, there is Peter Singer’s widely discussed claim that if the consequences of a medical experiment are sufficiently good to justify the use of animals, then we should be prepared to perform the experiment on human beings with equivalent mental capacities. Second, I consider defences of infanticide or after-birth abortion. I do not challenge the soundness of these arguments. Rather, I accuse those who seek to translate these (...) conclusions into moral advice of a dangerous overconfidence. This paper offers an insurance policy that protects against some of the costs of mistaken moral reasoning. An interest in moral insurance is motivated by the recognition that, in the event that overconfident ethicists have reasoned incorrectly, some actions recommended by their conclusions are not just bad, but very bad. We should reject suggestions that we conduct medical experiments on humans or kill newborns. (shrink)

Differences in guidance from various organisations is preventing uniform standards of practiceThe emphasis in medical law and ethics on protecting the patient’s right to choose is at an all time high. Apart from circumscribed situations, for instance where the Mental Health Act 19831 is applicable, the only justification for medically treating an adult patient against his or her wishes is on the basis of common law, using the principle of best interests, and only when he or she lacks (...) capacity to refuse treatment. As a result, it is important that clinicians should be able to assess capacity to refuse treatment. Given that judgements of incapacity involve deciding that a person does not have the ability to refuse treatment, a great deal of care needs to go into the assessment and characterisation of incapacity.There is divergence between the characterisation of capacity that is used by the courts and that which is recommended by the British Medical Association . The BMA usefully expands on the first element of capacity as set out in the standard legal definition of capacity in the Re C judgment2 but ignores the other two elements. By doing this, the BMA makes it unclear whether it is rejecting these as relevant to capacity; it also misses the opportunity to expand on these elements in a clinically useful way.We will begin with a description of the BMA’s advice3 and the standard English legal definition of capacity.2,4 Then we will show that there are important discrepancies between these two sources of advice. We think that the BMA ought to clarify its position on capacity in order to safeguard the interests of physicians, healthcare workers, and patients.THE RE C TESTMr C was a patient in a psychiatric secure hospital who had chronic paranoid schizophrenia with …. (shrink)

Objectives—During recent decades, rabbis in Israel have been playing an increasing role in the consultation of patients or their families on medical issues. The study was performed to determine the attitude of physicians to rabbinical consultation by parents of sick children for purposes of basic medical decision making.Design and setting–A questionnaire was prepared which contained questions regarding physicians' reactions to specific medical situations as well as their demographic data. The study participants included all the available physicians who (...) were employed in the study period at one tertiary medical centre in Israel, which is not associated with any religious organisation. The questionnaire was presented personally to all of the physicians who were available for the study.Results–Between 63% and 77% of the respondents were accepting of rabbinical consultation in regard to medical decisions. Nevertheless, in cases of divergence from accepted medical practice and in emergencies, almost all stated they would take measures to resist the rabbi's advice. This attitude did not correlate with the physician's age, religious status or experience in medicine.Conclusions–Israeli physicians respect rabbis' suggestions in the area of medical decision making, though they would not let a rabbi's advice interfere with their decisions if they believed the rabbi's opinion went against medical need. In order to prevent an untoward effect of the rabbinical involvement in medicine, rules should be set to establish norms for rabbi-physician collaboration. (shrink)

Dear Editor, -/- One of the recent changes in the UK cabinet, after Liz Truss became the Prime Minister, was that Dr Therese Coffey become the new Health Secretary. Some news outlets were quick to point out her anti-abortion stance (see e.g. (1–3)) and that this, according to them, might be a problem. While pro-lifers might not completely rejoice over this situation as Coffey stated that ‘she wouldn’t “seek to undo” abortion laws’(3), I do not wish to focus here on (...) speculating on the future status of UK abortion legislation. Rather, I wish to focus on some statements quoted by the media as made by Clare Murphy, chief executive of the British Pregnancy Advisory Service (BPAS), who stated that: (2,4) -/- ‘Earlier this year, our new Health Secretary voted to revoke access to at-home abortion care, and recriminalise women who end their own pregnancies without the approval of two doctors.’ ‘In doing so, Therese Coffey voted against the advice of leading medical bodies.’ ‘To have a health secretary who would place their personal beliefs above expert clinical guidance is deeply concerning.’ -/- Coffey is a Catholic, and this brings back to mind some of the aspects of the debate surrounding conflicts of interest in bioethics. There have been, for example, discussions and proposals that having a religious belief should be declared as a conflict of interest.(5,6) But something seems to be missing in these portrayals of conflict of interest and the disagreement between Coffey and these ‘leading medical bodies’. If we regard financial conflicts of interests as the classical case of such conflicts that is used as a reference to other types of conflicts of interest,(5,6) then why do we not see the media complaining that ‘leading medical bodies’ support procedures that will give them more work oppor-tunities and improve their financial stability? To paraphrase Murphy who (according to the BBC 'said while politicians were entitled to their own views on abortion, what mattered was whether their "personal convictions stand in the way of women's ability to act on their own”. (4) perhaps ‘BPAS and the leading medical bodies are entitled to considerations of their financial interests, but what matters is whether the advice they give is clinically sound and founded in the principles of ethical clinical practice. In Matthew 6:24 Our Lord said that one cannot serve two masters, so perhaps we should not be so concerned with Coffey consulting her conscience, but rather scrutinise clinical institutions. (shrink)

Medical assistance in dying, which includes voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide, is legally permissible in a number of jurisdictions, including the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Canada. Although medical assistance in dying is most commonly provided for suffering associated with terminal somatic illness, some jurisdictions have also offered it for severe and irremediable psychiatric illness. Meanwhile, recent work in the philosophy of psychiatry has led to a renewed understanding of psychiatric illness that emphasises the role of the relation between (...) the person and the external environment in the constitution of mental disorder. In this paper, I argue that this externalist approach to mental disorder highlights an ethical challenge to the practice of medical assistance in dying for psychiatric illness. At the level of the clinical assessment, externalism draws attention to potential social and environmental interventions that might have otherwise been overlooked by the standard approach to mental disorder, which may confound the judgement that there is no further reasonable alternative that could alleviate the person’s suffering. At the level of the wider society, externalism underscores how social prejudices and structural barriers that contribute to psychiatric illness constrain the affordances available to people and result in them seeking medical assistance in dying when they otherwise might not have had under better social conditions. (shrink)

This paper responds to Dr Cassell's request for a fuller explanation of my argument in the paper, Against medical ethics: a philosopher's view. A distinction is made between two accounts of ethics in general, and the philosophical basis of health work ethics is briefly stated. The implications of applying this understanding of ethics to medical education are discussed.

In a controversial paper, David Seedhouse argues that medical ethics is not and cannot be a distinct discipline with it own field of study. He derives this claim from a characterization of ethics, which he states but does not defend. He claims further that the project of medical ethics as it exists and of moral philosophy do not overlap. I show that Seedhouse's views on ethics have wide implications which he does not declare, and in the light of (...) this argue that Seedhouse owes us a defence of his characterization of ethics. Further, I show that his characterization of ethics, which he uses to attack medical ethics, is a committed position within moral philosophy. As a consequence of this, it does not allow the relation between moral philosophy and medical ethics to be discussed without prejudice to its outcome. Finally, I explore the relation between Seedhouse's position and naturalism, and its implications for medical epistemology. I argue that this shows us that Seedhouse's position, if it can be defended, is likely to lead to a fruitful and important line of inquiry which reconnects philosophy and medical ethics. (shrink)

Use of medication for treatment of ADHD (or its historical precursors) has been debated for more than forty years. Reasons for the ongoing differences of opinion are analyzed by exploring some of the arguments for and against considering ADHD a mental disorder. Relative to two important DSM criteria — that a mental disorder causes some sort of harm to the individual and that a mental disorder is the manifestation of a dysfunction in the individual — ADHD’s classification as a (...) mental disorder is found to be contentiously value-laden. The disagreements spill over to reasoning regarding appropriate management, because justification for a drug prescription is in part predicated on the idea that the drugs manage mental disorders. These debates do not appear to be nearing resolution, so individuals offering advice, or trying to decide whether ADHD drugs are appropriate for themselves or their children, may find it helpful to compare the values underlying various perspectives with their own. (shrink)

A young man, terminally ill and in extreme suffering, asks to be removed from life support, requesting morphine first so he'll be asleep when the machine stops. His physician agrees, but the hospital's chief administrator intervenes, arguing that the morphine might itself cause death, leaving the physician open to criminal indictment for murder. To placate the administrator, the doctor and patient reach a grim compromise: life support will be disconnected first, and only after manifest signs of suffering appear will the (...) physician administer the morphine, to alleviate pain. The patient's request is ultimately respected, but many staff members feel he has been made to suffer needlessly. This is just one of many cases Ruth Macklin discusses in Enemies of Patients, an eye-opening look at the growing number of forces that are hostile to the interests of patients, including hospital administrators, lawyers who represent hospitals, insurance companies, government regulations, and even some well intentioned physicians. Macklin, a highly regarded medical ethicist, the author of Mortal Choices and the subject of a New York Times Magazine cover story, provides a behind-the-scenes look at how the patient's ethical rights are often violated. She describes, for instance, how a new breed of hospital administrator, the risk manager, acts consistently as an enemy of the patient, often urging physicians to continue aggressive, expensive treatments for critically ill patients--even when the patient and doctor agree the treatment should cease--for fear of lawsuits, bad publicity, or criminal indictment. (Macklin points out, for instance, that even though no physician has ever been convicted of a crime for withdrawing treatment from a patient in a permanent vegetative state, hospital lawyers and risk managers regularly assert that there is a danger of criminal liability in such cases.) The government also can become an enemy of patients. The most egregious case, according to Macklin, is the Federal government's "gag rule" which has prohibited health care facilities that receive Title X funds from discussing abortion with pregnant women, violating the patient's right to full information. And physicians themselves can become enemies of patients. Some, seeing themselves as fiscal gatekeepers, ration expensive health care procedures on financial rather than medical grounds. Some physicians refuse to treat patients who don't follow their advice (a cardiologist, for instance, who will not take care of patients who smoke) and others won't treat patients who pose a threat of lawsuit (such as a California woman in need of life-sustaining dialysis, who had previously sued another physician). Packed with numerous case histories drawn from the author's experience in a major urban medical center, Enemies of Patients will give readers a better understanding of their rights as patients and show them how to forge an alliance with their doctors against common enemies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Stories of Families with Chronically Ill Pediatric Patients during the War in UkraineVita VoloshchukFebruary 24th was a day that has left a mark in the memory and on the lives of every Ukrainian person. My husband and I work together [End Page E5] in a hospital. He had gone into work early to conduct a kidney transplant that had been scheduled for that day. Suddenly, whilst on my way (...) to work that morning, I heard a strange sound—it was an air-raid siren. Before that, I had never heard such a sound. I went through all the possible options of what it could be. Of course, watching the morning news had never been a habit either. The next thing that astonished me was that the taxi I had ordered was taking an unnaturally long time to turn up. When I got into the taxi, I noticed that the taxi driver was really upset and silent for half of the journey. He then said, “A war has begun...”“War? So? The war has been going on since 2014.”“You don’t understand,” he said. “Russia is launching missile attacks all over the territory of Ukraine; Russian troops are coming from the east and north of Ukraine. They want to capture the capital of Ukraine.” (Kyiv).Arriving at the hospital, I saw confused faces everywhere. The morning meeting began with a discussion of how we were to act in any possible situation that may occur. We were to discharge patients from the hospital, as many as possible. The arrangement of a bomb shelter began (although I didn’t even think that such a thing existed in our hospital), along with the strengthening of the hospital’s windows, and the increase of supplies such as medicine and food. Of course, the boy who expected a kidney transplant did not receive it because no one knew what to expect at any second or where a hostile Russian missile might hit, as Russian missiles hit not only military objects but residential buildings, hospitals, and memorials as well.Children who had to continue therapy remained in the hospital. As soon as we heard the sound of an air-raid siren, we had to go down into the bomb shelter. This happened 5-10 times per day. Families with palliative and chronically ill children began to call and ask for advice on how to proceed in such a situation. As many children were on artificial respiration devices, others needed oxygen therapy, and sputum of mucus from the upper respiratory tract. All this required uninterrupted power supplies and appropriate equipment. Later that day, a doctor from Poland called me and asked if our pediatric patients needed help, saying it would be better if they were moved to Poland, where they would be safer and have the correct equipment. We started organizing evacuations for chronically ill and palliative patients.Seven days after the war began, parents from other regions, where the situation was more dangerous, began calling, asking for help evacuating. The hospital began to work intensively round the clock. Some patients moved in, and others were evacuated abroad. Some did not want to go. They continued treatment in the hospital, which turned into a hub for patients who had come from more dangerous, occupied territories; patients who were forced to leave their motherland to continue treatment.Since the beginning of the war, I have been responsible for transferring palliative patients and other patients with gastrointestinal diseases abroad. After the massive invasion, everything changed in our country. It is important to say that during the war, Lviv is safer than any other Ukrainian city, still air-raid sirens often go off, and everyone needs to run immediately to shelters for their safety. Palliative patients need special care. It is very difficult to run with patients several times per day during an air-raid siren or live with these children for a long time (2-3 weeks) in shelters because of the explosions occurring around them.It is impossible to move some patients to safety because they need appropriate medical equipment or mechanical ventilation is necessary. In shelters, there are crowds, and the high risk of... (shrink)

Most ethics guidelines for distributing scarce medical resources during the coronavirus pandemic seek to save the most lives and the most life‐years. A patient’s prognosis is determined using a SOFA or MSOFA score to measure likelihood of survival to discharge, as well as a consideration of relevant comorbidities and their effects on likelihood of survival up to one or five years. Although some guidelines use age as a tiebreaker when two patients’ prognoses are identical, others refuse to consider age (...) for fear of discriminating against the elderly. In this paper, I argue that age is directly relevant for maximizing health benefits, so current ethics guidelines are wrongly excluding or deemphasizing life‐stage in their triage algorithms. Research on COVID‐19 has shown that age is a risk factor in adverse outcomes, independent of comorbidities. And limiting a consideration of life‐years to only one or five years past discharge does not maximize health benefits. Therefore, based on their own stated values, triage algorithms for coronavirus patients ought to include life‐stage as a primary consideration, along with the SOFA score and comorbidities, rather than excluding it or using it merely as a tiebreaker. This is not discriminatory because patients ought to have equal opportunity to experience life‐stages. The equitable enforcement of that right justifies unequal treatment based on age in cases when there is a scarcity of life‐saving resources. A consideration of life‐stage would thus allow healthcare workers to responsibly steward public resources in order to maximize lives and life‐years saved. (shrink)

Background Equal access to healthcare is a core principle in Norway’s public healthcare system. The COVID-19 pandemic challenged healthcare systems in the early phase – in particular, related to testing and hospital capacity. There is little knowledge on how older people experienced being infected with an unfamiliar and severe disease, and how they experienced the need for healthcare early in the pandemic Aim To explore the experiences of older people infected by COVID-19 and their need for testing and hospitalisation. Research (...) design An explorative and descriptive approach, with qualitative interviews conducted in October 2020. Participants and research context Seventeen participants above 60 years of age hospitalised due to COVID-19 during spring 2020 were recruited 6 months after discharge. Ethical considerations Ethical approval was granted by the Regional Committee for Medical and Health Research Ethics in South-Eastern Norway (155425). Findings The main finding was that the informants experienced vulnerability and arbitrariness. This finding was supported by three sub-themes: experiences with a severe and unfamiliar disease, the strict criteria and the importance of someone advocating needs. Discussion Participants described varying access to healthcare. Those who did not meet the national criteria to be tested or hospitalised struggled against the system. Findings reveal arbitrary access to healthcare, in contrast to Norway’s ethical principle of fair and just access to health services. Moreover, to access and receive necessary healthcare, informants were dependent on their next-of-kin’s advocacy. Conclusion Even when dealing with an unfamiliar disease, health professionals’ assessments of symptoms must be performed with an ethical obligation to applicate competent appraisal and the exercise of discernment; this is in line with care ethics and ethical standards for nurses. These perspectives are a significant part of caring and the intension of doing good. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a lively (bio-)ethical debate on the nature of moral expertise and the concept of moral experts. However, there is currently no common ground concerning most issues. Against this background, this paper has two main goals. First, in more general terms, it examines some of the problems concerning moral expertise and experts, with a special focus on moral advice and testimony. Second, it applies the results in the context of medical ethics, especially in (...) the clinical setting. By situating the debate in the clinical setting, one arrives at some important conclusions to better understand the relevant concepts and vital problems in the general discussion on moral expertise and the requirements of who counts as a moral expert. (shrink)

Several contributions in this book tell of doctors' increasing emigration from developing countries where they are in critical shortage, especially from the underserved rural and public sectors of countries in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and South Asia. They point out the severe harm from that migration to some of the world's poorest and sickest populations who have no other doctors to turn to, and gain little from their emigration. Since significant harm to the badly off is bad, decline in that migration (...) is usually a good development. But how to strive to achieve it? (shrink)

The bioethical principle of autonomy is of paramount importance within medical practice. The extent to which a patient’s autonomy overlaps or conflicts with the physician’s duty of beneficence and non-maleficence, however, is not so clear cut, especially for those cases in which the patient’s request for medical intervention goes against the physician’s advice, either because of personal belief or because there is uncertainty regarding the therapeutic approach. Body integrity dysphoria (BID) is a condition that has been included (...) recently in the International Classification of Diseases, 11th edition (ICD-11). It may lead an affected individual to develop an intense desire to remove a specific body part in order to restore congruity between their body and their mind. Thus, its occurrence creates challenging moral and ethical dilemmas for the medical world (Loriga, 2023). The aim of this study was to investigate how Czech physicians understood, assessed and supported patient autonomy regarding requests for invasive body modifications. The objective was to produce a blueprint regarding how much a patient could influence the medical treatment they could gain within the Czech medical system and to develop a comparison with the ethical challenges of BID. A five-section survey was designed and submitted to Czech physicians on topics relevant to the BID debate. On the surface, the results showed an apparent predisposition toward collaboration between doctors and patients. However, further investigation showed that this supposed collaboration crumbled as the physiological risk-reward ratio moved further toward risk, which caused physicians progressively to rely less on the patient’s opinion and psychological needs. Moreover, a strongly authoritarian approach was evident, which became overwhelming in cases of amputation requests and removed, a priori, any collaboration. The results indicate that the Czech medical system does not accept or comprehend fully patients’ psychological needs, and therefore the BID phenomenon is a long way from being understood, which requires a fundamental paradigm shift. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Organizational Ethics and Health Care: Expanding Bioethics to the Institutional Arena **Laura Jane Bishop (bio), M. Nichelle Cherry (bio), and Martina Darragh* (bio)In 1995, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) expanded its patient rights standards to include requirements for assuring that hospital business practices would be ethical. Renamed “Patient Rights and Organization Ethics,” these standards are based on the realization that a hospital’s obligation to its (...) patients is derived from two relationships: the patient-provider relationship governed by “clinical ethics,” and the customer-supplier relationship governed by “business ethics.” “[This] boundary between ‘clinical’ ethics and ‘business’ ethics is not clear and in many cases is nonexistent. While marketing and admission practices are seen as issues related to ‘business’ ethics, they can lead to unneeded admissions or demand for unneeded services, both of which can unnecessarily expose the patient to the risk of side effects or complications. Likewise, underutilization of needed services is likely to lead to less than optimal health outcomes” (I. Schyve 1996, p. 17). “These new standards arose out of well-publicized concerns about abuses in which patients were admitted to hospitals unnecessarily and were discharged or transferred only after their insurance expired” (I. Schyve 1996, pp. 15–16).These abuses also sparked eloquent protests against threats to patient well-being and to the nature of the patient-provider relationship in the bioethics literature. The fiduciary responsibility of the provider to inform and to protect the patient was fragmented by insurer business practices such as gag clauses and economic credentialing of providers (VII. Scope Note 31, 1996). The background role that the institution plays, though poorly articulated historically, has been brought sharply into focus by the explosive growth of the managed practice of medicine. The context of medical ethics is no longer limited to the resolution of individual cases, but instead encompasses the adoption of institutional structures to protect and promote patient welfare (IV. Emanuel 1995, p. 335). In this new configuration, the institution and the providers are co-fiduciaries for populations [End Page 189] of patients, and the medicine that is practiced is “appropriately economically disciplined.” The expression “My patient always comes first” is no longer “... intellectually serious or morally responsible.” But, “... to be sure, both conceptually and in practice, being an economically disciplined fiduciary professional or institution is ethically unstable.... The task is to identify the boundaries outside of which institutional policy and behavior will not count as an ethically defensible form of being... [a] fiduciary.” (IV. McCullough 1997, pp. 143–44). This process of delimiting and enforcing boundaries requires the development of “... a language for talking about the ethical values of the organization. If such a language does not exist, discussions about ethics become cumbersome and unlikely to occur” (IV. Cleveland Clinic Foundation 1998, p. 2).As with bioethics generally, the literature addressing organizational ethics is multidisciplinary. JCAHO’s compliance guide for its revised standards, Ethical Issues and Patient Rights, draws on a wealth of ideas from both clinical ethics and business ethics. This is often an awkward alliance. “Because the study of organizational ethics is in its infancy compared to other areas of healthcare ethics, discussions about it often seem like hot air with no palpable payoff” (I. Boyle 1998, p. 2). The fact that “... there is an ancient history that reflects widespread doubt about the moral probity of business” (II. Frederick 1995, p. 209) does not help. To begin, “Aristotle had rude things to say about business” (II. Jackson 1998, p. 401). A brief review of introductions to several of the business ethics textbooks cited in this bibliography reveals that a rebuttal of “business ethics as an oxymoron” is the standard opening paragraph. This stigma is unfounded, and “increased stability” has characterized the state of business ethics literature during the 1990s (II. Beauchamp and Bowie 1997, p. ix). Significant attention has been given to elaborating two often overlapping theories—stakeholder and social contractarian.Originating in the 1960s as a pun on “stockholder,” proponents of stakeholder theory claim that a corporation’s fiduciary responsibility extends beyond increasing its profitability to protecting the rights of individuals or groups affected by its actions. Popular as a strategic planning tool in the... (shrink)

‘Futility’ is a contentious term that has eluded clear definition, with proposed descriptions either too strict or too vague to encompass the many facets of medical care. Requests for futile care are often surrogates for requests of a more existential character, covering the whole range of personal, emotional, cultural and spiritual needs. Physicians and other practitioners can use requests for futile care as a valuable opportunity to connect with their patients at a deeper level than the mere biomedical diagnosis. (...) Current debate around Canada’s changing regulatory and legal framework highlights challenges in appropriately balancing the benefits and burdens created by requests for futile care. (shrink)

The ethical obligation to provide a reasonably safe discharge option from the inpatient setting is often confounded by the context of homelessness. Living without the security of stable housing is a known determinant of poor health, often complicating the safety of discharge and causing unnecessary readmission. But clinicians do not have significant control over unjust distributions of resources or inadequate societal investment in social services. While physicians may stretch inpatient stays beyond acute care need in the interest of their patients (...) who are experiencing homelessness, they must also consider the implications of using an inpatient hospital bed for someone without the attendant level of medical need. Caring for patients in an inpatient setting when they no longer require acute care means fewer beds for acute care patients. And when a patient who is experiencing homelessness declines a medically safer option such as a skilled nursing facility, then clinicians may be faced with the sole option of discharge to the street, which raises troubling questions of nonmaleficence and social justice. Here we investigate the different forms of injustice that play out when patients are discharged to the street, and offer a map of the interwoven ethical responsibilities of clinicians, hospitals, and skilled nursing facilities. (shrink)