This essay is an attempt to analyze an important decision Brzozowski took at the end of his life, i.e. his late turn towards Catholicism, which, despite his own objections, we should nonetheless call a religious conversion. The main reason why Brzozowski resisted the traditional rhetoric of conversion lies in his often repeated conviction that faith cannot invalidate life, because “what is not biographical, does not exist at all.” Brzozowski, therefore, rejects conversion understood as a radical and abrupt revolution of the (...) soul, which annuls everything that happened before, and turns to a model of religiosity (“Catholicism, undoubtedly”) which preserves his entire biographical past. In this manner, Brzozowski seeks his own formula of faith, more adequate to the “situation” of the modern man who lives in and through History. I argue that the model of “conversion without conversion” Brzozowski chose as representative of modern man is typically, though avant la lettre , post-secular: closer to the Jewish sources of past-oriented tschuva than to the mystical timelessness of traditionally Christian metanoia . The idea that redemption consists not in a liberation of a pure spirit but in a patient working-through of the universal history of creation is an implicit credo of the whole modern age, first fully articulated by Brzozowski and only later in the writings of Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, and Walter Benjamin. Brzozowski emerges as a relatively early precursor of the future post-secular option whose advocates, like the author of The Diary , will not allow themselves to “lose a single moment,” either of their lives or the world’s history. (shrink)

ExcerptThis essay analyzes the following constellation of concepts from a theologico-philosophical perspective: “state of exception,” “bare life,” and “the remnant.” Recently employed in the work of Giorgio Agamben, none of these concepts is his own coinage. Agamben borrowed “state of exception” from Carl Schmitt's Political Theology, “bare life” from Walter Benjamin's “Critique of Violence,” and “the remnant” from biblical sources, which include Isaiah and the letters of Saint Paul. Nevertheless, the reappearance of these concepts within Agamben's constellation provides each with (...) an altered meaning, which emerges only through interplay with the others. In the prologue to his work on German…. (shrink)

This essay focuses on political implications of Derrida’s messianicité as a form of Marrano messianism: a universal vision of community “out of joints” which, despite its disjointedness and inner separation, nonetheless addresses itself as “we”. By referring to the generalized “Marrano experience” – the fate of those Sephardic Jews who were forced to convert to Christianity and, in consequence, became neither Jewish nor Christian – Derrida takes the Marrano as his paradigmatic political figure of a “rogue” who escapes every identity (...) politics. In Derrida’s project of “living together”, the Marrano stands for the non-participatory remnant of otherness which is not just the other of this or that particular tradition, but becomes a bearer of a new universalism, based not on the abstract notion of human nature but on the non-identity, a distance-from-identity or what Yirmijahu Yovel calls the “non-integral identity.”. (shrink)

Esej ten kreśli nową strategię uniwersalizacji historii, która wyłania się z analizy żydowskiejpraktyki filozofowania w erze nowożytnej. Nazywam ją „strategią marańską”, budując analogięmiędzy sytuacją conversos, którzy zostali zmuszeni do przyjęcia chrześcijaństwa, przechowującprzy tym judaizm „utajony”, a filozoficzną interwencją nowoczesnych myślicieli żydowskich,którzy wkroczyli w idiom zachodniej filozofii, jednocześnie nasycając go motywami wywiedzionymiz ich „partykularnego” kontekstu: nie po to jednak, by podważyć perspektywęuniwersalistyczną, lecz po to, by ją przekształcić. Dla Waltera Benjamina i Jacques’a Derridywłaściwy uniwersalizm okazuje się równoznaczny z „zadaniem tłumacza”: projektem (...) sklejaniarozbitej całości od środka, horyzontalnie, przez wysiłek wielojęzyczności, czyli bez przyjmowaniawyniosłej pozycji ogólnego metajęzyka, który mógłby uzurpować pozycję hegemona. (shrink)

The first [age] is in the servitude of slavery, the second in the servitude of sons, the third in freedom. The first in fear, the second in faith, the third in love. The first is the status of bondsmen, the second of freemen, the third of friends.What a violent, all-consuming, impetuous love! It thinks only of itself, lacks interest in anything else, despises all, is satisfied with itself! It confuses stations, disregards manners, knows no bounds. Proprieties, reason, decency, prudence, judgment (...) are defeated and reduced to slavery.It may seem strange for someone who delivered the keynote at a conference of the Utopian Studies Society to critique utopia. Yet this is precisely what I am going to do: I will criticize... (shrink)

The subject of this essay is the modern theology of work. Contrary to neoplatonism that condemned matter as unworthy of spiritual investment, theology of work states that matter is an ontological material that deserves further processing. Therefore, if modernity is to be understood as the beginning of the materialistic philosophy of immanence, early modern theological transformations have deeply contributed to this. Namely, the appreciation of matter as a realistically existing material to work through, the not yet ready and not fully (...) shaped element of creation justifying the creatio continua in the human version, has certainly inaugurated a turn towards temporality, far less random than Max Weber thought. In Weber’s classic approach, Puritan theology played the role of a catalyst for modernity, creating the concept of “intra-world asceticism”. It stood for work conceived as Beruf which, in line with the Lutheran concept, means “profession and vocation”. However, the author points to another – no more ascetic – theological genealogy of the modern idea of work, whose sources lie in the vision of the delayed apocalypse or, in other words, creative destruction. This extraordinary theology of work has its roots in the nominalism of Duns Scotus, the Kabbalah of Isaac Luria, then transformed into the Christian Kabbalah, Goethe’s Faust and particularly in Hegel’s dialectical concept of work performed by the destructive and yet suppressed negativity. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to give a general and accessible overview of the so called “post-secular” turn in the contemporary humanities. The main idea behind it is that it constitutes an answer to the crisis of the secular grand narratives of modernity: the Hegelian narrative of the immanent progress of the Spirit, as well as the enlightenmental narrative of universal emancipation. The post-secularist thinkers come in three variations which this essay names as Enlightenmental, Traditional, and Revolutionary. The first (...) camp wishes to reconceptualize the place of religion in the seemingly secularized modern paradigm and see if revelation can cooperate with enlightenment, that is, if it can support the modern emancipatory values in the dangerous moment of their “crisis of legitimation.” The second one emphasizes the need to recover the institutional aspect of Christian theology which must be reinstated once again as the “queen of the sciences,” or as the true “invisible hand” operating behind social theories. And the third party, which simultaneously opposes both, enlightenment and tradition, revolves mostly around the “revolutionary figure” of Saint Paul and constitutes a radically leftist answer to the crisis of Marxism with its scientific insight into the objective laws of history. (shrink)

My essay will take as its point of departure the paragraph from Gershom Scholem’s “Reflections on Jewish Theology,” in which he depicts the modern religious experience as the one of the "void of God" or as "pious atheism". I will first argue that the "void of God" cannot be reduced to atheistic non-belief in the presence of God. Then, I will demonstrate the further development of the Scholemian notion of the ‘pious atheism’ in Derrida, especially in his Lurianic treatment of (...) Angelus Silesius, whose modern mysticism emerges in Derrida’s reading as the ‘almost-atheism’. The interesting feature of this development is that, while for Scholem, the ‘void of God’ is a predominantly negative experience, for Derrida, it becomes an affirmative model of modern – not just Jewish, but more generally, Abrahamic – religiosity which, on the one hand, touches upon atheistic non-belief in the divine presence here and now, yet, on the other, still insists on commemorating the ‘withdrawn God’ through his ‘traces.’ What, therefore, for Scholem, constitutes the ultimate cry of despair, best embodied in Kafka’s work – for Derrida, reveals the more positive face of the modern predicament in which God has absented himself in order to make room for the creaturely reality. And while Scholem envisages redemption as the full restoration of the divine presence – Derrida redefines redemption as the ‘pious’ work of deconstruction to be undertaken in the ‘almost-atheistic’ condition of irreversible separation between God and the world. (shrink)