This book analyzes the different ways mathematics is applicable in the physical sciences, and presents a startling thesis--the success of mathematical physics ...

In this article, I argue that mapping-based accounts of applications cannot be comprehensive and must be supplemented by analyses of other, qualitatively different, forms of application. I support these claims by providing a detailed discussion of the application of mathematics to a problem of election design that is prominent in social choice theory.

Discussions of the applicability of mathematics in the natural sciences have been flawed by failure to realize that there are multiple senses in which mathematics can be ‘applied’ and, correspondingly, multiple problems that stem from the applicability of mathematics. I discuss semantic, metaphysical, descriptive, and and epistemological problems of mathematical applicability, dwelling on Frege's contribution to the solution of the first two types. As for the remaining problems, I discuss the contributions of Hartry Field (...) and Eugene Wigner. Finally, I argue that there are epistemological problems concerning the applicability of mathematics that nobody in the philosophical community has yet confronted, though the problems are well known to physicists. (shrink)

The first part of the essay describes how mathematics, in particular mathematical concepts, are applicable to nature. mathematical constructs have turned out to correspond to physical reality. this correlation between the world and mathematical concepts, it is argued, is a true phenomenon. the second part of this essay argues that the applicability of mathematics to nature is mysterious, in that not only is there no known explanation for the correlation between mathematics and physical reality, but there (...) is a good reason to except no such correlation. it is argued that there is a subjective element in the decision as to what constitutes a mathematical concept. a number of purported solutions to the mystery of the applicability of mathematics to nature are discarded, until we are left with eugene wigner's thesis that we are here confronted with a "miracle that we neither understand nor deserve.". (shrink)

This paper argues that scientific realism commits us to a metaphysical determination relation between the mathematical entities that are indispensible to scientific explanation and the modal structure of the empirical phenomena those entities explain. The argument presupposes that scientific realism commits us to the indispensability argument. The viewpresented here is that the indispensability of mathematics commits us not only to the existence of mathematical structures and entities but to a metaphysical determination relation between those entities and the modal structure (...) of the physical world. The no-miracles argument is the primary motivation for scientific realism. It is a presupposition of this argument that unobservable entities are explanatory only when they determine the empirical phenomena they explain. I argue that mathematical entities should also be seen as explanatory only when they determine the empirical facts they explain, namely, the modal structure of the physical world. Thus, scientific realism commits us to a metaphysical determination relation between mathematics and physical modality that has not been previously recognized. The requirement to account for the metaphysical dependence of modal physical structure on mathematics limits the class of acceptable solutions to the applicability problem that are available to the scientific realist. (shrink)

Depending on how it is clarified, the applicability of mathematics can lie anywhere on a spectrum from the completely trivial to the utterly mysterious. At the one extreme, it is obvious that mathematics is used outside of mathematics in cases which range from everyday calculations like the attempt to balance one s checkbook through the most demanding abstract modeling of subatomic particles. The techniques underlying these applications are perfectly clear to those who have mastered them and (...) there seems to be little for the philosopher to say about such cases. At the same time, moving to the other extreme, scientists and philosophers have often remarked on the remarkable power that mathematics provides to the scientist, especially in the formulation of new scientific theories. Most famously, Wigner claimed that The miracle of the appropriateness of the language of mathematics for the formulation of the laws of physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve (Wigner 1960, p. 14). But Wigner is far from an isolated case. According to Kant, in any special doctrine of nature there can be only as much proper science as there is mathematics therein (Kant 1786, p 6), and others seem to agree that there is some significant tie between mathematics and modern science. (shrink)

Suppose we are asked to draw up a list of things we take to exist. Certain items seem unproblematic choices, while others (such as God) are likely to spark controversy. The book sets the grand theological theme aside and asks a less dramatic question: should mathematical objects (numbers, sets, functions, etc.) be on this list? In philosophical jargon this is the ‘ontological’ question for mathematics; it asks whether we ought to include mathematicalia in our ontology. The goal of this (...) work is to answer this question in the affirmative, by drawing on considerations on the the applicability of mathematics to natural science. (shrink)

This paper discerns two types of mathematization, a foundational and an explorative one. The foundational perspective is well-established, but we argue that the explorative type is essential when approaching the problem of applicability and how it influences our conception of mathematics. The first part of the paper argues that a philosophical transformation made explorative mathematization possible. This transformation took place in early modernity when sense acquired partial independence from reference. The second part of the paper discusses a series (...) of examples from the history of mathematics that highlight the complementary nature of the foundational and exploratory types of mathematization. (shrink)

This paper explores how to explain the applicability of classical mathematics to the physical world in a radically naturalistic and nominalistic philosophy of mathematics. The applicability claim is first formulated as an ordinary scientific assertion about natural regularity in a class of natural phenomena and then turned into a logical problem by some scientific simplification and abstraction. I argue that there are some genuine logical puzzles regarding applicability and no current philosophy of mathematics has (...) resolved these puzzles. Then I introduce a plan for resolving the logical puzzles of applicability. (shrink)

In 1966 Richard Levins argued that applications of mathematics to population biology faced various constraints which forced mathematical modelers to trade-off at least one of realism, precision, or generality in their approach. Much traditional mathematical modeling in biology has prioritized generality and precision in the place of realism through strategies of idealization and simplification. This has at times created tensions with experimental biologists. The past 20 years however has seen an explosion in mathematical modeling of biological systems with the (...) rise of modern computational systems biology and many new collaborations between modelers and experimenters. In this paper I argue that many of these collaborations revolve around detail-driven modeling practices which in Levins’ terms trade-off generality for realism and precision. These practices apply mathematics by working from detailed accounts of biological systems, rather than from initially idealized or simplified representations. This is possible by virtue of modern computation. The form these practices take today suggest however Levins’ constraints on mathematical application no longer apply, transforming our understanding of what is possible with mathematics in biology. Further the engagement with realism and the ability to push realistic models in new directions aligns well with the epistemological and methodological views of experimenters, which helps explain their increased enthusiasm for biological modeling. (shrink)

Attempts at solving what has been labeled as Eugene Wigner’s puzzle of applicability of mathematics are still far from arriving at an acceptable solution. The accounts developed to explain the “miracle” of applied mathematics vary in nature, foundation, and solution, from denying the existence of a genuine problem to designing structural theories based on mathematical formalism. Despite this variation, all investigations treated the problem in a unitary way with respect to the target, pointing to one or two (...) ‘why’ or ‘how’ questions to be answered. In this paper, I argue that two analyses, a semantic analysis ab initio and a metatheoretical analysis starting from the types of unreasonableness involved in this problem, will establish the interdisciplinary character of the problem and reveal many more targets, which may be addressed with different methodologies. In order to address objectively the philosophical problem of applicability of mathematics, a foundational revision of the problem is needed. (shrink)

Mathematical concepts play at least three roles in the application of mathematics: an inferential role, a representational role, and an expressive role. In this paper, I argue that, despite what has often been alleged, platonists do not fully accommodate these features of the application of mathematics. At best, platonism provides partial ways of handling the issues. I then sketch an alternative, anti-realist account of the application of mathematics, and argue that this account manages to accommodate these features (...) of the application process. In this way, a better account of mathematical applications is, in principle, available. (shrink)

Willem Jacob ’s Gravesande is widely remembered as a leading advocate of Isaac Newton’s work. In the first half of the eighteenth century, ’s Gravesande was arguably Europe’s most important proponent of what would become known as Newtonian physics. ’s Gravesande himself minimally described this discipline, which he called «physica», as studying empirical regularities mathematically while avoiding hypotheses. Commentators have as yet not progressed much beyond this view of ’s Gravesande’s physics. Therefore, much of its precise nature, its methodology, and (...) its relation to Newton’s actual work remains unclear. This article discusses one particular methodological element that ’s Gravesande himself often stressed in detail, namely the use of mathematics in philosophy and physics. In doing so, it takes exception to the claim that mathematics played only a minor role in ’s Gravesande’s work, a view put forward in recent historiography. Besides that, this article casts new light on the interpretation of ’s Gravesande’s philosophical notion of «mathematical reasoning», a notion that has remained somewhat obscure thus far. (shrink)

A number of people have recently argued for a structural approach to accounting for the applications of mathematics. Such an approach has been called "the mapping account". According to this view, the applicability of mathematics is fully accounted for by appreciating the relevant structural similarities between the empirical system under study and the mathematics used in the investigation ofthat system. This account of applications requires the truth of applied mathematical assertions, but it does not require the (...) existence of mathematical objects. In this paper, we discuss the shortcomings of this account, and show how these shortcomings can be overcome by a broader view of the application of mathematics: the inferential conception. (shrink)

Attempts at solving what has been labeled as Eugene Wigner’s puzzle of applicability of mathematics are still far from arriving at an acceptable solution. The accounts developed to explain the “miracle” of applied mathematics vary in nature, foundation, and solution, from denying the existence of a genuine problem to designing structural theories based on mathematical formalism. Despite this variation, all investigations treated the problem in a unitary way with respect to the target, pointing to one or two (...) ‘why’ or ‘how’ questions to be answered. In this paper, I argue that two analyses, a semantic analysis ab initio and a metatheoretical analysis starting from the types of unreasonableness involved in this problem, will establish the interdisciplinary character of the problem and reveal many more targets, which may be addressed with different methodologies. In order to address objectively the philosophical problem of applicability of mathematics, a foundational revision of the problem is needed. (shrink)

Attempts at solving what has been labeled as Eugene Wigner’s puzzle of applicability of mathematics are still far from arriving at an acceptable solution. The accounts developed to explain the “miracle” of applied mathematics vary in nature, foundation, and solution, from denying the existence of a genuine problem to designing structural theories based on mathematical formalism. Despite this variation, all investigations treated the problem in a unitary way with respect to the target, pointing to one or two (...) ‘why’ or ‘how’ questions to be answered. In this paper, I argue that two analyses, a semantic analysis ab initio and a metatheoretical analysis starting from the types of unreasonableness involved in this problem, will establish the interdisciplinary character of the problem and reveal many more targets, which may be addressed with different methodologies. In order to address objectively the philosophical problem of applicability of mathematics, a foundational revision of the problem is needed. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for the view that structuralism offers the best perspective for an acceptable account of the applicability of mathematics in the empirical sciences. Structuralism, as I understand it, is the view that mathematics is not the science of a particular type of objects, but of structural properties of arbitrary domains of entities, regardless of whether they are actually existing, merely presupposed or only intentionally intended.

In this paper I argue for the view that structuralism offers the best perspective for an acceptable account of the applicability of mathematics in the empirical sciences. Structuralism, as I understand it, is the view that mathematics is not the science of a particular type of objects, but of structural properties of arbitrary domains of entities, regardless of whether they are actually existing, merely presupposed or only intentionally intended.

In his seminal 1960 paper, the physicist Eugene Wigner formulated the question of the applicability of mathematics in physics in a way nobody had before. This formulation has been entirely overlooked due to an exclusive concern with solving Wigner’s problem and explaining the effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences, in one way or another. Many have attempted to attribute Wigner’s unjustified conclusion—that mathematics is unreasonably effective in the natural sciences—to his formalist views on mathematics. (...) My goal is to show that this reading misses out on Wigner’s highly original formulation of the problem which is presented throughout his body of work in physics as well as in philosophy. This formulation, as I will show, leads us in a new direction in solving the applicability problem. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for the view that structuralism offers the best perspective for an acceptable account of the applicability of mathematics in the empirical sciences. Structuralism, as I understand it, is the view that mathematics is not the science of a particular type of objects, but of structural properties of arbitrary domains of entities, regardless of whether they are actually existing, merely presupposed or only intentionally intended.

In his seminal 1960 paper, the physicist Eugene Wigner formulated the question of the applicability of mathematics in physics in a way nobody had before. This formulation has been entirely overlooked due to an exclusive concern with solving Wigner’s problem and explaining the effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences, in one way or another. Many have attempted to attribute Wigner’s unjustified conclusion—that mathematics is unreasonably effective in the natural sciences—to his formalist views on mathematics. (...) My goal is to show that this reading misses out on Wigner’s highly original formulation of the problem which is presented throughout his body of work in physics as well as in philosophy. This formulation, as I will show, leads us in a new direction in solving the applicability problem. (shrink)

Steiner defines naturalism in opposition to anthropocentrism, the doctrine that the human mind holds a privileged place in the universe. He assumes the anthropocentric nature of mathematics and argues that physicists' employment of mathematically guided strategies in the discovery of quantum mechanics challenges scientists' naturalism. In this paper I show that Steiner's assumption about the anthropocentric character of mathematics is questionable. I draw attention to mathematicians' rejection of what Maddy calls ‘definabilism’, a methodological maxim governing the development of (...) mathematics. I contend that because definabilism is anthropocentric, its rejection casts doubts on Steiner's assumption. (shrink)

The question of the applicability of mathematics is an epistemological issue that was explicitly raised by Kant, and which has played different roles in the works of neo-Kantian philosophers, before becoming an essential issue in early analytic philosophy. This paper will first distinguish three main issues that are related to the application of mathematics: indispensability arguments that are aimed at justifying mathematics itself; philosophical justifications of the successful application of mathematics to scientific theories; and discussions (...) on the application of real numbers to the measurement of physical magnitudes. A refinement of this tripartition is suggested and supported by a historical investigation of the differences between Kant’s position on the problem, several neo-Kantian perspectives, early analytic philosophy, and late 19th century mathematicians. Finally, the debate on the cogency of an application constraint in the definition of real numbers is discussed in relation to a contemporary debate in neo-logicism, in order to suggest a comparison not only with Frege’s original positions, but also with the ideas of several neo-Kantian scholars, including Hölder, Cassirer, and Helmholtz. (shrink)

We outline a framework for analyzing episodes from the history of science in which the application of mathematics plays a constitutive role in the conceptual development of empirical sciences. Our starting point is the inferential conception of the application of mathematics, recently advanced by Bueno and Colyvan. We identify and discuss some systematic problems of this approach. We propose refinements of the inferential conception based on theoretical considerations and on the basis of a historical case study. We demonstrate (...) the usefulness of the refined, dynamical inferential conception using the well-researched example of the genesis of general relativity. Specifically, we look at the collaboration of the physicist Einstein and the mathematician Grossmann in the years 1912--1913, which resulted in the jointly published ``Outline of a Generalized Theory of Relativity and a Theory of Gravitation,'' a precursor theory of the final theory of general relativity. In this episode, an independently developed mathematical theory, the theory of differential invariants and the absolute differential calculus, was applied in the process of physical theorizing aiming at finding a relativistic theory of gravitation. We argue that the dynamical inferential conception not only provides a natural framework to describe and analyze this episode, but it also generates new questions and insights. We comment on the mathematical tradition on which Grossmann drew, and on his own contributions to mathematical theorizing. We argue that the dynamical inferential conception allows us to identify both the role of heuristics and of mathematical resources as well as the systematic role of problems and mistakes in the reconstruction of episodes of conceptual innovation and theory change. (shrink)

Using set theory in the first part of his book, and proof theory in the second, Gaisi Takeuti gives us two examples of how mathematical logic can be used to obtain results previously derived in less elegant fashion by other mathematical techniques, especially analysis. In Part One, he applies Scott- Solovay's Boolean-valued models of set theory to analysis by means of complete Boolean algebras of projections. In Part Two, he develops classical analysis including complex analysis in Peano's arithmetic, showing that (...) any arithmetical theorem proved in analytic number theory is a theorem in Peano's arithmetic. In doing so, the author applies Gentzen's cut elimination theorem. Although the results of Part One may be regarded as straightforward consequences of the spectral theorem in function analysis, the use of Boolean- valued models makes explicit and precise analogies used by analysts to lift results from ordinary analysis to operators on a Hilbert space. Essentially expository in nature, Part Two yields a general method for showing that analytic proofs of theorems in number theory can be replaced by elementary proofs. Originally published in 1978. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

"Foundations of the Formal Sciences" is a series of interdisciplinary conferences in mathematics, philosophy, computer science and linguistics. The main goal is to reestablish the traditionally strong links between these areas of research that have been lost in the past decades. The second conference in the series had the subtitle "Applications of Mathematical Logic in Philosophy and Linguistics" and brought speakers from all parts of the Formal Sciences together to give a holistic view of how mathematical methods can improve (...) our philosophical and technical understanding of language and scientific discourse, ranging from the theoretical level up to applications in language recognition software. Audience: This volume is of interest to all formal philosophers and theoretical linguists. In addition to that, logicians interested in the applications of their field and logic students in mathematics, computer science, philosophy and linguistics can use the volume to broaden their knowledge of applications of logic. (shrink)

The conditions involved in the applicability of mathematics in science are the subject of ongoing debates. One of the best‐received approaches is the inferential account, which involves structural mappings and pragmatic considerations in a three‐step model. According to the inferential account, these pragmatic considerations happen in the immersion and interpretation stages, but not during derivation (symbol‐pushing in a mathematical formalism). In this work, I draw inspiration from the later Wittgenstein and make the case that the applicability of (...) mathematics also rests on pragmatic considerations at the mathematical derivation level. I make the further case that pragmatic considerations at the mathematical derivation level may substitute pragmatic considerations in the other two stages, thus showing how they are holistically interrelated. I illustrate these two points with the solution of a simple geometrical problem. (shrink)

The main task of this paper is to defend anti-platonism by providing an anti-platonist (in particular, a fictionalist) account of the indispensable applications of mathematics to empirical science.

In this paper I examine Field’s account of the applicability of mathematics from a measurementtheoretic perspective. Within this context, I object to Field’s instrumentalism, arguing that it depends on an incomplete analysis of applicability. I show in particular that, once the missing piece of analysis is provided, the role played by numerical entities in basic empirical theories must be revised: such revision implies that instrumentalism should be rejected and mathematical entities be regarded not merely as useful tools (...) but also as conceptual schemata by means of which we can articulate our understanding of experience. (shrink)

In his Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft, Kant claims that chemistry is a science, but not a proper science (like physics), because it does not adequately allow for the application of mathematics to its objects. This paper argues that the application of mathematics to a proper science is best thought of as depending upon a coordination between mathematically constructible concepts and those of the science. In physics, the proper science that exhausts the a priori knowledge of objects of the (...) outer sense, only motions and concepts reducible to motions can be legitimately coordinated with mathematical constructions. Since chemistry can neither achieve its own a priori principles of coordination nor be reduced to the coordinated doctrine of motion, it is a merely improper science. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophical accounts of the applicability of mathematics in physical sciences and the empirical world are based on formalized relations between the mathematical structures and the physical systems they are supposed to represent within the models. Such relations were constructed both to ensure an adequate representation and to allow a justification of the validity of the mathematical models as means of scientific inference. This article puts in evidence the various circularities (logical, epistemic, and of definition) that are present (...) in these formal constructions and discusses them as an argument for the alternative semantic and propositional-structure accounts of the applicability of mathematics. (shrink)

Just as mathematics helps us to represent and reason about the natural world, in its internal applications one branch of mathematics helps us to represent and reason about the subject matter of another. Recognition of the close analogy between internal and external applications of mathematics can help resolve two persistent philosophical puzzles concerning its applicability: a platonist puzzle arising from the abstractness of mathematical objects; and an empiricist puzzle arising from mathematical propositions’ lack of empirical factual (...) content. In order to see how this is the case, we will examine what it is to apply mathematics internally and describe examples. (shrink)

It has been argued that the attempt to meet indispensability arguments for realism in mathematics, by appeal to counterfactual statements, presupposes a view of mathematical modality according to which even though mathematical entities do not exist, they might have existed. But I have sought to defend this controversial view of mathematical modality from various objections derived from the fact that the existence or nonexistence of mathematical objects makes no difference to the arrangement of concrete objects. This defense of the (...) controversial view of mathematical modality obviously falls far short of a full endorsement of the counterfactual approach, but I hope my remarks may serve to help keep such an approach a live option. (shrink)

Handbook of Mathematical Induction: Theory and Applications shows how to find and write proofs via mathematical induction. This comprehensive book covers the theory, the structure of the written proof, all standard exercises, and hundreds of application examples from nearly every area of mathematics. In the first part of the book, the author discusses different inductive techniques, including well-ordered sets, basic mathematical induction, strong induction, double induction, infinite descent, downward induction, and several variants. He then introduces ordinals and cardinals, transfinite (...) induction, the axiom of choice, Zorn’s lemma, empirical induction, and fallacies and induction. He also explains how to write inductive proofs. The next part contains more than 750 exercises that highlight the levels of difficulty of an inductive proof, the variety of inductive techniques available, and the scope of results provable by mathematical induction. Each self-contained chapter in this section includes the necessary definitions, theory, and notation and covers a range of theorems and problems, from fundamental to very specialized. The final part presents either solutions or hints to the exercises. Slightly longer than what is found in most texts, these solutions provide complete details for every step of the problem-solving process. (shrink)

With the widespread application of information technology and the continuous deepening of my country’s education informatization construction, the educational field has increasingly higher requirements for teachers’ informatization quality. The advancement of the process of education informatization depends to a large extent on the level of teachers’ own level of informatization and has gradually become an important indicator to measure the informatization of education. The main body of education and the decisive factor are teachers. The scientific and reasonable evaluation of informatization (...) education is an important content of today’s education informatization. This paper uses regression analysis to evaluate the teacher education information system and uses mathematical statistics to establish a linear regression model for the city and analyze and calculate it. Through the quantitative analysis of the evaluation index system of the education informatization level, the multiple linear regression analysis method was used to establish the linear regression mathematical model of the school education informatization level on each secondary index, and the influence of various indicators on the school education informatization level was analyzed to establish a scientific evaluation system to evaluate the literacy of teachers’ informatization education and to give suggestions for improving the level of school education informatization. The design of the evaluation system is more scientific and reasonable, the regression error is small, the results obtained are more accurate, and the impact of nonlinear errors is basically eliminated. (shrink)