Disarming the Prophets - ABSTRACT: Kinch Hoekstra takes up another question related to supposed revelatory experience, namely, the claim to prophesy, and, more particularly, why Hobbes’s concern with it grows during the decade after 1640, what varieties of it preoccupy him and what his responses are to them. Of central importance for Hobbes was his contemporaries’ concern with biblical prophecy, both radical and royalist. Trying to pluck its political sting, Hobbes argues that apocalyptic prophecy is a form of madness (...) but more broadly seeks to place the interpretation of scripture solidly within the purview of the sovereign. By blunting the belief in prophecy, Hobbes disarms the prophet. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 111-120 [Access article in PDF] Hobbes on Law, Nature, and Reason Kinch Hoekstra Balliol College, University of Oxford The reason of a thing is not to bee inquired after till you are sure the thing it selfe bee soe. Wee comonly are att (What's the reason of it?) before wee are sure of the thing. T'was an excellent question of (...) my Lady Cotton, when Sr. Robert Cotton was magnifying of a shoe, wch was Moses's or Noahs, & Wondering att the strange shape & fashion of it: but, Mr. Cotton, sayes shee, are you sure 'tis a shooe. 1A law of nature is a rule discovered by reason. 2 This is the key to John Deigh's attempt to show that "Hobbes's ethics is logically independent of his moral psychology." 3 By this he means that the "theorems" of Hobbes's ethics, the laws of nature, "have no other ground than the definition on which it [his ethics] is based." 4 Deigh thinks he establishes this conclusion by taking seriously both Hobbes's definition of a law of nature as "a Precept, or generall Rule, found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which is destructive of his life," and his definition of reason as "nothing but Reckoning (that is, Adding and Substracting) of the Consequences of generall names." 5 Deigh puts these two definitions together to argue that Hobbes's ethics is a deductive science, and that those who instead think of his ethics as dependent on desire or as involving instrumental reason ("means-to-ends thinking," as he calls it) are mistaken. The particular virtue of this interpretation, Deigh says, is that without it we have to read Hobbes in the Leviathan as sometimes using "reason" in a way that is different from the way he defines it in chapter 5. 6I will argue that Deigh misunderstands the basis, status, and scope of Hobbesian natural law. In his attempt to save Hobbes from using "reason" equivocally, Deigh attributes mistakes and inconsistencies to him that are more serious and have less [End Page 111] textual justification than that apparent equivocation. A source of the misunderstanding is a simplification—accepted by Mark Murphy and many other interpreters—of Hobbes's conception of reason.Let us begin with Deigh's view of the scope of the law of nature, as he admits that his interpretation would be undermined were he wrong about this. "While the laws of nature are dictates of reason for people living in a state of nature," he says, "they are not truly laws in such circumstances and therefore not sources of obligation in them." 7 If Murphy is right that Hobbes does think they are obligatory outside of civil society, then it is, Deigh concedes, "a genuine problem" for his account. 8 In reply, Deigh refers to the two passages where Hobbes says that the laws of nature are "not properly Lawes," quoting the one from chapter 26, which explicitly recapitulates a claim from chapter 15. 9 In this earlier passage, however, Hobbes adds: "But yet if we consider the same Theoremes, as delivered in the word of God, that by right commandeth all things; then are they properly called Lawes." 10 Hobbes thinks that the laws of nature are always obligatory. He holds, for example, that the law of nature that covenants be kept obliges even "in the condition of meer Nature" or "condition of Warre," and that "the rule of Manners, without Civill Government, is the Law of Nature." 11 Hobbes says that although the laws of nature donot always oblige "in foro externo; that is, to the putting them in act," they do always "oblige in foro interno; that is to say, they bind to a desire they should take place." 12 Although they only require "a desire, and endeavour," Hobbes makes clear that these requirements are laws, and that they are binding and obligatory. 13If Deigh were right, sovereigns would not be obligated by... (shrink)

We must, therefore, make a study of mechanism; but some introduction is advisable, for cybernetics treats the subject from a new, and therefore unusual, ...

In the first three sections, I argue that Hobbes has a distinctive conception of philosophy, the highest value of which is not truth, but human benefit; and that his philosophical utterances are constrained by this value (both insofar as they are philosophical in particular, and insofar as they are public utterances of any kind). I address an evidentiary problem for this view in the penultimate section, and then turn to the question of how such a conception of philosophy requires different (...) interpretations of particular philosophical positions. The whole is intended as a case study of the need for an interpreter to understand how the interpreted philosopher conceives of the nature and aim of his undertaking. (shrink)

By the 1840s and 1850s biogeographical theory had polarized into two opposing views — both of which had their origins in the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries. At issue in this polarization was the question of God's involvement with His creation. At one end of the spectrum were Sclater, Agassiz, Kirby, and others who saw a neatly designed world in which geographical distributions were planned and executed by the hand of God at creation. For most of these naturalists, organisms were created (...) en masse within the regions they now occupy. Disjunct distributions were proof to them that God had indeed created species in situ as many individuals. These naturalists hoped to reveal God's biogeographical plan by discovering His regions of creation. They had hoped to demonstrate a neatly devised set of regions of creation which might be applicable to all creatures, but in attempting to do so, they arrived at conflicting sets of delineations — thus helping to undermine their conceptions of nature in which design (both idealist and utilitarian) played an important part.93At the other end of the biogeographical spectrum were the theoretical ideas of Prichard and Lyell, who viewed a more remote God — one who allowed His creation to be shaped and modified by secondary laws. Lyell in particular wished to leave considerations of design aside, hoping to demonstrate that the shape of the present creation is due to natural laws. Prichard and Lyell saw God's role in the creation of species (and distributions) as being extremely limited. In fact, the regions of creation seen today are in actuality only natural artifacts produced by migrations and barriers. They saw distributions being in constant flux, as was the rest of nature.Those supporting the views of Prichard and Lyell spent a great deal of effort in attempting to remove a major obstacle in their paths — disjunct distributions. If disjunct distributions were indeed the products of separate creative acts, as Sclater and others claimed, then the arguments of Prichard and Lyell would be negated. For if the creation of a species was shown to be the product of multiple creations, then what was the need of migrations and dispersal mechanisms? Also at stake, of course, was the concept of species based upon generation. Darwin was well aware that if the supernatural implications of disjunct distributions could not be refuted, then his evolutionary system — founded upon a species concept based on descent — would be in peril.94A further barrier to the acceptance of the Prichard/Lyell view was the fact that those sympathetic to a nonsupernatural explanation of disjunct distributions could not agree upon a natural explanation for those anomalies, and an internal debate between naturalists within this group raged for decades.95By 1859 a biogeographical stalemate had occurred. Sclater and others, supporting their static view of nature, continued to look for regions of creation, pointing to disjunct distributions in support of their arguments, while those favorable to the views of Prichard and Lyell continued to search for natural explanations for such biogeographical anomalies.The key needed to resolve the biogeographical debate was a credible theory for species origins. By 1858 there were essentially three options for British naturalists: supernatural creation, Lamarckian transmutation, or natural creation. A few British naturalists grasped at these straws, but most workers preferred the option of remaining silent until a more viable explanation for the origin and distribution of species could be advanced.96 And not until the publication of Darwin's theory did that explanation become available. (shrink)

I use the concept of epistemic injustice to think through the practice and methodology of comparative, or “fusion,” philosophy. I make two related claims: 1) the philosophical ethnocentrism displayed by academic departments in the U.S. is a case of epistemic injustice, primarily willful ignorance, that ought to be rectified; 2) the corrective to this problem, namely, fusion philosophy, is itself epistemically problematic in its tendency toward ontological expansiveness, that is, an unjustified claim to all traditions as one’s own. In the (...) end, I hope to show how a robust practice of self-reflexivity can counter this potentially colonizing tendency of fusion philosophizing. (shrink)

Much of the sustained attention on pandemic preparedness has focused on the ethical justification for plans for the “crisis” phase of a surge when, despite augmentation efforts, the demand for life...

To know the nature of any phenomenon or practice, it is often a good idea to learn about how it might have emerged or might have been constructed. The Birth of Ethics offers an account of how morality might have emerged, without any planning, in a society with language but without any properly ethical concepts or practices. The conjectural history that it documents serves a philosophical purpose, for it directs us the role that morality plays in human life and the (...) nature of morality that enables it to play that role. (shrink)

2015 Reprint of 1956 Printing. Full facsimile of the original edition. Not reproduced with Optical Recognition Software. Cybernetics is here defined as "the science of control and communication, in the animal and the machine"-in a word, as the art of steersmanship; and this book will interest all who are interested in cybernetics, communication theory and methods for regulation and control. W. Ross Ashby (1903-1972) was an English psychiatrist and a pioneer in cybernetics, the study of complex systems. His two (...) books, "Design for a Brain" and "An Introduction to Cybernetics," were landmark works. They introduced exact and logical thinking into the nascent discipline and were highly influential. Contents include: What is new -- Change -- The Determinate Machine -- The Machine with Input -- Stability -- The Black Box -- Quantity of Variety -- Transmission of Variety -- Incessant Transmission -- Regulation in Biological Systems -- Requisite Variety -- The Error-controlled Regulator -- Regulating the Very Large System -- Amplifying Regulation. (shrink)

Answere not a foole according to his folly, lest thou also be like unto him.Answere a foole according to his folly, lest hee be wise in his owne conceit.Proverbs 26:4-5.

Discussing Difference and Dealing With Desolation and Despair Content Type Journal Article Category Editorial Pages 315-317 DOI 10.1007/s11673-011-9331-1 Authors Michael A. Ashby, Palliative Care and Persistent Pain Services, Royal Hobart, Hospital, Southern Tasmania Area Health Service, and School of Medicine, Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Tasmania, 1st Floor, Peacock Building, Repatriation Centre, 90 Davey Street, Hobart, TAS 7000 Australia Leigh E. Rich, Department of Health Sciences (Public Health), Armstrong Atlantic State University, 11935 Abercorn Street, Savannah, GA 31419, USA (...) Journal Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Online ISSN 1872-4353 Print ISSN 1176-7529 Journal Volume Volume 8 Journal Issue Volume 8, Number 4. (shrink)

Dr Gillian Craig (1) has argued that palliative medicine services have tended to adopt a policy of sedation without hydration, which under certain circumstances may be medically inappropriate, causative of death and distressing to family and friends. We welcome this opportunity to defend, with an important modification, the approach we proposed without substantive background argument in our original article (2). We maintain that slowing and eventual cessation of oral intake is a normal part of a natural dying process, that artificial (...) hydration and alimentation (AHA) are not justified unless thirst or hunger are present and cannot be relieved by other means, but food and fluids for (natural) oral consumption should never be 'withdrawn'. The intention of this practice is not to alter the timing of an inevitable death, and sedation is not used, as has been alleged, to mask the effects of dehydration or starvation. The artificial provision of hydration and alimentation is now widely accepted as medical treatment. We believe that arguments that it is not have led to confusion as to whether or not non-provision or withdrawal of AHA constitutes a cause of death in law. Arguments that it is such a cause appear to be tenuously based on an extraordinary/ordinary categorisation of treatments by Kelly (3) which has subsequently been interpreted as prescriptive in a way quite inconsistent with the Catholic moral theological tradition from which the distinction is derived. The focus of ethical discourse on decisions at the end of life should be shifted to an analysis of care, needs, proportionality of medical interventions, and processes of communication. (shrink)

The enactivist paradigm of embodied cognition represents a powerful alternative to Cartesian and cognitivist approaches in the philosophy of mind. On this view, the body plays a constitutive role in the integrated functioning of perception, affect and other cognitive processes. Enactivism shares many of the central themes of feminist theory, and is extended to apply to social and political concerns. Following a discussion of the key components of the enactive approach, we apply it to explain more complex social manifestations, specifically (...) gender performance and its reproduction through time. By employing Judith Butler’s notion of performativity, we demonstrate how gender, as one marker of social identity and difference, emerges through processes of embodied and embedded sense-making as articulated by enactive theory. We argue that more attention to embodied and embedded values allows for the interruption and transformation of histories of oppressive practices and opens the door to more liberatory possibilities. (shrink)

This chapter explores why Hobbes produced an edition of Thucydides. In offering an interpretation of this edition in context, the chapter addresses Hobbes’s view of relations between commonwealths and, in particular, of wars of expansion; his analogy between individuals and commonwealths; and the evidence for and the nature of his humanism. Hobbes’s concerns are clarified by considering the domestic and international politics of the 1620s and the contemporary use of classical texts to promote England’s intervention in wars abroad. Hobbes’s critical (...) view of such intervention also encourages us to discern aspects of his later works that have been neglected. (shrink)