The need to instil philosophical thinking in children is supported by the phrase ‘catch them young’. Children do have inquisitive mind which is one of the bulks philosophers are made. To harness this virtue through the introduction of philosophy at the basic education levels will be a great milestone in the quest for human development and environmental protection and sustainability. Thus this paper believes that such will equip the future leaders with critical thinking tools necessary in a fast and dynamic (...) society faced with serious climate change challenges. (shrink)

As a representative of the papacy Bellarmine was an extremely moderate one. In fact Sixtus V in 1590 had the first volume of his Disputations placed on the Index because it contained so cautious a theory of papal power, denying the Pope temporal hegemony. Bellarmine did not represent all that Hobbes required of him either. On the contrary, he proved the argument of those who championed the temporal powers of the Pope faulty. As a Jesuit he tended to (...) maintain the relative autonomy of the state, denying the temporal powers ascribed by radical papalists and Augustinians. Their argument was generally framed as a syllogism: Christ, who possessed direct temporal power as both God and man, exercised it on earth; the Pope is the vicar of Christ; therefore the Pope possesses and may exercise direct temporal jurisdiction. Bellarmine simply denied that Christ had exercised the temporal power, which as God, it is true, he possessed. Moreover, he drew up and circulated a list of patristic passages collected under the title De Regno Christi quale sit, to prove to the Pope the orthodoxy of his position. (shrink)

Während seines Aufenthalts in Löwen machte Bellarmin Bekanntschaft mit einer humanistisch geprägten Exegese, wie sein Brief an Kardinal Sirleto zeigt, in dem es um die Autorität der Vulgata und deren Verhältnis zu den biblischen Sprachen geht. Auch später wird er sich auf Löwener Theologen berufen. Er war also gut vorbereitet, als er den Auftrag erhielt, an der Revision der durch Papst Sixtus V. publizierten Bibel mitzuwirken, deren Korrekturbedürftigkeit Bellarmin erkannt hatte. Um das Ansehen des Papstes zu schonen, schlug er vor, (...) die Bibel aus dem Verkehr zu ziehen. Der Konsequenzen eines solchen Schritts für das höchste Amt war er sich bewusst. Der in diesem Kontext von Bellarmin verfasste Traktat plädiert für eine weite Interpretation des Trienter Vulgatadekrets. Die Rolle der biblischen Sprachen wird ebenso betont wie die Schwierigkeiten einer Revision des lateinischen Textes. Bellarmins Haltung gegenüber der Sixtusbibel, die sich aufgrund der Bulle Aeternus ille infallibler Autorität zu erfreuen schien, trug ihm später von Jesuiten der Universität Ingolstadt den Vorwurf ein, gegen die Lehre von der päpstlichen Unfehlbarkeit verstoßen zu haben. (shrink)

As Paul Boghossian sees it, postmodernist relativists and constructivists are paralyzed by a “fear of knowledge.” For example, they lack the courage to say, in the face of the Lakotas’ claim that their ancestors came from inside the earth, that it is a matter of known fact that their ancestors came across the Bering Strait. To avoid this, they accept the nonconfrontational view Boghossian calls..

Many prominent arguments for epistemic relativism take their departure from the observation that a certain kind of epistemic symmetry is present in particular empirical cases. In this paper, we seek to attain further clarity about the kind of symmetry at issue, and the sort of relativism to which such symmetry can reasonably be taken to give rise. The need for such an investigation is made apparent, we believe, by the fact that prominent anti-relativist arguments such as that advanced by Boghossian (...) in his influential book Fear of Knowledge (2006) yield distorted pictures of the matter. Following Boghossian, we present our argument through a detailed consideration of the dispute between Bellarmine and Galileo concerning heliocentrism. Contrary to what Boghossian claims, the relevant sort of symmetry does not concern a difference in fundamental epistemic principles between Bellarmine and Galileo, but rather a much more localized difference in procedures for adjudication between shared principles in the novel epistemic circumstances generated by Galileo's telescopic observations. Bellarmine and Galileo advance fundamentally different procedures of adjudication that are nevertheless equally rational. The upshot is not so much the denial that there are absolute epistemic facts as such, as Boghossian thinks, but rather the denial that there is an absolute fact of the matter as to which was the most rational way to proceed: Bellarmine's or Galileo's. What this gives us, is the denial that there is a certain kind of absolute epistemic fact. (shrink)

ABSTRACTHistorians have portrayed the papal bull Coeli et terrae as a significant turning point in the history of the Catholic Church’s censorship of astrology. They argue that this bull was intended to prohibit the idea that the stars could naturally incline humans towards future actions, but also had the effect of preventing the discussion of other forms of natural astrology including those useful to medicine, agriculture, and navigation. The bull, therefore, threatened to overturn principles established by Thomas Aquinas, which not (...) only justified long-standing astrological practices, but also informed the Roman Inquisition’s attitude towards this art. The promulgation of the bull has been attributed to the ‘rigour’ of the incumbent pope, Sixtus V. In this article I revise our understanding of this bull in two ways. First, I reconsider the Inquisition’s attitude towards astrology in the mid-sixteenth century, arguing that its members promoted a limited form of Thomist astrology that did not permit the doctrine of inclination. Second, using Robert Bellarmine’s unpublished lectures discussing Aquinas’s views of astrology, I suggest that this attitude was common during the sixteenth century, and may have been caused by the crisis of Renaissance astrology precipitated by the work of Giovanni Pico. (shrink)

This article will examine Bellarmine’s first anti–conciliarist work, found in the Disputationes de controversiis Christianae fidei adversus huius temporis haereticos, emphasizing his theological treatment of the pope’s authority relative to the authority of a council and his repudiation of conciliarism. Bellarmine sees the conciliarists as attacking the divinely instituted Petrine structure of the Church. He does not advocate for an absolute papal monarchy in which there are no ‘constitutional’ limitations on the papacy. For Bellarmine, Christ and his (...) Word, as found in Sacred Scripture and Apostolic Tradition, have supreme authority in the Church: one which the magisterium, whether papal or conciliar, must accept in humility and pass on unsullied. Only Christ has a true fullness of power; the pope has a fullness only relative to that of the bishops. Nevertheless, Christ immediately instituted the pope as the supreme head of the Church on earth, and as such, the pope has supreme ecclesiastical power over the whole Church on earth. Lastly, the article examines Bellarmine’s position on papal heresy. (shrink)

This essay deals with two seventeenth-century intellectuals, the Aristotelian philosopher at Padua, Cesare Cremonini, and the Jesuit controversist, Robert Bellarmine. In the years of the cosmological affair of 1616, both defended their cosmological conceptions by relying on the principle of authority. However, they embraced different sources of legitimation in matters of natural philosophy. While the Padua professor stick to (what he considered to be) the letter of Aristotle, basically a secular interpretation of his world conception, Cardinal and Inquisitor (...) class='Hi'>Bellarmine understood the cosmos against a theological background. In particular, Bellarmine subordinated natural philosophy to exegesis and the authority of the Scriptures, and this allowed him to depart from Aristotle to some extent (for instance on the fluidity and possibly the corruptibility of the heavens). Yet, the two thinkers also shared the criticism of the major astronomical novelty of their time, namely the planetary system of Copernicus and his followers. But their objections rested on different worldviews and authorities (Aristotle and the Scriptures, respectively). Cremonini also supported a vision of celestial animation which was received with much preoccupation by religious authorities as they feared that his views might revive forms of astral worshipping. This essay discusses the manner in which Cremonini and Bellarmine received geocentrism and cosmology in very different, even opposite, manners, especially concerning the relation between natural philosophy and theology, and the reconcilability of cosmology with the Scriptures. (shrink)

In a speech celebrating the centenary of Einstein’s birth Pope John Paul II admitted that Galileo had been treated unjustly by the Church and praised his understanding of the relationship of science and religion. Is such praise deserved? At issue is not so much the truth of the Copernican position, as the meaning and value of truth. There is a sense in which reality is elided by the science inaugurated by Copernicus and Galileo. The Church was right to deny that (...) the truth that mattered to faith should take second place to the truth that matters to science. But it was wrong to think that the former truth be understood as objective truth. Copernicus put the pursuit of objective truth on the right track. But just because he did, we must consider legitimacy and limits of that pursuit. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the persistence of conciliarist constitutionalism down into the seventeenth century, and on the particular way in which the Gallican author, Edmond Richer (1559-1631), framed it in his sweeping and influential critiques of the papalist ecclesiology. In the tradition established by his fifteenth- and sixteenth-century predecessors in the Parisian theology faculty, Richer's formulation of conciliar theory was essentially political in nature. As a result, it lent itself readily to use in the cause of constitutionalist aspiration by such (...) eighteenth-century critics of French monarchical policy as Nicolas Le Gros and Gabriel-Nicolas Maultrot. (shrink)