This history of physics focuses on the question, "How do bodies act on one another across space?" The variety of answers illustrates the function of fundamental analogies or models in physics as well as the role of so-called unobservable entities. Forces and Fields presents an in-depth look at the science of ancient Greece, and it examines the influence of antique philosophy on seventeenth-century thought. Additional topics embrace many elements of modern physics--the empirical basis of quantum mechanics, wave-particle duality and the (...) uncertainty principle, and the action-at-a-distance theory of Wheeler and Feynman. 1961 ed. (shrink)

The argument from analogy is examined from the point of view of Carnap's confirmation theory. It is argued that if inductive arguments are to be applicable to the real world, they must contain elementary analogical inferences. Carnap's system as originally developed (theλ -system) is not strong enough to take account of analogical arguments, but it is shown that the new system, which he has announced but not published in detail (theη -system), is capable of satisfying the conditions of inductive analogy. (...) Finally it is shown that an elementary analysis of analogical inference yields postulates of the η -system with a minimum of arbitrary assumptions. (shrink)

This study examines how institutional logics interplay in a cross-sector social partnership that manages refugee integration in a rural district in Germany. In an inductive 15-month case study that drew on interviews and observations, we observe the dynamic materialization of institutional logics in day-to-day practices and an increasing contradiction and even rivalry between community- and market-based institutional logics over time. As a result, we delineate a model explaining the interplay of institutional logics along two dimensions: the dominance of one salient (...) logic and whether conflicts arise among logics. Our analysis also addresses the unifying properties of community as an institutional logic, especially in the context of urgency conditions. In addition, we show the influence of exogenous events and their media coverage on the interplay and conflicts of institutional logics. By unfolding the complexity of refugee integration—one of the global grand challenges of the present—we deepen the current understanding of the specific challenges addressed by cross-sector social partnerships. (shrink)

Hempel's qualitative criteria of converse consequence and special consequence for confirmation are examined, and the resulting paradoxes traced to the general intransitivity of confirmation. Adopting a probabilistic measure of confirmation, a limiting form of transitivity of confirmation from evidence to predictions is derived, and it is shown to what extent its application depends on prior probability judgments. In arguments involving this kind of transitivity therefore there is no necessary "convergence of opinion" in the sense claimed by some personalists. The conditions (...) of application of the limiting transitivity theorem are most perspicuously described in terms of De Finetti's notion of exchangeability, which leads to a suggested revaluation of the function of theories in relation to confirmation and explanation. (shrink)

According to proponents of the continuity hypothesis, metaphors represent one end of a spectrum of linguistic phenomena, which includes various forms of loosening/broadening, such as category extensions and approximations, as well as hyperbolic interpretations. The continuity hypothesis is used to establish that the inferences derived from the set of linguistic expressions mentioned above result from the same or nearly similar pragmatic processes. In this paper, we want to challenge that particular aspect of the continuity hypothesis. We do so based on (...) considerations and analysis of an understudied linguistic phenomenon that we call the metaphorical uses of proper names (MPNs). We first explain how MPNs represent a unique linguistic class distinguishable from, for example, nicknames. In addition, we offer some remarks on how MPNs can be understood against the background of current debates between referentialists and predicativists about names. Our discussion leads us to conclude that MPNs are categorically different from literal interpretations of proper names. We spell out the consequences that the results of our analysis have for the continuity hypothesis. (shrink)

The argument from analogy is examined from the standpoint of Carnap's confirmation theory. Carnap's own discussion of analogy in relation to his c*— function is restricted to cases where the analogues are known to be similar, but not known to be different in any respect. It has been argued by the author in a previous work,, and by P. Achinstein, that typical analogy arguments involve known differences between the analogues as well as similarities. Achinstein shows that for such arguments none (...) of Carnap's Δ— system of conflrmation functions gives satisfactory values, and it is further shown in the present paper that for these arguments the confirmation never rises above its initial value, irrespective of evidence drown from an analogue. it is argued that even if inductive arguments are to be applicable to the real world, they must in principle be capable of taking into account known differences between the instances of an inductive generalization. Hence Carnap's Δ— system is inadequate as an explication of both induction and analogy.Three conditions are stated as necessary for any confirmation theory which gives a satisfactory explication of analogical inference:I. If two individuals a and b are known to agree in certain properties and differ in others, and if in addition a has a further property, then the confirmation of the hypothesis that b also has this property is greater than its initial confirmation, at least if the weight of the similarities is sufficiently great compared with the weight of the differences.II. The confirmation‐value increases or decreases with the weight of the similarities between the analogues compared with the weight of their differences.III. The confirmation that b has a certain property is greater if a has that property than if a does not have it.The Δ— system sastisfles none of these conditions. Carnap and Stegmüller have now, however, presented a new anxiom system for confirmation functions. the — system, Which is introduced primarily to deal with languages whose primitive predicates fall into families such that each individual can only be qualified by one predicate of each family. They construct a c‐ function which, as well as dealing with a language having two families of such predicates, also depends, unlike the functions in the Δ— system, on similarities between otherwise different individuals. The system is not developed far enough in this Appendix to enable the authors to discuss the confirmation in analogy arguments satisfying conditions I — III above, but it is shown in the present paper that, with a simple generalization of the measure‐function defined by Carnap and Stegmüller, and in the simplest non‐trivial case, condition I — III are all satisfied, indeed a stronger form of condition I is satisfied, in which no known similarity of the analogues is postulated.Finally it is remarked that Carnap and Stegmüller's method of introducing their Δ— system is extremely arbitrary and ad hoc, and an alternative method of introducing is suggested. Bearing in mind the fundamental nature of the argument from analogy in all application of induction to the real world, it is suggesetd that the fundamental inductive inference needing explication is not the inference of‘P1b, from ‘P,1a, but the analogical infeence of‘P2b, from‘P1P2a.P1b,. It is posinitial confirmation of‘P2b, and the confirmation of‘P2b, given‘P2a” and that the later two confirmation‐values are equivalent to those in the Δ— system. It is then shown that Carnap and Stegmüller's new measure‐function follows from their axiom system together with these postulates. Thus some of the arbitrariness of the — system is removed by general considérations regarding inductive and analogical inference. (shrink)

This essay places Isaiah Berlin’s famous “Two Concepts of Liberty” in conversation with perspectives defined as black fugitive thought. The latter is used to refer principally to Aimé Césaire, W. E. B. Du Bois and David Walker. It argues that the trope of liberty in Western liberal political theory, exemplified in a lineage that connects Berlin, John Stuart Mill and Benjamin Constant, has maintained its universal meaning and coherence by excluding and silencing any representations of its modernity gestations, affiliations and (...) entanglements with Atlantic slavery and European empires. This particular incarnation of theory is characterized as the Western discursive and hegemonic effects of colonial-racial foreclosure. Foreclosure describes the discursive contexts in which particular terms or references become impossible to formulate because the means by which they could be formulated have been excluded from the discursive context. Through an examination of the action of foreclosure, based largely on unraveling the liberal-colonial convergences of Two Concepts the essay reflects on the political and theoretical problems posed for black political thought by the hegemony of Western formulations of liberty that deny their indebtedness to Western colonialism. Drawing upon juxtapositions between white liberal/republican thinkers and black fugitivity thinkers, it argues a particular lineage of black political thought is compelled to conceive of itself as an escape from the colonial and racial hegemony of Western liberty. (shrink)

As in the case of great books in all branches of philosophy, Pierre Duhem's Le Théorie Physique , first published in 1906, can be looked to as the progenitor of many different and even conflicting currents in subsequent philosophy of science. On a superficial reading, it seems to be an expression of what later came to be called deductivist and instrumentalist analyses of scientific theory. Duhem's very definition of physical theory, put forward early in the book, is the quintessence of (...) instrumentalism: A physical theory is not an explanation. It is a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of principles, which aim to represent as simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible a set of experimental laws [p. 19]. (shrink)

In his paper “William Whewell on the Consilience of Inductions” Professor Laudan has suggested that Whewell’s use of “consilience of inductions” is not the same as mine in my paper of that title. Suppose we have a theory T which entails three empirical laws L1, L2, L3. L1 is supposed already confirmed by direct evidence of its instances, but we have as yet no direct evidence for L2 or for L3. Then Laudan distinguishes two problems: Whewell’s problem: T is suggested (...) to explain L1 and is supported by L1; how much is our confidence in T increased if it also predicts L2, and L2 is subsequently directly confirmed? My problem: T is suggested to explain L1 and is supported by L1; T also entails L3; how much is our confidence that L3 will turn out a correct prediction increased by the fact that T entails it? (shrink)

In his paper “William Whewell on the Consilience of Inductions” Professor Laudan has suggested that Whewell’s use of “consilience of inductions” is not the same as mine in my paper of that title. Suppose we have a theory T which entails three empirical laws L1, L2, L3. L1 is supposed already confirmed by direct evidence of its instances, but we have as yet no direct evidence for L2 or for L3. Then Laudan distinguishes two problems: Whewell’s problem: T is suggested (...) to explain L1 and is supported by L1; how much is our confidence in T increased if it also predicts L2, and L2 is subsequently directly confirmed? My problem: T is suggested to explain L1 and is supported by L1; T also entails L3; how much is our confidence that L3 will turn out a correct prediction increased by the fact that T entails it? (shrink)

The use of energy from wind has a multi-faceted relationship to visibility. Between 1973 and 1991, various actors in the West German environmental movement made assertions about the visibility of renewable sources of power, but wind energy took on a particular prominence. In this article, the question of how different actors have used knowledge and the materiality of wind turbines for competing purposes is explored. Environmentalists attempted to create visible signs of a valid alternative energy future by tinkering with small, (...) decentralized wind turbines, while the Federal Republic of Germany's Ministry of Research and established energy providers used the failure of the state-subsidized large-scale wind-energy project GROWIAN to criticize renewables and brand their application as misguided. In both cases, actors created new wind energy visibilities to convey their conflicting interests—pitting those advocating a new, environmentally friendly energy system against those who sought consolidation of the large-scale fossil-nuclear energy system. (shrink)

“Feminist epistemology”: on the face of it this is a contradiction in terms. “Feminism” has its origins in a social subgroup, which has tended to be particularist, separatist, and even sexist; “epistemology” is the study of the conditions of knowledge, or more modestly of justified belief, which are common to human beings as such. The question whether we can or cannot attain such conditions rationally is one of the most important topics of debate in modern philosophy, and it by no (...) means depends on the insights of any particular group. The debate has been situated in the space between those who regard valid knowledge as unitary across all differences of social and historical context, and those who regard claims to truth as essentially relative to such contexts, without any possibility of rational adjudication between them. (shrink)

The first two volumes of the Minnesota Studies contained some of the classic accounts of this view, especially Carnap's "The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts," and Hempel's "The Theoretician's Dilemma," but even in these volumes anticipations of a change of view are discernible, in Sellars' "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," Scriven's "Definitions, Explanations, and Theories," and Pap's excellent "Disposition Concepts and Extensional Logic," in which the adequacy of the empiricist's refuge in extensional logic is queried. Volume III contains two (...) papers within the "orthodoxy." One is a careful examination by Hempel of the structure of statistical explanation, which is shown to differ in important respects from the deductive pattern. The other is Rozeboom's "The Factual Content of Theoretical Concepts," which defends a "Thesis of semantic empiricism," namely that "the semantic properties, if any, of theoretical expressions derive,... wholly from their use with the observation language". Rozeboom holds that the factual content of a theory is designated by its Ramsey sentence, although the theory may be enriched in different and perhaps incompatible ways to entail further theoretical sentences, in which case a theoretical term may "designate" two or more different entities. The analysis is ingenious, but gives little comfort to those who want to allow for a "meaning" of theoretical concepts not wholly derived from the observation language. (shrink)

The thesis of underdetermination of theory by evidence has led to an opposition between realism and relationism in philosophy of science. Various forms of the thesis are examined, and it is concluded that it is true in at least a weak form that brings realism into doubt. Realists therefore need, among other things, a theory of degrees of confirmation to support rational theory choice. Recent such theories due to Glymour and Friedman are examined, and it is argued that their criterion (...) of "unification" for good theories is better formulated in Bayesian terms. Bayesian confirmation does, however, have consequences that tell against realism. It is concluded that the prospects are dim for scientific realism as usually understood. (shrink)

Kuhn 's incommensurability thesis of 1962 still implies a very radical critique of standard theories of meaning. It is argued that incommensurability is sufficiently pervasive throughout the development of theories as to call in question standard linguistic palliatives, and that Kuhn 's critique of extensionalist translation must be carried further into a theory of interpretation which not only depends on holistic meanings, but also explicitly addresses the ostensive and analogical processes of language learning. Such a theory is required for the (...) pervasively metaphoric character of natural language, as well as for the understanding of theoretical terms in science. (shrink)

As in the case of great books in all branches of philosophy, Pierre Duhem's Le Théorie Physique, first published in 1906, can be looked to as the progenitor of many different and even conflicting currents in subsequent philosophy of science. On a superficial reading, it seems to be an expression of what later came to be called deductivist and instrumentalist analyses of scientific theory. Duhem's very definition of physical theory, put forward early in the book, is the quintessence of instrumentalism:A (...) physical theory is not an explanation. It is a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of principles, which aim to represent as simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible a set of experimental laws [p. 19]. (shrink)

In his theory of rational discourse, Habermas has made essential use of the concept of 'force of the better argument'. He does not explicitly discuss the theories of meaning and of inference that must underpin this concept, but usually construes it in terms of univocal meaning and propositional inference. These assumptions are challenged by means of examples from the use of metaphor and analogical argument in science, and it is suggested that a generalisation of such arguments applies to philosophical discourse (...) also. Habermas's conception of modes of argument as monotonically directed towards truth should therefore be replaced by dialogue and dialectics, but it does not follow from this that argument is without rational rules. (shrink)