英文题名:A reconstruction of man as freedom.

本书以“认识的意义标准”、“科学的划界”、“科学说明”、“理论与观察”、“确证与归纳”、“科学知识的增长”、“科学知识社会学的相对主义科学观”等八个问题为基本线索,分析研究了科学哲学家们对问题的各种解 决方案及其之间的逻辑联系。.

本书以调和与制衡为红线,逐步从古代希腊罗马、中世纪的欧洲和近现代的欧美三个时期,分别讲述了西方混合政体思想从起步到逐步完善并继续发展的过程。其中重点对亚里士多德、柏拉图、托马斯、卢梭、黑格尔等几位著名 政治思想家的混合政体思想进行了论述。.

本書以20世紀80年代震動一時的“潘曉討論”為中心，為當代文學研究——特別是關於80年代文學的研究——帶入新的“問題意識”，一方面挑戰既有的線性文學史描述、豐富我們的文學研究範式；一方面將廣闊的社會、 文化“大本文”引入對於80年代具有代表性的文學“小文本”的解讀之中，以從方法上賦予當代文學研究以新質。.

Ben shu tong guo dui Kang Youwei zhi "qun" yu"du" guan nian de kao cha, lai ba wo Kang Youwei dui ge ren, guo jia nai zhi tian xia zhi xu de shen ke si kao. Zhu yao nei rong you: yi, Jin dai"qun-du" guan nian de chu xian ji qi zou xiang, er, Kang Youwei "qun-du" guan nian chan sheng de si xiang bei jing, san, "Du ren" yu Kang Youwei dui xian dai xing ge ti sheng cun zhi (...) ling hui, si, "Qun" yu guo jia wei xin, wu, "qun-du" guan lian yu chong tu: min quan yu guo jia guan nian zhi jian de zhang li, liu, Shi jie fan wei zhi "du" yu "qun" : guo jia yu "da tong"deng. (shrink)

Ben shu shi cai yuan pei xian sheng guan yu gong min dao de xiu yang fang mian de dai biao zuo, Zhu yao shou lu ta zui wei zhong yao de dao de si xiang dai biao zuo pinzhong xue xiu shen jiao ke shu hehua gong xue xiao jiang yi, Bing shou lu cai yuan pei qi ta you guan dao de xiu yang de ling san wen zhang, Chong fen ti xian le cai yuan pei xian sheng (...) dui yu xian dai zhong guo ren ying ju you de dao de su yang de zong ti gou xiang. (shrink)

Ben shu zhu yao cong san ge fang mian dui Zhou Dunyi li xue si xiang de mei xue te zhi jin xing jie du: yi shi gen ju qi "tai ji" guan fen xi "tai ji" zhi yuan rong mei, dong jing mei, he xie mei; er shi zai dui qi "jun zi guan" he "sheng ren guan" jin xing yan jiu de ji chu shang, zhan xian gang jian, zhong he, gao jie, sa luo, shang zhuo de jun (...) zi ren ge he yi "le" wei ben de sheng ren jing jie, shi dui chuan tong ren ge mei xue ji xian shi you chao yue de shuang chong te zheng de jin yi bu chan shi; san shi zai "xiang" yu "yi", "wen" yu "dao", "le" yun "li" de guan xi zhong fen xi "wen yi zai dao" de mei xue yi yun, cong ben ti de gao du fen xi wen dao guan xi, jiao wei jing zhun de chan shi le Zhou Dunyi "wen yi zai dao" de wen xue si xiang. (shrink)

Ben shu wei "Song Ming shi qi Chang Jiang zhong you de ru xue yan jiu" cong shu zhi yi: ben cong shu shi ren wen she hui ke xue chong dian yan jiu ji di-Wuhan da xue Zhongguo chuan tong wen hua yan jiu zhong xin tou biao, jing jiao yu bu zu zhi zhuan jia ping shen tong guo, zheng shi pi zhun de jiao yu bu ren wen she hui ke xue 2001 nian du zhong da yan (...) jiu xiang mu, xiang mu pi zhun hao shi 01JAZJD720008, ding yu 2004 nian qian hou wan cheng. ke ti zu zhu chi ren wei Guo Qiyong jiao shou, "Jiangxi zhi xue"shi Zhu Xi ti chu de yi ge gai nian, zhu yao zhi chu zi yu Jiangxi Jinxi Lu shi jia zu yi men de xue shuo, qi nei he shi Lu Jiuyuan de xin xue; di 2 quan ze shi you "Song Yuan xue an" suo zai zhi Xiangshan xiong Zhangfu, Suoshan de xue shuo; di 3 quan wei Xiangshan xiong di de di zi men de si xiang. Ben shu quan mian kao cha Jiangxi zhi xue zai Song dai Chang Jiang zhong you xing qi de xue mo yuan yuan, zhu yao xue shuo, yu Luo xue Min xue Zhejiang zhu xue zhe (Lü Zuqian, Yong Shangsi xian sheng deng) zhi jian de guan xi, yi ji qi dui Wang (Yangming) xue xing qi de nei zai guan lian xing, bing yan ji dui xian dai xin ru xue de tan tao. ben shu de xie zuo jiang zhu zhong si xiang kao gu de fang fa, zai quan mian yan jiu you guan dian ji de ji chu shang, dui you guan ren wu de chu sheng di, huo dong de di qu (ru jia zu suo zai cun luo, xue zhe shu xin wang lai, jiang xue, hui jiang, shu yuan deng) jin xing shi di de kao cha, guang fan di yun yong fang zhi, nian pu, shu yuan zhi, jia pu deng cai liao, ba si xiang jia huan yuan yu ju ti huan jing zhi zhong, zai ju ti she hui de li shi de jia zu de bei jing xia kao cha qi si xiang de nei han, jie shi qi jing shen suo zai, bing jin er yin shen chu qi yi yi yu jia zhi. (shrink)

Ben shu quan mian chan shu zhu xi de li xue yu ke xue si xiang,Te bie jiu zhu xi zhong shi zi ran yan jiu,Shen ru ke xue tan suo,Chuang xin ke xue si xiang,Chuan bo zi ran zhi shi yi ji zhu xi li xue de ke xue jia zhi zhan kai ju ti de lun shu,Chong fen ken ding zhu xi ke xue si xiang dui yu hou shi ke ji fa zhan de zhong yao zuo yong,Yi (...) qi dui jin tian de ke ji yu wen hua de fa zhan zhu ru yuan tou huo shui. (shrink)

This paper highlights the potential harms in the current state of business ethics education and presents an alternative new model of business ethics education. Such potential harms in business ethics education is due largely to restricted cognitive level of reasoning, a limited level of ethical conduct which remains only responsive and adaptive, and the estrangement between strategic thinking and ethical thinking. As a remedy for business ethics education, denatured by these potential harms, a new dynamic model of business ethics education (...) is proposed. The new model is composed of a basic foundation for business ethics education and three practical components of business ethics education. The basic foundation comprises of ethical reasoning, moral sentiments, and ethical praxis. Three practical components of business ethics education are, respectively, to intensify moral imagination, to develop ethical wisdom and courage, and to enhance meta- strategic competences. The ultimate purpose of these practical components is to help moral subjects to conduct ethical leadership, to actualize integrity between individuals and organization, and to fulfill the social responsibility of business firms. This new model is expected to attract attention to the effective business ethics education both in college and in industry, and to be used as a benchmark for new curriculum designs and development of teaching methods. Finally, some teaching methodologies and pedagogical experiments are introduced and discussed according to this new model of business ethics education. (shrink)

What should we do about “tainted” public commemorations? Recent events have highlighted the urgency of reaching a consensus on this question. However, existing discussions appear to be dominated by two naïve opposing views – to remove or preserve them. My aims in this essay are two-fold. First, I argue that the two views are not naïve, but undergirded by concerns with securing self-respect and with the character of our engagement with the past. Second, I offer a qualified defence of vandalising (...) tainted commemorations. The defence comprises two parts. I consider two prominent suggestions – to install counter-commemorations and to add contextualising plaques – and argue that they are typically beset with difficulties. I then argue that in some circumstances, constrained vandalism is a response to tainted commemorations which effectively adjudicates the demands of the two opposing views. (shrink)

What is it for something to be a disability? Elizabeth Barnes, focusing on physical disabilities, argues that disability is a social category. It depends on the rules undergirding the judgements of the disability rights movement. Barnes’ account may strike many as implausible. I articulate the unease, in the form of three worries about Barnes’ account. It does not fully explain why the disability rights movement is constituted in such a way that it only picks out paradigmatic disability traits, nor why (...) only the traits identified by the movement as constituting experiences of social and political constraint count as disability. It also leaves out the contribution of people other than disability activists, to the definition of disability. I develop Barnes’ account. On my account, a person is disabled if she is in some state which is constitutive of some constraint on her legitimate interests. This state must be the subject of legitimate medical interest and be picked out by the disability rights movement as among the traits for which they are seeking to promote progress and change. My account addresses the worries about Barnes’ account. It is also able to include all disabilities, rather than only physical ones. (shrink)

本书是一本关于陈冲体验人生感悟人生的书法集子。内容包括:悟道篇;明理篇;做人篇;处世篇等。.

I attempt to adjudicate the disagreement between those who seek to reconceptualize disability as mere difference and their opponents. I do so by reviewing a central conviction motivating the resistance, concerning the relationship between disability and well-being. I argue that the conviction depends on further considerations about the costs and extent of change involved in accommodating individuals with a particular disability trait. I conclude by considering three pay-offs of this clarification.

Hobbes’s own justification for the existence of governments relies on the assumption that, without a government, our lives in the state of nature would result in a state of war of every man against every man. Many contemporary scholars have tried to explain why universal war is unavoidable in Hobbes’s state of nature by utilizing modern game theory. However, most game-theoretic models that have been presented so far do not accurately capture what Hobbes deems to be the primary cause of (...) conflict in the state of nature – which is uncertainty, rather than people’s egoistic psychology. Any game- theoretic model that does not incorporate uncertainty into the picture is, therefore, I claim, the wrong model. In this paper, I use Bayesian game-theory to show how universal conflict can break-out in the state of nature - even when the majority of the population would strictly prefer to cooperate and seek peace with other people - due to uncertainty about the other person’s type. Along the way, I show that the valuation of one’s own life is one of the central mechanisms that drives Hobbes’s pessimistic conclusion. (shrink)

The concept of the cheng xin in the Zhuangzi claims that the cognitive function of the heart-mind is not over and above its affective states and in charge of them in developing and controlling virtue, as assumed by the Confucians and others. This joint cognitive and affective nature of the heart-mind denies ethical and epistemic certainty. Individual perspectives are limited given habits of thought, attitudes, personal orientations and particular cognitive/affective experiences. Nevertheless, the heart-mind has a vast imaginative capacity that allows (...) the open-endedness and broadening of perspectives. (shrink)

One recurring criticism of the best interests standard concerns its vagueness, and thus the inadequate guidance it offers to care providers. The lack of an agreed definition of ‘best interests’, together with the fact that several suggested considerations adopted in legislation or professional guidelines for doctors do not obviously apply across different groups of persons, result in decisions being made in murky waters. In response, bioethicists have attempted to specify the best interests standard, to reduce the indeterminacy surrounding medical decisions. (...) In this paper, we discuss the bioethicists’ response in relation to the state's possible role in clarifying the best interests standard. We identify and characterise two clarificatory strategies employed by bioethicists —elaborative and enumerative—and argue that the state should adopt the latter. Beyond the practical difficulties of the former strategy, a state adoption of it would inevitably be prejudicial in a pluralistic society. Given the gravity of best interests decisions, and the delicate task of respecting citizens with different understandings of best interests, only the enumerative strategy is viable. We argue that this does not commit the state to silence in providing guidance to and supporting healthcare providers, nor does it facilitate the abuse of the vulnerable. Finally, we address two methodological worries about adopting this approach at the state level. The adoption of the enumerative strategy is not defeatist in attitude, nor does it eventually collapse into (a form of) the elaborative strategy. (shrink)

Figure originale de la pensée chinoise, Wang Chong passe en revue, dans cet ouvrage, les conceptions de son temps. Alors que dans leur majorité les penseurs chinois se préoccupent en priorité de morale, il se donne un programme d'ordre épistémologique : la lutte contre l'erreur et le mensonge.

A common assumption in the selection of nonhuman animal subjects for research and the approval of research is that, if the risks of a procedure are too great for humans, and if there is a so-called scientific necessity, then it is permissible to use nonhuman animal subjects. I reject the common assumption as neglecting the central ethical issue of the permissibility of using nonhuman animal subjects and as being inconsistent with the principle of justice used in human subjects research ethics. (...) This principle requires that certain classes of individuals not be subjected to a disproportionate share of the burdens or risks of research. I argue for an extension of this principle to nonhuman animal research and show that a prima facie violation of the principle occurs because nonhuman animals bear an overwhelmingly disproportionate share of the risks of research without sufficient justification or reciprocal benefit. (shrink)