The central topic of this essay consists into establishing a relation between two dimensions of formation: the conceptual process of creating philo- sophical toys - that is of reelaborating existing philosophical concepts, mainly deriving from the thought of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, in terms of their potential as ‘operative constructs' - and their parallel redeployment towards the specific problem of analyz- ing a recent transdisciplinary artwork. By means of this strategical shift, theory looses its character of explanation and illustration. (...) Philosophy as toy becomes rather the matter of evaluating the com- plexity of a specific artistic composition in terms of its aesthetic potential. It contributes towards developing meta- stable conditions of mutual resonance between heterogeneous modalities of creation. (shrink)

Slurs are derogatory terms targeting individuals and groups of individuals on the basis of race, nationality, religion, gender or sexual orientation. The aim of my paper is to propose an account of appropriated uses of slurs – i.e. uses by targeted groups of their own slurs for non-derogatory purposes, as in the appropriation of ‘nigger’ by the African-American community, or the appropriation of ‘queer’ by the homosexual community. In my proposal appropriated uses are conceived as echoic, in Relevance Theory terms: (...) in-groups echo derogatory uses in ways and contexts that make manifest the dissociation from the offensive contents. I will show that the echoic strategy has interesting advantages over alternative theories, and especially over Anderson and Lepore’s deflationary strategy. (shrink)

What distinguishes evils from ordinary wrongs? Are some evils unforgivable? How should we respond to evils? Card offers a secular theory of evil--representing a compromise between classic utilitarian and stoic approaches--that responds to these and other questions.

This essay pursues the question of vegetal respiration in Presocratics’ doctrines in contrast to Aristotle’s categorical circumscription of this vital process to the blooded animals. It finds that epithelial respiration in DK31 B100 is central to Empedocles’ conception of plants’ breathing, linked to their fructification, deciduousness, and overall life preservation. It also discusses plants’ respiration in relation to their body temperature in Menestor, then, concludes by analyzing Democritus’ psychological doctrine, arguing that the intake of fiery atoms pertained to all living (...) beings, plants included. (shrink)

The digital represents an oppressive apparatus of control or a new horizon for liberation? This article frames a post-deleuzian and post-guattarian line of though about the digital and the politics. Control and discontinuity of affections are the two poles for a reasoning about our involvment in the digital and our awareness of risks and opportunities. If we assume that the contemporary is characterized by the pulverization of the real, and that from the thanatology of the twentieth century could hardly be (...) born a 'providential' technology at the same time thanatology can’t stop the entropic being, which transcends all ambition of autonomy of matter. The machines were built in the frame of segmentation, but the ontological instability is able to give form to a different and new releases. However, a reflection on new technologies leads us to understand that the affectivity of matter, its discontinuities, while constituting a virtual source of potentiality with 'machinic heterogenesis', does not 'escape' the power, but urges the control to raise new challenges not in opposition but in affinity. In this mimetic interaction, then, should continue to reflect, remembering always the lure of Deleuze to irony and humour, on possible differential practices for limiting the disciplines in order to move the entropy in the logic of the database, under the sign of an aesthetics of affection, renewing the an-aestheticized subjectivity of contemporary. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 45, Issue 11, November 2021.

"What do grown children owe their parents?" Over two decades ago philosopher Jane English asked this question and came up with the startling answer: nothing (English 1979). English joins many contemporary philosophers in rejecting the once-traditional view that grown children owe their parents some kind of fitting repayment for past services rendered. The problem with the traditional view, as argued by many, is, first, that parents have duties to provide fairly significant services to their growing children, and persons do not (...) owe repayment for others' mere performance of duty; second, even where parents go above and beyond duty in their loving and generous rearing of their children, the benefits are bestowed, at least on young children, without their voluntary acceptance and consent, and so, again, fail to generate any obligation of subsequent repayment on their part (see Blustein 1982: 182-3). Moreover, the entire idiom of obligation and repayment, in English's 1 words, "tends to obscure, or even to undermine, the love that is the correct ground of filial obligation" (352). English's alternative, however -- that children strictly "owe" their parents nothing except what flows naturally from whatever love and affection exist between them -- also strikes many as problematic. Christina Hoff Sommers offers examples of what seem to be clearly delinquent adult children, who simply don't "feel" like sharing their lives with their aging parents, or providing any emotional or financial support to them, and so don't (Sommers 1986: 440-41). Sommers points out that we need some talk of obligations in order to fill in the cracks in human relationships where love and affection fail: "The ideal relationship cannot be 'duty-free,' if only because sentimental ties may come unraveled, often leaving one of the parties at a material disadvantage'" (450-51). Sommers proposes as her alternative to English that legitimate duties arise out of special relationships defined by social roles: being a father or mother, a son or a daughter, "is socially as well as biologically prescriptive; it not only defines what one is; it also defines who one is and what one owes" (447).. (shrink)

This short paper responds to the essays by Shilpi Sinha, Shaireen Rasheed, and Lyudmila Bryzzheva. It considers how racial inequality between teachers and students affects the possibilities of educational hospitality, both in cases of white teachers teaching racialized students and in cases of racialized teachers teaching white students. The response takes a phenomenological turn, considering the relative vulnerability of bodies that encounter each other in educational spaces which, themselves, are not neutral.

The motif of literature abandoned by Foucault in the 70s can find new possibilities and resurface transformed from an ethical perspective that continues focusing on the language. Language and subject are not two vertebral topics in Foucault’s reflection, but a single framework in which literature, disappearance of the subject and ethics are linking different paths of the same journey. Western man largely questioned in Foucault’s works appears together with other subjectivities that challenge him and make us think about the limits (...) and possibilities of the subject. In this sense, we propose literature as a practice of subjectivation in which language frees from imposed limits, literature as an ethical practice. (shrink)

Gray zones, which develop wherever oppression is severe and lasting, are inhabited by victims of evil who become complicit in perpetrating on others the evils that threaten to engulf themselves. Women, who have inhabited many gray zones, present challenges for feminist theorists, who have long struggled with how resistance is possible under coercive institutions. Building on Primo Levi's reflections on the gray zone in Nazi death camps and ghettos, this essay argues that resistance is sometimes possible, although outsiders are rarely, (...) if ever, in a position to judge when. It also raises questions about the adequacy of ordinary moral concepts to mark the distinctions that would be helpful for thinking about how to respond in a gray zone. (shrink)

Este artículo propone explorar algunos de los vínculos que es posible establecer entre el pensamiento indígena y el afrodescendiente que se ha desarrollado en América Latina durante el siglo XX. El caso que aquí trabajamos pone en relación al Caribe con los Andes, y más específicamente, a un intelectual indígena de Bolivia y un afrocaribeño de Martinica: Fausto Reinaga y Frantz Fanon. Reparamos en las referencias que hace Reinaga a la obra de Fanon en sus libros inaugurales del pensamiento indianista, (...) señalando que estas no son accesorias sino fundamentales para el tipo de indianismo que el autor quechua-aymara elabora, uno de tipo anticolonial en el que se encuentra presente un horizonte universal y humano. This article explores links that can be established among indigenous and Afro-descendent thought developed in Latin America during the 20th century. By drawing a comparison between the Caribbean and Andean regions, we specifically concentrate on the intellectual work of an indigenous Bolivian and an Afro-Caribbean from Martinique: Fausto Reinaga and Frantz Fanon. Reinaga’s inaugural writings on indianista thought reveal several references to the work of Fanon, providing material for our analysis. We argue that such allusions are not mere accessories, but rather fundamental elements for the kind of indianismo that the Quechua-Aymara author develops; that is, an anticolonial thought in which universal and human horizons are present. (shrink)

Indexicality is at the core of many major philosophical problems.1 In the last years, recorded messages and written notes have become a significant test and an intriguing puzzle for the semantics of indexical expressions.2 In this paper, I argue that a parallel may be drawn between the determination of the reference of the indexical expressions in recorded messages or written texts, and the determination of the illocutionary force of recorded or written utterances. To this aim, I will endorse the intention-based (...) approach proposed by Stefano Predelli - and in particular his distinction between context of utterance and context of interpretation. (shrink)

This special issue responds to the current discourse on cinema and education from a philosophical point of view. Considering the fact that young people worldwide are watching films and series via their smartphones or personal computers, we here explore the educative aspects of this popular activity. Does this wide-ranging habit mis-educate the next generation? Or does cinema carry a potential for ethical-political education, parallel to the ancient Greek tragedies and the modernist Bildungsroman? The authors of this special issue deliberate this (...) question by exploring the intersection between cinema and philosophy and the potential powers of cinematic education. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that the concept of disposition is often unclear in teacher education programs, sometimes referring to general personal values and beliefs, and sometimes referring to professional commitments and actions. As a result, it is unclear whether teacher education programs should focus on selecting the right kind of person, or on educating the student for a profession. I suggest that a clearer distinction should be made between predispositions (value commitments that a person may or may not act (...) upon) and professional dispositions (characteristics attributed to a person based on actually observed actions), and that teacher education programs should focus their attention on the latter, not the former. The question is not whether student-teachers have the ?right? personal beliefs but whether, if the dispositions required by the profession are at odds with their personal beliefs, the former will override the latter. (shrink)

It is possible to raise and solve philosophical problems with no very clear idea of what philosophy is, what it is trying to do, and how it can best do it; but no great progress can be made until these questions have been asked and some answer to them given ( Collingwood, 2005 , p. 1).

The paper considers Martha Nussbaum's motivation for departing from her earlier cosmopolitan position in favour of now promoting a globally sensitive patriotism. Her reasons for endorsing patriotism will be shown as exemplary for related argumentations by other authors, especially insofar as love of country as a motivating force for civic duty is understood as in tension or even as incompatible with cosmopolitan aspirations. The motivation for turning to patriotism as articulated by Nussbaum and others will be demonstrated to rely on (...) misleading understandings of love of country as a possessive emotion. Relying on Alice Crary's critique, it will be argued that sound moral judgement with regard to the patria as well as from a cosmopolitan stance is equally tied to our sensitivities and equally requires their education. Furthermore, I will discuss Axel Honneth's notion of solidarity, a form of love inflected by justice, as a possible alternative for conceptualising the social bonding patriotic attachment is supposed to provide. However, a critical patriotism ultimately needs to transgress this inward-directed focus and take into account how a country is seen by non-citizens, the historical relationships and the obligations that arise in terms of historical justice in relation to other countries. If we take patriotism in this outward-looking perspective seriously, we also come to understand why it would be a mistake to skip patriotism altogether. Rather than constructing cosmopolitanism and patriotism as mutually exclusive opposites, critical cosmopolitanism and critical patriotism can be shown to have different but complementary and mutually corrective functions. (shrink)

Thinking of the evils of homophobia and what is needed to survive them requires acknowledging a new category of evil besides the evils of individual deeds, social practices and social structures. That further category is evil social environments. Building on the work of Jeremy Waldron on the harm in hate speech, this chapter extends that account to certain hate crimes that, like the written word, send a lingering social message. The cases of four women survivors of homophobia are then examined (...) in relation to such harm. Two who wrote memoirs had been targeted for murder, one in an evil environment, the other in a more positively responsive environment. The remaining two survival stories are less dramatic. But they are important in how they illustrate ordinary challenges faced successfully by lesbians and gay men in emotionally toxic environments, and how, in this sense, those not directly threatened with murder might still be justly regarded as survivors. The chapter concludes with reflections on the meanings of survival and some of the costs of surviving an evil homophobic environment. (shrink)

Torture is like slavery (and unlike murder and genocide) in that it is not inconceivable that torture might be justifiable. But the circumstances that would make it tolerable are unrealistic in philosophically interesting ways. It is unrealistic to think we can predict when torture will be effective and containable; unwarranted to suppose that humane alternatives are impossible; disastrous to remove motivations to create alternatives; unacceptable to be satisfied with available evidence regarding suspects’ identity, knowledge of critical detail, ability to recall (...) it, or reasons for not providing it. Most importantly, the costs of even successful interrogational torture would negate the gains sought. Or so this essay argues. (shrink)

In De Anima III 10, Aristotle introduces the notion of phantasía logistikē as one of the principles of rational action. On the basis of some texts from De Anima and the Nicomachean Ethics, the paper seeks to interpret the place of that type of imagination in practical reasoning. To that e ect, it rst sets forth Aristotle’s doctrine regarding the principles of action and the issue of their articulation, and then goes on to discuss the role of rational imagination in (...) the con guration of the object of desire. (shrink)

In Germany, philosophy of sport is still a young discipline which developed in the 20th century as a result of the growing significance of sport in society. Whereas the academic discussion in Germany which took place in the founding phase of the discipline in the early 1970s had much in common with that conducted in the Anglo-American academic community thanks to such integrative figures as Hans Lenk and Gunter Gebauer, who hosted the international conferences held in Germany by the Philosophic (...) Society for the Study of Sport (PSSS)1 in the early 1980s and the 1990s, the transnational dialogue abated almost completely in the following years.2 As a consequence, philosophy of sport in Germany underwent a development of its own and acquired its own profile. The specific characteristics of German philosophy of sport are not rooted so much in any cultural particularities of sport practice, as is the case for bicycling in the Netherlands or hunting and cricket in England, for example, but rather in regional philosophical traditions established by such philosophers as Wittgenstein, Plessner, Nietzsche, Kant and Hegel.3 In order to give the reader an overview of the historical development and current status of research in philosophy of sport in Germany, relevant exemplary publications will be presented in the following and treated firstly in terms of their genesis, secondly in the context of current trends and tendencies, thirdly from the perspective of differences and commonalities between the German and the Anglo-American academic discussion, and fourthly concerning status and degree of institutionalization. Lastly an outlook on future developments will be given. (shrink)