Featuring nine new articles chosen by coeditor Steven M. Cahn, the third edition of E. D. Klemke's The Meaning of Life offers twenty-two insightful selections that explore this fascinating topic. The essays are primarily by philosophers but also include materials from literary figures and religious thinkers. As in previous editions, the readings are organized around three themes. In Part I the articles defend the view that without faith in God, life has no meaning or purpose. In Part II the selections (...) oppose this claim, defending instead a nontheistic, humanistic alternative--that life can have meaning even in the absence of theistic commitment. In Part III the contributors ask whether the question of the meaning of life is itself meaningful. The third edition adds substantial essays by Moritz Schlick, Joel Feinberg, and John Kekes as well as selections from the writings of Louis P. Pojman, Emil L. Fackenheim, Robert Nozick, Susan Wolf, and Steven M. Cahn. The only anthology of its kind, The Meaning of Life: A Reader, Third Edition, is ideal for courses in introduction to philosophy, human nature, and the meaning of life. It also offers general readers an accessible and stimulating introduction to the subject. (shrink)

Many writers in various fields--philosophy, religion, literature, and psychology--believe that the question of the meaning of life is one of the most significant problems that an individual faces. In The Meaning of Life, Second Edition, E.D. Klemke collects some of the best writings on this topic, primarily works by philosophers but also selections from literary figures and religious thinkers. The twenty-seven cogent, readable essays are organized around three different perspectives on the meaning of life. In Part I, the readings assert (...) and defend the theistic view that without the existence of God--or faith in God--life has no significance or purpose. In Part II the selections deny this thesis, defending instead the humanistic alternative--that life has or can have meaning and worth without any theistic beliefs or commitment. In the final group of readings, contributors ask if the question of the meaning of life is in itself legitimate and significant. The volume also includes an introduction by the editor and a selected bibliography. This new edition adds essays by A. J. Ayer, Hazel Barnes, William Lane Craig, Owen Flanagan, Antony Flew, Thomas Nagel, Kai Nielsen, Philip L. Quinn, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Walter T. Stace. The only anthology of its kind, The Meaning of Life, Second Edition, is ideal for courses in introduction to philosophy and human nature. It also provides an accessible and stimulating introduction to the subject for general readers. (shrink)

Ineffability, method, and ontology, by G. Bergmann.--The glory and the misery of Ludwig Wittgenstein, by G. Bergmann.--Stenius on the Tractatus, by G. Bergmann.--Naming and saying, by W. Sellars.--The ontology of Wittgenstein's Tractatus, by E. D. Klemke.--Material properties in the Tractatus, by H. Hochberg.--Wittgenstein's pantheism: a new light on the ontology of the Tractatus, by N. Garver.--Science and metaphysics: a Wittgensteinian interpretation, by H. Petrie.--Wittgenstein on private languages, by C. L. Hardin.--Wittgenstein on private language, by N. Garver.--Wittgenstein and private languages, by (...) W. Todd.--The private-language argument, by H.-N. Castañeda.--Wittgenstein on privacy, by J. W. Cook.--"Forms of life" in Wittgenstein's Philosophical investigations, by J. F. M. Hunter.--Privacy and language, by M. S. Gram.--On language games and forms of life, by F. Zabeeh.--Wittgenstein on meaning and use, by J. F. M. Hunter.--Wittgenstein on phenomenalism, skepticism, and criteria, by A. Oldenquist.--Tractarian reflections on saying and showing, by D. W. Stampe.--Wittgenstein and logical necessity, by B. Stroud.--Negation and generality, by H. Hochberg.--Facts, possibilities, and essences in the Tractatus, by H. Hochberg.--Arithmetic and propositional form in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, by H. Hochberg.--Selected bibliography (p. 543-546). (shrink)

In his Morality and Religion , W. W. Bartley III states that ‘the chief aim of this study is to get clearer about the extent to which morality and religion may be interdependent’ . After stating various possible alternatives, in terms of the logical relationships of derivability and compatibility, which are relevant to this issue, Prof. Bartley in fact devotes his book to a consid eration of four views: Morality is reducible to religion. Religion is reducible to morality. Morality and (...) religion are in conflict . Morality and religion are inseparable. (shrink)

A phenomenalist philosophy which employs the Principle of Acquaintance (PA) plus the Principle that what exists are the referents of certain meaningful terms, defined by PA, cannot include either universals or particulars in its ontology, but is limited to instances of universals as constituting the range of ontological existents. Universals must be omitted since they are repeatable and, hence, never wholly presented or contained, whereas the objects of direct acquaintance are wholly and exhaustively presented. Furthermore, no entities beyond characters (qualities (...) and relations) are given in direct acquaintance; hence, particulars, too, must be omitted for the phenomenalist who relies on PA. (shrink)

In Reason and Analysis, Prof. Brand Blanshard criticises the logical empiricist view regarding necessary statements, including the laws of logic. He distinguishes four component these of this view: (I) Necessary statements--here, the laws of logic--are resolutions or reports of linguistic usage. (II) They are conventions. (III) They are analytic (tautologies). (IV) They say nothing about the world. In this paper I first show that Prof. Blanshard is essentially right in his criticisms of (I), (II), and (IV); but that he has (...) done nothing to show that (III) is incorrect with regard to the laws of logic. Then, second, I attempt to show that even though (I), (II), and (more importantly) (IV) are false, (III) is true. That is, the laws of logic are tautologies, and yet, in a sense to be distinguished, they say something about the world. (shrink)