Both Nietzsche and La Rochefoucauld rejected metaphysical principles, such as the Kantian moral imperatives, and adopted psychology as their first philosophy. In this article I explore their views of self-love and of the will to power as the first principles of human motivation. Although both thinkers reduce actions to egoistic motives, they define the human drives and passions differently. While Nietzsche criticizes La Rochefoucauld’s view of a self-love-oriented intention as the principal cause of deeds, his interpretation is reductionist (...) seeing that La Rochefoucauld also gives a quasi-expressivist account of deeds based on multiple drives. Unlike La Rochefoucauld, Nietzsche claims that there is no preexisting intention before or behind deeds, but rather that the doer expresses herself in and through her deeds. He laments that La Rochefoucauld’s concept of self-love is overshadowed by Christianity and criticizes him for condemning secular virtues as postlapsarian vices in disguise. Egoism, for Nietzsche, is a drive that is ingrained in the psyche for self-elevation. By comparing and contrasting their views, I conclude that self-love for La Rochefoucauld is pure self-affirmation at the expense of other drives or other agents, while Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power is a master-drive’s organization of other drives in service of the grander project of the self, which at the same time allows the subordinate drives to express themselves and fulfill the functions proper to their own nature. This interpretation sheds light on the key concept of egoism and the will to power in Nietzsche’s moral psychology, as well as on the first principles of human action in Nietzsche and La Rochefoucauld. (shrink)

Introduction Over a hundred years separate the date of the birth of François VI, duc de La Rochefoucauld, from that of Luc de Clapiers, ...

Le but de cet article est de discuter la place de la littérature non narrative (plus particulièrement « moraliste », avec l’exemple des Maximes de La Rochefoucauld) dans la philosophie de la littérature actuelle. On remarquera d’abord l’importance prise par le roman dans les analyses actuelles, et les difficultés dès lors de penser la valeur cognitive spécifique du genre de la maxime. Or la maxime, tout comme une histoire, sait préserver la complexité des faits humains, et la communiquer au (...) lecteur. Nous verrons en ce sens l’exemple d’une lectrice assidue de La Rochefoucauld et ses usages du texte : la reine Christine de Suède. Nous nous demanderons pour finir s’il est possible de proposer une « philosophie de la littérature » avec un texte aussi inclassable, « philosophico-littéraire », qu’est le texte du moraliste français. (shrink)

Pour qui s'intéresse aux formes les plus subtiles de la pensée morale en Europe, ceux que l'on nomme les " moralistes " brillent d'un éclat particulièrement vif. Le moraliste se présente souvent comme " un anatomiste du cœur " OU un spectateur de la vie, non comme l'architecte d'un système ou le porte-parole d'une doctrine générale. La présente enquête collective est tout entière guidée par le souci de s'interroger sur les significations proprement historiques et politiques émanant de l'œuvre des moralistes. (...) Et cela, depuis ce moment de crise politique et morale qui fut celui de La Rochefoucauld jusqu'à l'ère du soupçon de Nietzsche et de ses successeurs : ainsi, tout près de nous, Emil Cioran et Jacques Derrida. Entre ces deux pôles, des lieux essentiels de la pensée et de l'écriture morales sont revisités en ce livre : de La Bruyère à Marivaux, de Graciàn à Vauvenargues et à Chamfort, de Diderot à Joubert. (shrink)

This article argues that the reception of Augustinian ideas in Pascal and Nicole can be used to clarify what is distinctive in La Rochefoucauld’s treatment of self-relations. La Rochefoucauld does not share the Augustinian dichotomy between self-love at the price of forgetting God and love of God at the price of self-contempt that is prominent in both Pascal and Nicole. Rather, La Rochefoucauld develops a conception of an attitude towards the self that could be described as self-acceptance. (...) As he describes it, being open about one’s character faults falls short of self-esteem, if self-esteem is understood as involving a positive evaluation of one’s own character traits. However, it counterbalances these faults and can enhance the esteem in which we are held. And it offers a remedy for competing for social esteem which can be detrimental to our lives because the sincere person does not seek to be esteemed for qualities that are only pretended. At the same time, it overcomes an inflated self-image, thereby improving both social relations and the relation to the self. (shrink)

Drawing primarily on Relevance Theory, this essay explores mindreading strategies in the works of La Rochefoucauld and La Bruyère. The first part shows how La Bruyère exploits such strategies in bridging the gap between author and reader and in building his character portraits through observation of bodily behaviour. It also shows how he stages mindreading between characters. The second part analyses the procedural expressions ‘souvent’ and ‘ne que’ as linguistic clues to mental processes, more specifically as a device for (...) bypassing readers' epistemic vigilance mechanisms. Rather than providing evidence for exceptions to the ruling principle of self-interest, such expressions block readers' attempts to draw such conclusions, thereby rendering their cognitive environment more uncertain. Endemic in La Rochefoucauld's Maximes, they prepare the ground for and help to construct the pessimistic world-view and wit that characterize the work as a whole. (shrink)

Adam Smith is one of the main writers of the Scottish Enlightenment better known for his economic system than for his philosophical thought. Recent literature about this author has insisted upon the importance of studying his two main works, WN and TMS, as a whole. In this way, central issues of modern thought such as: social harmony, the role of passions and the need for ethics might be better understood. Influences from La Rochefoucauld and B. Mandeville can be found (...) in Smith which connect with the Jansenist thought of the XVII century. With these considerations, it is shown that some writers of the Enlightenment were not as optimistic as it had been thought, Adam Smith being one of them. (shrink)

This article argues that the reception of Augustinian ideas in Pascal and Nicole can be used to clarify what is distinctive in La Rochefoucauld’s treatment of self-relations. La Rochefoucauld does not share the Augustinian dichotomy between self-love at the price of forgetting God and love of God at the price of self-contempt that is prominent in both Pascal and Nicole. Rather, La Rochefoucauld develops a conception of an attitude towards the self that could be described as self-acceptance. (...) As he describes it, being open about one’s character faults falls short of self-esteem, if self-esteem is understood as involving a positive evaluation of one’s own character traits. However, it counterbalances these faults and can enhance the esteem in which we are held. And it offers a remedy for competing for social esteem which can be detrimental to our lives because the sincere person does not seek to be esteemed for qualities that are only pretended. At the same time, it overcomes an inflated self-image, thereby improving both social relations and the relation to the self. (shrink)

Neste artigo analisa‑se a Máxima de La Rochefoucauld “l’esprit est toujours la dupe du coeur”. O esclarecimento da noção de coração passa por uma análise dos mecanismos do inconsciente, pela investigação do que se entende por corpo e da sua relação com o conceito de coração. Estuda‑se a oposição entre espírito e coração, como formas de “legislação” contrárias entre si, e como se produz o seu apaziguamento.

Cet article explore plusieurs moutures de la philosophie historique de Nietzsche, depuis ses réflexions d’adolescent, où les réflexions génétiques sont encore inscrites dans une méditation d’ordre éthico-théologique, à la généalogie proprement dite, où l’étude de la provenance des valeurs prétend congédier toutes les autres formes d’histoire de la morale, que ce soit la microhistoire psychologique des moralistes français (La Rochefoucauld), l’histoire conjecturale des utilitaristes (Mandeville) ou l’histoire évolutionniste qui déduit la morale de l’adaptation (Spencer). Ainsi, en vertu de l’activité (...) d’autodépassement perpétuel et d’antagonisme incessant qui caractérise la volonté de puissance, Nietzsche s’emploie à faire la critique des autres formes de philosophies de l’histoire pour imposer sa « morphologie de la volonté de puissance », et il s’efforce en outre, tout au long de son propre itinéraire intellectuel, de lutter aussi contre lui-même, dans la mesure où les alliances qu’il avait contractées auparavant le retenaient d’être pleinement original. (shrink)

LA ROCHEFOUCAULD ONE of the most gifted of the young officers who gave their lives for France at the beginning of the war, Quartermaster Paul Lintier, in the admirable notes which he wrote on his knee at intervals during the battle ...

Non pas Pourquoi la fiction?, ni A quoi pense la fiction?, ni même Que fait la fiction?, mais : Comment fait la fiction? Comment la fiction fait-elle pour défendre ou illustrer une morale, alors qu'elle se définit par son indépendance à l'égard du monde dit réel? Peut-être, d'ailleurs, n'est-ce qu'en tant qu'elle est défictionnalisée que la fiction peut promouvoir ou publier une morale. Mais il est, pourtant, des morales qui contiennent une part constitutive de fiction, et qui, en quelque sorte, (...) appellent la fiction : ainsi de la morale intuitive de Victor Hugo, ou de la morale de la liberté de Sartre. La Fontaine, La Rochefoucauld, Vauvenargues, Hugo, Tolstoï, Sartre : à première vue, les auteurs convoqués ne sont pas tous faits pour s'entendre. C'est bien pour cela qu'ils sont ici réunis. Car la fiction et la morale ne sont pas plus immuables l'une que l'autre, et c'est dans leurs intermittences, dans leurs fluctuations, dans leurs variations qu'il convient d'étudier leurs noces improbables. (shrink)

Resumen: Este trabajo investiga las traducciones realizadas por Aphra Behn a partir de la clasificación tripartita que estableció John Dryden entre metáfrasis, paráfrasis e imitación. Behn cultiva la metáfrasis principalmente en sus traducciones de La Rochefoucauld, la paráfrasis en las versiones de Cowley o Tallemant, entre otros; mientras que aplica la imitación a las Fábulas de Esopo. Se constata que Behn rompe con la tradición de traducir principalmente a los autores clásicos, ensanchando los cauces de entrada de literatura moderna (...) en Inglaterra y ampliando las posibilidades de la traducción literaria. Analizando unas muestras, se infiere la manipulación del texto original que la autora realiza en ocasiones, en consonancia con su ideario creativo, generando un texto meta provisto de nuevas resonancias de género y políticas contextualizadas en su época. Asimismo, se deduce que la escritora profesional de la Restauración cultiva la traducción movida, entre otros motivos, por los gustos del naciente mercado literario en cuanto a las novedades del país galo y, por tanto, motivada por un afán comercial.: This paper examines the translations by Aphra Behn based on the tripartite classification that John Dryden established between metaphrase, paraphrase and imitation. Behn employs mainly metaphrase in her translations of La Rochefoucault; paraphrase in her versions of Cowley and Tallemant, among others; while applying the imitation to Aesop's Fables. It is found that Behn breaks with the tradition of translating principally classical authors, broadening channels for the entrance of modern literature into England and expanding the possibilities of literary translation. Analyzing the samples, the author's occasional manipulation of the original text is identified, consonant with her creative ideas and generating a metatext featuring new political and gender resonances contextualized in her era. It is also concluded that the professional writer of the Restoration employs translation spurred by the tastes of the burgeoning literary market, among other factors, shaped by recent developments in France and, as such, motivated by commercial interests. (shrink)

Jon Elster has written a comprehensive, wide-ranging book on the emotions in which he considers the full range of theoretical approaches. Drawing on history, literature, philosophy and psychology, Elster presents a complete account of the role of the emotions in human behaviour. While acknowledging the importance of neurophysiology and laboratory experiment for the study of emotions, Elster argues that the serious student of the emotions can learn more from the great thinkers and writers of the past, from Aristotle to Jane (...) Austen. He attaches particular importance to the work of the French moralists, notably La Rochefoucauld, who demonstrated the way esteem and self-esteem shape human motivation. The book also maintains a running dialogue with economists and rational-choice theorists. Combining methodological and theoretical arguments with empirical case-studies and written with Elster's customary verve and economy, this book has great cross-disciplinary appeal. (shrink)

This article studies Madame de Lambert's early eighteenth-century views on aging, and especially the aging of women, by contextualizing them in a twofold way: It understands them as a response to La Rochefoucauld's skepticism concerning aging, women, and the aging of women; It understands them as being closely connected to a long series of scattered remarks concerning esteem, self-esteem, and honnêteté in Lambert's moral essays. Whereas La Rochefoucauld describes aging as a decline of intellectual, emotional, and physical powers (...) and is suspicious of the mechanisms of esteem and self-esteem, Lambert develops a view of aging as offering the chance to become more independent of the judgment of others, especially the chance for women to become more independent of the judgment of men. As she argues, aging offers women the possibility of cultivating genuinely estimable intellectual and emotional qualities that attract the justified esteem essential for a stable friendship, as well as the opportunity to develop a form of self-esteem that is based on respect for one's own capacities of judgment. (shrink)

Dialogues - Fragments - Critique de quelques maximes du Duc de La Rochefoucauld - Correspondence.

Friedrich Nietzsche is one of the most elusive thinkers in the philosophical tradition. His highly unusual style and insistence on what remains hidden or unsaid in his writing make pinning him to a particular position tricky. Nonetheless, certain readings of his work have become standard and influential. In this major new interpretation of Nietzsche’s work, Robert B. Pippin challenges various traditional views of Nietzsche, taking him at his word when he says that his writing can best be understood as a (...) kind of psychology. Pippin traces this idea of Nietzsche as a psychologist to his admiration for the French moralists: La Rochefoucauld, Pascal, Stendhal, and especially Montaigne. In distinction from philosophers, Pippin shows, these writers avoided grand metaphysical theories in favor of reflections on life as lived and experienced. Aligning himself with this project, Nietzsche sought to make psychology “the queen of the sciences” and the “path to the fundamental problems.” Pippin contends that Nietzsche’s singular prose was an essential part of this goal, and so he organizes the book around four of Nietzsche’s most important images and metaphors: that truth could be a woman, that a science could be gay, that God could have died, and that an agent is as much one with his act as lightning is with its flash. Expanded from a series of lectures Pippin delivered at the Collège de France, _Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy_ offers a brilliant, novel, and accessible reading of this seminal thinker. (shrink)

ABSTRACTContemporary accounts of knowing one’s own mental states can be instructively supplemented by early modern accounts that understand self-knowledge as an important factor for flourishing human life. This article argues that in the early modern French moralists, one finds diverging conceptions of how knowing one’s own personal qualities could constitute a kind of human excellence: François de la Rochefoucauld argues that the value of knowing one’s own character faults could contribute to an attitude of self-acceptance that liberates one from (...) the effort of deceiving oneself and others. Madeleine de Scudéry argues that knowing one’s own character faults could be an incentive for self-cultivation that leads to the development of character traits that are naturally good. Anne-Thérèse de Lambert concurs with Scudéry’s insight and develops it further. According to Lambert, self-knowledge is crucial for developing character traits that give rise to the natural right of bei... (shrink)

Jon Elster has written a comprehensive, wide-ranging book on the emotions in which he considers the full range of theoretical approaches. Drawing on history, literature, philosophy and psychology, Elster presents a complete account of the role of the emotions in human behaviour. While acknowledging the importance of neurophysiology and laboratory experiment for the study of emotions, Elster argues that the serious student of the emotions can learn more from the great thinkers and writers of the past, from Aristotle to Jane (...) Austen. He attaches particular importance to the work of the French moralists, notably La Rochefoucauld, who demonstrated the way esteem and self-esteem shape human motivation. The book also maintains a running dialogue with economists and rational-choice theorists. Combining methodological and theoretical arguments with empirical case-studies and written with Elster's customary verve and economy, this book has great cross-disciplinary appeal. (shrink)

Adam Smith's lectures present a bleak theory of history in which the innate human results in the perpetuation of increasingly repressive slave societies. This theory challenges common conceptions about the philosophical and historical foundations of Smith's thought, and accounting for it requires moving beyond traditional dichotomies between an sphere grounded on asocial wants and a sphere grounded on sociability. For Smith, under the influence of earlier thinkers like La Rochefoucauld, Mandeville, and Rousseau, all human behavior is rooted in our (...) esteem-seeking social nature, and the dominant form of esteem-seeking is a one based on external superiority. Understanding these foundations explains why Smith views both European commercial society and its central motive of economic self-interest as historically contingent, the product of a long series of unintended historical consequences. (shrink)

One of the major debates of early modern philosophy concerned what David Hume called “the selfish hypothesis.” According to this view, all human conduct is motivated by self-love. Influential versions can be found in the writings of Hobbes, Mandeville, the Jansenists, and La Rochefoucauld. Important critics of this view included Butler, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Rousseau, Hume, and Smith. My essay argues that we should add Kant to this list of critics. I propose that Kant knew about this important debate and (...) responded to it. More specifically, I propose that he responded at two different levels. At one level, Kant sided with the critics, arguing for the reality of genuine fellow feeling. At another level, he concluded that everyone was arguing about the wrong thing. All the critics of the selfish hypothesis seek to vindicate common morality, but Kant thought this required establishing the possibility of human freedom. He believed that instead of arguing about whether we are capable of responding in a genuinely compassionate or sympathetic way to other people, we should be arguing about whether we are capable of responding in a nonmechanical way to the demands of morality. Looking at Kant’s practical philosophy from this underexplored perspective sheds new light on his doctrines of respect and moral worth. It renders both more interesting and intelligible, and it illuminates the direct connection between these doctrines and the fundamental concerns of his entire critical project. (shrink)

Etrange personnage que Pierre Nicole. La postérité l'a rangé parmi les deuxièmes rôles de Port-Royal, une sorte de permanent du parti janséniste. Il a secondé le grand Arnauld, instruit Racine dans les Petites Ecoles, aidé Pascal et traduit en latin ses Provinciales. Fidèle entre les fidèles, et en même temps mal à l'aise dans cette atmosphère de fronde et de résistance que représente le milieu de Port-Royal, au sein de la France du XVII e siècle, ce latiniste timoré ne songeait (...) qu'aux Moyens de conserver la paix avec les hommes - titre de l'un de ses essais les plus célèbres. Dès que les tensions semblent s'apaiser, pendant la trêve appelée "la Paix de l'Eglise", Nicole peut enfin laisser libre cours à sa vocation de moraliste et de psychologue. Il publie, volume après volume ses Essais de morale : le succès sera tel que le libraire, après la mort de Pierre Nicole, s'ingéniera à en augmenter la série jusqu'à atteindre vingt-cinq volumes. Depuis la fin du XVIII e siècle, ce classique de la littérature morale était devenu pour ainsi dire inaccessible. On en publie parfois quelques pages choisies, défigurées par les coupures et les corrections. Il est proposé ici au lecteur moderne de redécouvrir dix essais de Nicole, donnés dans leur intégralité. Certains nous replongent dans les principes moraux d'un autre âge (et tirent de cet exotisme une part de leur valeur). D'autres présentent les qualités de finesse, le piquant, le goût du paradoxe qui ont longtemps fait juger Nicole comme un des grands représentants, à côté de Pascal et de La Rochefoucauld, de la littérature morale classique. L'oeuvre morale de Nicole s'avère ainsi demeurer passionnante pour un lecteur moderne, au moins à trois égards : 1/ ses considérations sur l'amour-propre, qui constituent les premiers jalons d'un utilitarisme économique ; 2/ ses réflexions sur la sociabilité et une approche originale de la civilité ; 3/ ses observations pédagogiques, émanant d'un des principaux maîtres des Petites Ecoles de Port-Royal. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 27.1 (2003) 134-150 [Access article in PDF] Deception and Intentional Transparency:The Case of Writing Jeff Karon Intention never to deceive lays us open to many a deception. —La Rochefoucauld, MaximsWE LIVE IN DECEPTIVE TIMES. We anticipate the latest exposé of corporate greed, personal aggrandizement, or government cover-up, and yearn for yesterday's supposed truthfulness and integrity. Lies and other forms of deceptive behavior degrade our characters, (...) unravel the fabric of civil society, and threaten our progress toward the good life.We also fear the loss of public civility and etiquette, wishing instead that others still treated us with the respect we deserve. Deception is bad enough; now we must bear rude neighbors, supervisors, colleagues, merchants, and all manner of strangers. Yet deception and rudeness together generate a paradox: the lost standards we lament—ones that direct people to treat others as valuable ends rather than means—include specific forms of conduct that avoid inflicting unnecessary pain or creating unnecessary conflict. Whether in the personal or professional sphere, the written and unwritten rules of etiquette often bid us to employ euphemisms and other misdirections so that our listeners or readers will not be offended, thus maintaining the social fabric by means of benign deceit. How, then, can we possibly hope to live ethical lives without necessarily employing deception?The answer is that we cannot. By expanding the category of acts usually analyzed in ethics to include the extended writing act, we can appreciate how deception is wound tightly into the moral life, a result that is not widely accepted in moral philosophy. Sissela Bok's seminal [End Page 134] books Secrets and Lying, for example, advocate deception in extraordinary circumstances of personal or national security, but do not allow for its constant deployment to navigate life's daily vicissitudes. 1 The complex, everyday act of writing helps us see past this simplification.Recent books by David Nyberg, Jeremy Campbell, John Vignauz Smyth, Dariusz Galasinski, and Charles V. Ford attest to our fascination with social deception, providing philosophical, literary, linguistic, and psychological insights into real-life examples. 2 As instances pile up, we begin to appreciate how deception is woven closely into our lives. This point receives a brash formulation in Arnold Ludwig's 1965 The Importance of Lying: "[W]hen we find the lie, hypocrisy and deception used so widely by man, we are forced to wonder whether this behavior represents some moral failure or weakness or whether, in fact it plays some more important biological or survival role for man. Perhaps, without resorting to lying or self-deception, man would find life intolerable and existence impossible." 3 More recent authors have tried to rehabilitate deception by choosing familiar cases that seem benign in both intention and effect, thus avoiding a justification built solely on survival needs. The next step, however, should move us beyond the empirical question of just how common deception is to a different one: are there widely shared features that make these cases candidates for moral approval, even if subsequent events require that we ultimately withhold that approval? Writing, by its very nature, demonstrates that moral reasoning always must take account of deception by triangulating between an author's supposed intentions, supposed character, and the eventual reception in the world by a real audience. And as writing pervades our lives, so do the possibilities for justified deception. I Those who study deception rarely agree on any universal characteristic except one: lying, a particularly direct form of deception, always is intentional. A corresponding minimal assumption for writing would be the following: Writing, in the absence of some very peculiar story-telling, is intentional. This minimal assumption ought to be admitted, though one fashionable current in literary studies runs against it. Language works by itself, "deconstructs itself," for example, without the direct intervention of an agent. Language "speaks us," and so on, in lyrical, mystifying formulations that offer inspiration for the critic as an [End Page 135] explorer of a far, exotic land, but little solid geography for those who wonder at what point in the... (shrink)

" Ce qu'il y a de plus beau, de plus désirable sans doute au monde, c'est l'impossible, l'invraisemblable dans la mesure où on les réalise, où on les vit. " Les Eléments pour une éthique, comme chaque livre de Marcel Jouhandeau, ne sont pas ce qu'ils paraissent. On s'attend à recevoir une leçon de morale, et c'est une leçon de style qui nous est ici donnée. A soixante-sept ans, lorsqu'il publie ce texte (1955), Marcel Jouhandeau ne s'est pas résigné à (...) une sagesse de circonstance. Vivre, nous dit-il, nous sermonne-t-il plutôt, tel un prêtre hérétique, implique des règles esthétiques autant que des principes éthiques. Car mener une vie droite, c'est avant tout rester en quête du moment sublime, jouir de la " surprise d'exister ", c'est s'offrir un relais à l'Eternel. Dans une langue moins épurée que Bossuet ou La Rochefoucauld, Jouhandeau nous offre ici un bréviaire pour l'impossible. (shrink)

Excerpt from Helvetius: Sa Vie Et Son uvre, d'Apres Ses Ouvrages, des Ecrits Divers Et des Documents Inedits Je dois d'abord quelques explications sur cet ouvrage, sur la methode employee, le but poursuivi. Psychologue, moraliste, poete epicurien, ideologue, economiste, Helvetius, avec ses tendances encyclopediques, peut etre considere a des titres divers. Mais on s'apercoit bientot que ce disciple de Locke et de Hobbes, ce continuateur systematique de La Rochefoucauld, ce contemporain de Voltaire, de Buffon et de Montesquieu, dont il (...) est l'ami, se presente surtout comme un philosophe politique. Sa philosophie, c'est-a-dire sa pensee, sous ses aspects varies, s'oriente de plus en plus vers un but defini, vers un but pratique et social. Je me suis efforce d'avoir recours a tous les documents importants (et ils sont nombreux) qui pouvaient servir a ma tache d'historien, pour reconstituer, en cette tentative de biographie psychologique, la vie intellectuelle d'un auteur mal connu et meconnu. J'ai multiplie, pendant quelques annees, les recherches et les efforts afin de me renseigner d'une maniere aussi precise, aussi scrupuleuse que possible, mais en n'oubliant jamais que l'erudition, la recherche complexe des causes et des effets demeurent steriles si l'on n'y joint sans cesse les ressources de la sympathie et de l'evocation. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.". (shrink)

This book analyses the use of the crucial concept of 'taste' in the works of five major seventeenth-century French authors, Méré, Saint Evremond, La Rochefoucauld, La Bruyère and Boileau. It combines close readings of important texts with a thoroughgoing political analysis of seventeenth-century French society in terms of class and gender. Dr Moriarty shows that far from being timeless and universal, the term 'taste' is culture-specific, shifting according to the needs of a writer and his social group. The notion (...) of 'taste' not only helped to shape a new dominant culture, but also registered the conflicts within that culture between a view of taste that presupposted the values of 'polite society' as an exclusive (though not necessarily aristocratic) group, and a view that stressed the value of the classical-humanist tradition as a source of standards ratified by a broader public. this study sheds light not only on the central concept, but also on the individual authors discussed and on the norms of French classical literature in general. (shrink)

André Comte-Sponville livre ici vingt-six études d’histoire de la philosophie, portant principalement sur les traditions tragique et matérialiste, depuis l’Ecclésiaste jusqu’à Marcel Conche, en passant par Montaigne, Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, Spinoza, La Mettrie, Jean-Marie Guyau, Nietzsche et Alain. La préface propose une longue analyse de la notion de tragique. L’auteur y prend au sérieux ce que la littérature et la vie nous apprennent : que le tragique a à voir avec le malheur, mais réel plutôt que possible (par différence (...) avec le «suspense») et nécessaire plutôt que contingent (par différence avec le drame). Loin d’être l’affirmation joyeuse de tout, comme le voulait Nietzsche, le tragique est plutôt la prise en compte inconsolée de ce qu’il y a de catastrophique dans la condition humaine : la mort, la solitude, l’insatisfaction – trois formes de la finitude, qui ne sont tragiques que par la conscience, en l’homme, d’un infini au moins pensable. La conclusion, elle aussi fort développée, montre que le matérialisme, s’il est rigoureux, se doit d’être une pensée tragique, c’est-à-dire aporétique, déceptive, inconsolée. Et qu’une sagesse qui se sait insuffisante et insatisfaite (une sagesse tragique) vaut mieux, de ce point de vue, que la suffisance d’une sagesse prétendument satisfaite. Cela amène à prendre quelque distance avec Epicure, Spinoza, Nietzsche et Marx. Et à se trouver plus proche de Lucrèce, de Montaigne ou du dernier Althusser. (shrink)

From the late sixteenth to the late seventeenth centuries, French writing is especially concerned with analysing human nature. The ancient ethical vision of man's nature and goal survives, even, to some extent, in Descartes. But it is put into question especially by the revival of St Augustine's thought, which focuses on the contradictions and disorders of human desires and aspirations. Analyses of behaviour display a powerful suspicion of appearances. Human beings are increasingly seen as motivated by self-love: they are driven (...) by the desire for their own advantage, and take a narcissistic delight in their own image. Moral and religious writers re-emphasize the traditional imperative of self-knowledge, but in such a way as to suggest the difficulties of knowing oneself. Operating with the Cartesian distinction between mind and body, they emphasize the imperceptible influence of bodily processes on our thought and attitudes. They analyse human beings' ignorance of their own motives and qualities, and the illusions under which they live their lives. Their critique of human behaviour is no less searching than that of writers who have broken with traditional religious morality, such as Hobbes and Spinoza. A wide range of authors is studied, some well-known, others much less so: the abstract and general analyses of philosophers and theologians are juxtaposed with the less systematic and more concrete investigations of writers like Montaigne and La Rochefoucauld, not to mention the theatre of Corneille, Molière, and Racine. (shrink)

Drawing on his past work as an interpreter of Adam Smith, Hanley offers an account of Fénelon’s social and political thought that emphasizes the role of pride and self-love in human affairs. Fénelon does not join those, like Mandeville and La Rochefoucauld, who seek to understand and possibly to control self-love. Instead, he attempts to wed a far more rigorous and classical approach to the problem of pride—namely, the refinement of self-love through virtuous practices—to a modern view of the (...) state and political economy. (shrink)

Friedrich Nietzsche is one of the most elusive thinkers in the philosophical tradition. His highly unusual style and insistence on what remains hidden or unsaid in his writing make pinning him to a particular position tricky. Nonetheless, certain readings of his work have become standard and influential. In this major new interpretation of Nietzsche’s work, Robert B. Pippin challenges various traditional views of Nietzsche, taking him at his word when he says that his writing can best be understood as a (...) kind of psychology.Pippin traces this idea of Nietzsche as a psychologist to his admiration for the French moralists: La Rochefoucauld, Pascal, Stendhal, and especially Montaigne. In distinction from philosophers, Pippin shows, these writers avoided grand metaphysical theories in favor of reflections on life as lived and experienced. Aligning himself with this project, Nietzsche sought to make psychology “the queen of the sciences” and the “path to the fundamental problems.” Pippin contends that Nietzsche’s singular prose was an essential part of this goal, and so he organizes the book around four of Nietzsche’s most important images and metaphors: that truth could be a woman, that a science could be gay, that God could have died, and that an agent is as much one with his act as lightning is with its flash.Expanded from a series of lectures Pippin delivered at the Collège de France, Nietzsche, Psychology, and First Philosophy offers a brilliant, novel, and accessible reading of this seminal thinker. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Fallen Nature, Fallen Selves: Early Modern French Thought IIDavid Cunning and Seth JonesMichael Moriarty. Fallen Nature, Fallen Selves: Early Modern French Thought II. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Pp. xviii + 430. Cloth, $125.00.This book is the second of two volumes on a myriad of issues surrounding the early modern distinction between the embodied self and the immaterial self that is one of its components. One of (...) the theses of the book is that, although canonical philosophers like Descartes and Malebranche hold that it is in some sense the latter that is our true self, and although they expend a significant amount of their corpus trying to help us to touch base with it, they also offer well-developed and insightful views about our embodiment and about what we are to do as embodied beings. Another thesis of the book is that, even if early modern philosophers tend to think that we have unimpeded and transparent access to our psychological states after we have done enough reflection to keep our embodiment from restricting the view, a concomitant position in the period is that we otherwise have very little self-knowledge. A related thesis is that important elements of the psychoanalytic tradition of Freud and Lacan can be traced back to philosophers like Descartes and Malebranche and to the investigations that they inspire in their contemporaries and successors. The book is ambitious and is an extremely interesting and important contribution.Descartes holds that as a result of the bad habits of childhood we come to misrepresent external bodies as having qualities like color, smell, taste, and sound. Building on the work of volume one, Moriarty (5, 335–36, 372–73, 243–44) reminds us that Descartes also holds that we come to misrepresent our minds as in part tangible and corporeal (the Second Meditation, Second Replies) and that the Cartesian project of clarifying ideas is not restricted to the ideas of natural science. Indeed, Moriarty could also cite Descartes’s remark that there are circumstances in which we might report that we are thinking of our selves when in fact we are only thinking of our bodies (Principles of Philosophy I:12). Descartes seems to allow that if we are not sufficiently reflective and observant, our thinking is not transparent to us, and if so he is leaving open the view that we can mischaracterize our own psychological states. Descartes does not speak explicitly to this kind of mischaracterization, but in later writings (especially Passions of the Soul and the letters to Princess Elizabeth) he does speak to the importance of clearly defining the passions and distinguishing them, and to the importance of knowing the relationships between brain traces and particular passions so that we can understand our motivations and get a better handle on them (315). Moriarty then brings to the table a number of figures who develop these positions. In Nicole, we find the view that, from the first-person perspective, it can be very difficult to distinguish acting from charity and acting from self-love, and that we have a considerable interest in identifying ourselves as acting from the former (219–24). In La Rochefoucauld, we find the view that friendship is often a matter of wanting to see a certain image of ourselves reflected in and confirmed by others and that true friendship is very rare (243). We might focus on figures like Nicole insofar as they engage the more traditional questions of metaphysics and epistemology, but issues of embodiment and self-knowledge were also front and center in the early modern period, and the contributions of Nicole, Lamy, La Rochefoucauld, and Senault (just to name just a few) are enormous.Another strength of the book is that it highlights the systematic nature of early modern work on self-knowledge. For example, Moriarty not only considers the empirical psychology of thinkers like Nicole and Lamy, but also shows how their results are grounded in fully articulated views of habit, language, and imagination (361–63, 371–74). Of course, these views are Cartesian as well.The book also has some potential problems. Some philosophers might worry that it is a stretch... (shrink)