Resumo: O pensamento de Walter Benjamin ocupa uma posição particular e, pode-se até dizer, especial na história do pensamento crítico moderno. Sua obra, fragmentada, inacabada, hermética, atual, anacrônica e complexa, possibilita um passeio sobre uma diversidade de temáticas que vão desde a literatura, passando pela sociologia, filosofia, arte, história, entre outras. O objetivo principal deste artigo consiste, assim, em estabelecer mais um olhar em direção a esse pensador. Trata-se, sobretudo, de compreender como as temáticas do fetichismo da mercadoria e da (...) fantasmagoria podem ser vistas em uma de suas principais obras semificcionais (“Infânc[1]ia Berlinense: 1900”). Foram selecionados, para fins deste trabalho, oito excertos. São eles: “O telefone” “Rua de Steglitz, esquina com a rua de Genthin”, “Mercado”, “Krumme Straβe”, “Um fantasma”, “O anãozinho corcunda”, “Blumeshof 12” e “Desgraças e Crimes”. Após a análise dos excertos, pôde-se observar que o conceito de fetichismo da mercadoria, cunhado por Marx no Capital e ampliado por Benjamin como um elemento de interpretação da realidade burguesa alemã da época de sua infância (fantasmagoria), pode ser visualizado na maioria dos excertos escritos pelo autor na obra “Infância Berlinense: 1900”. Palavras-chave: Fetichismo; Fantasmagoria; Infância Berlinense: 1900; Walter Benjamin. Fetishism and Phantasmagoria in the Work “Berliner Childhood: 1900”, by Walter Benjamin Abstract: Walter Benjamin's thought occupies a particular and, one might even say, special position in the history of modern critical thought. His work, fragmented, unfinished, hermetic, current, anachronistic and complex, allows a tour of a diversity of themes ranging from literature, through sociology, philosophy, art, history, among others. The main objective of this article is, therefore, to establish another look towards this thinker. It is, above all, to understand how the themes of commodity fetishism and phantasmagoria can be seen in one of his main semi-fictional works (“Berlin Childhood: 1900”). Eight excerpts were selected for the purposes of this work. They are: “The Telephone”, “Steglitz Street, Corner with Genthin Street”, “Market”, “Krumme Straβe”, “A Ghost”, “The Humpbacked Little Dwarf”, “Blumeshof 12” and “Misfortunes and Crimes”. After analyzing the excerpts, it was possible to observe that the concept of commodity fetishism, coined by Marx in Capital and expanded by Benjamin as an element of interpretation of the German bourgeois reality of his childhood (phantasmagoria), can be visualized in most excerpts written by the author in the work “Berlin Childhood: 1900”. Keywords: Fetishism; Fantasmagoria; Berlin Childhood: 1900; Walter Benjamin. Fetichismo y Fantasmagoría en la Obra “Infancia Berlinesa: 1900”, de Walter Benjamin Resumen: El pensamiento de Walter Benjamin ocupa un lugar particular y, hasta se podría decir, especial en la historia del pensamiento crítico moderno. Su obra, fragmentada, inconclusa, hermética, actual, anacrónica y compleja, permite un recorrido por una diversidad de temáticas que van desde la literatura, pasando por la sociología, la filosofía, el arte, la historia, entre otras. El objetivo principal de este artículo es, por tanto, establecer otra mirada hacia este pensador. Se trata, sobre todo, de entender cómo los temas del fetichismo de la mercancía y la fantasmagoría pueden verse en una de sus principales obras semificcionales ("Infancia berlinesa: 1900"). Se seleccionaron ocho extractos para los propósitos de este trabajo. Ellos son: "El teléfono", "Calle Steglitz, esquina con calle Genthin", "Mercado", "Krumme Straβe", "Un fantasma", "El enanito jorobado", "Blumeshof 12" y "Desgracias y crímenes". Tras el análisis de los extractos, fue posible observar que el concepto de fetichismo de la mercancía, acuñado por Marx en El Capital y ampliado por Benjamin como elemento de interpretación de la realidad burguesa alemana de su infancia (fantasmagoría), puede visualizarse en la mayoría de los extractos escritos del autor en la obra "Infancia berlinesa: 1900". Palabras clave: Fetichismo; Fantasmagoría; Infancia Berlinesa: 1900; Walter Benjamin. Data de registro: 04/03/2022 Data de aceite: 01/12/2022. (shrink)

In recent years, several formalisms for program construction have appeared. One such formalism is the type theory developed by Per Martin-L f. Well suited as a theory for program construction, it makes possible the expression of both specifications and programs within the same formalism. Furthermore, the proof rules can be used to derive a correct program from a specification as well as to verify that a given program has a certain property. This book contains a thorough introduction to type theory, (...) with information on polymorphic sets, subsets, monomorphic sets, and a full set of helpful examples. (shrink)

This book casts new light on the classic dispute between `compatibilists' and `incompatibilists' about determinism and moral responsibility. Martha Klein argues that the traditional account of the dispute, turning as it does on the notion of the agent's `ability to have acted otherwise',misrepresents the real disagreement, which arises from the compatibilists' conviction that it is sufficient for blameworthiness that an agent's wrongdoing was the result of a morally reprehensible frame of mind, and the incompatibilists' insistence that wrongdoers cannot be morally (...) responsible fortheir actions if they are not responsible for their motivating desires and beliefs. The incompatibilist position seems compelling when, for instance, we consider wrongdoers whose desires and attitudes can be traced to early emotional deprivation. The author argues that our response to these andother `problem cases' commits us to an incompatibilist condition for blameworthiness which is actually unfulfillable. In her view, however, some reflections on emotional deprivation should also encourage acceptance of a compatibilist condition which will satisfy our desire to be just more fully thanthe usual proposals emanating from either side of the debate. (shrink)

Originally published in 1990, this book centres on a certain way of surveying a variety of theories of language, and on outlining a new proposal of meaning within the framework set by the survey. One of the key features of both survey and proposal is the insistence on the need to locate theories of language within a large framework that includes questions about the nature of thought and about general ontological questions as well. The book deals in an interconnected (...) way with both very general and specific issues. At one end of this spectrum there are discussions of the contrast between realist and nominalist ontologies, while at the other are analyses of specific lexical items of English. (shrink)

J Harvey; Stereotypes and Group-claims: epistemological and moral issues, and their implications for multi-culturalism in education, Journal of Philosophy of Ed.

Biologists are remarkably visual people. Yet, the classics of logical empiricism never raised the general question of scientific illustration. Moreover, one suspects that the silence was, if anything, actively hostile. People did not talk about biological illustration, because they did not judge it to be part of “real science”. This enterprise produces statements or propositions, ideally embedded in a formal system. It may beaboutthe real world, but it is not in any senseofthe real world, in being a copy or mirror (...) image. Philosophers recognized that regretfully human weakness demanded the visual. But it was judged at best a prop. (See, for instance, Braithwaite 1953, Hempel 1965, and Bunge 1967; although see also Achinstein 1968. The best discussion of scientific illustration that I know is Rudwick 1976.). (shrink)

How are causes and laws related? Some attempt to analyze causal relations in terms of laws, others view causal explanation as quite distinct from explanation using laws. My analysis of the relations between causes and laws focuses on cases such as the simple pendulum law where asymmetries in causal relations between quantities are not reflected in the functional dependencies in the law equations. The asymmetry puzzle has elicited a variety of accounts which reflect quite different views on the relation between (...) causes and laws and their roles in scientific explanation. Finding none of the usual accounts satisfying, I offer an explication based on some distinctions in the analysis of the relevant causes that are not commonly heeded. I criticize the very notion of causal law and examine some implications of my account forceteris paribusproblems which arise in attempts to give realist interpretations of scientific theories. (shrink)

A recent set of experiments by Cairnset al.(1988) purport to show that some mutations in a strain ofE. colibacteria are directed in the sense that they are induced, somehow, in an environment that is suited for them. If this claim is true it would limit the validity of the neo-Darwinian assumption that evolution proceeds by “random variation and natural selection” which requires that there be no correlation between the genesis of a particular mutation and the fitness of the corresponding phenotype (...) in the environment in which the mutation occurs. Instead, it would argue for the occurrence of some “neo-Lamarckian” processes in evolution in the sense that the genesis of some mutations would have a positive correlation with the fitness of the resultant phenotype in that environment. Thus, one of the most fundamental tenets of the neo-Darwinian interpretation of evolution would be brought into question. (shrink)

In this book, John Dryzek criticizes the dominance of instrumental rationality and objectivism in political institutions and public policy and in the practice of political science. He argues that the reliance on these kinds of politics and to technocracies of expert cultures that are not only repressive, but surprisingly ill-equipped for dealing with complex social problems. Drawing on critical theory, he outlines an alternative program for the organization of political institutions advocating a form of communicatively rational democracy, which he terms (...) discursive democracy, that stresses the importance of active citizenship and public discourse. He draws out the limitations of instrumental rationality and investigates how policy analysis and political science may be reformed to help constitute and comprehend democracy. Discursive Democracy examines how the political process can be made more vital and meaningful. At the same time it shows how such an invigorated process will serve as a more effective agent for social problem solving. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 379 Hoedl) would warrant a less minimalistic interpretation of Thomas's prominence in the theological controversies of the 70s and 80s of the thirteenth century. This volume claims to examine Thomas's work and influence in light of the newest research. This is very true of Wielockx's article, but not every contribution equally justifies this claim. Still, this collection is a welcome addition to the ongoing investigation of Thomas's (...) thought. It is all the more regrettable, then, that the publishers have decided upon such an exhorbitant price, apparently resigning themselves to the belief that there is no market for the book outside libraries which have already ordered the series. The editors and contributors deserve a wider audience. Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften Munich RICHARD SCHENK, O.P. Edith Stein: Scholar, Feminist, Saint. By FREDA MARY 0BEN. New York: Alba House, 1988. Pp. 80. $5.95 (paper). Essays on Woman. By EDITH STEIN. Edited by Dr. L. Gelber and Romaeus Leuven, O.C.D. Translated by Freda Mary Oben. The Collected Works of Edith Stein, Teresa Benedicta of the Cross, Discalced Carmelite, 1891-1942, vol. 2. Washington, DC: ICS Publications, 1987. Pp. ix + 290. $7.95 (paper). Whether as an ample introduction for one unfamiliar with Edith Stein or as a further education for one who already appreciates her legacy, these two books will serve the reader well. The saintly philosopher and educator became a Carmelite nun and eventually a victim of the Holocaust; she was beatified in 1987. Doctor Freda Mary Oben is well qualified to interpret Stein's writings as she, like Edith Stein, is a convert from Judaism to Catholicism and a scholar as well. She began to study Edith Stein after her conversion but }lad to learn German to do it. Essays on Woman is a testimonial to Oben's nearly 30year enterprise. This work is a translation of Die Frau, Ihre Aufgabe nach Natur und Gnade, which contains Edith Stein's lectures and writings on woman, compiled and edited by Dr. L. Gelber and Romaeus Leuven, O.C.D., of the Archivum Carmelitanum Edith Stein in Brussels. These two works can be read in either order, as each supports and elucidates the other, but for an introduction, Edith Stein: Scholar, Feminist, Saint should be read first. Since Oben refers to Stein as Edith in this work, this reviewer will do the same. 380 BOOK REVIEWS The Edith Stein work consists of three chapters. Chapter One is a 37-page, well-documented biography supported by quotations from Edith's writings. Oben's straightforward, lucid style enhances this compact account of the variety of interesting, inspiring, and gripping details of Edith's life. Oben recounts her own tour of the significant places in Edith's life: Breslau, Gottingen, Bergzabern, Speyer, Miinster, Cologne, Echt, Auschwitz. The narrative is supplemented with eight pages of Stein family photographs in the middle of the book. Throughout her life, Edith Stein maintained a strong love for her family and her own Jewish people. Integrated with this is the develop· ment and growth of her intellectual life: from an ambivalence toward school to her being among the first women to enter a university to her becoming a university professor, all the while struggling from being at first unable to pray to later working among scholars who were deep· ly spiritual. Several of these scholars were converts from Judaism to Christianity and even to Catholicism. Oben shows how Edith followed this same route, relating her scholarly insights in psychology and philosophy to her spiritual ones and finally turning to Catholicism after a casual encounter with a biography of St. Teresa of Avila. Oben shows how, once a Catholic, Edith used her intellectual ability to study the link between woman's nature and religious education. By 1932 Edith was recognized as the intellectual leader of Catholic feminism in Europe. Oben tells of Edith's entrance into the Carmelite Convent in Cologne in 1933, her life there as Sister Teresa Benedicta of the Cross, and her decision, foreseeing the Holocaust, to hear the Cross for the Jewish people. In a brief but captivating account, Oben tells of Edith's hasty transfer from Cologne to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:iA NOTE ON W. J. HILL'S "THE DOCTRINE OF GOD AFTER VATICAN II" F. F. CENTORE St. Jerome's Oollege, University of Waterloo Waterloo, Ontario GOD MAY NOT :be dead, hut certamly 1any strictly philosophical, scientific, rational approach to God 'WIOuld seem to ibe derud today. Modern thought, even rumong deeply religious people, seems to J:nwe despaired of ever being ruble to pwve rbhe existence oi God to anyone, even (...) to someone who not 'SO willfully prejudiced against relig~on. that he simply rrefuses to view the evidence in 1an open-minded, calm, am.d rreflective iway. However, this does :not mean that our,apip:voach to God must be strictly emotional and ir.rational. It may >still 1be reasonable rto believe in God, even though we cannot rprove his existence in 'Some strictly r:ationrul way. Rather,than beginning with our ordinary human experience of the real exbramenrtail world and,working our way up to a knowledge o:f the bet that God exists·, we might take a more inner.,directed, psychofogicail, humanistic, phenomenological, historical app1 voach to such knowledge. Such an aiprproach might even 1be more effective and more convincing rto un1believers. Reoent writers on the modern God-question ha1v;e emphasi~ed the notion that rational wgruments :for the existence (and natuire ) of God may :be :a:ll 1weH and :good hut only for ia oomputer or a rolbot. What modern man needs is not 1 so much 1a krrmwledge of God as ;a persona1 relrutionshlp to God. And perhaps the hesit 1w:ay to achieve this is not to throw out completely the role of reason in providing a.scientific support for God'1 s existence ibut to rev;errse the pmcess. We must first come to a personrul ruwaireneiss of God 1 and then proceed to v;alida;te rthfus 531 53~ F. F. CENTORE awareuess via scientific confirmation. After all, how can anyone ever hope even to 1begin the search for God unless he already hais some ·awareness of God's e:ristence? According to John Hick, fo.r inst:mce, this is especially true in the Juda.eo-Christian tradition and, hy extension, in those other religious traiditions 1 which derive f["om it, such as Islam. H " to kno·w " means " to be a1ble to prove hy syllogistic reasoning," then the Jews of the Old 'I1esbament did not know God. Instead of attempting to prove the existence of God they took his existence £or granted. " They thought of God as an experienced reality rather than as an inferred entity." i The ancient £aithful were as sure of the existence of their God as they we:ve of the material wo:rld which surrounded them. There was. no need to :become rationalistic rubout it. In iaddition, even if they had turned ra:tiona1listic it would hav;e been of no use whatsoever to them. F11om the point of view of faith, all of the theistic proofs (none of which is v;ery oompelling or cogent an;}'iway) are completely ir:velevant. They can actually do nothing to move anyone to :feel and act in a religious way. AH such proofs are only for pedants who are content to 1live an empty,and ·sterile rubstract life within their own minds rather than wailking in the living p:vesence of the divine. Although there may well. he a place for the rational development of our intuitive sense of the living presence of God as expressed in revelation, once we are in full possession of such a revelation, it must always hold a place secondary to the experienced fact of £aith. Thus, even though modern religious thinkers reject natuira:l theology, "This modern theofogioal rejection of natural theology is not necessarily motiva:ted ·by an ir:vationaJi.st distrust of reason." 2 There is a :vole :for reason, hut only so long as it comes: after we already know thrut God exists. Since reason ialone can never pirove the existence 0£ God, ·reve1 J. Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1983), pp. 59-60. 2 Ibid., p. 74. A NOTE ON W. J. HILL 533 lation 1 and ·faith... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 741 pointedly, what he is asking for is " the ' planned dissolution ' of the Latin Church into a considerable number of distinct, autonomous ' patriarchates ' " (p. 132). These suggestions, although not original, are intriguing. They deserve, however, more than three pages. What is needed is a detailed presentation of these changes, indicating their historical context, their advantages and disadvantages, and their practical implementation. (...) Despite the criticisms given above, there is much good material to be found in this crisply written book. I agree in general with Hill's judgment that Church authority should embody a collegial rather than a monarchical ecclesiology. He shows that the MC ecclesiology has a solid foundation in scripture and tradition and its cornerstone is the theology of the local Church. Furthermore, he is correct in insisting that the doctrines of collegiality and the priesthood of the faithful are urgent questions in contemporary ecclesiology and that they have broad ecumenical ramifications. He speaks convincingly of greater lay participation, local autonomy, consultation, and accountability. At the same time, his partisanship leads him to caricature the MP view. He will not persuade many MP supporters by criticizing their "highhanded authoritarianism and paternalism " (p. 53) and " ecclesiastical dishonesty " (p. 127) or by claiming that the Roman Curia " is neuro· tically obsessed with the matter of papal authority" (p. 114). Hill makes many valid and important points, but, on occasion, he weakens them by exaggeration. At times his partisan style overcomes his theo· logical substance. The Catholic University of America Washington, D.C. pATRICK GRANFIELD Many Paths: A Catholic Approach to Religious Pluralism. By EUGENE HILLMAN. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1989. Pp. 95. A Christian theology of religions raises fundamental epistemological and methodological questions. Hillman comes to the debate from what Lindbeck has called an " experiential expressivist " background, that is, there is a tacit assumption that reality is experienced and then expressed, that reality precedes language rather than being disclosed and shaped through language. When such an outlook is applied to the theology of religions, the outcome is often the " discovery " of a common experience underlying all religions, despite their different expressions. The latter can be seen to vary according to climate, history, temperament, and so on. Such expressions are loose symbols for a 742 BOOK REVIEWS greater reality, which takes on an increasingly vague shape with the demise of the signifier. History can offer very little resistance to such a model, and the conflicts, differences, intractabilities, and real problems of religious plurality are slowly silenced, almost numbed into a drowsy calm. That history refuses to play this role, while theologies of religion are often demanding it, is indicative of the difficulties with such a model. Hillman's first book on this topic (The Wider Ecumenism, 1968) showed him to be a follower of Rahner. He stressed the universality of grace and its mediation through the historical and particular; he thereby argued for a wider ecumenism with regard to the world religions, in a model analogous to intra-Christian ecumenism. In this book, Hillman advances the same position, but now infused with a strong dose of Wilfred Cantwell Smith. He does not confront the theological criticisms made against either of his mentors. The book is divided into four lucid chapters. The first considers the meaning and role of religion, and much of Hillman's discussion is helpful. However, as the chapter proceeds, one finds that the definition of religion is not controlled by the particularities and intractable dif. ferences presented by the subject matter but rather by an experiential essentialism. Hillman uses Smith's distinction between "faith" and " belief " to two ends, one descriptive, the other evaluative. However he, like Cantwell Smith, conflates description with evaluation. Furthermore, he is untroubled that the subject matter under inspection does not easily yield to such distinctions. Descriptively, " belief " or the " cumulative tradition " involves the " myriad historico-cultural par· ticularizations " that go to make up a religion such as liturgies, doc· trines, ethical systems, practices, histories, and so on {20). Faith is basically an experience of " the tr,anscendent, which is presumably the same for every person," and can be distinguished from the "cumulative tradition, which is different for each people, nation or... (shrink)

Helvetius -- Die Sozietätsphilosophie Franz von Baaders -- Gewalt und Recht in der Staats- und Rechtsphilosophie Rousseaus und der deutschen idealistischen Philosophie -- Das Dämonische.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:184 BOOK REVIEWS knower, one may avoid undercutting the position that the cognitive powers are passive, without failing to do justice to the fact that aware· ness and discrimination are activities of the knower {pp. 71-72; 148· 49, n. 6). Second, Kai holds that the individual human being cannot really he said to have intuitive mind in himself: "Man has mind; hut only to a certain degree and without (...) mind losing its independence from the human whole.... the divine mind is present in man without los· ing its character of divine mind " (p. 75). If only God has intuitive mind {pp. 155, n. 32; 156-57, n. 13), how can the individual human being really know, even in the sense of having discursive thought? Since knowledge depends on first principles, what does not possess the intuitive mind which knows the first principles would, it seems, not properly have knowledge. The only hope for a definitive interpretation of the disconcertingly brief De Anima, 3. 5, lies in the possibility that one can establish a definite connection between this chapter and other elements in the Aris· totelian corpus, a connection that would elucidate the otherwise in· scrutable teaching on active mind. It is the great merit of Kai to have made an excellent case for a connection between De Anima, 3. 5, and two other elements in the Aristotelian corpus: nous as it functions in the logic and epistemology, and the unmoved mover of Metaphysics, Lambda. Exploring this connection in a penetrating and thorough analysis of a great body of Aristotelian and secondary te~ts, Kai has not merely taken a position on a more than two-thousand-year-old con· troversy, hut also has decisively advanced our understanding of active mind. St. John's University Jamaica, New York JAMES T. H. MARTIN Anselm Studies: An Occasional Journal. Vol. 2. Edited by JosEPH ScHNAUBELT, OSA, et al., White Plains, New York: Kraus Inter· national Publications, 1988. Pp. 634. $55.00. This volume contains the proceedings of the Fifth International Saint Anselm Conference (Villanova University, September 16-21, 1985). Held in conjunction with the Tenth International Patristic, Medieval, and Renaissance Conference, the meeting occasioned papers concen· trating on areas of "influence and juncture" in the life and thought of St. Anselm and St. Augustine. Given the dependence of much of Anselm's work on the thought of St. Augustine, the Conference took as its particular objective the understanding of the relationship between BOOK REVIEWS 185 faith and reason. While the focus of the papers in this volume includes both saints, the principal emphasis falls on Anselm as inheritor and interpretor of the methods and ideas of his intellectual ancestor. A brief introduction provides cameo presentations of Anselm's character as abbot, monk, and archbishop, together with a conspectus on Anselm's position vis-a-vis the canonical and ecclesiological issues of his day. The papers are then divided into five chapters: "Anselm's Monasticism." "The Proslogion Argument," "Truth: Anselm and Augustine," "Theological Method," and "The Anselmian Worldview." While the papers are of use to scholarly readers desiring detailed treatment of central issues in Anselm's logic and epistemology, the un· doubted strength of the collection lies in its well-calculated effort to integrate an understanding of Anselm's intellectual and spiritual out· look with the theological, spiritual, and literacy currents of his time. Especially for the historian of intellect and society, the essays in this volume provide analysis that advances our understanding of the cultural context of the 11th and 12th centuries. The contribution to our understanding of Anselm's culture is par· ticularly clear in the first and fourth divisions of the volume, the sec· tions dealing with monasticism and Anselm's worldview. In the former division, Glenn Olsen's assessment of " Anselm and Homosexuality" neatly evaluates the evidence for Anselm's sexual orientation made controversial by John Boswell's Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality. In fact, the present article, together with its notes, provides a useful summary of the critical literature which has grown up of late around the Boswellian thesis as well as the study of literary expressions of affection in the 11th and 12th centuries. Olsen grasps the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:570 BOOK REVIEWS like reasonable rule for economic life. This effort is worthy of more attention than is possible here, but let it be noted that it must inevitably suffer the same fate as any ethical calculus: someone must decide for others what is their due and what is not. How much wealth, for example, makes for a concentration [of wealth] that would be " demonstrably detrimental to some (...) people's exercise of their generic rights "? His is ultimately an entitlement or rights ethic, rather than an aitial ethic of goal-purposive fulfillment for the individual, projected outwards for a common good scenario. While his rejection of goal ethics's inability to detail principles for distribution of goods is noteworthy, it does not appear that a tightened version of generic rights theory will come closer to either of Phillips's desiderata: a justification of moral reasoning apart from any theory of nature or a calculus for its application. Desan and Phillips wish to think against the limits of the human situation. For Desan, rising above limitation is a moral task and obligation facing us each, if there is to be a common future. His call is to be World Citizen in a Polis of Nations. Phillips's vision is more concrete, a distribution of benefits to benefit all with well-being and freedom. But this mundane task is no less difficult than Desan's transcendent one. Indeed, according to Augustine, even the Divine Mind must utilize an artifice in dealing with human creation: "He loves each of us as though there were only one of us." Both ethicists have striven to show us how we might think this vision for ourselves, i.e., for each other of us. ]OIIN B. DAVIS, O.P. ' Detroit, Michigan Catholics, Anglicans, and Puritans: Seventeenth-Century Essays. By HUGH TREVOR-ROPER. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988. Pp. xiii + 317. $27.50 (hardbound). Even to list the changes and events which occurred in seventeenth century England is a difficult task: the century spans the period from the death of Queen Elizabeth to the Glorious Revolution and beyond, through the Civil War, the accession and exile (twice) of the Stuarts, the rise of science, the transformation of the theological and religious issues of the English Reformation, to name only the most obvious. To conceive a book, in the form of occasional essays, which not only addresses these changes and events but does so by establishing the connections which were present with European currents at the same time surely tempts fate, even when it does not tempt reviewers. BOOK REVIEWS 571 But Hugh Trevor-Roper is a master, both of the period under survey and of the form of the essay. With one exception, each of these essays began as a lecture or seminar paper, and the pleasantly legible style in which they are written must bear some trace of that origin. The occasional flashes of wit, mixed with rthe fairly non-technical style, make the book a joy to read and a welcome escape from the usually constipated style of scholarly prose. In his Introduction, the essayist clearly sets forth his thesis that English intellectual history does not exist apart from the currents of European intellectual history (a thesis for which Trevor-Roper has already staked a claim). That leads to what may very well be the major problem with these essays: its end is in its beginning. The list of names cited in these essays only partially coincides with the list of names in the index; the former is much longer than the latter. And while the style of the essay welcomes the reader to the period, it also throws up more names and places and events than can be explained or even annotated adequately. This occurs both on a large and on a small scale. The first essay, on "Nicholas Hill, the English Atomist" contains such a vast array of names that at times it becomes the prosopo· graphical equivalent of a telephone book. On a large scale, there is the problem with a definition of Arminianism. No definition, at least no formal definition, is attempted-and this is probably wise. But, particularly in... (shrink)

A review of Lycan's Book "Consciousness".

Feminist social theory and female body experience are the twin themes of Iris Marion Young's twelve outstanding essays written over the past decade and brought together here. Her contributions to social theory raise critical questions about women and citizenship, the relations of capitalism and women's oppression, and the differences between a feminist theory that emphasizes women's difference and one that assumes a gender-neutral humanity. Loosely following a phenomenological method of description, Young's essays on female embodiment discuss female movement, pregnancy, clothing, (...) and the breasted body. In an introduction that situates her work in the context of shifts in feminist theory and politics over the past decade, Young emphasizes the rootedness of her theorizing in a dedicated and seasoned political activism. (shrink)

This important new study offers a powerful exposition of the ethical theory underlying Hegel's philosophy of society, politics, and history. Professor Woodshows how Hegel applies his theory to such topics as human rights, the justification of legal punishment, criteria of moral responsibility, and the authority of individual conscience. The book includes a critical discussion of Hegel's treatment of other moral philosophers, provides an account of the controversial concept of 'ethical life', and shows the relation between the theory and Hegel's critical (...) assessment of modern social institutions. The book is nontechnical and should interest anyone concerned with Hegel's ethical and political thought, including philosophers, political scientists, intellectual historians and students of German culture. (shrink)

The Empire of Chance tells how quantitative ideas of chance transformed the natural and social sciences, as well as daily life over the last three centuries. A continuous narrative connects the earliest application of probability and statistics in gambling and insurance to the most recent forays into law, medicine, polling and baseball. Separate chapters explore the theoretical and methodological impact in biology, physics and psychology. Themes recur - determinism, inference, causality, free will, evidence, the shifting meaning of probability - but (...) in dramatically different disciplinary and historical contexts. In contrast to the literature on the mathematical development of probability and statistics, this book centres on how these technical innovations remade our conceptions of nature, mind and society. Written by an interdisciplinary team of historians and philosophers, this readable, lucid account keeps technical material to an absolute minimum. It is aimed not only at specialists in the history and philosophy of science, but also at the general reader and scholars in other disciplines. (shrink)

Future robots should have common sense about the world in order to handle the problems they will encounter. A large part of this commonsense knowledge must be naive physics knowledge, since carrying out even the simplest everyday chores requires familiarity with physics laws. But how should one start codifying this knowledge? What kind of skills should be elicited from the experts (each and every one of us)? This paper will attempt to provide some hints by studying the mental models of (...) force and motion. (shrink)

Studies the politics of Heidegger in terms of "thrownness" or "existential contingency". Attempts to think through Heidegger's philosophy in a manner that parallels his own dialogue with other key western thinkers.

This book explores these differences and in particular considers various theoretical perspectives that might be useful for opening new interpretive strategies for critical social theory in relation to these differences.

Philosophers now treat the relationship between Classical Mendelian Genetics and molecular biology as a paradigm of nonreduction and this example is playing an increasingly prominent role in debates about the reducibility of theories ranging from macrosocial science to folk psychology. Patricia Churchland (1986), for example, draws an analogy between the alleged elimination of the “causal mainstay” of classical genetics and her view that today’s psychological theory will be eliminated by neuroscience. Patricia Kitcher takes an autonomous rather than eliminativist view of (...) the reported nonreduction in genetics and reasons that psychology will retain a similar autonomy from lower level sciences (1980 and 1982). Although Churchland and Kitcher offer different interpretations of the apparent failure of molecular biology to reduce classical genetics, they agree that this failure will help illuminate theoretical relations between psychology and lower level sciences. The appearance of the Mendelian example along side the usual ones from physics and chemistry marks a turning point in philosophy of science. (shrink)