For decades, policy-makers in government, development banks and foundations, NGOs, researchers and students have struggled with the problem of how to protect people who are displaced from their homes and livelihoods by development projects. This book addresses these concerns and explores how debates often become deadlocked between 'managerial' and 'movementist' perspectives. Using development ethics to determine the rights and responsibilities of various stakeholders, the authors find that displaced people must be empowered so as to share equitably in benefits rather than (...) being victimized. They propose a governance model for development projects that would transform conflict over displacement into a more manageable collective bargaining process and would empower displaced people to achieve equitable results. Their book will be valuable for readers in a wide range of fields including ethics, development studies, politics and international relations as well as policy making, project management and community development. (shrink)
Over the past 20 years, global ethics has come to be conceived in different ways. Two main tendencies can be distinguished. One asks from whence global ethics comes and defines ‘global ethics’ as arising from globalization. The other tendency is to ask whither global ethics must go and thus defines ‘global ethics’ as a destination, namely arriving at a comprehensive global ethic. I will note some types of discussion that may have been wrongly excluded from the scope of global ethics (...) by one or the other. In addition, I take notice of recent debates and concerns about risks that global ethics may become a neo-colonial activity. These concerns raise a further conceptual question. Should ‘global ethics’ be defined in a normative fashion, so as to exclude neo-colonial approaches that may be damaging to the credibility of global ethics? In response to these alternatives – whence vs. whither, descriptive vs. normative – I will propose a middle way. I begin by defining ‘global problems’ as those that will cause harm in the absence of cross-border cooperation. In a descriptive sense, any ethical statements about global problems should be included within the scope of global ethics. On the other hand, I will propose a more specific normative conception of the central task of global ethics: seeking reasonable and responsible agreement on global problems, agreement based on possibly diverse moral grounds. (shrink)
As a contribution to development ethics, this article attempts to clarify what 'empowerment' should mean, in so far as it is a valuable goal. I begin with the core ethical idea of empowerment that is to be found in recent work on measuring empowerment, led by Deepa Narayan, namely: empowerment occurs when people are better able to shape their own lives. Since this is a metaphor, I attempt to articulate a corresponding literal meaning. What I find is that people are (...) empowered to the extent that: (a) they exercise enhanced decision-making and influence over strategic life-choices and barriers to agency and well-being freedom; (b) their capacity for such decision-making and influence has also been enhanced; and (c) they are capable of making these gains prevail, given (i) the capabilities they have and assets they control, individually or collectively, and (ii) the opportunity structure in which they act. (shrink)
In The Idea of Justice , Amartya Sen argues for an approach to justice that is comparative and realization-based rather than transcendental and institutional. While Sen’s arguments for such an approach may not be as convincing as he thought, there are additional arguments for it, and one is that it provides a unique and valuable platform on which an account of justice as a virtue of social and political actors (including institutions and social movements) can be built. Hence new dimensions (...) of comparison are opened up: some actors are better disposed and more successful than others at leading social change in the direction of greater justice. The main objective of this article is to use the capability approach to construct such an account. Six dimensions of acting justly are identified: (1) reducing capability shortfalls; (2) expanding capabilities for all; (3) saving the worst-off as a first step towards their full participation in economy and society, (4) which is also to be promoted by a system of entitlements protecting all from social exclusion; while (5) supporting the empowerment of those whose capabilities are to expand; and (6) respecting ethical values and legitimate procedures. I conclude by sketching some underlying moral psychology. (shrink)
The Routledge Handbook of Development Ethics provides readers with insight into the central questions of development ethics, the main approaches to answering them, and areas for future research. Over the past seventy years, it has been argued and increasingly accepted that worthwhile development cannot be reduced to economic growth. Rather, a number of other goals must be realised: - Enhancement of people's well-being - Equitable sharing in benefits of development - Empowerment to participate freely in development - Environmental sustainability - (...) Promotion of human rights - Promotion of cultural freedom, consistent with human rights - Responsible conduct, including integrity over corruption Agreement that these are essential goals has also been accompanied by disagreements about how to conceptualize or apply them in different cases or contexts. Using these seven goals as an organizing principle, this handbook presents different approaches to achieving each one, drawing on academic literature, policy documents and practitioner experience. This international and multi-disciplinary handbook will be of great interest to development policy makers and program workers, students and scholars in development studies, public policy, international studies, applied ethics and other related disciplines. (shrink)
Adoption of the Millennium Development Goals triggered much discussion among donor states, multilateral institutions, and developing countries towards changing dysfunctional patterns of interaction that seemed to put the MDGs at risk from their inception. Initially in these high-level discussions, accountability was understood in a state-centric way, primarily as accountability to donors. This needed to be modified with the shift towards developing-country ownership of development strategies and programs. Yet an even greater change was in store when civil society organizations were included (...) in the discussions, since their focus was on accountability to project-affected persons and communities. Hence a new and irreducible conception of accountability came on stage. I characterize this as accountability to the subjects of development and show how it is required and justified by development ethics, based on values of agency and justifiability. This results in a dual standard for accountability: reducing stakeholders’ vulnerability to harmful and inequitable outcomes, and ensuring the justifiability of development projects to affected persons and communities. (shrink)
Many of the ethical problems that are posed by development can be illuminated by clarifying some of the differences between development that is worthwhile and ethically undesirable ?maldevelopment?. So it is with development projects that displace communities that physically stand in their way: typically the ?oustees? are victimized and disempowered, in some cases by projects that are also indefensible in other ways. Can this help us to clarify what is owed to people who are displaced by climate change, the ?climate (...) migrants? or ?climate refugees?? These people, I will show, have a distinctive set of moral entitlements, which may include compensation and aid for resilience or resettlement; in addition, they are entitled to be included in decision-making in ways that are empowering. (shrink)
A collection of essays that examine how discussions of justice are most usefully shaped in our world, rethinking how we theorize justice and principles of justice.
The question of how to arrive at a consensus on human rights norm in a diverse, pluralistic, and interconnected global environment is critical. This volume is a contribution to an intercultural understanding of human rights in the context of India and its relationship to the West. The legitimacy of the global legal, economic, and political order is increasingly premised on the discourse of international human rights. Yet the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights developed with little or no consultation from (...) non-Western nations such as India. In response, there has developed an extensive literature and cross-cultural analysis of human rights in the areas of African, East-Asian, and Islamic studies, yet there is a comparative dearth of conceptual research relating to India. As problematically, there is an lacuna in the previous literature; it simply stops short at analyzing how Western understandings of human rights may be supported from within various non-Western cultural self-understandings; yet, surely, there is more to this issue. The chapters in this collection pioneer a distinct approach that takes such deliberation to a further level by examining what it is that the West itself may have to learn from various Indian articulations of human rights as well. (shrink)
It can be useful to sort out the debates over Hegel’s political philosophy in political terms. The early post-war debates took place on essentially liberal grounds, as Hegel’s adherence to free speech and constitutional government had to be defended against cold warriors such as Karl Popper and Sidney Hook. I think it is obvious to everyone that the liberals won. Nevertheless the liberal vision of Hegel gave way to what is really a social-democratic vision - though due to the anachronism (...) and implausibility of calling him a social-democrat, the social-democratic Hegel is called “modern.” The point is that he recognized that capitalism was crisis-prone and that political response was required, yet he had no designs on the private ownership of the means of production, and he would not condone repression. To 20th century ears, Hegel’s position resonates most sympathetically with the position of a social democrat. (shrink)
In what sense must global ethics be global? In one sense, it must deal with global issues. In another, it must not be parochial but inclusive of normative views from around the world. So far, global ethics has met the first standard much better than the second. Authors based in the global South contribute approximately 5% of the internationally published research on global ethics. With this in mind, the co-editors of this special issue sought to bring more perspectives, experiences, and (...) authors from India into the international global ethics conversation, and so they launched the Indian Global Ethics Initiative. Their first step, this special issue, presents Indian experience and authors on topics including urban development, care ethics, women’s empowerment, fair trade, distorted policy research, poverty, and health. Much of this work is grounded by the authors’ experience in policy-making and advocacy for social and global justice. The co-editors invite contact from interested readers who would like to join and continue this Indian Global Ethics Initiative, as well as readers who would like to take similar initiatives in other regions. (shrink)
After 1807, Hegel contrasts microhistorical chaos with macrohistorical order, the "cunning of reason." Agents interact blindly, but reason integrates all interactions, and this is the development and expression of rationality. No particular state dictates or precludes any subsequent outcomes; to allow the cunning of reason is to deny that causal relations are decisive for historical events. Ends are extraneous to objects, which suffer violence in achieving them. Consequently historical progress must also be regarded as extraneous to the objective social world, (...) and this world must be assumed to suffer violence as progress is achieved. If anyone was fooled by the "cunning of reason," it was Hegel. (shrink)
It probably comes as a surprise to no one that Hegel's political philosophy is difficult to interpret. But his political thought clearly poses problems which the rest of his work does not, and these problems arise from apparent political ambivalence on his part towards the French Revolution, towards monarchy, towards the doctrine of popular sovereignty, towards public opinion and press freedom - well, there is scarcely a reader of Hegel who could not add some additional topic to this already lengthy (...) list. For instance, Hegel sometimes noted how crucial it is for a state to be decisive; every state needs a reservoir of decisiveness, supplied preferably by a monarch, who ‘has become the personality of the state,’ who ‘cuts short the weighing of the pros and cons between which it lets itself oscillate perpetually now this way and now that, and by saying “I will” make its decision and so inaugurates all activity and actuality.’. (shrink)
If the sun is indeed setting on the cold war, there is reason to wonder whether Hegel’s Owl of Minerva should not be scheduled for further flights. Hegel was critical of political and economic liberalism as well as revolutionary egalitarianism. To the extent that actual capitalism and actual socialism have conformed to these positions in practise, Hegel’s double-edged critique has current applications. Sketched in broad strokes, Hegel’s position has a certain elegant symmetry. Revolutionary egalitarian movements tend to “put politics in (...) command,” to make political life dominant over civil society. On the other hand, the effects of liberalism tend in the opposite direction, to create a political life which is dominated by civil society. At the bottom of Hegel’s objections we find the claim that all members of a community have a right not to be excluded from the satisfactions that are offered by its way of life. Neither a community whose political life is dominated by civil society nor one where civil society is repressed by politics can honor his right. (shrink)
Responding to a call by Pierre Sané, Secretary-General of Amnesty International, for a worldwide political movement to overcome the social damage that has been wrought by economic globalization, this paper asks whether such a movement can invoke current conceptions of human rights. In particular, if human rights are Euro-centric, how well would they serve the self-understanding of a movement that is to be global, culturally pluralistic and counterhegemonic to Northern capital? I argue that it is not human rights that are (...) Eurocentric, but only certain conceptions of human rights. Properly understood, human rights are justifiable from within all cultures. Moreover, current conceptions of human rights are not as narrow as they were in 1948, when the Universal Declaration was drafted. Nearly five decades of international dialogue have transformed human rights discourse in ways that are profoundly anti-Eurocentric, and further transformations are already underway. There are resources of moral and political experience, within all cultures, which argue strongly in favor of these transformations. Therefore, a more consistent and more complete knowledge of human rights can emerge cross-culturally if the dialogue is not abused and if the relevant moral and political experience is let into the dialogue from all quarters. (shrink)
