Abstract“Sign stimuli” elicit specific patterns of behavior when an organism's motivation is appropriate. In the toad, visually released prey-catching involves orienting toward the prey, approaching, fixating, and snapping. For these action patterns to be selected and released, the prey must be recognized and localized in space. Toads discriminate prey from nonprey by certain spatiotemporal stimulus features. The stimulus-response relations are mediated by innate releasing mechanisms (RMs) with recognition properties partly modifiable by experience. Striato-pretecto-tectal connectivity determines the RM's recognition and localization (...) properties, whereas medialpallio-thalamo-tectal circuitry makes the system sensitive to changes in internal state and to prior history of exposure to stimuli. RMs encode the diverse stimulus conditions referring to the same prey object through different combinations of “specialized” tectal neurons, involving cells selectively tuned to prey features. The prey-selective neurons express the outcome of information processing in functional units consisting of interconnected cells. Excitatory and inhibitory interactions among feature-sensitive tectal and pretectal neurons specify the perceptual operations involved in distinguishing the prey from its background, selecting its features, and discriminating it from predators. Other connections indicate stimulus location. The results of these analyses are transmitted by specialized neurons projecting from the tectum to bulbar/spinal motor systems, providing a sensorimotor interface. Specific combinations of such projective neurons – mediating feature- and space-related messages – form “command releasing systems” that activate corresponding motor pattern generators for appropriate prey-catching action patterns. (shrink)

The distinction between agent-relative reasons and agent-neutral reasons is philosophically important, but there is no consensus on how to understand the distinction exactly. In this paper, I discuss several interpretations of the distinction that can be found in the literature: the Motivational Interpretation, the Scope Interpretation, and the Goal Interpretation, and argue that none of these interpretations is entirely convincing. I propose a novel interpretation of the distinction, which I call the Normative Force Interpretation, according to which the distinction between (...) agent-relative reasons and agent-neutral reasons concerns the normative force that these reasons can have for agents. (shrink)

When a conflict of duties arises, a resolution is often sought by use of an ordering of priority or importance. This paper examines how such a conflict resolution works, compares mechanisms that have been proposed in the literature, and gives preference to one developed by Brewka and Nebel. I distinguish between two cases – that some conflicts may remain unresolved, and that a priority ordering can be determined that resolves all – and provide semantics and axiomatic systems for accordingly defined (...) dyadic deontic operators. (shrink)

Agent-relative reasons are an important feature of any nonconsequentialist moral theory. Many authors think that they cannot be accommodated within a value-first theory that understands all value as agent-neutral. In this paper, I offer a novel explanation of agent-relative reasons that accommodates them fully within an agent-neutral value-first view. I argue that agent-relative reasons are to be understood in terms of second-order value responses: when an agent acts on an agent-relative reason, she responds appropriately to the agent-neutral value of her (...) own appropriate response to some agent-neutral value. This view helps reconcile important elements of deontology and consequentialism. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the method of normative reconstruction that is underlying Freedom’s Right undermines Critical Theory’s aspiration to be a force that is unreservedly critical and progressive. I start out by giving a brief account of the four premises of the method of normative reconstruction and unpack their implications for how Honneth conceptualizes social pathologies and misdevelopments, specifically that these notions are no longer linked to radical critique and normative revolution. In the second part, I demonstrate that (...) abandoning forms of radical critique and normative revolution is internally linked to adopting this method, before arguing that Freedom’s Right entails no resources to account for why abandoning them does not amount to a deficiency. In the final part, I point out two problematic implications of turning away from radical critique and normative revolution for the very project Honneth pursues in Freedom’s Right. I show that Honneth’s own view about the limited scope of application of the method of normative reconstruction and his account of the dangers associated with social misdevelopments give us reasons to consider this method to be incomplete. Finally, I contend that the explanatory power of Freedom’s Right is dubious because methodological premises that form part of normative reconstruction lead Honneth to ignore relevant alternative explanations of processes of deviation and disassociation from norms of social freedom, which he characterizes as social misdevelopments. (shrink)

Die sprachliche und soziale Natur der Erkenntnis ist eine Grundeinsicht der Moderne. Doch welchen Spielraum lässt sie noch der Kritik, der distanzierten Prüfung der eigenen Sprache und Lebensform? Vor dem Hintergrund des Werkes Stanley Cavells fragt dieses Buch nach dem Verhältnis von Lebensform und Selbsterkenntnis. In ungewohnter Weise liest es Wittgenstein und Foucault als komplementäre Antwortstrategien auf dieses Grundproblem: Philosophie muss als eine "Arbeit an sich", als körperliche "Selbsttechnik" verstanden werden. Nicht ethische Programmatik, so kann gezeigt werden, sondern systematische Konsequenz (...) führt zu einer Engführung von Philosophie und Lebenspraxis. (shrink)

In my paper, I shall take seriously Kant’s puzzling statements about the moral feeling of respect, which is, according to him, “a feeling self-wrought by means of a rational concept and therefore specifically different” from all common feelings. I will focus on the systematic position of the moral feeling of respect within the framework of Kant’s transcendental idealism. By considering its volitional structure, I argue for a compatibilist account of the moral feeling of respect, according to which both intellectualist and (...) affectivist interpretations are true. As such, respect can be understood in terms of a process of moral self-consciousness and self-formation, which means that the will must be freed from initial empirical motives, and finally be determined only by rational principles. (shrink)

In his book “Schiller as Philosopher”, Frederick Beiser laments that “contemporary Kant scholars have been intent on ignoring him. If they know anything at all about Schiller, it is only as the author of an epigram satirizing Kant”. Therefore, Beiser calls us “to consider Schiller as a philosopher, to reconstruct and appraise the arguments of his philosophical writings” (Beiser, 2005, p. vii). In this paper, I shall argue that it is Schiller's conception of freedom of the will as “heautonomy” that (...) stands behind his critique and modification of Kant's ethics. However, the systematic significance of Schiller's theory of freedom is not obvious. Its argumentative structure must first be reconstructed—as Beiser has demanded—because it is concealed by an esthetic discourse. A reconstruction of Schiller's theory of freedom shows that he contrasts his concept of heautonomy as individual self‐determination with the Kantian concept of an autonomy or autocracy of reason by the universal moral law. Schiller's own philosophical contribution to the debate on freedom after Kant must therefore not be understood as a mere esthetic balancing and softening of Kant's ethical rigorism. Rather, it shows serious transformations of Kant's approach, which justifies understanding it as a critical step beyond Kant's theory of the autonomy of reason. (shrink)

In this chapter, I will address the philosophical ambivalence of the concept of Willkür in and after Kant. The aim of my chapter is to defend it against the charge of irrationality and mere chance, and to rehabilitate it from a historical and analytic point of view. I will analyze Kant’s use of the word “Willkür”, and chronologically follow the semantic and systematic changes in his philosophical work. Finally, I address recent attempts to revitalize the concept of Willkür in the (...) analytic debate by referring to the work of Harry Frankfurt and Robert Kane. I shall argue that we need to distinguish between two kinds of libera arbitria. Whereas the liberum arbitrium indifferentiae can be interpreted in terms of the pejorative sense of “Willkür”—as mere chance—the liberum arbitrium voluntatis equals a reflective kind of Willkür—literal Will-kür —which involves freedom of the will. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Sven Danielsson argued that the ‘original paradoxes' of deontic logic, in particular Ross's paradox and Prior's paradox of derived obligation, can be solved by restricting the modal inheritance rule. I argue that this does not solve the paradoxes.

The series Studien zur deutschen Literatur (Studies in German Literature) presents outstanding analyses of German-speaking literature from the early modern period to the present day. It particularly embraces comparative, cultural and historical-epistemological questions and serves as a tradition-steeped forum for innovative literary research. All submitted manuscripts undergo a double peer-review process. Please contact the editor Marcus B hm (marcus.boehm at] degruyter.com) for further information regarding manuscript submission and subsidies.

Throughout its history, analytic philosophy has established a decidedly anti-rhetoric self-understanding. Yet the historical development of analytic philosophy, leading from Russell to Quine and Davidson, successively puts this anti-rhetorical ideals in question. Even though the rhetorics of clarity and objectivity remain, the discussions of post-analytic philosophy focus more and more an an understanding of language which is forced to acknowledge its irreducible practical and situational aspects. Analytical philosophy, then, should be seen as a decidedly anti-rhetoric tradition which tries to keep (...) up the spirit of scientific enlightenment in times of growing skepticism -- and which is driven, by the very force of clarity and a better understanding, to develop a picture of language which undermines this ideal at least in some aspects. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question whetherbullshitis a reasonable pragmatic category. In the first part of the paper, drawing on the insights of Harry Frankfurt’s seminal essay, bullshit is defined as an act of insincere asserting where the speaker shows a loose concern for the truth, and does not want the addressee to become aware of condition. The author adds to this definition the condition requiring that the bullshitter expresses morecertaintythan is adequate with respect to condition. In the second part of (...) the paper, it is discussed whether the above definition can cope with special types of bullshit considered to be a challenge to Frankfurt’s definition. These areevasive bullshitting,bullshit lies, andbald-faced bullshitting. It is shown that there is hope for establishing a reasonable pragmatic category of bullshitting if it is related to certain levels of pragmatic description, e.g. conversational implicatures, that can explain the putative challenges. (shrink)

The discovery of “molecular chaperones” has dramatically changed our concept of cellular protein folding. Rather than folding spontaneously, most newly synthesized polypeptide chains seem to acquire their native conformation in a reaction mediated by these versatile helper proteins. Understanding the structure and function of molecular chaperones is likely to yield useful applications for medicine and biotechnology in the future.

Beim Stichwort ”Kognition“ denken die meisten an das Gehirn, Computermodelle oder Informationsverarbeitung. In der realen Welt treffen wir aber immer nur auf Wesen mit Körpern, die in eine Umwelt eingebunden und in ihr aktiv sind. Kognition findet nicht im Kopf statt, sondern in der Welt. So lautet der Grundgedanke der Philosophie der Verkörperung. Die Hinwendung zu Körper und Umwelt stellt eine der vielleicht weitreichendsten Neuorientierungen der modernen Kognitionswissenschaft und Philosophie dar, die auch unser Verständnis von Wissenschaft und Kultur prägen wird. (...) Der Band versammelt die Grundlagentexte zu diesem Thema zum ersten Mal in deutscher Sprache. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss Plato's conception of expertise as a part of the Platonic theory of a good, successful life (eudaimonia). In various Platonic dialogues, Socrates argues that the good life requires a certain kind of knowledge that guides all our good, beneficial actions: the “knowledge of the good and bad”, which is to be acquired by “questioning ourselves and examining our and others’ beliefs”. This knowledge encompasses the particular knowledge of how to recognize experts in a given technical (...) domain. The central element in Socrates’ account of an expert is what I call the truth-and-caring criterion: an expert has to make seeking the truth and avoiding (avoidable) error her supreme epistemic goal and she has to make caring for common goods the supreme goal of practising her expertise. (shrink)

In konsequentialistischenKonsequentialismusTheorienEthikdeontologische (s. a. Pflichtenethik) hängt die moralische Richtigkeit oder Falschheit einer Handlung nur davon ab, wie gut oder schlecht ihre Konsequenzen (verglichen mit den Konsequenzen der anderen HandlungsalternativenKonsequentialismusHandlungskonsequentialismus) sind. Aus dieser definierenden Eigenschaft konsequentialistischer Theorien ergibt sich fast zwingend als weitere typische Eigenschaft die Maximierung des Guten, die in einer schwächeren Form als Maximierungserlaubnis und in einer stärkeren Form als Maximierungsgebot vertreten werden kann: Wenn die Richtigkeit einer Handlung nur von den Konsequenzen abhängt, liegt es nahe anzunehmen, dass es (...) niemals moralisch falsch und folglich immer moralisch erlaubt ist, die Handlung mit den besten Konsequenzen auszuführen. Diese Maximierungserlaubnis unterscheidet konsequentialistische Theorien insbesondere von deontologischen Theorien, in denen die Handlung mit den besten Konsequenzen oft verboten ist: Da in deontologischen Theorien die Richtigkeit nicht nur von den Konsequenzen, sondern auch von anderen Faktoren (z. B. der intrinsischen Schlechtheit bestimmter Handlungsweisen) abhängt, kann es Situationen geben, in denen ein solcher Faktor die Gutheit der Konsequenzen überwiegt und es deshalb verboten ist, die Handlung mit den besten Konsequenzen auszuführen. (shrink)

In discussing the normative implications of the doctor-patient relationship, medical ethics has mostly focused on the duties of doctors to their patients. This focus neglects an important normative dimension of the doctorpatient- relationship, namely the duties of patients to doctors. Only few authors have discussed the content and ground of the moral duties of patients, and each of these accounts are wanting in some way. This paper discusses patients’ duties and argues that patients have a relationship-dependent obligation to cooperate with (...) the doctor, because doctors have a morally justified interest in fulfilling their moral role obligations as doctors, and by not cooperating, patients make it more difficult for doctors to fulfill their moral obligations. In some cases, failing to cooperate might even create an avoidable moral dilemma for the doctor. (shrink)

Wurde bereits beim ersten Band der Reihe 'Philosophie & Repräsentation' / 'Philosophy & Representation' das Verhältnis von Dargestelltem und Darstellung am Beispiel des Diagramms bzw. der Diagrammatik erörtert und problematisiert, so geht es nun im zweiten Band um die Frage der grundsätzlichen Notwendigkeit von Modellen für das Denken. Die mechanischen oder symbolischen Modelle sind in allen ihren Formen die Vergegenständlichung menschlicher Vorstellung, und das sowohl in rationalistischer, also theorie-immanenter, wie auch in irrationalistischer Hinsicht. Sie sind dies nicht nur im Sinne (...) ihrer explikativer Modellhaftigkeit, also als adäquate Repräsentation von Realität aufgrund quantifizierbarer oder meßbarer Größen, sondern als Garant wahren Wissens, das sich in einer phänomenologischen Sichtung des eigenen Erfahrungs- und Verstehenshorizontes vergewissert. (shrink)

Cicero’s treatise On Divination is among the most intense ancient discussions of divinatory practices, arguing as much against the background of a long and rich tradition in Greek philosophy as contemporary and recent Roman practices. Focusing on book 2, my contribution will reconstruct Cicero’s “ludic view” of divinatory ritual and extispicy in particular (2.26–41). I will argue that the reference to playing is an important part of Cicero’s argument. I will then use this ancient observation as a hermeneutic lens onto (...) divinatory practices and the materiality involved here. I will conclude on an enquiry into the question of how central this very materiality is for the construction of the divine and the establishment of a bidirectional relationship with it. (shrink)

Eine neutrale Einführung in den Konsequentialismus, der die aktuelle ethische Diskussion dominiert und um den so heftig gestritten wird wie um keine andere ethische Theo-rie. Er scheint auf bestechenden Annahmen zu basieren, aber dennoch mit unserer herkömmlichen Moral unvereinbar zu sein. Wie geht man im Konsequentialismus mit dieser Spannung um? Was sind die Grundideen des Konsequentialismus? Wie unterscheidet er sich von deontologischen Theorien? Hat im Konsequentialismus das Gute Vorrang vor dem Rechten? Wie unterscheiden sich direkter Handlungskonsequentialismus, indirekter Handlungskonsequentialis-mus und Regelkonsequentialismus? (...) Wie vielversprechend ist das Projekt der Konsequentialisierung deontologischer Theorien? -/- A neutral introduction to consequentialism, which dominates current ethical debate and is more hotly contested than any other ethical theory. It seems to be based on compelling assumptions, yet incompatible with our conventional morality. How does consequentialism deal with this tension? What are the basic ideas of consequentialism? How does it differ from deontological theories? Does consequentialism prioritise the good over the right? How do direct act consequentialism, indirect act consequentialism and rule consequentialism differ? How promising is the project of consequentialising deontological theories? -/- Verlag Karl Alber 2022, 178 S., brosch., 24,– € ISBN 978-3-495-48525-5 (intro: Philosophie, Bd. 1). (shrink)

English summary: This book is both a study about the Socratic-Platonic conception of a good life, and an analytical study on self-knowledge, self-determination, and moral motivation.

This article explores the elective affinities between Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and the sociology of critical capacities. It argues that these two research programmes can be understood as symmetrical twins. We show the extent to which the exchange between Bruno Latour and Luc Boltanski has influenced their respective theoretical developments. Three strong encounters between the twin research programmes may be distinguished. The first encounter concerns explanations for social change. The second encounter focuses on the status of objects and their relationship to (...) places. The third encounter is about the concept of critique. Drawing on their long-term mutual readings, we gain insight into how pleas for symmetrical analysis raised in response to Bourdieu’s theory of fields have evolved within both ANT and the sociology of critical capacity. We conclude by relating the development of the respective research programmes to the issue of disciplinary boundaries. (shrink)

Ohne Unmittelbarkeit verliert sich das Selbst in Vermittlungen. Daher die Versuchung, auf Differenzen zu verzichten, zur Selbstaufgabe ins Unum. Wie aber, wenn wir Grenzen als als Trefflinien oder Flächen denken sollten? Das wird hier mit Fichte am Bild erwogen: Bild als Dienst im Erscheinungsgeschehen. Darin zeigt das Eins sich als Mit-Eins. Das bedrohliche Zwischen wird zum Ort wechselseitigen Daheim-seins.Without immediateness the self will be lost in mediations. Is it therefore forced to self-delivery into Unum? This paper suggests, to take borders (...) for meeting-lines or -faces. In this way - according to Fichte - pictures are serving within a process of appearance . So Unum could become togetherness, the threatening »between«: »circuminsessio«, mutually being at home. (shrink)

This paper discusses under which circumstances grateful responses can become intrinsically bad. It is argued that gratitude should be understood as an appropriate response to value and that it is subject to the so-called recursive account of intrinsic value, according to which appropriate responses to value are intrinsically good, and inappropriate responses to value are intrinsically bad. As a result, gratitude can become intrinsically bad in two cases: i) when gratitude has the wrong object, i.e., is a pro-response to an (...) intrinsically bad act, ii) when the grateful response is grossly disproportionate, i.e., the intensity of the response does not match the goodness of the act that it is a response to. (shrink)