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Katherine Dunlop
University of Texas at Austin
  1.  38
    Burge, Tyler (1946-).Mikkel Gerken & Katherine Dunlop - 2018 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Tyler Burge is an American philosopher whose body of work spans several areas of theoretical philosophy in the analytic tradition. While Burge has made important contributions to the philosophy of language and logic, he is most renowned for his work in philosophy of mind and epistemology. In particular, he is known for articulating and developing a view he labels ‘anti-individualism.’ In his later work, Burge connects his views with state-of-the-art scientific theory. Despite this emphasis on empirical considerations, Burge stands in (...)
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  2. Kant and Strawson on the Content of Geometrical Concepts.Katherine Dunlop - 2012 - Noûs 46 (1):86-126.
    This paper considers Kant's understanding of conceptual representation in light of his view of geometry.
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  3. Why Euclid’s Geometry Brooked No Doubt: J. H. Lambert on Certainty and the Existence of Models.Katherine Dunlop - 2009 - Synthese 167 (1):33-65.
    J. H. Lambert proved important results of what we now think of as non-Euclidean geometries, and gave examples of surfaces satisfying their theorems. I use his philosophical views to explain why he did not think the certainty of Euclidean geometry was threatened by the development of what we regard as alternatives to it. Lambert holds that theories other than Euclid's fall prey to skeptical doubt. So despite their satisfiability, for him these theories are not equal to Euclid's in justification. Contrary (...)
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  4.  8
    Laws of Nature in Kant’s Critical Philosophy.Katherine Dunlop - forthcoming - Metascience:1-6.
  5.  8
    The Origins and “Possibility” of Concepts in Wolff and Kant: Comments on Nicholas Stang, Kant's Modal Metaphysics.Katherine Dunlop - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):1134-1140.
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  6.  46
    Mathematical Method and Newtonian Science in the Philosophy of Christian Wolff.Katherine Dunlop - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):457-469.
  7.  14
    Poincaré on the Foundations of Arithmetic and Geometry. Part 2: Intuition and Unity in Mathematics.Katherine Dunlop - 2017 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 7 (1):88-107.
    Part 1 of this article exposed a tension between Poincaré’s views of arithmetic and geometry and argued that it could not be resolved by taking geometry to depend on arithmetic. Part 2 aims to resolve the tension by supposing not merely that intuition’s role is to justify induction on the natural numbers but rather that it also functions to acquaint us with the unity of orders and structures and show practices to fit or harmonize with experience. I argue that in (...)
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  8.  84
    Isaac Newton's Scientific Method: Turning Data Into Evidence About Gravity and Cosmology by William L. Harper (Review).Katherine Dunlop - 2013 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 51 (3):489-491.
    Not a full treatment of Newton’s scientific method, this book discusses his optical research only in passing (342–43). Its subtitle better indicates its scope: it focuses narrowly on the argument for universal gravitation in Book III of the Principia. The philosophical project is to set out an “ideal of empirical success” realized by the argument. Newton claims his method is to “deduce” propositions “from phenomena.” On Harper’s interpretation Newton’s phenomena are patterns of data, which are used to measure “parameters” by (...)
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  9. The Unity of Time's Measure: Kant's Reply to Locke.Katherine Dunlop - 2009 - Philosophers' Imprint 9:1-31.
    In a crucial passage of the second-edition Transcendental Deduction, Kant claims that the concept of motion is central to our understanding of change and temporal order. I show that this seemingly idle claim is really integral to the Deduction, understood as a replacement for Locke’s “physiological” epistemology (cf. A86-7/B119). Béatrice Longuenesse has shown that Kant’s notion of distinctively inner receptivity derives from Locke. To explain the a priori application of concepts such as succession to this mode of sensibility, Kant construes (...)
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  10.  21
    Poincaré on the Foundations of Arithmetic and Geometry. Part 1: Against “Dependence-Hierarchy” Interpretations.Katherine Dunlop - 2016 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 6 (2):274-308.
    The main goal of part 1 is to challenge the widely held view that Poincaré orders the sciences in a hierarchy of dependence, such that all others presuppose arithmetic. Commentators have suggested that the intuition that grounds the use of induction in arithmetic also underlies the conception of a continuum, that the consistency of geometrical axioms must be proved through arithmetical induction, and that arithmetical induction licenses the supposition that certain operations form a group. I criticize each of these readings. (...)
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  11.  40
    Arbitrary Combination and the Use of Signs in Mathematics: Kant's 1763 Prize Essay and its Wolffian Background.Katherine Dunlop - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (5-6):658-685.
    In his 1763 Prize Essay, Kant is thought to endorse a version of formalism on which mathematical concepts need not apply to extramental objects. Against this reading, I argue that the Prize Essay has sufficient resources to explain how the objective reference of mathematical concepts is secured. This account of mathematical concepts’ objective reference employs material from Wolffian philosophy. On my reading, Kant's 1763 view still falls short of his Critical view in that it does not explain the universal, unconditional (...)
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  12.  69
    The Role of Visual Language in Berkeley’s Account of Generality.Katherine Dunlop - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):525-559.
  13.  67
    The Mathematical Form of Measurement and the Argument for Proposition I in Newton's Principia.Katherine Dunlop - 2012 - Synthese 186 (1):191-229.
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  14.  28
    The Wolffian Paradigm and its Discontents: Kant's Containment Definition of Analyticity in Historical Context.Katherine Dunlop - 2012 - Noûs 46 (1).
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  15.  25
    Review: Mosser, Kurt, Necessity and Possibility: The Logical Strategy of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason[REVIEW]Katherine Dunlop - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (5).
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  16.  8
    Niccolò Guicciardini. Isaac Newton on Mathematical Certainty and Method. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009. Pp. 422. $55.00. [REVIEW]Katherine Dunlop - 2011 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 1 (2):359-364.
  17.  3
    Jeremy Gray, Henri Poincaré: A Scientific Biography. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press , 608 Pp., $35.00.Katherine Dunlop - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (3):481-486.
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  18.  2
    Peter Achinstein. Evidence and Method. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. Xv+177. $24.95.Katherine Dunlop - 2014 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 4 (2):361-365.