13 found
Order:
See also
Profile: Mattia Gallotti (University of London)
  1.  86
    Social Cognition in the We-Mode.Mattia Gallotti & Chris Frith - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):160-165.
  2.  79
    A Naturalistic Argument for the Irreducibility of Collective Intentionality.Mattia Gallotti - 2012 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (1):3-30.
    According to many philosophers and scientists, human sociality is explained by our unique capacity to “share” attitudes with others. The conditions under which mental states are shared have been widely debated in the past two decades, focusing especially on the issue of their reducibility to individual intentionality and the place of collective intentions in the natural realm. It is not clear, however, to what extent these two issues are related and what methodologies of investigation are appropriate in each case. In (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  3.  8
    Collective Intentionality and Socially Extended Minds.Mattia Gallotti & Bryce Huebner - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-18.
    There are many ways to advance our understanding of the human mind by studying different kinds of sociality. Our aim in this introduction is to situate claims about extended cognition within a broader framework of research on human sociality. We briefly discuss the existing landscape, focusing on ways of defending socially extended cognition. We then draw on resources from the recent literature on the socially extended mind, as well as the literature on collective intentionality, to provide a framework for thinking (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  33
    Response to Di Paolo Et Al.: How, Exactly, Does It ‘Just Happen’? Interaction by Magic.Mattia Gallotti & Chris Frith - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (7):304-305.
  5.  52
    Naturalizing Intention in Action. [REVIEW]Mattia Gallotti - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):1-4.
    Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-4, Ahead of Print.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6.  30
    Why We Cooperate. [REVIEW]Mattia Gallotti - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (2):183-190.
  7.  17
    Why Not the First-Person Plural in Social Cognition?Mattia Gallotti - 2013 - Behavioural and Brain Sciences 36 (4):422-423.
    Through the mental alignment that sustains social interactions, the minds of individuals are shared. One interpretation of shared intentionality involves the ability of individuals to perceive features of the action scene from the perspective of the group (the ). This first-person plural approach in social cognition is distinct from and preferable to the second-person approach proposed in the target article.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  3
    Why Not the First-Person Plural in Social Cognition?Mattia Gallotti - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):422-423.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  2
    The Extended Mind, by RichardMenary . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010, 390 Pp. ISBN 9780262014038. [REVIEW]Mattia Gallotti - 2014 - European Journal of Philosophy 22:e12-e15.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. No Title Available: Reviews.Mattia Gallotti - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (2):183-190.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Review of Why We Cooperate. [REVIEW]Mattia Gallotti - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (2):183-190.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition.Mattia Gallotti & John Michael (eds.) - 2014 - Springer.
    Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition brings together contributions discussing issues arising from theoretical and empirical research on social ontology and social cognition. It is the first comprehensive interdisciplinary collection in this rapidly expanding area. The contributors draw upon their diverse backgrounds in philosophy, cognitive science, behavioral economics, sociology of science and anthropology. -/- Based largely on contributions to the first Aarhus-Paris conference held at the University of Aarhus in June 2012, the book addresses such questions as: If the (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Objects in Mind.Mattia Gallotti & John Michael - 2014 - In Mattia Gallotti & John Michael (eds.), Perspectives on Social Ontology and Social Cognition. Springer.