Résultat des recherches du philosophe allemand positiviste ayant pour objectif d'établir un système logique de constitution des concepts par dérivation, à partir d'un petit nombre de concepts fondamentaux.

Ideals (or ideal values) help people to navigate in social life. They indicate at a very fundamental level what people are concerned about, what they strive for, and what they want to be affiliated with. Transferring this to a leader-follower analysis, our first study (n = 306) confirms that followers' identification and satisfaction with their leaders are stronger, the more leaders match followers' ideal leader values. Study 2 (n = 244) extends the perspective by introducing the novel concept of counterideals (...) (i. e., how an ideal leader should not be) as a second, non-redundant point of reference. Results confirm that a leader's match on ideal and on counter-ideal values have independent effects in that both explain unique variance in followers' identification and satisfaction with their leader. Study 3 (n = 136) replicates the previous results in an experimental scenario study and provides evidence for the proposed causal direction of the underlying process. We conclude that counter-ideal values might be an additional point of reference that people use to triangulate targets above and beyond ideal values and discuss the implications of our findings for value research and management. (shrink)

The ArgumentThis essay attempts to show the decisive importance of the “scientific discipline” for any historical or sociological analysis of modern science. There are two reasons for this:1. A discontinuity can be observed at the beginning of modern science: the “discipline,” which up until that time had been a classificatorily generated unit of the ordering of knowledge for purposes of instruction in schools and universities, develops into a genuine and concrete social system of scientific communication. Scientific disciplines as concrete systems (...) (Realsysteme) arise as a result of (a) the communicative stabilization of “scientific communities” at the end of the eighteenth century and the formation of “appropriate” roles and organizational structures (in universities); (b) the structural differentiation of the new scientific disciplines from the established professions (law, theology, medicine) in Europe; (c) the formation of scientific communication in the standardized form of scientific publication; the distinction of the separate action-type “scientific research” and the differentiation of these two elementary acts of all future scientific endeavor in relation to each other.2. The scientific discipline as primary unit of the internal differentiation of science has, since its genesis, been stabilized by two conditions: (a) The fact of a science differentiated into a plurality of (competing, mutually stimulating) disciplinary perspectives becomes the chief causal factor underlying the developmental dynamism of modern science; (b) Similar to the way in which the discipline functions as a cognitive address within the system of science, science also links the discipline up as a structural unit (utilized in both systems) with curricular structures in the system of education — i.e., it is stabilized by the central system/environment relation of science. (shrink)

These lectures, delivered at New York University from February 20th till March 1, 1913, appeal less to students and philosophers than to the cultured public at large. I take this opportunity of expressing my sincere gratitude to the New York University, and especially to Chancellor Elmer E. Brown, for all the kindness and interest shown to me during my stay in New York.RUDOLF EUCKEN.JENA, June, 1913.

The article sketches an approach to the sociology of the stranger which is based on historical semantics, on comparative studies of social structures of premodern societies and on a reconsideration of the `classical sociology of the stranger' and of marginality (Simmel, 1908; Michels, 1929 and others; Schütz, 1944; Park, 1964). The guiding hypothesis of the article is that there is a discontinuity in the modern experience of the stranger which has not been reflected sufficiently in the classical sociology of the (...) stranger. Whereas in premodern societies membership criteria are binary codes such as `kin' vs. `stranger', `friend' vs. `enemy', and elaborate arrangements were then necessary for institutionalizing a third status (e.g. for internal strangers) between the binary alternatives, the modern experience is wholly different. Modern society is no longer a membership organization. The third status (i.e. being neither `friend' nor `stranger') has become constitutive of our everyday experience of other persons. And this everyday experience is that of indifference as our normal attitude towards most persons living in the world. A modern sociology of the stranger has to explore the facets of indifference. Indifference can be described as an interactional achievement in situations of fleeting contact. And it can be examined in its macrostructural consequences in a modern societal order in which motivations for societal engagements and therefore any willingness to care for the other are unavoidably scarce. (shrink)

Two chief problems of the theory of knowledge are the question of meaning and the question of verification. The first question asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning, in the sense of cognitive, factual meaning. The second one asks how we get to know something, how we can find out whether a given sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes the first one. Obviously we must understand a sentence, i.e. we must know its meaning, before we can (...) try to find out whether it is true or not. But, from the point of view of empiricism, there is a still closer connection between the two problems. In a certain sense, there is only one answer to the two questions. If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. And if for two sentences the conditions under which we would have to take them as true are the same, then they have the same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible. (shrink)

Riehl, A. Zu R. Hayms gedächtnis.--Schrader, W. Die seelenlehre der Griechen in der älteren lyrik.--Vaihinger, H. Die transcendentale deduktion der kategorien.--Rehmke, J. Wechselwirkung oder parallelismus?--Wentscher, M. Das problem der willensfreiheit bei Lotze.--Kühnemann, E. Über die grundlagen der lehre des Spinoza.--Volkelt, J. Die kunst des individualisierens in den dichtungen Jean Pauls.--Uphues, G. Über die idee einer pädagogik als bildungswissenschaft. Über die idee einer philosophie des christentums.--Lipps, T. Von der form der ästhetischen apperception.--Schwarz, H. Gefallen und lust.--Medicus, F. Die beiden prinzipien der (...) sittlichen beurteilung.--Reischle, M. Jesu worte von der ewigen bestimmung der menschenseele in religionsgeschichtlicher beleuchtung. (shrink)

Moral behaviour, based on social norms, is commonly regarded as a hallmark of humans. Hitherto, humans are perceived to be the only species possessing social norms and to engage in moral behaviour. There is anecdotal evidence suggesting their presence in chimpanzees, but systematic studies are lacking. Here, we examine the evolution of human social norms and their underlying psychological mechanisms. For this, we distinguish between conventions, cultural social norms and universal social norms. We aim at exploring whether chimpanzees possess evolutionary (...) precursors of universal social norms seen in humans. Chimpanzees exhibit important preconditions for their presence and enforcement: tolerant societies, well-developed social-cognitive skills and empathetic competence. Here, we develop a theoretical framework for recognizing different functional levels of social norms and distinguish them from mere statistical behavioural regularities. Quasi social norms are found where animals behave functionally moral without having moral emotions. In proto social norms, moral emotions might be present but cannot be collectivized due to the absence of a uniquely human psychological trait, i.e. shared intentionality. Human social norms, whether they are universal or cultural, involve moral emotions and are collectivized. We will discuss behaviours in chimpanzees that represent potential evolutionary precursors of human universal social norms, with special focus on social interactions involving infants. We argue that chimpanzee infants occupy a special status within their communities and propose that tolerance towards them might represent a proto social norm. Finally, we discuss possible ways to test this theoretical framework. (shrink)

The social problem incites the Belgian catholics to study scientifically the human collectivity. As early as the nineteen-eighties learned societies are ouded, seminars, congresses, lectures are organized, a review is launched. At the Catholic University of Louvain the School of Political and Social Sciences is inaugurated in 1892. The sociological approach of the problems becomes wide-spread.All this movement is prepared by the work of a pioneer : Edouard Ducpétiaux. He opens the way by his numerous publications and realizations in as (...) various fields as the social inquiries, statistics, sociography, social economics, political science, criminology... The article analyses his methodology and shows place of E. Ducpétiaux among the main intellectual currents of the past century. (shrink)

Two chief problems of the theory of knowledge are the question of meaning and the question of verification. The first question asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning, in the sense of cognitive, factual meaning. The second one asks how we get to know something, how we can find out whether a given sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes the first one. Obviously we must understand a sentence, i.e. we must know its meaning, before we can (...) try to find out whether it is true or not. But, from the point of view of empiricism, there is a still closer connection between the two problems. In a certain sense, there is only one answer to the two questions. If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. And if for two sentences the conditions under which we would have to take them as true are the same, then they have the same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible. (shrink)

From the contents: Philosophie, Politik und Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: zur Frage der Philosophie in Osterreich und Deutschland (B. Smith). - Facts, truths and the ontology of logical realism (H. Hochberg). - Franz Brentano und die Wiederentdeckung der Intentionalitat Richtigstellung herkommlicher Missverstandnisse und Missdeutungen (M. Antonelli). - Erneuerung der Philosophia Perennis: uber die ersten vier Habilitationsthesen Brentanos (W. Sauer). - Confessions of a Meinongian logician (D. Jacquette). - Lewis and Sylvan on noneism (A. Witherall). - What is it to compose a musical (...) work (M.E. Reicher).". (shrink)

The Italian translation of R. Virchow’s conference of 1859 "Atome und Individuen". Virchow’s emphasis on the federal structure of the biological individual as composed of "cell-territories" supersedes the previous cellular atomis, and can be considered as a turning point in the establishment of a modular approach to the organism.

. E. O. Wilson writes that the “choice between transcendentalism and empiricism” is this century's “version of the struggle for men's soul” . The transcendentalist argues for theism—that there is a God, a creator of the world. The empiricist instead makes the point that the notion of God, including morality and ethics, are adaptive structures of human evolution. Before entering the debate of the transcendentalist/empiricist controversy I analyze how things exist and suggest that all that is exists as united diversity, (...) as identity in difference. I argue that oneness by itself is intangible because wholes are concrete only through their tangible parts. I briefly discuss this understanding of existence in the realm of art to show that transcendence and immanence are not mutually exclusive but constitute each other. I conclude that existence, the hypostasis of unity in diversity, might be seen as a gift from absolute existence. In this view, the world might reveal itself as a gift that reflects the trinitarian existence of the Giver. (shrink)

Uma leitura atenta de Para lá do Princípio de Prazer de Freud sugere que o mecanismo da repetição cega, a oposição a toda a mudança e uma vontade niilista em afirmar o seu próprio poder excessivo caracterizam todas as pulsões. O que distingue as pulsões de morte das outras pulsões deve ser procurado noutra coisa, tal como uma forma particular de prazer ou destruição agressiva. Apesar do seu regresso a Freud, Lacan dá conta de uma nova imagem do mecanismo de (...) repetição. Quer aquilo que se repete seja a expressão de um trauma quer seja de um desejo inconsciente, a repetição ameaça sempre o princípio de prazer e a sua gestão por um ego imaginário. Para Lacan, a repetição descontrolada apela insistentemente à instituição de um sujeito cujo desejo simbolicamente determinado se situa para lá do curso natural de um princípio de prazer. (shrink)

Among the various meanings in which the word ‘probability’ is used in everyday language, in the discussion of scientists, and in the theories of probability, there are especially two which must be clearly distinguished. We shall use for them the terms ‘probability1’ and ‘probability2'. Probability1 is a logical concept, a certain logical relation between two sentences ; it is the same as the concept of degree of confirmation. I shall write briefly “c” for “degree of confirmation,” and “c” for “the (...) degree of confirmation of the hypothesis h on the evidence e“; the evidence is usually a report on the results of our observations. On the other hand, probability2 is an empirical concept; it is the relative frequency in the long run of one property with respect to another. The controversy between the so-called logical conception of probability, as represented e.g. by Keynes, and Jeffreys, and others, and the frequency conception, maintained e.g. by v. Mises and Reichenbach, seems to me futile. These two theories deal with two different probability concepts which are both of great importance for science. Therefore, the theories are not incompatible, but rather supplement each other. (shrink)

O presente texto, apresentado originalmente numa mesa inter-religiosa, procura, sob forma de teses, contribuir para com uma postura religiosa sincera, autocrítica e crítico-construtiva em relação à sociedade e seus agentes, na busca do bem comum. Longe de serem as únicas atrizes, e ainda que pressupondo um estado laico, as religiões não deixam de ser uma força importante para a legitimação e o exercício de uma cultura da paz. Nessa caminhada, não se deve desconsiderar o aspecto da exclusividade salvífica que, de (...) uma forma ou outra, está presente em todas as religiões. Estar convicto da validade e universalidade da própria fé não precisa, contudo, significar que se exclui a possibilidade de outros caminhos também serem verdadeiros. Importa ter abertura ao diálogo e à aprendizagem mútua, bem como colocar o bem comum antes dos interesses próprios. A Igreja Evangélica de confissão Luterana no Brasil (IECLB), que representei na referida mesa, vem se preocupando há muito tempo com a paz acompanhada de justiça social. Assim, o texto é dedicado ao Pastor Richard Harvey Wangen, incansável advogado da paz através da prática da não-violência, e encerra-se com uma oração de intercessão da referida Igreja, convidando suas comunidades a unir-se na promoção de uma cultura de paz e de não-violência. Palavras-chave: Paz; Cristianismo; Tradição evangélicoluterana; Diálogo inter-religioso. ABSTRACT This article, originally presented at an inter-religious panel, seeks to contribute to a sincere, self-critical and critically constructive attitude in relation to society and its actors, in order to foster bonum commune. Far from being the only actors, and presupposing a lay State, religions still remain an important force for the legitimacy and exercise of a culture of peace. On the road, the aspect of exclusiveness of salvation must not be overlooked, as it is present in some way or another in all religions. To be convinced of the validity and universality of one’s own faith, however, does not imply the negation of truth in other religions. It is important to be open to dialogue and mutual learning, as well as to seek bonum commune before one’s own interests. The Igreja Evangélica de Confissão Luterana no Brasil – IECLB (Evangelical Church of Lutheran Confession in Brazil), which the author represented at the panel, has been dealing with issues of peace with social justice for quite a long time. Thus, this text is dedicated to the memory of the Rev. Richard Harvey Wangen, an untiring defender of peace through the practice of non-violence, and ends with an intercessory prayer of that Church, inviting its congregations to unite in the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence. Key words: Peace; Christianity; Lutheran tradition; Inter-religious dialogue. (shrink)