In the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant formulates teleological principles, or rather ideas, and explicates them referring to concrete examples of natural science such as chemistry, astronomy, biology, empirical psychology, and physical geography. Despite the increasing interest in the systematic relevance of the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic and its importance for Kant’s conception of natural science, the numerous historical sources for the regulative use of reason have not yet been investigated. One that is very central is Maupertuis’ principle (...) of least action. In 1781, Kant transformed teleology into heuristics and methodology, but in doing so, he partially develops a teleology which was disqualified by Maupertuis because its starting point lies in the construction of animals or plants, the structure of the earth, and the immensity of the celestial bodies. Based on Maupertuis’ principle of action, it can be shown that the Appendix forms a systematic interface between Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens and Critique of Judgement which allows the reconstruction of Kant’s regulative use of reason and its specific status in the context of natural science and his critical appraisal of Maupertuis. (shrink)

Im ersten Teil des Anhangs zur Transzendentalen Dialektik entwickelt Kant einen Übergang zwischen dem logischen Gebrauch der Vernunft und den transzendentalen Prinzipien der Vernunft. Basierend auf methodologischen Überlegungen zur Chemie, zur physiologischen Anthropologie und zur Entwicklungsgeschichte astronomischer Grundannahmen versucht Kant, diese Prinzipien in ihrem transzendentalen Status zu rechtfertigen und ihre Kompatibilität mit anderen Teilen der Kritik der reinen Vernunft nachzuweisen. Ausgehend von diesen wissenschaftstheoretischen Beispielen wird für eine heuristisch- pragmatische Rechtfertigung der transzendentalen Prinzipien der Vernunft und eine ideelle Funktion der (...) durch diese Prinzipien gewonnenen Ideen argumentiert. Dabei lässt sich die enge Verbindung zwischen den transzendentalen Prinzipien des ersten Teils des Anhangs zur Transzendentalen Dialektik und Kants Konzept der rationalen Naturwissenschaft in den Metaphysischen Anfangsgründen der Naturwissenschaft nachweisen. (shrink)

In The Philosophical Criticism, Alois Riehl developed a realistic interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism based on his theory of space and time. In doing so, more than 100 years ago, he formulated an interpretation of the relation between the thing in itself and appearances that is discussed in current research as the metaphysical „dual aspect“ interpretation, although it is rarely attributed to Riehl. To reconstruct Riehl’s position, the research results of comparative studies on Moritz Schlick are systematically extended and applied (...) to the current debate on Kant’s transcendental idealism. (shrink)

In a crucial paragraph (KrV, A 663-664 / B 691-692) of the first part of the “Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic”, Kant discusses the specific status of the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity. In doing so, he refers to an already proven argument and thus to other passages of the Critique of Pure Reason. In search of this argument the “Transcendental Analytic” but in particular the “first book” of the “Transcendental Dialectic” turn out to be possible reference points. Although (...) this contextualisation demands further systematic and editorial reflections, it also allows the clarification of the status of the principles and their justification in relation to a subjective deduction. Kant offers with the subjective deduction, as introduced in the “Preface” (of the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason) and again in the “first book” of the “Transcendental Dialectic”, a first argumentative strategy, which differs from the objective one but provides “some objective validity” (KrV, A 664 / B 692; Kant, 1998, p. 602) and therefore has systematic importance for the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity. My aim is to offer immanent strategies for a justification of the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity in the framework of the Critique of Pure Reason. (shrink)

In der 1970 gegr ndeten Reihe erscheinen Arbeiten, die philosophiehistorische Studien mit einem systematischen Ansatz oder systematische Studien mit philosophiehistorischen Rekonstruktionen verbinden. Neben deutschsprachigen werden auch englischsprachige Monographien ver ffentlicht. Gr ndungsherausgeber sind: Erhard Scheibe (Herausgeber bis 1991), G nther Patzig (bis 1999) und Wolfgang Wieland (bis 2003). Von 1990 bis 2007 wurde die Reihe von J rgen Mittelstra mitherausgegeben.

An important contribution to our thought about human society. A classic, long out of print.

Samples of Steiner's work are to be found in this introductory reader in which Andrew Welburn brings together excerpts from Steiner's many talks and writings on Religion. This volume also features an editorial introduction, commentary and notes. Topics include: mysticism and beyond: the importance of prayer; the meaning of sin and grace; rediscovering the Bible; true communion; rediscovering the festivals and the life of the earth; finding one's destiny: walking with Christ; the significance of religion in life and death; Christ's (...) second coming: the truth for our time; universal religion: and the meaning of love. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Byzantinische Zeitschrift Jahrgang: 111 Heft: 3 Seiten: 813-815.

As early as 1884, while tutoring a boy with special needs, Steiner began a lifelong interest in applying spiritual knowledge to the practical aspects of life. Steiner originally published the essay at the core of this book in 1907. It represents his earliest ideas on education, in which he lays out the soul spiritual processes of human development, describing the need to understand how the being of a child develops through successive "births," beginning with the physical body's entry into earthly (...) life, and culminating in the emergence of the I-being with adulthood. Also included here are several early lectures on education (1906-1911). Contents: "The Education of the Child in the Light of Spiritual Science," essay "Teaching from a Foundation of Spiritual Insight," Berlin, May 14, 1906 "Education in the Light of Spiritual Science," Cologne, December 1, 1906 "Education and Spiritual Science," Berlin, January 24, 1907 "Interests, Talent, and Educating Children," Nuremberg, November 14, 1910 "Interests, Talent, and Education," Berlin, January 12, 1911. (shrink)

9 lectures, Oxford, England, August 16-29, 1922 (CW 305) These lectures follow from those presented in Soul Economy. Given during a conference on spiritual values in education and life and attended by many prominent people of the time, Steiner's Oxford lectures present the principles of Waldorf education at the highest cultural level. The Manchester Guardian reported: "Dr. Steiner's lectures...brought to us in a very vivid way an ideal of humanity in education. He spoke to us about teachers who, freely and (...) unitedly, unrestricted by external prescription, develop their educational methods exclusively out of a thorough knowledge of human nature. He spoke to us about a kind of knowledge needed by the teacher, a knowledge of the being of man and the world, which is at the same time scientific and also penetrates into the most intimate inner life, which is intuitive and artistic." These lectures form one of the best introductions to Waldorf education. Contents: Introduction by Christopher Bamford The Spiritual Ground of Education The Perception of Soul and Spirit The Spiritual Ground of Physical Education The Art of Educating Young Children The Art of Educating Older Boys and Girls Teachers As Artists in Education The Organization of the Waldorf School Moral Teaching & Eurythmy in the Waldorf School Teachers in the Waldorf School German source: Die geistig-seelischen Grundkr fte der Erziehungskunst. Spirituelle Werte in Erziehung und sozialem Leben (GA 305). (shrink)

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

From the INTRODUCTION. The measurement of intelligence at the present time is a well recognized part of psychology. The growth of this work and the interest shown in it during the last three decades have been truly remarkable. We have witnessed the establishment of innumerable clinics and the appearance of the "mental tester." This growth has been characterized by the practical considerations of clinical examinations. The need for a psychological examination has been recognized and answers to practical situations have been (...) demanded before the psychologist has really had time to formulate his own conceptions of the whole problem. Theoretical considerations have lagged behind the practical application of mental tests. We have been measuring intelligence long before we have decided as to what intelligence really is. Far from being a drawback, as this at first sight would appear to be, it has in fact proved' to be of distinct advantage, since the measurement of this something, that we have been making, is leading us slowly but surely to a real knowledge of what can with profit be called "general intelligence." Only after considerable work with mental tests did psychologists arrive at the now generally accepted definition of intelligence, as enunciated by Stern, that "Intelligence is a general capacity of an individual consciously to adjust his thinking to new requirements: it is general mental adaptability to new problems and conditions of life." Although even this definition of intelligence may be modified in the future, it serves, at the present time, as a good working hypothesis for the selection of tests for mental measurement. Other conceptions of general intelligence are numerous and many are very similar. Binet, for example, says: "It seems to us that in intelligence there is a fundamental faculty, the alteration or the lack of which is of the utmost importance for practical life. This faculty is judgment, otherwise called good sense, initiative, the faculty of adapting one's self to circumstances. To judge well, to comprehend well, to reason well, these are the essential activities of intelligence." Meumann says general intelligence depends on two qualities, "(1) on the capacity for independent, productive thought (productive, synthetic thinking).... (2).the intensity of the whole mental life." Ebbinghaus makes intelligence include abstraction and the ability to compare and contrast. Burt says that the result of his work "strongly suggests that it is one feature or function of attentive consciousness which forms the basis of intelligence, namely, the power of readjustment to relatively novel situations by organizing new psycho-physical co-ordinations." And lastly Hart and Spearman look upon general intelligence as a "common factor" or "central tendency" not exactly definable, but entering into all sorts of mental activities to a greater or less degree. In addition to these hypotheses as to the nature of intelligence, theoretical considerations as to the growth of intelligence and the general distribution of the various grades of intelligence are arising as a direct result of the practical work being done. Questions as to the rate of increase in normal mentality are being raised, and the theoretical assumptions, upon which we base our classification of individuals into different groups, are being discussed. (shrink)

Notes on Rudolf Allers and his thought -- Introduction -- Cause in psychology -- Irresistible impulses -- Vis cogitativa and evaluation -- The cognitive aspect of emotion -- The limitations of medical psychology -- Intuition and abstraction -- Philosophia-philanthropia -- Ethics and anthropology -- The dialectics of freedom -- Psychiatry and the role of personal belief -- Reflections on co-operation and communication -- Ontoanalysis : a new trend in psychiatry -- Work and play -- The Freud legend.

Distributor statement from label mounted on t.p.

The Brentano-Meinong concept of self-presentation is discussed and defined. A property P is said to be self-presenting, i f and only if, P is necessarily such that, for every x, i f x has P and considers the question whether he has P, then it is evident to x that he has P. A definition of the purely psychological is propojsed. Then the following material epistemic principle is discussed and defended: A property P is self-presenting to a person x, i (...) f and only if, P is entailed by a purely psychological property of x. (shrink)

In the field of theory formation some of the old metaphysical questions attract the attention of philosophers anew. The idea that observational terms refer to objects only in a theoretical mode leads to a comparison of fables and theories. Meinong's concept of incomplete objects is used for linking these two ways of constructing objects. Lessing's theory of fables is then compared with the new anti-positivist theory of science by pointing out some striking similarities.

The paper attempts to give an outline of the main doctrines of the Brentano-School and to mark the place of Bergman's contributions to descriptive Psychology. The idea of an immanent object is rejected by Marty and Bergman and was critized by Bergman in the framework of the 'concept-intuition'-distinction. It is shown that Bergman's critic leads to an interesting defense of the thesis of the privacy of mental contents.