Cet article s’intéresse en premier lieu à quelques passages des Esquisses pyrrhoniennes de Sextus (I 1-3 ; 8-10 ; III 119-122). Ces « études de cas » permettent d’examiner la relation dialectique entre Sextus et Aristote. Le Stagirite y est représenté à la fois comme une sorte de primus inter dogmaticos pares, et par conséquent comme une cible privilégiée des attaques pyrrhoniennes contre les dogmatismes, et, de façon indirecte, comme une sorte d’« ombre » se profilant derrière l’attitude critique de (...) Sextus. Parallèlement, la stratégie de Sextus consiste à utiliser le matériel aristotélicien à l’appui soit de l’attitude propre à l’ἀγωγή sceptique, soit de la construction d’une διαφωνία spécifique. En second lieu, la section finale de l’article examine en outre un passage difficile du Contre les moralistes (XI 77‑78), proposant une correction qui permettrait, en éliminant le nom d’Aristote, d’y voir une citation d’Ariston. (shrink)

Praise for First Edition: `This book is highly recommended to a wide range of people as a clear and systematic introduction to phenomenological psychology... the book has set the stage for possible new colloquia between the phenomenological and other approaches in psychology' - Changes `As a trainee interested in matters existential, I have been put off in the past by the long-winded and confusing texts usually available in academic libraries. Thankfully, here is a text that remedies that situation... [it] provides (...) a readable and insightful account' - Clinical Psychology Forum 'Spinelli’s classic introduction to phenomenology should be essential reading on all person-centred, existential and humanistic trainings, and any other counselling or psychotherapy course which aims to help students develop an in-depth understanding of human lived-experience. This book is sure to remain a key text for many years to come' - Mick Cooper, Senior Lecturer in Counselling, University of Strathclyde 'This is by far the most monumental, erudite, comprehensive, authoritative case that Existentialism and Phenomenology (a) have a rightful place in the academy; (b) are tough-minded bodies of thought; (c) have rigorous scientific foundations; (d) bequeath a distinctive school of psychotherapy and counselling; and (e) are just as good as the more established systems of psychology' - Alvin R. Mahrer, Ph.D. University of Ottawa, Canada, Author of The Complete Guide To Experiential Psychotherapy 'This book’s rich insight into the lacunae of modern psychological thinking illustrates the contribution that existential phenomenology can make to founding a coherently mature Psychology that is both fully human(e) and responsibly ‘scientific’ in the best sense of that term' - Richard House, Ph.D., Magdalen Medical Practice, Norwich; Steiner Waldorf teacher. The Interpreted World, Second Edition, is a welcome introduction to phenomenological psychology, an area of psychology which has its roots in notoriously difficult philosophical literature. Writing in a highly accessible, jargon-free style, Ernesto Spinelli traces the philosophical origins of phenomenological theory and presents phenomenological perspectives on central topics in psychology - perception, social cognition and the self. He compares the phenomenological approach with other major contemporary psychological approaches, pointing up areas of divergence and convergence with these systems. He also examines implications of phenomenology for the precepts and process of psychotherapy. For the Second Edition, a new chapter on phenomenological research has been added in which the author focuses on the contribution of phenomenology in relation to contemporary scientific enquiry. He describes the methodology used in phenomenological research and illustrates the approach through an actual research study. The Interpreted World, Second Edition demystifies an exciting branch of psychology, making its insights available to all students of psychology, psychotherapy and counselling. (shrink)

The problem to be discussed in this paper is what it could have meant, in Epicurus’ words, to call oneself "autodidact", a term which in various philosophers is applied in a similar sense. As will be shown, with regard to Epicurus, autodidaxía has various meanings: a) the philosophical area within which the proper doctrine is made and conceived; b) the requirement of originality in one’s own thinking; c) that knowledge of oneself is without a master, as is also well-doing in (...) moral acting; d) that self-knowledge requires autárkeia; e) that Epicurus, in this respect, cannot be separated from Socrates. (shrink)

Antes da Filosofia, a Sabedoria era a que continha o "saber" humano haurido da experiéncia vivida. E, portanto, Sabedoria expressava mais ou menos o que hoje concebemos como Cultura. Ora, a Filosofia construiu-se mediante a operacionalização de uma passagem: do contexto da Cultura (a qual se expressava mediante um sistema simbolico próprio do mito, da religião e da literatura heróica) para o contexto da Ciencia (a qual se expressou, na dependència do antigo, através de um novo sistema simbólico conceitual, pelo (...) exercicio de uma determinada competência). Do contexto de uma Sabedoria experimental, organizada no tempo da experiência da vida, construiu-se uma habilidade de tipo próprio: a de elaborar considerações sábias ou a de formular máximas mediante observações precisas. Tales representa, nos primórdios da descoberta do pensamento racional, orientando-a, não tanto para o governo da vida ou do viver, mas para o governo da Natureza, pela observação dos seus fenómenos. É sobre a instauração desta nova atitude (inferida do exercicio prático e não de discurso teórico feito por Tales) que se detém este artigo. Ele versa, num primeiro momento, sobre a sua figura de Sábio; sobre a sua necessidade de viajar, como forma de estudo e de instrução; sobre o seu envolvimento com a Geometria (uma ciência de feição especulativa, mas de carácter empírico); enfim, sobre a sua habilidade teórica e prática (mediante relatos de Platão e de Aristóteles). Num segundo momento, e finalmente, aborda a sua explicação racional da "physis". /// Avant la Philosophie, la sagesse détenait le "savoir" humain extrait de l'expérience vécue. La sagesse s'approchait done de ce que nous comprenons aujourd'hui comme culture. La Philosophic est le fruit du passage du contexte de la Culture (celle qui s'exprimait par un système symbolique propre au mythe, à la religion, à la littérature héroïque) à celui de la Science (qui s'est exprimée, pour la dépendance du système ancien, par le biais d'un nouveau système symbolique conceptuel moyennant l'exercice d'une compétence détérminée). C'est à partir de la Sagesse experimentale, organisée pendant l'expérience de la vie, que s'est construite une capacité propre: celle qui consiste à élaborer des considérations sages ou à formuler des maximes moyennant des observations précises. Aux origines de la découverte de la pensée rationnelle, Thalès fut un jalon dans ce mouvement de la sagesse: il a marqué le début d'une nouvelle activité du sage, par l'exercice spécifique de la recherche ou de l'élévation rationnelle, en l'orientant, non seulement pour la conduite de la vic (ou du vivre), mais encore pour la connaissance de la nature, grace à l'observation de ses phénomenes. Le thème de cet article aborde l'instauration de cette nouvelle attitude (induite de l'exercice pratique et non du discours théorique fait par Thalès). II traite, en un premier moment, de Thalès comme Savant; de ses voyages comme forme d'etude et d'instruction, de son introduction à la Géométrie (une science de nature spéculative mais de caractère empirique); enfin, de son habileté théorique et pratique (en utilisant des récits de Platon et d'Aristote). En un second moment, il traite de son explication rationnelle de la "Physis". /// Before Philosophy, Wisdom included much of human "knowledge" learned through the experience of life. Wisdom was thus approximately what we nowadays call Culture. Philosophy was built up by way of a passage: from the context of Culture (wheh espresses itself by means of a symbolic system peculiar to myth, religion and epic literature) to the context of Science (which although still dependent from the ancient tradition expresses itself through a new conceptual symbolic system by means of the exercise of a specific competence). Out of the context of an experimental Wisdom, a specific skill developed organized on the basis of experience of life: to elaborate wise considerations, or to formulate propositions based upon precise observations. In the early days of the discovery of rational thought, Thales represents a landmark in his sapiential movement: the inauguration of a new activity of Scholars, through the specific exercise either of research or of rational speculation, directed mainly not to the rule of life, but to the rule of Nature through the observations of its phenomena. This paper deals with the instauration of this new activity (inferred from Thales 1 practice and not from his theoretical discourse). First, Thales personality of a Scholar is analysed: his need to travel as a way of study and instruction; his interest for Geometry (a science of speculative kind, but of empirical character); his theoretical and practical skill (according to the reports of both Plato and Aristotle). In a second part, Thales' rational explanation of "physis" is examined. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Consciousness and Machines:A Commentary Drawing on Japanese PhilosophyS. D. Noam Cook (bio)Viewed from within the great unity of consciousness, thinking is a wave on the surface of a great intuition.Kitarō NishidaIntroductionRecent developments in AI have made the long-standing debate about what computers can and can't do a major public concern. What we understand the properties of such machines to be, and consequently how we design [End Page 305] and (...) deploy them, will increasingly shape how we live and how we understand ourselves. Thus, there is an urgent need for better understanding of these issues.Susan Schneider, in her book Artificial You: AI and the Future of Your Mind, offers an exceptionally careful and insightful examination of key issues entailed in how we understand AI and ourselves. One of her central concerns is how we might test for machine consciousness. Given the variations in design and function among current and projected AIs, Schneider sees no likely one-size-fits-all test. So, she offers a battery of different tests that she believes together will make such testing more reliable. This seems a wise approach, and reflects the conceptual and pragmatic care Schneider takes throughout the book.Similarly, it seems to me that the question of machine consciousness should also include various understandings of consciousness itself. What consciousness is taken to be has varied widely both historically and culturally. No commonly accepted single understanding has emerged, and may never emerge. Just as having a battery of tests might help us better assess possible machine consciousness, having different understandings of consciousness might give us a better understanding of what we are testing for. The two should work in tandem, each gauging and shaping the other.Like the development of computers themselves, the predominant thinking about AI has been shaped, in part, by key presuppositions of a scientific worldview, with its origins in Western thought and culture. Among these presuppositions are materialism, reductionism, and a primary focus on objective behavior. These are reflected in the common concern with observable behavior of physical aspects of the brain in efforts to understand human consciousness, which in turn has become a familiar model for work on machine consciousness. All this is important and valuable work. But, in the spirit of Schneider's cautions, it should not be taken as one-size-fits-all. Accordingly, I offer one view of consciousness from a different perspective.In what follows, I sketch out an understanding of consciousness that draws on Japanese philosophy, particularly that of the highly influential early twentieth-century Japanese philosopher Kitarō Nishida (1870–1945). I then explore how the tests for machine consciousness that Schneider proposes might be viewed from that perspective.Consciousness: A Perspective from Japanese PhilosophyConsciousness was a central concern for Nishida, whose philosophy is deeply informed by Japanese culture and by Zen theory and practice. As one might expect from such a philosopher, Nishida's exploration of consciousness is not concerned with properties of the brain, but with what we might discern through disciplined reflection on the experience of our own consciousness. Ultimately, he views consciousness as an organic whole [End Page 306] of systemically organized interrelationships of activities and sensations within our subjective experience. This may be understood by first considering 'nothingness'.For Nishida, nothingness does not suggest an ultimate and absolute vacuity, as is often understandably assumed. In Nishida's sense, it is a singular "place" that mirrors the multifaceted world of our common experience. In understanding this, I am told by native Japanese speakers that the English word 'nothingness' has an advantage over the Japanese equivalent, 'mu', in that 'nothingness' can usefully be broken down as 'nothing-ness'. This suggests that nothingness is a state of consciousness where what we commonly experience as distinct (self, other, world, blue, ache, joy, etc.) is indistinct, a state of unified experience. This is consciousness without our finding or discriminating in it the myriad "things" of common experience, but rather a "pure experience" of a singular whole. Nishida introduces his concept of "pure experience" as follows:To experience means to know facts just as they are, to know in accordance with facts by completely relinquishing one... (shrink)

Einstein, in his “Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper”, gave a physical (operational) meaning to “time” of a remote event in describing “motion” by introducing the concept of “synchronous stationary clocks located at different places”. But with regard to “place” in describing motion, he assumed without analysis the concept of a system of co-ordinates.In the present paper, we propose a way of giving physical (operational) meaning to the concepts of “place” and “co-ordinate system”, and show how the observer can define both the (...) place and time of a remote event. Following Einstein, we consider another system “in uniform motion of translation relatively to the former”. Without assuming “the properties of homogeneity which we attribute to space and time”, we show that the definitions of space and time in the two systems are linearly related. We deduce some novel consequences of our approach regarding faster-than-light observers and particles, “one-way” and “two-way” velocities of light, symmetry, the “group property” of inertial reference frames, length contraction and time dilatation, and the “twin paradox”. Finally, we point out a flaw in Einstein’s argument in the “Electrodynamical Part” of his paper and show that the Lorentz force formula and Einstein’s formula for transformation of field quantities are mutually consistent. We show that for faster-than-light bodies, a simple modification of Planck’s formula for mass suffices. (Except for the reference to Planck’s formula, we restrict ourselves to Physics of 1905.). (shrink)

An investigation into some of the literary features of the book of Malachi reveals that each unit is structured in a twofold way. The macrostructure of the book also shows that the book can be divided into two parts. The results of this investigation strengthens the recent trend in the research of Malachi that it is unlikely that the book underwent an extensive redactional process over a period of time and that it is rather more likely that the book was (...) written in a relatively short period of time. (shrink)

Geoffrey Rose’s prevention paradox points to a tension between two prima facie plausible moral principles: that we should save the greater number and that weshould save the most at risk. This paper argues that a novel moral theory, ex-ante contractualism, captures our intuitions in many prevention paradox cases, regardless of our interpretation of probability claims. However, it goes on to show that it might be impossible to square ex-ante contractualism with all of our moral intuitions. It concludes that even if (...) ex-ante contractualism cannot furnish an entire ethics of risk, it does identify important considerations for any such theory. (shrink)

Geoffrey Rose’s prevention paradox points to a tension between two prima facie plausible moral principles: that we should save the greater number and that weshould save the most at risk. This paper argues that a novel moral theory, ex-ante contractualism, captures our intuitions in many prevention paradox cases, regardless of our interpretation of probability claims. However, it goes on to show that it might be impossible to square ex-ante contractualism with all of our moral intuitions. It concludes that even if (...) ex-ante contractualism cannot furnish an entire ethics of risk, it does identify important considerations for any such theory. (shrink)

Emotion regulation (i.e. either up- or down-regulating affective responses to emotional stimuli) has been shown to modulate long-term emotional memory formation. Further, research has demonstrated that the emotional aspects of scenes are preferentially remembered relative to neutral aspects (known as the emotional memory trade-off effect). This trade-off is often enhanced when sleep follows learning, compared to an equivalent period of time spent awake. However, the interactive effects of sleep and emotion regulation on emotional memory are poorly understood. We presented 87 (...) participants with pictures of neutral or negative objects on neutral backgrounds paired with instructions to either increase or decrease their emotional response by altering personal relevance, or to passively view the stimuli. Following a 12 h period of sleep or wakefulness, participants were tested for their memory of objects and backgrounds separately. Although we replicated the emotional memory trade-off effect, no differences in the magnitude of the trade-off effect were observed between regulation conditions. Sleep improved all aspects of memory, but it did not preferentially benefit memory for emotional components of scenes. Irrespective of a period of sleep or wake following encoding, findings suggest emotion regulation during encoding did not influence memory for emotional items at a 12-hour delay. (shrink)

Eupolis’ fragmentary Demes has traditionally been placed in 412 bc, after the failure of the Sicilian Expedition but before the oligarchic coup of 411. Ian Storey has recently argued that the play belongs instead in 417 or perhaps 416 bc, while Mario Telò and Leone Porciani put it in 410 bc. This article demonstrates that both alternative dates face decisive objections, and suggests that Demes is better kept in 412 bc. I then briefly consider the role of late 5th-century Athenian (...) “political” comedy generally, and in particular the sort of popular sentiment that Eupolis’ comedy must have been exploiting or echoing when it was conceived in the first half of 413. (shrink)

Emergence of the requirement of justice -- Justice's major platforms -- Justice within human rights -- Judges' balancing exercise -- The calculus of social harmonization -- Equilibrating the forces of attraction and repulsion -- Principles of justice and the reasons for their mixing -- Metrics and dialectics for a reflective equilibrium -- Social institutions as equilibrium setting tools.

A recent exchange on Benatar’s book Better never to have been between Doyal and Benatar discusses Benatar’s bold claim that people should not be brought into existence. Here, I expand the discussion of original position that the exchange focused on. I also discuss the asymmetries, between benefit and harm and between existence and non-existence, upon which Benatar’s bold claim rests. In both discussions, I show how Benatar’s bold claim can be rejected.

The practice of prenatal screening for disability is sometimes objected to because of the hurt and offence such practices may cause to people currently living with disabilities. This objection is commonly termed “the expressivist objection”. In response to the objection it is standardly claimed that disabilities are analogous to illnesses. And just as it would be implausible to suppose reduction of the incidence of illnesses such as flu sends a negative message to ill people, so it is not plausible to (...) suppose prevention of disability sends a negative message to disabled people. The expressivist objection hinges, however, upon a view of the relationship between disability and self identity which sees disability as part of the identity of the disabled person, in a way in which illnesses such as flu cannot be. This possibility is generally not considered in critiques of the expressivist objection. In this paper, an “identity claim” to the effect that disabilities can be identity constituting is accepted and the force of the expressivist argument is reconsidered in the light of its acceptance. It is concluded that even when such an identity claim is accepted, the expressivist objection is still not morally compelling. (shrink)

This paper discusses the predicament of Oscar Pistorius. He is a Paralympic gold medallist who wishes to participate in the Olympics in Beijing in 2008. Following a brief introductory section, the paper discusses the arguments that could be, and have been, deployed against his participation in the Olympics, should he make the qualifying time for his chosen event (400m). The next section discusses a more hypothetical argument based upon a specific understanding of the fair opportunity rule. According to this, there (...) may be a case for allowing Pistorius to compete even if he should fail to make the official qualifying time. The final part of the paper reviews the situation at the time of writing and offers some assessment of the strategy of the IAAF in responding to it. It is argued below that the proper focus for assessment of Pistorius's eligibility to compete should not be on whether his blades lead to his having an unfair advantage over his competitors, but instead should focus on whether what he does counts as running. (shrink)

Menachem Butler. Bibliography: Mark Steiner’s main works, pp. 3–7.