This article argues that in Beyond Good and Evil (BGE) Nietzsche defends “will to power” as a transcendentally ideal condition of objectivity, in the sense in which Kant considers, say, space, time, or the concepts of substance and causation to be such conditions. The article shows how Nietzsche’s engage-ment with the transcendental idealist arguments of his Kantian contemporaries leads him to reject naturalism and to adopt a peculiarly transcendental kind of skepticism, which rejects as unjustified the conditions that (...) would make objec-tivity possible. The article then turns to the argument for “will to power” in BGE 36, showing that it is best read as defending a transcendentally ideal condition of objectivity, and thus as responding to transcendental skepticism. The article concludes by elaborating on this understanding of “will to power,” particularly in relation to the sense of causality that Nietzsche invokes and in comparison with Kant’s own transcendental claims. (shrink)

It is common to experience hostile emotions like frustration, anger and hate in our everyday life. It could be sufficient a mere hindrance obstructing the pursuit of our goals to lead us thinking and justifying alternative actions to our original aim, in a manner that can redirect us to obtaining a disvalue, instead of realising the purpose of good will of our initial intention. Normally, we are unaware of this shift because the emotional process is the only perceived phenomenon. (...) This situation often contributes in a negative way to the escalation of frustration to anger, and even beyond that, to hate. Implying the phenomenological concept of will to power that is described by Edmund Husserl in his manuscript A VI 8 I, this article philosophically analyses the process of escalation. In addition to the psychological perspective, which shows the personal motivations of hostile emotions, philosophy helps to discover the structural reasons for such irrational uprising. The article presents this topic from the following steps the psychological description of frustration, anger and hate; providing contemporary instances as a showcase for these hostile emotions; discussing Husserl’s argument on the will to power; describing the notion of power and its motivation and showing its connection to realpolitik, where we can easily trace some extreme examples of power and negative emotions in narcissistic behaviors. Significantly, the overarching purpose of this investigation is to delineate the will to power as the underlying principle of experiencing hostile emotions like frustration, anger and hate. Then, the article discusses how the escalation of these hostile emotions alters our goals and values from something that we freely wanted, to something that the blind power unreasonably desired. (shrink)

This book explains and defends a naturalized reading of Nietzsche’s doctrine of will to power. By providing a new interpretation of the term, Brian Lightbody argues that other aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy, such as his ontology, epistemology and ethics become clearer and more coherent.

The will to power has non-trivial physical models taken from the class of parallel dis¬tributed processing systems, specifically wave-mechanical discrete dynamical systems with cyclical entropy. The will to power is thus linked to research in non-linear self-organizing dynami¬cal systems, includ¬ing oscillons, cellular automata, spin-glasses, Ising systems, and connectionist networks.

This paper analyzes the underlying tendencies and attitudes toward reproductive medicine borrowing the Nietzschean concepts of nihilism: “death of God” with secularization; “will to power” with reproductive liberty and technological power; and the race of “supermen” with transhumanism. Medical science has advanced in leaps and bounds. In some way, technical innovations have given us unprecedented power to manipulate the way we reproduce. The indiscriminant use of medical technology is backed by a warped notion of human freedom. (...) With secularization in the West, freedom has taken on greater significance in society, but with a heavy emphasis on individual choices and rights. As technology joins forces with sexual liberty, it is not difficult to understand why the public accepts the latest novelty from the reproductive industry. As a result, many find Catholic teaching behind the times and incomprehensible, if not downright anti-scientific. In fact, this coupling of reproductive liberty (will) with reproductive technology (power) echoes the famous dictum “will to power” Nietzsche predicted would characterize post-modern societies. When liberty becomes absolute and technology unchecked, transhumanism is the logical outcome. As a response to these nihilistic tendencies, the paper will end with a critique drawing from theological insights. (shrink)

On Heidegger's Beitraege and the influence of Nietzsche's Will to Power (a famous non-book).

This paper challenges a near universal assumption regarding the third treatise of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality : that its main concern is to explain the attraction or power of the ascetic ideal. I argue that GM III’s main concern is normative rather than descriptive-explanatory. An earlier paper argues that GM III’s leading question – What is the meaning of the ascetic ideal? – is equivalent to the question: What is the value of the ascetic ideal? In the (...) present paper, I interpret an aspect of GM III ignored in the earlier paper: the will to power principle of GM III 7, which seems to claim that all human behavior is to be explained in terms of the will to power. I argue that the principle’s true function is normative rather than explanatory: to indicate how philosophers are best or ideally or healthily constituted, in particular, regarding sexuality. I also offer a normative account of what Nietzsche means by ‘interpretation’ in GM III and an argument against the surprisingly well-accepted view that a Nietzschean philosopher would either have little interest in sexual activity or would resist whatever interest he or she had in it. I end with brief suggestions as to the positive contribution Nietzsche thinks sexuality makes to philosophy. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s critique of causality has not been taken as seriously as it should be. Nietzschean naturalists such as Ken Gemes, Brian Leiter, and John Richardson carry on with their appeals to causal-scientific forms of explanation as if there were no such critique.1 For instance, Leiter claims that Nietzsche is a naturalist in that he sets forth “theories that explain various important human phenomena … [in scientific terms], but are also modeled on science in the sense that they seek to reveal (...) the causal determinants of these phenomena, typically in various physiological and psychological facts about persons”. But Nietzsche decisively rejects every element of this claim in many passages. For instance, he... (shrink)

A mammoth labor, this work offers us for the first time in a definitive English edition those notes grouped together and published in 1901 by Nietzsche's sister under the title, Der Wille zur Macht. In his Introduction Kaufmann disputes with good reason Karl Schlechta's claim that "The Will to Power contains nothing new, nothing that could surprise anyone who knows everything Nietzsche published." There are many new things in this work—of particular interest are the discussion of European nihilism (...) in Book One and the "Critique of the 'Good Man'" in Book Two. In addition to an illuminating introduction, there are eight pages of facsimile manuscripts.—J. T. (shrink)

A mammoth labor, this work offers us for the first time in a definitive English edition those notes grouped together and published in 1901 by Nietzsche's sister under the title, Der Wille zur Macht. In his Introduction Kaufmann disputes with good reason Karl Schlechta's claim that "The Will to Power contains nothing new, nothing that could surprise anyone who knows everything Nietzsche published." There are many new things in this work—of particular interest are the discussion of European nihilism (...) in Book One and the "Critique of the 'Good Man'" in Book Two. In addition to an illuminating introduction, there are eight pages of facsimile manuscripts.—J. T. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Nietzsche’s published works contain a substantial, although implicit, argument for the will to power as ontology—a critical and descriptive, rather than positive and explanatory, theory of reality. Further, I suggest this ontology is entirely consistent with a naturalist methodology. The will to power ontology follows directly from Nietzsche’s naturalist rejection of three metaphysical presuppositions: substance, efficient causality, and final causality. I show that a number of interpretations, including those of Clark, (...) Schacht, Reginster, and Richardson, are inconsistent with Nietzsche’s naturalism, because they presuppose efficient or final causality. In contrast, I argue that the will to power is not an explanatory theory, but a description of the basic, necessary character of reality, designed to critically reveal and minimize metaphysical presuppositions—to reject false explanations of reality and human behavior. It avoids substance-metaphysics by describing reality as will, a causal process without discrete efficient causes or agents. It eliminates efficient causality by describing events as maximal manifestations of power, rather than as agent-actualized potentialities. Finally, it opposes teleology by describing life as tending toward the activity of resistance as such, rather than toward explanatory end-states, such as the accumulation of power or overcoming of resistances. (shrink)

Nietzsche's controversial will to power thesis is convincingly rehabilitated in this compelling book. Tsarina Doyle presents a fresh interpretation of his account of nature and value, which sees him defy the dominant conception of nature in the Enlightenment and overturn Hume's distinction between facts and values. Doyle argues that Nietzsche challenges Hume indirectly through critical engagement with Kant's idealism, and that in so doing and despite some wrong turns, he establishes the possibility of objective value in response to (...) nihilism and the causal efficacy of consciousness as a necessary condition of human autonomy. Her book will be important for scholars of Nietzsche's metaphysics, and of the history of philosophy and science more generally. (shrink)

(2005). Nietzsche's will to Power as a Doctrine of the Unity of Science. Angelaki: Vol. 10, continental philosophy and the sciences the german traditionissue editor: damian veal, pp. 77-93.

While the debate continues over whether Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power is intended as ontology, biology, psychology, or some variant of the three, there is a significant consensus on many sides that were the will to power intended as an ontology, it would be inconsistent with his anti-metaphysical stance, implausible from a contemporary scientific perspective, and very poorly supported, based only on wild metaphysical speculation or sloppy, pseudo-scientific generalization. In this paper, I suggest, to (...) the contrary, that Nietzsche’s published works contain a substantial, though implied, argument for the will to power as ontology. Further, this ontology and the supporting argument for it are fully consistent with a naturalist methodology. Indeed, I will suggest that Nietzsche believes the will to power ontology follows directly from his rejection of metaphysics and is grounded in a critical form of naturalism. Consequently, even if he is mistaken in this conclusion, we must take the will to power ontology as seriously as we do his critique of metaphysics, for it is intended as a direct consequence of that critique. I will further suggest that, once we have recognized Nietzsche’s implied philosophical argument for the will to power ontology, we can better understand the intended scope and purpose of the theory of the will to power, as well as reject many of the influential interpretations of the concept, including the vitalist (Heidegger, Schacht), intentionalist (Clark), evolutionary (Richardson), and teleological (Reginster) readings. In contrast to these interpretations, I argue that the will to power as ontology follows directly from his rejection of three principal metaphysical presumptions: substance, causal agency, and teleology. As a rejection of substance, the will to power describes reality as consisting of general will, not objects, agents, or discrete wills. As a rejection of causal agency, it describes events as maximal manifestations of power rather than as realized potencies—abilities, motives, or possibilities actualized by efficient causal agencies. Finally, as a rejection of teleology, the will to power is a descriptive principle of action and events as essentially active engagements of obstacles, rather than an explanatory final cause, purpose or aim. Consequently, the will to power is a not a theory of desires, intentions, or drives, but rather a basic descriptive principle of events or activity, describing not agency but the causal process as a whole, and tending not toward accumulating power or overcoming resistance, but rather toward the activity of resistance as such. I conclude that the will to power is a critical ontology about what reality is not, rather than a positive theory of reality, intended not to explain events but to reveal and reject the common metaphysical presuppositions that underlie many common-sense, philosophical and scientific explanations of reality, such as freedom of the will, rational and moral motivation, physical atomism and the concept of natural law. (shrink)

There can be little doubt that the “will to power” remains one of Nietzsche’s most controversial philosophical concepts. Leaving aside its colorful and controversial political history in the first half of the twentieth century, the will to power poses considerable problems for any serious reconstruction of Nietzsche’s project. This is particularly the case for analytic reconstructions, which view Nietzsche’s philosophical naturalism largely through the lens of metaethical concerns that are themselves grounded in a psychological reading of (...) will, affect, value, or ressentiment.1 The will to power, though, defies interpretations that are schooled in contemporary philosophy of mind, or cognitive psychology. Even.. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this article I confront and criticize the widespread tendency to ignore, marginalize, or dismiss without serious consideration Nietzsche's psychological hypothesis that a “will to power” is the major motivator of human behavior. I begin by separating Nietzsche's psychological hypothesis from both his occasional cosmological extension of it into an account of all processes in the world and from his power-based theory of value. And I argue that, since the psychological thesis does not depend on the (...) cosmological extension, is more fundamental to Nietzsche's overall project, and is much better supported by Nietzsche's argument, it deserves to be seriously considered on its own merits. Then, I critically consider Robert Solomon's attempts to deny any value at all to the will to power as a general motivational hypothesis and to reinterpret Nietzsche's theory of the will to power in a way that ignores what Nietzsche actually says about it and, moreover, radically undermines its significance. (shrink)

The past decade and a half has seen a considerable flowering of interest in Nietzsche’s metaethics. In this time, Nietzsche has been presented with nearly as wide a range of views in metaethics as there are exegetical options on the table—views ranging from nihilism to subjective realism to expressivism to fictionalism to objective realism to, most recently, constructivism and constitutivism. Interpreters must square Nietzsche’s apparently skeptical remarks about the objectivity of value with his seeming commitment to a certain privileged set (...) of values, in light of which he purports to “revalue” the values of the moral tradition. Is this apparent commitment nothing more than rhetorical bluster? Or does he think... (shrink)

The paper argues for a normative rather than psychological interpretation of Nietzsche's conceptions of power and will - and hence will to power. It does so with a view to rethinking the questions of Nietzsche's relationship to Enlightenment thought. Jürgen Habermas's view of Nietzsche's philosophy of power as epitomizing a counter-Enlightenment instrumentalism is contrasted with Maudmarie Clark's attempt to divest it of its power aspect in order to place him within the tradition of Enlightenment. (...) Both approaches, it is argued, ignore the irreducibly normative basis of Nietzsche's conception of will to power. This normative basis suggests that Nietzsche's thought can in fact contribute to the reconfiguration of our concept of rationality recently urged by Habermas.In der Abhandlung wird in Abgrenzung zur psychologischen ein normative Interpretation von Nietzsches Auffassung von Macht und Willen, und folglich seiner Idee vom Willen zur Macht, vorgestellt, mit der zugleich Nietzsches Beziehung zum Denken der Aufklärung revidiert werden soll. Dazu wird zunächst Jürgen Habermas' verkürzte Deutung von Nietzsches Philosophie der Macht als eines Instruments der Gegenaufklärung mit Maudmarie Clarks Versuch konfrontiert, Nietzsches Philosophie ihres Machtaspektes zu berauben und ihn so in die Tradition der Aufklärung zu stellen. Es wird gezeigt, das beide Interpretationsversuch die nicht reduzierbar normative Basis von Nietzsches Begriff des Willens zur Macht ignorieren. Dagegen legt die normative Deutung nahe, dass Nietzsches Denken tatsächlich zur Rekonfiguration unseres Vernunftkonzeptes beitragen kann, wie sie jüngst von Habermas gefordet wurde. (shrink)

While agreeing with Bernard Reginster that Nietzsche's advocacy of the will to power as a psychological thesis is much more fundamental than his extension of it as a cosmological or metaphysical thesis, I criticize him for failing to support this interpretation, and I attempt to supply an analysis that does support it. Then, I take issue with the common tendency to sanitize Nietzsche's theory of the will to power, to make it more palatable—and with Reginster's treatment (...) of this issue. This leads me to an examination of Nietzsche's conception of power—and a critique of Reginster's account of it. (shrink)

A prominent tradition in Nietzsche scholarship reads his views about will to power as a psychological thesis and his claims about the value of power as an attempt to derive normativity from psychological necessity. This article shows that these interpretations have failed to articulate a cogent reading faithful to Nietzsche’s texts, and so casts doubt on such an approach. My argument bears not only on how we read Nietzsche, but also on the viability of one recent constitutivist (...) reading. After presenting these critical arguments, I consider an original interpretation of will to power in terms of the motivation to grow. This revised interpretation, however, still fails to support the tradition’s derivation of normativity. Thus, I conclude we should look elsewhere for Nietzsche’s normative argument. (shrink)