The New Chinese philosophy should face the main issues in traditional philosophy and modern philosophy. The biggest issue in traditional Chinese philosophy during the last 800 years is Xing (Nature) is Li 性即理 or Xin (Mind) is Li 心即理. The biggest issue in modern Western philosophy is how to fortify value in thisera of knowledge explosion. This paper tries to do some exploration on these issues through reconstruction the Chinese metaphysics. It puts forward a theory of Four Substances 四體說. The (...) so called Four Substances include Yi Ti 易體 or the substance of Yi, Xing Ti 性體 or the substance of Nature, Xin Ti 心體 or the substance of Mind, and Dao Ti 道體 or the substance of the Way. The sphere of Yi 易 is the origin of the universe and the root of the world. The substance of Yiis formed by three fundamental cosmic ideas or energies, namely Zhi 恉 or meaning, Li 理 or reason or principle, and Qi 氣 or matter. Zhi 恉 is the being of Value and meaning. Li 理is the being of knowledge. Zhi 恉 and Li 理 are forms, and Qi 氣 is matter. Yi Ti 易體 or the substance of Yi is an inexhaustible value source. Just like Confucianism has developed its Dao or the Way and Orthodoxy, other value systems in the world have also developed their own Dao or the Way and Orthodoxy. (shrink)
This book is a translation of a key commentary on the Book of Changes, or Yijing, perhaps the most broadly influential text of classical China. The Yijing first appeared as a divination text in Zhou-dynasty China and later became a work of cosmology, philosophy, and political theory as commentators supplied it with new meanings. While many English translations of the Yijing itself exist, none are paired with a historical commentary as thorough and methodical as that written by the Confucian scholar (...) Cheng Yi, who turned the original text into a coherent work of political theory. (shrink)
Here I respond to Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer’s “The Evil of Death: A Reply to Yi.” They developed an influential strategy in defense of the deprivation account of death’s badness against the Lucretian symmetry problem. The core of their argument consists in the claim that it is rational for us to welcome future intrinsic goods while being indifferent to past intrinsic goods. Previously, I argued that their approach is compatible with the evil of late birth insofar as an (...) earlier birth would have generated more goods in the future. In reply, Brueckner and Fischer argue that my critique fails to appreciate an important aspect of their thought experiment, which aims only to show that the deprivation of past goods per se is not bad for us. Thus, purportedly, my critique poses no threat to their view. Here I argue that since the deprivation account explains the evil of death with recourse to how one’s life would have fared had one lived longer, it ought to respond to the symmetry problem with reference to how one’s life would have fared had one been born earlier. However, it is not generally true that the life one would have had with an earlier birth is not preferable to one’s actual life, because in many cases such a life would contain more future goods. (shrink)
Editor'sIn one of the very first reactions to Li Minghui’s criticism of Mainland New Confucianism, Zeng Yi emphasizes the ties between MNC and Han-dynasty “Classical Learning”, as opposed to the basis of Mou Zongsan-style New Confucianism in Song-dynasty Neo-Confucian “Way learning”. He further connects the MNC approach with an institutional, “concrete continuation” of the Confucian tradition, as opposed to the abstract, philosophical approach of Mou Zongsan.This short essay, another of the immediate reactions to Li Minghui's criticism of Mainland New Confucianism, (...) focuses on the distinction between “old” and “new” Confucianism, and their differing relations to liberal democracy. Fang identifies a tension in Li Minghui's attitude toward the “old,” since Li seems to want to have a connection with the tradition but also not to be bound by it. (shrink)
Wang Yi’s article deals with the role of house churches, that is, unregistered churches. In his evaluation of the different branches of house churches Wang Yi touches upon issues of identity and the future of China, and he also harshly criticizes the Chinese party-state, claiming that “China is becoming a tumor in the world.”.
After reading the recent essays in the People's Daily [Jen-min jih-pao] by Comrade Ts'ai I, Comrade Chu Kuang-ch'ien, Comrade Li Che-hou, and others on the problems in aesthetics, I feel that they contain both accuracies and inaccuracies concerning the basic questions with which they have dealt, and here I would like to discuss my views on the problems involved in the debate.
In this sequel to "The logic and meaning of plurals. Part I", I continue to present an account of logic and language that acknowledges limitations of singular constructions of natural languages and recognizes plural constructions as their peers. To this end, I present a non-reductive account of plural constructions that results from the conception of plurals as devices for talking about the many. In this paper, I give an informal semantics of plurals, formulate a formal characterization of truth for the (...) regimented languages that results from augmenting elementary languages with refinements of basic plural constructions of natural languages, and account for the logic of plural constructions by characterizing the logic of those regimented languages. (shrink)
In this essay I present the postmodern phenomenological approach of Levinas, Derrida, and Marion to the problem of naming the unnameable God. For Levinas, God is never experienced directly but only as a third person whose infinity is testified to in the infinity of responsibility to the hungry. For Derrida, God remains the unnameable "wholly other" accessible only as the indeterminate term of pure reference in prayer. For Marion, God remains the object of "de-nomination" through praise. In all three, the (...) problem of naming the unnameable God is necessarily linked to how we relate to fellow human beings, to the hungry in Levinas, justice in Derrida, and charity in Marion. I also reflect on the merits and adequacy of phenomenology as such for speaking of divine transcendence. (shrink)
Lawrence Sklar in his book, Physics and Chance (1993), proposes a sophisticated account of reduction of thermodynamics (TD) by statistical mechanics (SM). I argue that Sklar's analysis of the alleged reduction of TD by SM is problematic in several respects. I consider a few counterexamples to show that none of what Sklar takes to be the central features of successful reduction in science (unification and identification) holds in the case of TD and SM. I suggest the broader conclusion that a (...) more useful way of understanding the relationship between TD and SM is as collaboration and competition among alternative methodologies rather than reduction of one theory to another. (shrink)