Introduction. The article considers the ontological difference as a fundamental idea dividing M. Heidegger’s ontology into two levels. The author proposes an explication of temporal foundations for the main principle of fundamental ontology, the ontological difference, on the basis of existential analytics of Dasein. It is assumed that the organization of Dasein is a micromodel of being in general, which is the ultimate goal of M. Heidegger’s philosophical work. The aim of the study is to explicate the phenomenon (...) of simultaneity as the ontological basis of the temporality of Dasein as a result of philosophical analysis, Methods The author uses hermeneutic, phenomenological and some general scientific methods such as analysis, synthesis, and abstraction. The scientific novelty of the study. When analyzing the self as an existential center of Dasein the author reveals the ontological duality of the first and, as a consequence, of the entire model of existence. The phenomenon of existence towards death is analyzed in the context of existential gap in the centre of the Dasein self, which gives rise to different ways of Dasein being - genuine and non-genuine; the author considers and analyzes the whole structure of the temporal Dasein in the light of the thesis of the human existence finiteness. On the basis of this idea, the key role of simultaneity is revealed, which becomes the ontologically initial concept in relation to the whole Dasein system of being and, accordingly, the fundamental ontology. It is suggested that the ontological difference is based on the more fundamental principle of temporal synthesis. Results. The author presents a model of Dasein existence structure on the basis of the dual nature of the self, with the simultaneity belonging to the ontologically determining specificity of the organization. Conclusions. The temporal justification of ontological differences reveals a feature of fundamental ontology, which consists in a specifically transformed dialectic of being and nothing. The study shows that fundamental ontology offers an atypical approach to the problem of time. (shrink)

This is the first of a series of commentaries on the works of the latest Heidegger; all of Heidegger's works published by Neske of Pfullingen since 1954 will be presented and interpreted in the series. The expository plan announced in the editor's preface calls for three-part commentaries, with the first part summarizing the work in question, the second presenting glosses of lines or paragraphs as required by their respective importance, and the third giving philological exegesis of texts also (...) as required in the judgment of the editors. The interpretative inspiration is generally traditional, with more emphasis given to themes with echoes in medieval and modern rationalism and in Italian and French ontologism. The editors adopt Heidegger's characteristic attitude in his latter period, his relinquishing of all objective or subjective idealistic presuppositions. Ontology thus becomes the unveiling of the conditions of possibility of Dasein's speech as truth-making. In Being and Time these conditions of possibility were given in the fundamental ontology and reached their existential expression in resolve. In Gelassenheit Dasein has become a mere instrumentality for the ultimate sense of Being to come to pass. The conditions of possibility of the new Dasein are well understood and highlighted by Landolt. Their existential expression is a new temporal tension within the Dasein, that of Warten or attending. If resolve was the modal intentionality of authentic Dasein, attending is the modal intentionality of poetic symbolic Dasein. Landolt does not seem to have been sufficiently critical of the reflective character of this new intentionality. Can it adequately ground essence, fact and freedom? The techniques of this commentary often depart from hermeneutical respect for the text.--A. M. (shrink)

Analysis of the state and possible options for the development of modern humanities gives the grounds to assert the growing importance of the idea of historicity in culture and philosophy during the 20th and early 21st centuries. In this regard, both the disclosure of the concept of historicity and the substantiation of the significance of the principle of historicity, both for the methodology of historical and philosophical knowledge and for humanitarian knowledge in general become relevant. The author of this article (...) carries out historical and philosophical reconstruction of historical issues in the philosophy of M. Heidegger and reveals the process of converting the idea of historicity into the principle of German existentialism. It is concluded that with the help of historicity M. Heidegger was able to present his own version of phenomenology on an existential basis. Seeing an existential achievement in historicity, M. Heidegger understood by it the direction of existence to the source, tradition, on the basis of this, the intentionality of consciousness was revealed as an essential property of existence: the direction of man as a finite being to its source, which allowed the German philosopher to interpret historicity as a tradition, the existential source of man, and how the temporality of human existence. The author of this article concludes that in the philosophy of M. Heidegger historicity was transformed from an idea into a principle on the basis of which the German philosopher revealed not only the historicity of Dasein, building a fundamental ontology and hermeneutics of factuality, but also tried to solve the problem of the history of being, going beyond the existential philosophy. (shrink)

This study interprets the movement of Heidegger's famous "turn" through an analysis of his critique of Kant, Schelling, and Hegel in the period spanning roughly 1925 to 1936. Heidegger's "turn" sought to overcome the traditional metaphysical conception of being that had come to absolute expression through Hegel's method of dialectical reflection. Heidegger was successful to the extent that he provided the final "con-text" of being as a discourse that both frames the historical "text" of being and permeates (...) it, allowing the coherence of that text to appear in a new light. Heidegger's interpretation of the original sense of time as temporality opposed the latent dogmatism in Kant's critique of reason by shifting the locus of unity in experience away from the spontaneity of the self toward an intuitional transcending of the self as "being-in-the-world." This pointed Heidegger toward a novel revelatory conception of freedom as "letting being be," which he posed as an alternative to the absolutizing of subjectivity that took place in German idealism. Heidegger used Schellings anti-Hegelian conception of the origination of freedom from nature to clarify the meaning of Hegel's key metaphysical notion of reflection. In so doing he developed an alternative interpretation of the "nothing," in contrast to Hegel's method of double negation, that set the meaning of negation into a greater contextual perspective. Heidegger's goal of uncovering the meaning and possibility of reflection as the original possibility of evil led him to a qualified retrieval of his early Roman Catholic orientation to thinking. Transforming these paradigms into a new deconstructive discourse, Heidegger advanced beyond Schellings critique of Hegel, allowing him to establish a hermeneutical relationship with Hegel's system that simultaneously confronts and preserves it. Heidegger's early phenomenological interpretation of Pauline eschatology and Augustinian original sin thus, finally situates his interpretation of the "nothing" as the abyss of being retrieved from the primal Greek conception of nature . Heidegger thereby provides the ultimate "con-text" of metaphysics in its necessary and reciprocal relation to Hegel's conception of presence as an all-encompassing, "self-absolving" system. (shrink)

_Purpose._ The purity of consciousness in European culture has practically been turned into an abstraction. Because of this, there are so many discrepancies in understanding its nature. For Heidegger, the question of the purity of human consciousness remains open. Our purpose is to study the purity of European consciousness in the work of M. Heidegger. _Theoretical basis._ We draw on the deep foundations of existential, phenomenological, hermeneutic, religious-philosophical and postmodern Western and Eastern thought. _Originality._ While the early (...) class='Hi'>Heidegger was thinking under the sign of Dasein, he did not hear the nature of the "pure consciousness" of human. Nevertheless, temporality for him was such a fundamental property that it determined the depth of understanding not only of being, but also of human consciousness itself (like Dasein). In this context, we begin to understand that the depth of consciousness in the concept of early Heidegger can be associated with its temporality. In fact, towards the end of "Being and Time", Heidegger, thinking more and more about the understanding of time from the horizon of being, begins to form similar ideas about understanding itself, that is, about human consciousness, in the sense that consciousness itself arises from the horizon of time (and being). What, then, is pure human consciousness the pure time? Does not this mean that the original meaning of consciousness is in its directed temporalizing. This temporalizing of consciousness of human (as a thinking being), which arises from the future, is perceived in three modes and reveals the fundamental nature of the consciousness itself (thinking is a stream of consciousness and, in such a context, directed understanding). Paraphrasing Heidegger, we say that the ontological meaning of pure human consciousness is revealed as temporality. Already after writing _Being and Time_, Heidegger thinks about the origins of the European consciousness, its comprehending from the depths (originality) of the being of European culture. _Conclusions._ The early Heidegger seeks the purity of being and, at the same time, strives more and more to understand the essence of the purity of human thinking. All of Heidegger’s work is a consistent transition from human understanding of the purity of being (Dasein) to the purity of thinking of a human himself. In this sense, there is a transformation of M. Heidegger’s consciousness from fundamental ontology (Dasein) in the early period to existential anthropology (human consciousness) in the late period. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se discuten las nociones de filosofía y espiritualidad, tratadas por M. Foucault en La hermenéutica del sujeto, que relacionan el sujeto con la verdad. Si la filosofía del conócete a ti mismo trata la relación cognoscitiva del sujeto con la verdad a la que tiene derecho, entonces la espiritualidad del cuidado de sí trata de la transformación experiencial que requiere la verdad para que el sujeto acceda a ella. Este es el contexto en el que M. Foucault se refiere (...) a M. Heidegger y J. Lacan como los autores que pensaron la relación entre el sujeto y la verdad. Se discute en ambos casos la distinción entre la filosofía y la espiritualidad: en Lacan, porque la experiencia psicoanalítica aparece como vivencia espiritual del cuidado de sí; en Heidegger, porque el Dasein y la verdad como desocultamiento muestran la filosofía como actividad espiritual por excelencia. ABSTRACT The article discusses the notions of philosophy and spirituality relating the subject to truth, as dealt with by M. Foucault in The Hermeneutics of the Subject. While the philosophy of “know thyself” deals with the cognitive relation of subjects to the truth they have a right to, the spirituality of the care of the self has to do with the experiential transformation necessary for subjects to have access to truth. It is in this context that M. Foucault refers to M. Heidegger and J. Lacan as authors who thought the relation between subject and truth. In both cases, the distinction between philosophy and spirituality is discussed: in the case of Lacan, because the psychoanalytical experience appears as a spiritual experience of the care of the self, and in that of Heidegger, because Dasein and truth as unveiling reveal philosophy to be a spiritual experience par excellence. (shrink)

Fredrik Svenaeus' book is a delight to read. Not only does he exhibit keen understanding of a wide range of topics and figures in both medicine and philosophy, but he manages to bring them together in an innovative manner that convincingly demonstrates how deeply these two significant fields can be and, in the end, must be mutually enlightening. Medicine, Svenaeus suggests, reveals deep but rarely explicit themes whose proper comprehension invites a careful phenomenological and hermeneutical explication. Certain philosophical approaches, on (...) the other hand - specifically, Heidegger's phenomenology and Gadamer's hermeneutics - are shown to have a hitherto unrealized potential for making sense of those themes long buried within Western medicine. Richard M. Zaner, Ann Geddes Stahlman Professor of Medical Ethics, Vanderbilt University. (shrink)

In this article, the author argues that the phenomenological revolution inaugurated by Husserl and Heidegger opens up new avenues for a radical rethinking of the God question. With Husserl's 'free variation of possibilities in imagination' and Heidegger's famous claim in Being and Time that 'for phenomenology possibility stands higher than actuality', the author discovers new resources for our understanding of both Being and God. In both cases, the article claims, we witness the surpassing of the traditional metaphysical priority (...) of actuality over possibility. Then, in a second moment, the paper explores the notion of the 'God of possibility' from the perspective of three different hermeneutic circles: scriptural, testimonial and literary. The essay concludes with an analysis of the positive implications of the notion of the 'possible' (as posse and possest) for a new understanding of the God of eschatology. /// No presente artigo, o autor defende que a revolução fenomenológica inaugurada por E. Husserl e M. Heidegger abre novas possibilidades para um repensar radical da questão de Deus. A partir da 'livre variação de possibilidades na imaginação' de Husserl e afamosa pretensão de Heidegger em Ser e Tempo de que para a 'fenomenologia a possibilidade está acima da actualidade', o autor descobre novos recursos para a nossa compreensão quer do Ser quer de Deus. Tanto num caso como no outro, diz-nos o artigo, podemos testemunhar a superação da tradicional prioridade metafisica da actualidade sobre a possibilidade. Em seguida, num segundo momento, o artigo explora também a noção de um 'Deus da possibilidade' a partir da perspectiva de três círculos hermenêuticos diferentes: o escriturístico, o testemonial e o literário. 0 ensaio conclui com uma análise das implicações positivas da noção de 'possível' (como posse e possest) para uma nova compreensão do Deus da escatologia. (shrink)

The philosophical definition of violence today is?incomplete? and leaves a?gap? between the phenomenon and the concept. This is due to the fact that the concept of?violence? was/is strangely included in the general philosophical categorial line. In domestic and Western discourse, the problem field of violence contains, above all, political and ethical meanings. The problem is intuitively resolved in its appeal to the concept of?power?, which turns out to be philosophically lost in modern philosophy. Only exceptionally do we find?traces? of this (...) concept in philosophical works. Among them are the works of Aristotle, which need to be freed from modern, distorting interpretations. Thus, in the translations of Aristotle, the Greek???????, used for the traditional transferring the category of possibility, lost its meaning of force ; in its turn,?force? lost relation to?violence? and?necessity?. Violence is understood as a kind of necessity, which is associated with the suppression of one?s?own decision?, freedom, something that?prevents desire? and contrary to?common thinking,? as well as the absence of?good?. Violence is presented not only in an ontological sense, but also existentially, as the opposite of?good? and of one?s own?desire?. Force remains in the shadow of?necessity? as?possibility?,?potential energy? and?movement?, and violence loses the opposition that has arisen in an ontological mode. nema. (shrink)

The research focuses on the problem of interpretation of such a concept as the origin, which is ultimate for philosophical thought and bases existentially oriented constructions of Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Heidegger. It is argues in this paper the fundamental difference between the interpretations of the origin in “The Star of Redemption» and in «Being and Time”, despite all points of intersection and coincidences that bring closer together dialogical and existential-historical thinking. Such differentiation of positions is determined by the (...) necessity both to neutralize romantic connotations, which expose the origin ( Ursprung ) as abyss ( Abgrund ), and to methodologically clarify the possibility not so much to think as to practically assert a limited and unclosed within itself integral being, including ontological and ethical dimensions. The origin of oblivion and renewal, imposed by Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity, is contrasted with Rosenzweig's origin of the “eternal overworld”, reconstructed on the basis of Herman Cohen's religio-philosophical intuitions and his analysis of the infinitesimal as a principle of reality. Rosenzweig’s position, which aims at a correlative consideration of the purely logical content of the infinitesimal quantity (almost-Nothing) and the existential experience of the finiteness of everything, is favorably distinguished by the absence of a one-sided focus on recalling, where fore-running although is declared, but it is immediately restrained by being-towards-death. As a result, Rosenzweig’s dialogism turns out to be free from overestimating what Heidegger’s interpretation calls resoluteness, which in fact is not much different from paralysis in the clearance of being. Cohen’s problem of an infinite task's realization, being actualized in Rosenzweig’s conception, allows to go beyond being-towards-death in juxtaposing the trajectories of initial elements into a true gestalt. (shrink)

In his early lecture courses, Martin Heidegger exhibited an abiding interest in human life. He believed that human life has philosophical import while it is actually being lived; language has philosophical import while it is being spoken. In this book, Scott Campbell traces the development of Heidegger's ideas about factical life through his interest in Greek thought and its concern with Being. He contends that Heidegger's existential concerns about human life and his ontological concerns about the meaning (...) of Being crystallize in the notion of Dasein as the Being of factical human life. Emphasizing the positive aspects of everydayness, Campbell explores the contexts of meaning embedded within life; the intensity of average, everyday life; the temporal immediacy of life in early Christianity; the hermeneutic pursuit of life's self-alienation; factical spatiality; the temporalizing of history within life; the richness of the world; and the facticity of speaking in Plato and Aristotle. He shows how Heidegger presents a way of grasping human life as riddled with deception but also charged with meaning and open to revelation and insight. (shrink)

My aim in the present paper is to show the significance of Heidegger's phenomenology of religion as an important step on his way to his magnum opus . First, I wish to exhibit traits characteristic of Heidegger's path of thinking in terms of his confrontation with phenomenology, historicism, hermeneutics, and Lebensphilosophie . I will then argue, in a second step, that it was with an eye to, and drawing upon, his previous understanding of religion and religious life, (...) as well as of the relation between faith and theology, that Heidegger was to conceive of philosophy and its relation to human existence in Being and Time . Both theology and philosophy offer a conceptual elaboration of something previously enacted or lived and, in doing so, are at the same time meant to refer back to and reinforce what they grow out of—faith or factical life. (shrink)

It seems that Heidegger's thought is subject to the dubious destiny of inspiring fat commentaries. However, Colombo's has this advantage over many of its counterparts, viz., it is more a true study than a reiteration. This is so in three important respects. First, a systematization of the thought of Heidegger is attempted, and, in so far as this is possible, rather successfully achieved. The book is divided into five parts, whose continuity follows only in part the development of (...) Heidegger. Happily, the author, unimpressed by the superficial schema of a Kehre, articulates a treatment which is independent from any simple genetic explanation. The five parts are: Design and Depth of Finitude, Beyond Form, Manifestation of Being, Man and Nothingness, and The Impotence of Thought. The systematization rests on an excellent discernment of themes in the thought of Heidegger. Instead of being content with the proposition that Heidegger is but a single theme thinker, Colombo rescues a variety of themes from the web of Heidegger's thought. This he does not by formulating such themes in classical or purely technical terms, but by showing their import and relevance relative to other historical themes in Western thought. Surprisingly enough, the result is not an absorption of Heidegger by the tradition, but rather a deepening of classical themes, and a freeing of shades missing in the Heideggerian synthesis. However this is done with such care that the focused topics are not taken out of context, or even hermeneutically overcome. On the contrary, they are very properly accented in their own contours. As befits a good study of this type, footnotes are the best part of the work. Colombo discourses with a multitude of authors, clearing lines of interpretation, and, more importantly, bringing forth ideas generated by Heidegger's philosophy. By being free from the poetic spell that the German philosopher casts upon those who study him, Colombo has written a philosophical book showing more clearly than others the scope and the idiosyncrasies of his subject-author. The results are impressive, and they place this young Italian professor, together with Pöggeler and Birault, at the top of the list of Heidegger's interpreters.—A. M. (shrink)

While heightening the nihilistic tension underlying the discourse of Richard Kearney, I highlight the positive contribution his book The God Who May Be makes to the debate concerning the need for a postmodern revitalization of religious symbolism. I argue for three qualifications of Kearney's argument, suggesting, in response to Kearney's exclusionary approach to the God who “neither is nor is not but may be,” a God whose possibility for meaningfulness arises as an “eschatological theogony” from out of the chaos (confusion (...) and openness) of contemporary religious symbolism. Arguing that such a radical reenvisioning of God must be tempered and given meaning through reentering and reaffirming onto‐theology in a qualified (hermeneutical) sense, I sketch a possible renewal of meaning for the traditional Christian parousia‐concept as a hermeneutical circle between Hegel's systematic closure of Western metaphysics and Heidegger's deconstructive appropriation of the hidden possibilities of presence within the onto‐theological tradition. (shrink)

Hans-Georg GADAMER, Hermeneutische Entwürfe. Vorträge und Aufsätze ; Pascal MICHON, Poétique d’une anti-anthropologie: l’herméneutique deGadamer ; Robert J. DOSTAL, The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer ; Denis SERON, Le problème de la métaphysique. Recherches sur l’interprétation heideggerienne de Platon et d’Aristote ; Henry MALDINEY, Ouvrir le rien. L’art nu ; Dominique JANICAUD, Heidegger en France, I. Récit; II. Entretiens ; Maurice MERLEAU-PONTY, Fenomenologia percepţiei ; Trish GLAZEBROOK, Heidegger’s Philosophy of Science ; Richard WOLIN, Heidegger’s Children. Hannah Arendt, Karl (...) Löwith, Hans Jonas and Herbert Marcuse ; Ivo DEGENNARO, Logos – Heidegger liest Heraklit ; O. K. WIEGAND, R. J. DOSTAL, L. EMBREE, J. KOCKELMANS and J. N. MOHANTY, Phenomenology on Kant, German Idealism, Hermeneutics and Logic ; James FAULCONER and Mark WRATHALL, Appropriating Heidegger. (shrink)

The philosophical definition of violence today is “incomplete” and leaves a “gap” between the phenomenon and the concept. This is due to the fact that the concept of “violence” was/is strangely included in the general philosophical categorial line. In domestic and Western discourse, the problem field of violence contains, above all, political and ethical meanings. The problem is intuitively resolved in its appeal to the concept of “power”, which turns out to be philosophically lost in modern philosophy. Only exceptionally do (...) we find “traces” of this concept in philosophical works. Among them are the works of Aristotle, which need to be freed from modern, distorting interpretations. Thus, in the translations of Aristotle, the Greek δύναμις, used for the traditional transferring the category of possibility, lost its meaning of force ; in its turn, “force” lost relation to “violence” and “necessity”. Violence is understood as a kind of necessity, which is associated with the suppression of one’s “own decision”, freedom, something that “prevents desire” and contrary to “common thinking,” as well as the absence of “good”. Violence is presented not only in an ontological sense, but also existentially, as the opposite of “good” and of one’s own “desire”. Force remains in the shadow of “necessity” as “possibility”, “potential energy” and “movement”, and violence loses the opposition that has arisen in an ontological mode. (shrink)

Veronique Foti delves into the full range of Heideggerian texts to elaborate the problematics of historicity, language, and the structure of disclosure or "manifestation" in connection with the Herman poets whom Heidegger invoked along his path of thinking. Foti's reading of these ports is a probing inquiry into the aesthetic, ethical, and political implications of Heidegger's thought. She knows how technicity and poetizing are opposed yet brought together in Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology, how they are both politicized and (...) linked with ethical praxis, and how technicity, poetizing, and praxis cannot be dissevered from Heidegger's essential thinking. (shrink)

The connections between hermeneutics and ontology cannot be restricted to the ontological (re)conception of understanding and interpretation. The ontological thematization of understanding and interpretation provided by Heidegger in Being and Time, is preceded by another, more original, and more comprehensive interrelation between hermeneutics and ontology. The former, the ontological thematization of understanding and interpretation may be seen to be, as it were, but a “derivative” case of this more primordial interdependence or fusion of ontology and hermeneutics (...) which has always already been operative or set into motion from the very first pages of the work in terms of a reciprocal dependence of the Being‐question (ontology) and a (vague and average) “understanding of Being” (hermeneutics). This chapter attempts to reconstruct and elaborate on the emergence of this twofold relation on Heidegger's path of thinking up to and inclusive of Being and Time. (shrink)

The structure of Chiodi's book is based on Vuillemin's important hermeneutical thesis that existentialism is one more step in the program of the romantics to give an absolute foundation to finite reality through the establishment of necessary relations between subjectivity and being. These relations, once revealed, would dispel the facticity and contingency in which the natural world is enshrouded. The role of Heidegger in this tradition involves one further dialectical twist, since Heidegger centers all Western Philosophy, including his (...) own, around the problem of ground in the manner proposed by the romantics. The suggested dialectical twist is then Heidegger's Kehre, a step beyond the radical contingency of Dasein in Sein und Zeit. Indeed, this contingency, once reached, shows unequivocally the failure of the romantic program. The ground cannot be ontologically connected with any object nor with the subject; it is rather the necessary history of the ground that determines all categorial differentiations in the world, including the reflective differentiation of subject-objects. Thus it becomes important to distinguish Heidegger from Hegel since, in both, history and necessity are characteristics of the ground. Chiodi gets to the bottom of this matter by pointing to the transfer of negativity from the process of history to the end of history. For Heidegger what is necessary is the repeated withdrawal of the ground so that it may never be confused with that which is known in any revelation or through all of them. This move, though clear, would still leave a fundamental ambiguity in the later philosophy of Heidegger: language, which acts as messenger from the ground to the world, must reflect the superabundance of Being from the standpoint of the ground while it only reflects possibilities of being from the standpoint of the world. This is an ambiguity that Heidegger would want to maintain. Chiodi's interpretation of Heidegger as a neo-platonist totally destroys this ambiguity and with it the very delicate balance created by Heidegger between infinite meaning and the ability of finite words to dwell upon it.--A. de L. M. (shrink)

W. Dilthey’s program of “criticism of historical reason” was formed in a polemic with the legacy of I. Kant on the basis of transcendental reflection of the data of descriptive psychology. It was focused on understanding the radical difference between the sciences of the spirit and the sciences of nature. Starting from a critical rethinking of Kant's legacy within the boundaries of his own version of the academic philosophy of life, Dilthey began to talk about the fact that the reason, (...) directing the cognitive activity of the subject, is characterized, first of all, not by the theoretical “purity”, but by its involvement in the “open” flow of history, which it gives meaning and sense through language. It interacts with historical experience, which arises through the synthesis of actual events perception in the time flow and memory images with real categories and concepts constructed by the intellect of the human subject. The ability to judge what is happening in history, its assessment in a humanistic perspective, is also considered by Dilthey as inseparable from the work of historical reason. The reason involved in the flow of time and life cannot be a carrier of theoretical “purity” and acts as inherently hermeneutic in its nature. Dilthey presented an interesting analysis of the main levels of hermeneutical procedure - emotional perception, expression and understanding, aimed at comprehension of the diversity of spiritual and cultural worlds in synchrony and diachrony of their existence. Denying the possibility of comprehending the meaning and sense of history by constructing substantialist schemes, he asserted the importance of narrative representation of the past in the light of the present. Dilthey's project of “criticism of historical reason” was based on the idea of the “openness” of the meaning of the past, due to its rootedness in the very way of human existence in time. This idea was inherited and further developed in the horizon of the fundamental ontology of M. Heidegger and other contemporary thinkers of hermeneutical orientation. (shrink)

As estéticas de Heidegger e Ortega representam dois modos de compreender a arte radicalmente distintos, o que é lógico se tivermos em conta que ambas respondem, por sua vez, a pontos de partida filosóficos absolutamente distintos: o ontológico e o humanista. Em oposição directa à estética ontológica heideggeriana, elaborada sobre a base da principalidade do ser, no segundo momento da sua filosofia pessoal e depois do seu contacto com o pensamento de Heidegger, Ortega, partindo da radicalidade metafísica do (...) conceito de vida humana e do seu carácter hermenêutico, elabora uma hermenêutica raciobiográfica da arte como método adequado de aproximação ao fenómeno artístico bem como toda uma estética humanista que não faz senão desenvolver a tendência humanista que caracteriza essencialmente a filosofia orteguiana desde a sua origem. /// Heidegger and Ortega's aesthetics represent two radically opposed views of Art, coming from two different philosophical starting points: ontological and humanist, respectively. In direct opposition to the Heideggerean ontological aesthetic, founded on the primacy of being, Ortega elaborates in the second period of his philosophy, after his contact with Heidegger's ideas, a ratio-biographical hermeneutic of Art. Starting from the metaphysical radicalism of the concept of human life and its hermeneutical character, Ortega uses this hermeneutic to approach the artistic phenomenon. This humanistic aesthetic naturally develops from the humanistic tendency that characterizes the essence ofOrteguean philosophy from its origin. (shrink)

This study argues that the bond between ‘secularization’ and ‘de-legitimation’ is not only borne out in debates over grand historical narratives relating to the status of modernity, as argued by Hans Blumenberg, but in debates over the appraisal of specific modern philosophical programs as well. It does this by examining how the category of ‘secularization' is used to delegitimize Martin Heidegger's thought, from both theological and secular perspectives, by two of his former students, Hans Jonas and Karl Löwith. By (...) analysing their interpretation of Heidegger and their understanding of secularization, legitimacy, and the philosophy-theology relationship, this study sheds light on the intellectual projects of these three thinkers – master and two students – and demonstrates the application of secularization as a hermeneutical category of de-legitimization on the basis of ‘insufficiency’ – either insufficiently secular or insufficiently religious. (shrink)

Organized by Richard Kearney and Joseph S. O’Leary, the 1979 Colloquium Heidegger et la question de Dieu was of critical importance for the development of phenomenology of religion in France. This special issue introduces the event and its ensuing publication to the English-speaking world. The editors’ historical and thematic contextualizing essay is followed by contributions from six leading philosophers. Richard Kearney sets the stage by updating his original foreword, while Jean-Yves Lacoste presents the central moments in the history of (...) Heidegger’s complicated relationship to Christian thinking. Paul Ricoeur’s “Introductory Note” delivers a well-known challenge to Heidegger in a piece whose brevity belies its impact. Finally, three participants of the 1979 Colloquium, Joseph S. O’Leary, Jean Greisch, and Jean-Luc Marion, reflect back on the significance of this event and its role in developing their own groundbreaking work. The special issue closes with a brief reflection on where we find ourselves in philosophy today. (shrink)

_Plato's Dialectical Ethics,_ Gadamer's earliest work, has now been translated into English for the first time. This classic book, published in 1931 and reprinted in 1967 and 1982, is still important today. It is one of the most extensive and imaginative interpretations of Plato's _Philebus_ and an ideal introduction to Gadamer's thinking. It shows how his influential hermeneutics emerged from the application of his teacher Martin Heidegger's phenomenological method to classical texts and problems. The work consists of two (...) chapters. The first, which puts Socratic/Platonic dialectics and ethics in the context of Gadamer's thinking about how we come to shared understanding through conversation, helps to clarify the intentions and trajectory of all Gadamer's subsequent work. The second chapter, on the _Philebus, _will interest everyone who is concerned with the connection between Plato's discussions of ethics and those of Aristotle, and with the substantive issues of the relation between pleasure and reason that Plato explores and Gadamer interprets. This edition includes a new and useful introduction by the translator, Robert M. Wallace. (shrink)

La finalidad del presente trabajo es determinar el marco teórico dentro del cual se puede desarrollar una hermenéutica de los mass media a partir de los presupuestos de la filosofía de Heidegger. La tesis que se propone es que ese marco teórico es la fenomenología del espacio.Por ello, en primer lugar, se expone el sentido que tiene la expresión "medio". Luego se presentan los conceptos fundamentales de la espacialidad del Dasein. Y, por ultimo, se extraen dos consecuencias sobre la (...) relación entre el espacio y los mass media a partir de una lectura narrativa de la espacialidad.This paper aims at determining the theoretical framework where a mass media hermeneutics can be developed from Heidegger's philosophical presumptions. The thesis proposed says that that theoretical framework represents the phenomenology of the space. Therefore, first it is exposed the meaning of "media". Then, the main concepts of the Dasein spatiality are presented.And, finally, two consequences about the relation between space and mass media from a narrative reading of the spatiality are extracted. (shrink)

The contribution hermeneutic philosophy can make to reflection on issues in psychology is shown through a critique of the "positive psychology" movements inaugurated in the special issue of the American Psychologist edited by M. Seligman and M. Csikszentmihalyi in 2000. Drawing on the broad historical sense advocated by hermeneutics, it is shown that the conceptions of the good life defended by the contributors to the special issue might turn out to be limited to the rather narrow range of questionable (...) and shallow ideals of contemporary Western consumerist economy. In particular, the attempt made by S. E. Taylor, et al to show that "positive illusions" are conducive to a good life is shown to rest on dubious conceptions about what is genuinely worthwhile in life. As an alternative to the somewhat arid conception of human existence presupposed by the authors contributing to the special issue, M. Heidegger's conception of authentic existence is put forward as a hermeneutically inspired basis for rethinking what constitutes the richest and most fulfilling life for humans. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

This two-volume work is a comprehensive reader in modern philosophical and theological hermeneutics. David E. Klemm has selected essays representing acknowledged classics in hermeneutics and the best modern hermeneutical thinkers. Volume One collects essays on the hermeneutics of texts. Volume Two collects works on the hermeneutics of existence. Each essay is preceded by an informative contextualizing introduction. Volume Two includes essays by: F. Schleiermacher, W. Dilthey, E. Husserl, M. Heidegger, R. Bultmann, P. Tillich, P. Ricoeur, (...) J. Habermas, H-G. Gadamer, and R. Scharlemann. (shrink)

A la hora de describir aquellos elementos que intervienen en la situación hermenéutica desde la cual comprendemos e interpretamos la realidad, es posible poner el acento en unos aspectos u otros. Mientras que la interpretación tradicional de la propuesta hermenéutica de Heidegger ha hecho hincapié en el modo previo de ver, el lenguaje de la comunidad o incluso las cosas mismas objeto de interpretación son puestas de relieve en el modelo hermenéutico de la antropología del conocimiento de Apel. A (...) comparar críticamente ambas propuestas está dedicado el presente trabajo, con el objetivo de señalar las ventajas que la transformación gnoseo-antropológica de la situación hermenéutica presenta en el panorama filosófico actual. When it comes to describe the ingredients of the hermeneutic situation from which reality is understood and interpreted, it is possible to emphasize some of them or others. Whereas the traditional interpretation of Heidegger's hermeneutic proposal has highlighted the previous way of seeing, the community language or even the things themselves subject of interpretation are emphasized in the hermeneutic model of Apel's anthropology of knowledge. The main aim of this paper is to compare and evaluate both proposals, showing the advantages of the gnoseo-anthropological transformation of the hermeneutic situation within the contemporary philosophical framework. (shrink)

H. Arendt developed largely her hermeneutical interpretation of understanding in line with the rethinking of I. Kant’s philosophical heritage. Although she was able to offer a rather original interpretation of the theoretical views of the great German philosopher, her hermeneutic strategy was also influenced by the approaches to their understanding that were proposed by her teachers M. Heidegger and K. Jaspers. Arendt’s hermeneutical teaching proceeds from the need to realize the close unity of practical action and spiritual activity of (...) the human subject - Vita Activa and Vita Contemplativa. Accepting the initial position of Heidegger’s metaphysics of finiteness about the “abandonment” of man in the flow of time, Arendt simultaneously follows Jaspers’ call for the need for an existential-hermeneutic interpretation of practical action and the abilities of the spirit by their understanding on the basis of Kant’s legacy. Singling out thinking, will and judgement among the main vectors of self-realization of the spirit, she demonstrates their close relationship with the main types of practical human activity - work, work and action. Analyzing the abilities of the spirit, Arendt emphasizes the major role of thinking, which brings together the processes of knowledge acquisition and meaning creation. It highlights the primacy of the meaning-producing function of the reason in relation to the ability of the intellect to generate true knowledge on the basis of generalization of the data of contemplation. Describing thinking after Kant as a “thing in itself”, Arendt speaks of its involvement in eternity and time in the moment of the present, the ability to generalize the past and design the future. Thinking forms the core of practical reason, which Kant identified with the will, and opens a new horizon of meaning generation in its aspiration to the future. The ability to judge also turns out to be a product of thinking, referring to the past while relying on common sense and imagination. Arendt rightly argues that the “paralysis” of the faculty of judgement, indicating the significance of Kant’s categorical imperative, threatens not only to produce a distorted vision of history, but also the triumph of the “banality of evil” in the sphere of politics. (shrink)

The poetic work of Paul Celan provides an opportunity to display how Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneuticsdialogues with texts. The article reconstructs Gadamer’s reading of some of the poems of Celan and contrasts this interpretative approach to that of Jacques Derrida, representative of a trend of hermeneutics known as deconstruction and which is inspired by the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Derrida, who is also reader and admirer of Celan, stresses the open, secret, and unspeakable nature of the poem in contrast (...) to the hermeneuticprinciple of Gadamer that emphasizes the recovery of meaning. Despite the differences of both approaches, thearticle argues that they address some form of negativity within the poem, whose silence questions and motivatesboth readings, though they go in different directions. Being able to listen carefully to the negativity of thepoem, to what is unspeakable within the poetic work of Celan, reveals itself as a common motivation in these contemporaneous philosophers, which turns out to make them look closer than they appear to be at first sight. (shrink)

This collection contains such a wealth of topics that it deserves the attention of anyone seriously interested in what its title denotes, namely the philosophy of the history of philosophy. The content of the various essays, along with their translated titles, can be described as follows. "The New Aspects of the Philosophy of the History of Philosophy" claims to be, but is not, an introduction to the other essays; it abounds in obscurities and does not even make the effort of (...) integrating the various contributions into some common themes. "Meta-philosophy and History of Philosophy" is partly a methodological discussion of the connections among philosophy, metaphilosophy, and history of philosophy, and partly a discussion from a psychological-psychoanalytical and cultural anthropological point of view of questions like the following: whether anything like progress exists in the history of philosophy, what is the meaning of the whole philosophical history, and what are its prospects for the future. "Heidegger, Schelling, and German Idealism" discusses the relations between the history of philosophy and the philosophy of existence, using primarily Heidegger’s lectures on Schelling as a case study. "Hermeneutic Experience and Philosophical Historiography" is a discussion primarily of the theory of historical interpretation in Gadamer’s Wahrheit und Methode, and secondarily of some of its consequences for the study of the history of philosophy; it is highly informative, but one cannot fail to lament the fact that the author reports Gadamer’s critiques of historicism without any explicit indication that, besides Dilthey’s version, there exists Croce’s brand of historicism, which in my judgment is very similar to Gadamer’s hermeneutics as reported in this essay. "History of Art as History of Philosophy?" is a thoughtful and provocative brief discussion of the divergence between the histories of art and of philosophy; it also suggests that, nevertheless, data and facts from art-history can be used by the historian of philosophy for the reconstruction of the philosophical concepts of epochs and cultures whose available historical records abound in the field of art but are lacking in the area of philosophy. "The Hegelian Left and the History of Philosophy" is an analysis of some of the historiography of the 19th century Hegelian Left. "-Philosophy and the Theology of Secularization discusses the interconnections among philosophy, history of philosophy, the contemporary historical situation, and political philosophy, developing a Gentilean critique of the theology of secularization; it argues that Gentile’s critique refutes some presuppositions of this theology, namely, the idea of the progressive character of contemporary history and that of the irreversible process of secularization. "Philosophy of Religion and History of Philosophy," though terminologically and stylistically obscure, is a very stimulating justification of the thesis that an adequate philosophy of religion is to be grounded on a philosophy of history, which in turn is to be grounded on an all-encompassing history of philosophy; independently of the adequacy of this justification, the author makes a number of very suggestive comparisons between the history and historiography of philosophy and the history and historiography of the Church, such as the following: the analogy of the relationships between theology and Church history and between philosophy and philosophical history, the analogy between the "history of ideas" and ecumenical Church history, the analogy between the position of Hegel in philosophical history and that of Jesus in Church history, and the analogy between the visible/ invisible Church distinction in religious studies and the history/theory distinction in philosophical inquiry. "Beyond the Historical Disease" discusses to what extent philosophical hermeneutics solves Nietzsche’s problem that there is a conflict between historiographical awareness and the capacity to make history; it answers that, in spite of its insights, hermeneutics fails, and that the solution lies in the direction of certain suggestions found in Sartre’s Question of Méthode. "Interpretation and Translatability of Philosophical Texts" discusses certain problems in the theory of meaning from the point of view of analytical philosophy, and in relation to the meaning of philosophical passages. "Epistemology, Hermeneutics, and Analytical-Philosophical Historiography" is an interesting mixture of a critique of the view that contemporary analytical philosophy is ahistorical, a discussion of the similarities between Popper’s epistemology and Gadamer’s hermeneutics, and a study of the interplay between Popper’s epistemology and his interpretation of Plato in The Open Society and its Enemies. "Information Theory and Philosophy" studies the relation between science and the history of philosophy by comparing and contrasting certain philosophical ideas of Leibniz and Kant with recent results in information theory. A final essay deals with "The Myth of Faust in Kierkegaard."—M.A.F. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s great influence on contemporary French philosophy, especially during the last decades of the twentieth century, might be considered as the main inspiration for the emergence of the so-called «philosophy of difference». This paper retraces the key moments of that influential presence, relating the event of Nietzsche’s revival in the late sixties with the effect generated in France by the powerful interpretation offered by Heidegger. An interpretation, whose hermeneutical research for the foundation and definite unity of the nietzschean thought, (...) seemed to overlook, according to the young generation of French philosophers, the untamable plurality of meanings within Nietzsche’s texts, as well as the potentiality that his radical thinking entailed in creating new ways of philosophizing. (shrink)

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant announced the birth of transcendental philosophy by turning to the “subject;” in the First Introduction to the Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte launched his style of transcendental philosophy by turning to the “I”; and, finally, in the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl introduces the “transcendental attitude” by turning to the transcendental subject. What is it then that characterizes the subject that transcendental philosophy in all its varied forms is, in one form or another, based on it? I want (...) to defend the thesis that it is the interpretive power of the subject that makes it a productive ground of transcendental philosophy. One implication of this claim is that the current debate about the primacy of hermeneutics over philosophy is misguided. This debate began with Heidegger’s critique of Husserl. It has been advanced by Gadamer and, to be sure, by Derrida. Hermeneutics and philosophy are not opposed; on the contrary, they relate to one another interdependently. However, because of the teleological determination of philosophy—to find the truth—it is transcendental philosophy that posits and limits the scope of hermeneutics, i.e., the interpretive powers of the subject. Another consequence of the thesis proposed is that the interdependence of transcendental philosophy and hermeneutics nullifies the ground of the debate about the question whether transcendental philosophy is inherently idealistic; it will turn out that a consequent transcendental philosophy is both idealistic and realistic. (shrink)

Discusses G. A. Widdershoven's hypothesis that contemporary hermeneutical philosophers believe that truth is neither absolute nor relative, which is based on the hermeneutical philosophies of Wittgenstein, Gadamer, and Habermas. However, to be representative of the thought of hermeneutical philosophers, one would need to include M. Heidegger's notion of geworfenheit, since this notion is instrumental in viewing the impact of non-rational factors on human thinking and "truth." 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

RESUMEN La comprensión aristotélica de la prudencia constituye un antecedente fundamental para entender el giro hermenéutico de la fenomenología heideggeriana. Se examina cómo la interpretación fenomenológica de Heidegger sobre esta virtud dianoética puede entenderse si se consideran a cuatro aspectos: la prioridad de la praxis respecto de los saberes teóricos, el reconocimiento de un horizonte de verdad más amplio que la verdad proposicional del logos apophantikos, el valor del instante kairológico en el que discurre la acción humana y el (...) anticipo de la temporalidad y, cómo no, la importancia de la finitud, la libertad y la autenticidad del existir fáctico del hombre. ABSTRACT Aristotle's conception of phronesis is crucial in order to understand the hermeneutic turn in Heidegger's phenomenology. The article examines how Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of this dianoetic virtue could be understood if four aspects are taken into account: the priority of praxis over theoretical knowledge, the recognition a horizon of truth that is broader than the propositional truth of the logos apophantikos, the importance of kairos, in which human action occurs, and the anticipation of temporality, and, of course, the importance of the finitude, freedom, and authenticity of man's factual existence. (shrink)

Language, meaning, and ek-sistence, by J. J. Kockelmans.--Heidegger's conception of language in Being and time, by J. Aler.--Poetry and language in Heidegger, by W. Biemel.--Heidegger's topology of being, by O. Pöggeler.--Thinking and poetizing in Heidegger, by H. Birault.--Hermeneutic and personal structure of language, by H. Ott.--Ontological difference, hermeneutics, and language, by J. J. Kockelmans.--The world in another beginning: poetic dwelling and the role of the poet, by W. Marx.--Panel discussion.--Heidegger's language: metalogical forms of thought (...) and grammatical specialties, by E. Schöfer.--M. Heidegger's "ontological difference" and language, by J. Lohmann.--Bibliography (p. 365-368). (shrink)

This chapter proposes to reconstruct and make sense of Gadamer's position with regard to the concept of prejudice in its relation to several neighboring, that is, related concepts. These concepts include, first of all, pre‐understanding.The method of clarifying the meaning of concepts through reconstruction of their history is based on a particular conviction or, more exactly speaking, a philosophical position. According to it, philosophical concepts are determined in their meaning not through a random choice to designate them with that word (...) “but rather on the basis of their historical background”, and “legitimate philosophizing needs to be able to account historically for its own concepts”. The chapter then shows how Gadamer's treatment of the issue was anticipated and indeed delineated by Heidegger. The particular prejudice we are urged to liberate ourselves from is the assumption that past ages knew better how things were than we do. (shrink)

First published in 1988 as volume 63 of his Collected Works, Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity is the text of Heidegger's lecture course at the University of Freiburg during the summer of 1923. In these lectures, Heidegger reviews and makes critical appropriations of the hermeneutic tradition from Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine to Schleiermacher and Dilthey in order to reformulate the question of being on the basis of facticity and the everyday world. Specific themes deal with the history of (...) ontology, the development of phenomenology and its relation to Hegelian dialectic, traditional theological and philosophical concepts of man, the present situation of philosophy, and the influences of Aristotle, Luther, Kierkegaard, and Husserl on Heidegger's thinking. Students of Heidegger will find initial breakthroughs in his unique elaboration of the meaning of human experience and the "question of being," which received mature expression in Being and Time. (shrink)

Repositions Bachelard as a critical and integral part of contemporary continental philosophy. Like Schelling before him and Deleuze and Guattari after him, Gaston Bachelard made major philosophical contributions to the advancement of science and the arts. In addition to being a mathematician and epistemologist whose influential work in the philosophy of science is still being absorbed, Bachelard was also one of the most innovative thinkers on poetic creativity and its ethical implications. His approaches to literature and the arts by way (...) of elemental reverie awakened long-buried modes of thinking that have inspired literary critics, depth psychologists, poets, and artists alike. Bachelard’s extraordinary body of work, unduly neglected by the English-language reception of continental philosophy in recent decades, exhibits a capacity to speak to the full complexity and wider reaches of human thinking. The essays in this volume analyze Bachelard as a phenomenological thinker and situate his thought within the Western tradition. Considering his work alongside that of Schelling, Husserl, Bergson, Buber, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, Deleuze, and Nancy, this collection highlights some of Bachelard’s most provocative proposals on questions of ontology, hermeneutics, ethics, environmental politics, spirituality, and the possibilities they offer for productive transformations of self and world. (shrink)

The paper gives a hermeneutical description of Jung’s theory of complexes and archetypes, in which the complexes are defined as those parts of psyche which have split from it. Thus the human inward could not be conceived as a simple and unified whole. Complexes were understood as neutral “nodal points” of the inner structure of psyche. Jung’s searching for the factors of their formation resulted in articulating of the theory of archetypes which he saw as the invisible “roots of consciousness”. (...) Later on an important connection between the theory of archetypes and Plato’s doctrine of history was postulated. The conception of archetypes was taken as a new interpretation of the latter, going back to A. Schopenhauer. In his articulation of the theory of archetypes Jung was influenced mainly by Kant’s conception of apriori intuitions and categories. In conclusion the author critically compares Jung’s conception with the existential of M. Heidegger, drawing from O. ?álek’s work. (shrink)

(1998). The Hermeneutics of Heidegger's Speech: A Rhetorical Phenomenology. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology: Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 162-173.

This article attempts to start an interdisciplinary dialogue, dealing with the different approaches on translation coming from philosophy and translation studies. The article argues that, despite many efforts of describing the phenomenon of translation from the point of view of linguistics, theory of literature and communication sciences, it is only the hermeneutical perspective that is able to interpret this phenomenon starting from itself and thus to reach to a comprehensive understanding of it. Hermeneutical reflections on translating came both from the (...) hermeneutic philosophy (F. E. D. Schleiermacher, M. Heidegger, H.-G. Gadamer, P. Ricoeur) and from the translation studies (F. Paepcke, R. Stolze in Germany, H. Meschonnic, A. Bermann and J.-R. Ladmiralin France, G. Steiner in the Anglo-American area). However these two orientations have not, so far, entered into a dialogue. It is only these latest three books discussed in the present article that offer the premises of bringing closer the two hermeneutical traditions which developed so far in a parallel fashion, thus setting a starting point for discussing upon a general hermeneutical “theory” of translation. (shrink)