Praktische Vernunft, Handlungstheorien und Moralvorstellungen. Ein Interessantes Werk zum Thema Handeln udn Denken.

„Ein jedes Ding in der Natur wirkt nach Gesetzen. Nur ein vernünftiges Wesen hat das Vermögen, nach der Vorstellung der Gesetze, i.e. nach Prinzipien zu handeln oder einen Willen.“ So definiert Kant in der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten den Willen oder, was für ihn dasselbe ist, die praktische Vernunft. Die Moral ergibt sich sowohl unter dem formalen Gesichtspunkt ihres Geltungsanspruchs wie unter dem materialen ihrer Grundnorm, nämlich des kategorischen Imperativs, aus der Selbstanwendung der apriorischen Grundstruktur der praktischen (...) Vernunft. Damit ist die Frage beantwortet, "von woher ein unbedingtes Sollen verbindet, was der Grund seiner Verbindlichkeit ist", wie sie beispielhaft Dirk Greimann formuliert. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.2 (2001) 304-305 [Access article in PDF] Wildfeuer, Armin G. Praktische Vernunft und System. Entwicklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zur ursprünglichen Kant-Rezeption Johann Gottlieb Fichtes. Stuttgart-Bad/Cannstatt : Frommann-Holzboog, 1999. Pp. 596. Cloth, DM 168. The subtitle of this book, a slightly revised dissertation from the University of Bonn (1994), reads: "Investigations into the developmental history of Johann Gottlieb Fichte's original reception of Kant." The (...) work comes to almost 600 pages. The main text is heavily overlaid with detailed footnotes, extensive quotations and supplementary material in smaller print and narrow line spacing. To the reader who is patient enough to face this scholastic mode of presentation, there emerges behind it a valuable contribution to our overall understanding of Fichte's philosophical work in general and its core discipline, the Wissenschaftslehre or first, transcendental philosophy, in particular.In the grand narrative about the development of German idealism Fichte is placed between Kant and Schelling. More precisely, he is typically portrayed as continuing but also revising Kant's work under the double influence of the leading early post-Kantian, Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1758-1823), and the skeptical anti-Kantian and anti-Reinholdian, Gottlob Ernst Schulze (1761-1833), called "Aenesidemus" after the title of his anonymous main work.Wildfeuer's investigations supplement this picture with a detailed consideration of what could be called "Fichte before Fichte": the early development of Fichte's thought, prior to his encounter with Reinhold and prior even to his encounter with Kant (1790). To be sure, Wildfeuer also deals with Fichte's continued philosophical development up through 1794, and he has many interesting things to say about the lasting presence of Fichte's earliest concerns in his more mature work. But the chief merit of the book is the sustained attention it pays to the very beginnings of Fichte's thought.Much of the prehistory of Fichtean philosophy has to be conjectured, given the scarcity of documents about Fichte's years of study (1780-84) and of his work as itinerant tutor (1785-1793). From Fichte's own testimony in his correspondence it is clear that prior to encountering Kant's three Critiques he held a determinist position regarding nature as well as human conduct. Based on some indications in Fichte's later works, Wildfeuer identifies as the chief source of Fichte's determinism the work of Karl Ferdinand Hommel (1722-1781), a professor of law at Leipzig, whom Fichte could have heard as a student and whose pseudonymous treatise Alexander von Joch... On Reward and Punishment According to Turkish Laws (1770) Fichte cites. Hommel (alias von Joch) maintains a deterministic view of human action, while justifying the social practice of punishment and reward. In particular, he maintains the dependence of the will on the intellect and of the latter on sensations or sensory impressions. Wildfeuer refers to this position, as it was temporarily adopted by Fichte, as that of the primacy of the understanding over the will.But Wildfeuer also shows that from early on Fichte's determinist leanings in speculation were counterbalanced by the conviction that feeling, especially feeling in religious matters, is an equally valid source of truth. For Wildfeuer, this early duality of speculation and feeling is the lasting basis of Fichte's life-long concern with reconciling the competing demands of head and heart. In particular this pre-Kantian key concern [End Page 304] in Fichte informs the latter's central systematic occupation with the unity of the mind amidst its differentiation into faculties or kinds of mental activity.Further texts which Wildfeuer examines in pursuit of the pre-Kantian Fichte are his Latin Valedictory Address, given upon graduating from one of Germany's finest secondary schools at the time, the Princely College of Pforta (1780), and the "Aphorisms on Religion and Deism" (1790).On the basis of this material Wildfeuer goes on to reconstruct the distinct reception that each of Kant's three Critiques received by Fichte. According to Wildfeuer, the Critique of Pure Reason originally was read by... (shrink)

It is first Kant who makes "practical reason" a central term in moral philosophy. He departs from a tradition which assigned clearly distinct roles within the theory of moral obligation to "ratio" on the one hand, and "voluntas" on the other. Using an example of a Christian natural law approach employed before Kant, the article isolates and portrays each of these roles. Against this background it shows that Kant transforms a theological argument for God's self-obligation though His own will to (...) create a "kingdom of nature" into a philosophical argument for human self-obligation through human creation of a "kingdom of freedom". The rational and voluntary moments of this "act of creation" are expressed in the concept of "practical reason". This concept thus articulates human understanding of self as a self-legislating and free being. 'Praktische Vernunft' wird erst mit Kant zu einem zentralen Terminus der Moral. Er steht quer zu jener Tradition, welche bis dahin der 'ratio' einerseits und der 'voluntas' andererseits wohlunterschiedene Aufgaben im Rahmen der Theorie moralischer Verbindlichkeit zuwies. Am Beispiel einer christlich-naturrechtlichen Argumentationsweise vor Kant werden die beiden genannten Aufgaben herausgearbeitet. Es zeigt sich vor diesem Hintergrund, daß Kant ein theologisches Argument für die Selbstbindung Gottes durch dessen eigenen Willen zur Schöpfung eines 'Reiches der Natur' in das philosophische Argument einer Selbstbindung des Menschen durch die Schöpfung eines 'Reiches der Freiheit' transformiert. Vernunft- und Willensmoment ebendieses 'Schöpfungsaktes' finden Ausdruck in dem Begriff einer 'praktischen Vernunft'. Dieser artikuliert somit das Selbstverständnis des Menschen als eines sich selbst das Gesetz gebenden, freien Wesens. (shrink)

Since antiquity, prudence has been esteemed as an important guideline of reasonable human conduct and even as a cardinal virtue. There are, however, controversies about what it means and demands. In ancient and medieval philosophy, prudence was understood in a very wide sense as the comprehensive capacity to act in a well-considered way on the basis of best reasons, including moral reasons. By contrast, in modern philosophy it has often been interpreted in a much narrower sense as individuals' pursuit of (...) their own long-term good or rational self-interest, which does not necessarily rely on moral reasons and may lead to results contradictory to morality. On the assumption of this second, narrow concept, this paper aims at clarifying the role of prudence in the realm of practical reason and its relationship to morality. Any human action faces three questions regarding its reasonableness: We can ask whether or not it is expedient, i.e. suitable for achieving the pursued goals, whatever these goals may be, prudent, i.e. compatible with the actor's well-considered self-interest, and moral, i.e. acceptable from the viewpoint of moral impartiality and universality. Accordingly, one can differentiate between three levels of practical reason that include different guidelines for human conduct, but must be combined in order to come to a final judgement: expediency, prudence, and morality. These levels of practical reason differ, on the one hand, in the way they make use of individual preferences and, on the other, in the initial state of affairs to which they refer. Since the considerations at the different levels may result in contradicting directions, there must be a rule for combining them in a coherent end-result: this rule consists in a strict ranking order according to which morality overrules prudence that itself has priority over expediency. This conception of practical reason raises a number of questions as to the relationships between prudence and morality. The most frequently asked question in this context, namely the question of why one should be moral, is not discussed in the paper. Instead, it focuses on the internal connections between morality and prudence. One connection concerns the impact of morality on prudence. Morality may enter into prudential considerations in two ways: through internalized moral traits that may become part of a person's self-interest and through moral preferences that may restrict conflicting prudential motives to a certain degree. But there is also a connection between prudence and morality. On the assumption that a reasonable morality must aim at achieving a social order which is to the benefit of all people concerned from an impartial point of view , it is obvious that moral reasoning cannot do without prudential considerations. (shrink)

Friedrich Vollhardt befasst sich in seiner Untersuchung „Selbstliebe und Geselligkeit" und vielen weiteren Arbeiten intensiv mit dem Verhältnis der Literatur zu Wissensbeständen, die sich der praktischen Vernunft zuordnen lassen. Dazu zählen neben Rechts- und Morallehren auch Theorien der Politik und der Religion. Daher lässt sich sagen, dass sich Vollhardts Forschungen im Sinne des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts auf die Bedeutung einer philosophia practica universalis für die Literatur konzentrieren. Diesem Themenkomplex ist auch die Festschrift zu Vollhardts 60. Geburtstag gewidmet: Lehrer (...) und Kollegen, Schüler und Freunde des Geehrten setzen sich aus philologischen, philosophischen, theologischen und historischen Perspektiven mit dem Verhältnis von Literatur und praktischer Vernunft auseinander. Sie spannen dabei einen Bogen vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart. (shrink)

Vihjanen: Institutional Mercy u S. Harwood: Is Mercy Unjust? u K. Tuori: Critical Positivism and the Problem of the Legitimacy of Law u K. Sevon: The Practical ...

Kants Lösung des Problems von Freiheit und Determinismus scheint nur für gute und schlechte Handlungen zu gelten, also für Handlugen, die eine moralische Dimension haben. Nach Ausführungen Kants im Kanon-Kapitel der KdrV scheint die Freiheit zweckrationaler Handlungen Gegenstand der empirischen Erfahrung zu sein, womit sie eine bloß ‚komparative‘ oder ‚psychologische‘ Freiheit und deshalb Teil der kausalen Struktur der Welt wäre. Allerdings schreibt Kant auch instrumentellen Handlungen eine moralische Dimension zu, insofern sie erlaubt sind und deshalb einen mindestens hypothetischen Bezug zum (...) Sittengesetz haben. (shrink)

Der Band versammelt Studien, die sich dem von Friedrich Vollhardt intensiv erforschten Verhältnis von Literatur und Formen der praktischen Vernunft widmen. Dazu zählen neben Rechts- und Morallehren auch Theorien der Politik und der Religion. Ihre Bedeutung für die Literatur vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart leuchten die Beiträge dieser Festschrift aus.

The philosophical foundation and the limits of religious tolerance are part of the core problems of legal philosophy. The text explores the key epistemological and normative foundations of tolerance. Even though Kant cannot be credited with solving the riddles of tolerance his thought leads in core respects, most notably as regards to his critique of religious knowledge and his concept of human dignity, to the heart of the problem of the foundations of religious tolerance. Kant’s philosophy of religion is therefore (...) the focus of the following remarks which lead in the end to an assessment of widely discussed problems of religious tolerance today. (shrink)

This paper explores the question whether utilitarianism is compatible with the autonomy of the moral agent. The paper begins by considering Bernard Williams' famous complaint that utilitarianism cannot do justice to the personal projects and commitments constitutive of character. Recent work (by Peter Railton among others) has established that a utilitarian agent need not be free of such personal projects and commitments, and could even affirm them morally at the level of second"order reflection. But a different and more subtle problem (...) confronts this approach: the use of utilitarian principles to justify the cultivation of personal projects and attachments undermines the autonomy to support this objection, according to which autonomy is a matter of acting in a way one can reflectively endorse. (shrink)

Das Phänomen Freiheit, das einerseits einen nicht-vorbestimmten Handlungsraum und anderseits ein verfolgbares kausales Verhältnis zum Urheber voraussetzt, lässt sich auf das Spannungsfeld zwischen Bestimmtheit und Unbestimmtheit zurückführen. Gemäß diesem Leitgedanken erläutert die vorliegende Studie die Theorie über die Beziehung der Willensfreiheit zur praktischen Vernunft bei Kant, Reinhold und Fichte, die hierzu drei unterschiedliche, in den historischen Kontext eingebundene Standpunkte vertreten.

The paper investigates the Kantian idea that a rational life is a life of “mere form”—a life in which a “mere form” is the force or spring of action. I start by developing Kant’s practical notion of life—the capacity to be the cause of what one represents. In a second step, I investigate the way in which Kant characterizes a rational life—the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws and to determine ourselves by the mere form of (...) a practical rule. In the third section, I point to some of the attractions and some of the problems of such an account. I close by considering a Hegelian alternative: the notion that a rational life is not the life of “mere,” but of “absolute form.”. (shrink)