In the recent Anglo-American philosophy of religion, significant attention has been given to the nature of faith. My goal is to show that some of the recent discussion of faith can be fruitfully brought to bear on a problem for a less globally well-known version of monotheism found in African Traditional Religion. I argue that African Traditional Religion could benefit from utilizing non-doxastic accounts of faith. For a significant number of Africans questioning authority or tradition, including (...) the tenets of African Traditional Religion is viewed as harmful to the community and hence beyond the pale. A non-doxastic account of faith would be helpful for adherents of African Traditional Religion who find themselves disbelieving yet wanting to continue in religious practice and maintain communal harmony. This is because a non-doxastic state such as hope is within one’s direct control and does not require as much evidential justification as rational belief. (shrink)

Our aims are to articulate some core philosophical positions characteristic of Traditional African Religion and to argue that they merit consideration as monotheist rivals to standard interpretations of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition. In particular, we address the topics of how God’s nature is conceived, how God’s will is meant to bear on human decision making, where one continues to exist upon the death of one’s body, and how long one is able to exist without a body. For each of (...) these topics, we note how Traditional African Religion posits claims that clash with mainstream Judaism, Christianity, and Islam and that, being prima facie plausible, indicate the need for systematic cross-cultural philosophical debate. (shrink)

Wiredu’s call for democracy by consensus is illustrated by his description of traditional African consensual rationality. This description contains the attribution of immanence to African consensual rationality. This paper objects to this doctrine of immanence. More importantly, the doctrine of immanence has led to the attribution of pure rationality to traditional African consensual practices. With reference to Aristotle’s three components of persuasion, I object to deliberation as purely rational and impervious to extraneous factors. I further (...) argue that it is because deliberation is not always perfectly rational that the process of consensus can suffer three forms of social conformity: conformity to dominant players, to numerical opinion majority, and to group-centrism. These forms of conformity mean that a consensus task order could lead to decisions of more inclusive value, but not necessarily decisions of more epistemic value. The concept of agonistic inquiry is employed to tackle what I see as the dangers of conformity and complacency in the project of inclusivity, and this is to strike a crucial balance between too-consensual and purely adversarial forms of deliberation. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show the relationship between the normative outlook and political philoso- phy of traditional societies on the one hand, and the crises of governance and leadership in contemporary African Societies, particularly subSaharan states, on the other. Although there are quite some differences in the quality of leadership and governance among sub-Saharan African states because of the different political and economic circumstances, this part of the globe taken as a whole remains underdeveloped (...) in terms of having the will to institute and maintain stable polities with responsive, responsible and efficient governance. (shrink)

Western moral philosophy is driven by the attempt to sharply distinguish persons from the rest of the cosmos, and then to identify the ways in which persons must be treated. The traditional African approach is different on both counts.

This chapter is a preliminary to the development of a philosophy of mind and world that has learned from the African traditional understanding of the human person. The objective is to frame the discipline by reference to the norms internal to philosophy as a social practice, thus facilitating dialogue across traditions. The obstacle lies in the oversight of such normative framing in the more dominant Analytic approach to the philosophy of mind, for which science and scientific method is (...) paradigmatic. By the nature of things, there is in the framework of science no resources for thematizing the one doing the science, the person or agent treated not as one object among others but presupposed to science as a human project. The key point is the determination of ‘objectivity’, which is, in that tradition, contrasted with the subjective world that is the reality of the human person as they experience themselves. The African insights into how persons grow (as subjects) through the natural and personal environment undercut this dualism. To show this, and to mitigate a misrepresentation of the African insight into the spiritual reality of the person in terms of a dualism, the African traditional categories of mind and world, predating the rise of science, have to be translated into a register that is self-consciously in dialogue with a scientific and secular culture. I take as my example the Thomism-influenced African philosophy of mind of Placide Tempels. (shrink)

Traditional African American foods, also referred to as “soul food,” are often given a blanket label of “poor food choices.” The cultural value of these ethnic foods may be disregarded without sufficient study of their nutrient content. This study showed that of the various foods perceived as traditionally African American by the local sampled population, greens were the most often identified as such by 78% and the most frequently consumed (22%) by the subjects. 37% perceived chitterlings as (...) a traditional food, yet only 30% consumed them, and only on an occasional basis. Okra, yams, and black-eyed peas had relatively high consumptions but were not often perceived as traditional African American foods. The latter may suggests a lack of historical food facts, relating to indigenous African foods or may indicate the mainstreaming of these foods. Cowpeas or black-eyed peas, okra, sesame seeds, and watermelon seeds were originally brought to North America from Africa. The literature contains scant information on this particular topic, which leaves unanswered: (1) the current consumption of traditional foods by African Americans, (2) certain availability of these foods; and (3) the positive contributions to the diet that these foods may contribute. The author recognizes that “African American” is the most appropriate and preferred term used widely today, to refer to African descendants in North America, however “Black” and “Black American” will be used interchangeably, to reflect consistency of literature cited herein. First, this article will define traditional African American foods and relate their historical significance. Secondly, it will present data on current food consumption from a sample population of African Americans surveyed in San Diego. Lastly, this article will explore possible applications of the research itself. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to examine the relationship between philosophy (considered as an expression of fundamental values) and development, this here particularly understood in its economic sense. The author starts with an exploration of the meaning of development and then goes on to evaluate the views and perspectives that tend to argue against philosophy in its broadest sense (that is considered simply as a worldview or as a system of values) occupying a distinct and significant role in development. (...) In order to demonstrate this important point, the author explores what he considers to be the impact of the traditional African ethical outlook and values in relation to the economic activities and the process of development in contemporary Africa. O objectivo deste artigo é analisar a relação entre a filosofia (considerada como expressão de valores filosóficos fundamentais) e o desenvolvimento, sendo este especialmente entendido no sentido económico. O autor começa por explorar o significado de desenvolvimento e, em seguida, continua com a avaliação das visões e perspectivas que tendem a argumentar contra a filosofia no seu sentido mais alargado (isto é, a filosofia considerada simplesmente como visão do mundo ou como um sistema de valores) que ocupam um papel distinto e significativo no desenvolvimento, sendo esta exploração e avaliação efectuadas no sentido de argumentar que a filosofia tem, de facto, um papel muito distinto e significativo a desempenhar no processo de desenvolvimento, mesmo no sentido económico do termo. Para demonstrar este importante aspecto, o autor explora o que ele considera ser o impacto da perspectiva ética e dos valores tradicionais africanos em relação com as actividades económicas e o processo de desenvolvimento na África contemporânea. (shrink)

In this article I am applying the anthropological term of "cosmology" to the study of Christianity in order to place plural Christian settings under a wider methodological perspective. I am drawing on the findings of my fieldwork in Southwestern Ghana, where I met twelve different Christian denominations and five traditional healers operating in one village. I am sketching a concise image of the local Nzema cosmology and then I am launching an attempt to present its Christian equivalent. Informed by (...) the situation in the field, by general history of Christianity, as well as by my personal understanding of it, my cosmological investigation yields three different Christian cosmologies, which all coincide side by side in African contexts. I see, thus, pluralism as inherent to Christianity itself, rather than as an outcome of cultural encounter between Christianity and local pre-Christian religion. (shrink)

This paper discusses justice as an inherent aspect of life in traditional African societies. It further examines the degree to which constitutions of African countries recognise and promote the traditions and customary practices. It is noted that of late, in the desire to contextualise justice, human rights has to a large extent become the yardstick. This universal idea often creates conflicts with African customary practices which indeed represent the expectations of individuals or groups within such customary (...) traditions. It is therefore possible in the modern context to have customary practices that are at variance with the contents of human rights. The paper cautions that any effort therefore to transform customary practices to fall in line with the universal human rights imbued idea of justice could result in a situation where traditional societies are forced to conform to standards of justice that become impositions. (shrink)

Merciful, holy, all-powerful, all-knowing, spirit, unchanging, the first cause, unknowable. These are just some of the properties that some scholars of African religions have attributed to the being they call God. Setting aside accusations that some of these properties reflect the colonially imposed religions, it is almost taken as a given that these properties really do belong to some of the various versions of the African God. This, then, raises the question: how is it ever the case that (...) the present world, filled with various forms of evil and terror, emanates from a God possessing these same properties? Thus, the African God joins the formidable list of deities for which the problem of evil is relevant. In this essay, I argue that the power of the problem of evil lies in the belief, in many major African traditional religions, that God is a personalized entity. This, in turn, ensures a blind misattribution of the properties to God. To buttress this point, I begin by presenting a materialistic and de-personalised notion of God that sheds away those properties that are imperceptible and/or are not logically necessary. Next, drawing from this new vision of God, and from religious traditions such as the Luba and Bantu traditions, I provide an account of some properties that can be ascribed to God, and show how this notion of God enables a predeterministic world. Finally, I show that what we refer to as evil is compatible with the idea of a material, depersonalized and unconscious God, and with the context of a predeterministic world that is indifferent to human experience. (shrink)

This essay discusses how ontological commitments within modern Western culture are no less problematic than those within traditional African cultures. Each posits unobservable entities to explain the experiential world, and neither has ready access to those posits held as grounding or as otherwise determining what is experienced. It looks at the conceptions of persons in Western and African traditions and suggests that each tradition can learn from the other.

Beyond reasonable doubt, the influence of Western culture and civilizations has enervated traditional African family systems, and their functions as providers of social welfare. Hitherto, traditional African family and clan by extension served as the plausible medium by which Africans proffered solutions to those social, economic and other existential problems found within their communities. However, measuring and evaluating the successes of the various social welfare programs organized by the family and clan was a difficult task to (...) achieve. It seems the services rendered merely controlled the social problems but did not improve the standard of living of the victims. This paper seeks to critically analyse the traditional African family system and its role as a provider of social welfare and argues that it can complement the Western models towards holistic social integration. Thus this work adopts the theory of change as a tool for understanding how Western models of social welfare should be integrated with traditional African approaches to care for the ‘weak’ in the society. Advocating for a paradigm shift from the modern models of providing social welfare to the traditional African family and clan model is consequent upon the claim that the latter is more embracing in approach. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has brought significant challenges to healthcare systems worldwide, and in Africa, given the lack of resources, they are likely to be even more acute. The usefulness of Traditional African Healers in helping to mitigate the effects of pandemic has been neglected. We argue from an ethical perspective that these healers can and should have an important role in informing and guiding local communities in Africa on how to prevent the spread of COVID-19. Particularly, we argue (...) not only that much of the philosophy underlying Traditional African Medicine is adequate and compatible with preventive measures for COVID-19, but also that Traditional African Healers have some unique cultural capital for influencing and enforcing such preventive measures. The paper therefore suggests that not only given the cultural context of Africa where Traditional African Healers have a special role, but also because of the normative strength of the Afro-communitarian philosophy that informs it, there are good ethical reasons to endorse policies that involve Traditional Healers in the fight against COVID-19. We also maintain that concerns about Traditional African Healers objectionably violating patient confidentiality or being paternalistic are much weaker in the face of COVID-19. (shrink)

Purpose: The purpose of this article is threefold: First, to present the African traditional ritual concept of salvation. Second, to demonstrate that this concept subconsciously forms the worldview through which African Christians interpret biblical narratives and salvation. Third, to access if certain ecclesiastical practices are influenced by the African salvific expressions. Methodology: The methodology used is exploratory, where aspects of African salvific rituals and selected ecclesiastical practices are explored. Part one of this article deals with (...) African expressions of salvation. Three aspects of salvation in the African Traditional Religion (ATR) are; one- traditional rituals that ward-off evil, two- continuity of life through genealogies and three- consciousness of ancestral spiritual world/living dead. Findings: The findings are that these three are the hallmarks of African worldview as expression of salvation. Part two of the article deals with ecclesiastical interventions, specifically on contextual biblical hermeneutic(s) expounded in worship praxis paved by African worldview. The typological and allegorical hermeneutical theories of biblical interpretation are enriched by traditional African concept of salvation in African Christianity. Contribution to Theory and Practice: In practice the African Church ought to spread the salvation of Jesus Christ through contextually interpreted biblical rituals. (shrink)

In the face of the recent backlashes against homosexual persons in Africa, on the ground that the phenomenon is un-African and/or threat to procreation and marital values, it is pertinent to review the discourse in the light of how ancient Africans perceived the reality. This is imperative given the lack of consensus on the part of scientists to disinter a conclusive finding on what causes homosexual behaviours among humans. In this research, I employ traditional Yorùbá philosophy to provide (...) a plausible justification for homosexuality among the people. In the face of this justification via Yorùbá folklore, I find that there is no documented evidence among the ancient Yorùbá that is suggestive of discrimination and stigmatization of homosexuals and inter-sex persons. As homosexual persons were respected but not criminalized, this study recommends the regurgitation of this outlook in the contemporaneous dealings with homosexual persons, beginning with the repealing of the Same-Sex Marriage Prohibition Act of 2014 in Nigeria, which is inconsistent with African values and outlooks on the subject. (shrink)

The paper attempts to provide a philosophical justification for the belief in the living-dead among the traditional Africans using the Yoruba as an example. It argues that in spite of the various criticisms leveled against the belief in the living-dead among the traditional Africans, this belief can be rationally defended and philosophically understood within the conceptual scheme of the traditional Yoruba thought. The paper argues that the link between the living and the livingdead possesses social as well (...) as moral functions. It encourages people to live morally so as to merit a good place in the other world. It imbues them with the spirit of hard work, industry, and integrity in the community. It symbolizes the continuity not only of the social structure but of the human community as well. Finally, the paper points to the need of reappraising this traditional belief in the living-dead in the quest of relieving contemporary African societies from their plethora of social predicaments. (shrink)

Traditional Africans teach ubuntu principles of communality, mutual respect, caring and so forth, but they do not walk the talk with regard to the treatment of widows. In the footsteps of Jesus of Nazareth, Christian communities preach unconditional love, especially for the poor, marginalised and vulnerable. Implementation is, however, grossly lacking in respect of the treatment of widows. There is thus an apparent deliberate uncaring, disrespectful, discriminatory, impolite and unjust treatment of widows in African communities in spite of (...) the ubuntu values and Christian teaching that emphasise love and caring, especially towards the grieving and thus vulnerable widows. Widows seem to be neglected and even oppressed in our time. The aim of this research is to critically examine African traditional widowhood rites and practices with special reference to the comfort or pain to which they subject African widows. The research further aims to examine the behaviour of some African Christians belonging to three congregations of one mainline church to determine whether their treatment of widows resonates with Jesus’ teaching regarding the requisite care of widows. The issue of widowhood in Africa, in terms of the apparent plight of these bereaved and grieving women, needs to be urgently addressed for change in the 21st century. A critical literature study of relevant sources and a newspaper article will be used for this research. My personal experiences and continuing observation as an insider will also inform the research in useful ways. (shrink)

In this paper, I take issue with Wiredu’s characterization and criticism of the general problem of epistemic authoritarianism that he identifies in some African cultures. I then defend a plausible view of epistemic authoritarianism as a method of epistemic justification in some African cultures. I argue that both his characterization and criticism implies an affirmation of epistemic individualism and autonomy, doxastic voluntarism, and a denial of epistemic dependence. I argue against epistemic autonomy and individualism, and doxastic voluntarism, because (...) they imply that one is always in the best epistemic position to be the best judge in order to make voluntary decisions regarding what is justifiable. But one person alone cannot have an infinite set of beliefs to determine in every possible situation what would constitute a determinate set of relevant alternatives and evidence in order to rule out any plausible or possible defeater. He would have to epistemically depend on others who may be authorities and ‘epistemically superior.’ Thus, I argue in favor of the dependence on the epistemic superiority and authority of tradition and elders as a basis for epistemic justification in African cultures---which Wiredu characterizes as epistemic authoritarianism. I suggest that there could be two senses of epistemic authoritarianism: the irrational and rational variants. I defend the latter in the context of the evidentialist notion of justification. I rely in part on the arguments of some philosophers who have attempted to provide a social and pragmatic context for the analysis of knowledge. So, my defense is an attempt to consider how social context, which is an important dimension of epistemology, may justify the notion of epistemic dependence on the authority of tradition and elders. This contextual and social analysis of knowledge and justification would lend credence to the sense of epistemic authoritarianism that underlies some African cultures. Although I concede that this plausible idea of authoritarianism may in principle discourage inquiry and questioning, I do not agree that it is as negative as Wiredu suggests. It has validity, when it is considered with respect to the contextual nature of epistemic justification. Moreover, such justification may have a particular resonance with respect to substantive beliefs which have practical relevance in the day-to-day lives of people. (shrink)

The question whether or not there is African philosophy has, for too long, dominated the philosophical scene in Africa, to the neglect of substantive issues generated by the very fact of human existence. This has unfortunately led to an impasse in the development of a distinctive African philosophical tradition. In this path-breaking book, Segun Gbadegesin offers a new and promising approach which recognizes the traditional and contemporary facets of African philosophy by exploring the issues they raise. (...) In Part I, the author examines, with refreshing insights, the philosophical concepts of the person, individuality, community and morality, religiosity and causality, focusing on the Yoruba of Nigeria. Part II discusses, in an original way, contemporary African social, political and economic realities from a philosophical perspective. (shrink)

For over two centuries, Western scholars have discussed African philosophy and culture, often in disparaging, condescending terms, and always from an alien European perspective. Many Africans now share this perspective, having been trained in the western, empirical tradition. Makinde argues that, particularly in view of the costs and failings of western style culture, Africans must now mold their own modern culture by blending useful western practices with valuable indigenous African elements. Specifically, Makinde demonstrates the potential for the development (...) of African philosophy and even African traditional medicine. Following the lead of a number of countries with government policies of incorporating indigenous medicine with orthodox Western medicine, Makinde argues that traditional African practices should be taken seriously, both medically and scientifically. Further, he charges African scholars with the responsibility of investigating these and other elements of traditional African culture in order to dispel their mystery and secrecy through modern research and useful publications. (shrink)

In traditional African ethics the emphasis is on respect and hierarchy. This is underpinned by a conception of the person as normative, developmental, and communitarian. But in this conception the person is only problematically unified. Further elaboration is needed on how one’s motivational structure is critically integrated if the tradition is to be reformulated so as to meet the challenges of a liberal, and often relativist, global culture. The psychological and intersubjective conditions for such personal growth need to (...) be spelled out. Here I draw upon the writings of a contemporary South African Thomist writer, Augustine Shutte, on the emergence, development, and fulfillment of our powers of self-enactment, which are given their proper intersubjective dimension. (shrink)

In this paper, I take issue with Wiredu’s characterization and criticism of the general problem of epistemic authoritarianism that he identifies in some African cultures. I then defend a plausible view of epistemic authoritarianism as a method of epistemic justification in some African cultures. I argue that both his characterization and criticism implies an affirmation of epistemic individualism and autonomy, doxastic voluntarism, and a denial of epistemic dependence. I argue against epistemic autonomy and individualism, and doxastic voluntarism, because (...) they imply that one is always in the best epistemic position to be the best judge in order to make voluntary decisions regarding what is justifiable. But one person alone cannot have an infinite set of beliefs to determine in every possible situation what would constitute a determinate set of relevant alternatives and evidence in order to rule out any plausible or possible defeater. He would have to epistemically depend on others who may be authorities and ‘epistemically superior.’ Thus, I argue in favor of the dependence on the epistemic superiority and authority of tradition and elders as a basis for epistemic justification in African cultures---which Wiredu characterizes as epistemic authoritarianism. I suggest that there could be two senses of epistemic authoritarianism: the irrational and rational variants. I defend the latter in the context of the evidentialist notion of justification. I rely in part on the arguments of some philosophers who have attempted to provide a social and pragmatic context for the analysis of knowledge. So, my defense is an attempt to consider how social context, which is an important dimension of epistemology, may justify the notion of epistemic dependence on the authority of tradition and elders. This contextual and social analysis of knowledge and justification would lend credence to the sense of epistemic authoritarianism that underlies some African cultures. Although I concede that this plausible idea of authoritarianism may in principle discourage inquiry and questioning, I do not agree that it is as negative as Wiredu suggests. It has validity, when it is considered with respect to the contextual nature of epistemic justification. Moreover, such justification may have a particular resonance with respect to substantive beliefs which have practical relevance in the day-to-day lives of people. (shrink)

BackgroundThe Western-European concept of libertarian rights-based autonomy, which advocates respect for individual rights, may conflict with African cultural values and norms. African communitarian ethics focuses on the interests of the collective whole or community, rather than rugged individualism. Hence collective decision-making processes take precedence over individual autonomy or consent. This apparent conflict may impact informed consent practice during biomedical research in African communities and may hinder ethical principlism in African bioethics. This study explored African biomedical (...) researchers' perspectives regarding informed consent and potential limitations to the principle of respect for autonomy in African communities.MethodsWe conducted a qualitative study based on in-depth interviews with 12 biomedical researchers, five females and seven males aged 34 to 74 years, currently working at an African university. Interviews lasted 35–40 min each and involved semi-structured open-ended interviews, which allowed participants to offer information about their perceptions and feelings regarding respect for autonomy and informed consent as practised in Africa. Empirical data from the interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analysed using thematic content analysis, together with an interrogation of relevant scientific literature about African communitarian ethics, making evaluations and drawing inferences consistent with the empirical bioethics approach.ResultsBased on these interviews and analysis of relevant literature, we found that informed consent is difficult to apply in an African context because it derives from a Western conception of libertarian rights-based autonomy. Most respondents pointed out that it was challenging to implement informed consent in the African setting. Furthermore, communalism, customary beliefs, spirituality, and relational autonomy are predominant in most African communities, as exemplified by the African moral philosophies of Ubuntu/botho and Ukama, which emphasize communitarianism over individual rights. We also found that language, education, poverty, and cultural beliefs are barriers to obtaining proper informed consent in African communities.ConclusionsWe conclude that there are limitations to applying the principle of respect for autonomy and informed consent in African communities, especially in the context of human biomedical research. We recommend using a more relational approach, such as Ross’s prima facie duties, to implement informed consent in African communities. (shrink)

Kwame Gyekye offers a philosophical interpretation and critical analysis of the African cultural experience in modern times. Critically employing Western political and philosophical concepts to clear, comparative advantage, Gyekye addresses a wide range of concrete problems afflicting postcolonial African states, such as ethnicity and nation-building, the relationship of tradition to modernity, the nature of political authority and political legitimation, political corruption, and the threat to traditional moral and social values, practices, and institutions in the wake of rapid (...) social change. (shrink)

African Philosophy is a collection of previously unpublished essays that address epistemological and metaphysical concerns that have emerged from the sub-Saharan regions of Africa. The primary focus of the book is on traditional African conceptions of mind, person, personal identity, truth, knowledge, understanding, objectivity, and reality. The collection also discusses traditional African conceptions of causation, destiny, and free will.

African nations are many and diverse, each one of them a multicultural home to philosophies that have enriched human communities over the centuries. Yet, the continent's wisdom remains largely undocumented. Of particular importance are those insights that could serve as stimuli to the more responsible and sustainable management of the global economy and the earth's resources. African philosophies about the way to live a flourishing life are predominantly virtue-oriented. However, narratives of African conceptions of virtue are uncommon. (...) This book therefore helps bridge an important gap in literature. Authors writing from South Africa, Ghana, Egypt, Kenya, Mauritius, Côte D'Ivoire and Nigeria share research on indigenous wisdoms on virtue, displaying a marked consensus about the communitarian nature of African virtue ethics traditions and virtues essential for a flourishing life. They also show how indigenous virtue ethics improve corporate practices. This book will be a launchpad for further studies in Afriethics as well as a medium for sharing rich knowledge with the rest of the world.These chapters form a unique record in ethics for researchers, teachers, students and management practitioners of responsible management and African studies. (shrink)

A special issue of The Philosophical Forum , one of the most prestigious philosophy journals, is now available to a wider readership through its publication in book form. The volume includes twelve essays in three sections-- Philosophical Traditions; the African-American Tradition; and Racism, Identity, and Social Life. Contributors are: K. Anthony Appiah, Kwasi Wiredu, Lucius Outlaw, Leonard Harris, Bernard Boxill, Frank M. Kirkland, Tommy L. Lott, Adrian M.S. Piper, Laurence Thomas, Michele M. Moody-Adams, Anita L. Allen, and Howard McGary. (...) The introduction is by John P. Pittman. (shrink)