Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Self-Consciousness" by Joel Smith
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- Campbell, John, 1994, Past, Space, and Self, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999a, “Immunity to Error through Misidentification and the Meaning of a Referring Term”, Philosophical Topics, 26(1&2): 89–104. (Scholar)
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- –––, 2002, Reference and Consciousness, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Cappelen, Herman and Ernie Lepore, 2007, “The Myth of Unarticulated Constituents”, in O’Rourke & Washington 2007: 199–214. (Scholar)
- Cappelen, Herman and Josh Dever, 2013, The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Carr, David, 1999, The Paradox of Subjectivity: The Self in the Transcendental Tradition, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Carruthers, Peter, 1996, “Simulation and Self-Knowledge: A Defence of Theory Theory”, in Carruthers & Smith 1996: 22–38. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, Consciousness: Essays from a Higher-Order Perspective, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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- –––, 2011, The Opacity of Mind: An Integrative Theory of Self-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Carruthers, Peter, Logan Fletcher, and J. Brendan Ritchie, 2012, “The Evolution of Self-Knowledge”, Philosophical Topics, 40(2): 13–37. (Scholar)
- Carruthers, Peter and Peter K. Smith (eds.), 1996, Theories of Theories of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Cary, Phillip, 2000, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner
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- Cassam, Quassim, 1989, “Kant and Reductionism”, Review of Metaphysics, 43(1): 72–106. (Scholar)
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- –––, 1995, “Introspection and Bodily Self-Ascription”, in Bermúdez, Marcel, & Eilan 1995: 311–336. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, Self and World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Castañeda, Hector Neri, 1966, “’He’: A
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- –––, 1967, “Indicators and
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- –––, 1999, The Phenomeno-Logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness, edited by James G. Hart and Tomis Kapitan, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. (Scholar)
- Caston, Victor, 2002, “Aristotle on Consciousness”, Mind, 111(444): 751–815. (Scholar)
- Chadha, Monima, 2017, “No-Self and the Phenomenology of Agency”, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 16(2): 187–205. (Scholar)
- Chalmers, David, 1996, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a
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- Chen, Cheryl K., 2011, “Bodily Awareness and Immunity to Error through Misidentification”, European Journal of Philosophy, 19(1): 21–38. (Scholar)
- Chisholm, Roderick M., 1976, Person and Object, Chicago: Open Court. (Scholar)
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2003, “Can Animals Recall the Past and Plan for the
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- Cohen, Jonathan, 2013, “Indexicality and the Puzzle of the Answering Machine”, The Journal of Philosophy, 110(1): 5–32. (Scholar)
- Coliva, Annalisa, 2002, “Thought Insertion and Immunity to Error through Misidentification”, Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 9(1): 27–34. (Scholar)
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- Corazza, Eros, 2004, Reflecting the Mind: Indexicality and Quasi-Indexicality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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- Cory, Therese Scarpelli, 2014, Aquinas on Human Self-Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Dainton, Barry, 2000, Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
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- Damasio, Antonio, 2010, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the
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- Davidson, Donald, 1991, “Three Varieties of Knowledge”, in A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), A.J. Ayer: Memorial Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 153–166; reprinted in Donald Davidson, 2001, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 205–220. (Scholar)
- de Gaynesford, Maximilian, 2003, “Is ‘I’
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