Haunted by dreams of a powerful red tide, Odd Thomas, accompanied by two otherworldly sidekicks--his dog Boo and the Chairman of the Board--is drawn to a small California coastal town, where nothing is at it appears and where he confronts overwhelming and sinister forces out to stop his quest.

Der Streit um die Prinzipien der Theorienentwicklung hat in den Jahren seit dem Erscheinen von TH. S. KUHNS "Die Struktur wissen schaftlicher Revolutionen" mannigfache und lebhafte AufSerungen pro und contra hervorgerufen. Die Gegenposition wird im wesent lichen durch die Namen POPPER und LAKATOS charakterisiert. Die Kontroverse erweist sich als eine solche zwischen synchronischer und diachronischer, zwischen systematischer und historischer Betrach tungsweise. 1st die Entwicklung der Wissenschaften, wie man es nach KUHN glauben kann, in entscheidendem MafSe aufSeren Einfliissen und Zufalligkeiten ausgesetzt, (...) oder gibt es nicht doch rationale, rein wissenschaftsimmanente Kriterien, auf Grund derer eine Entwicklung im Sinne eines Fortschrittes zu immer besseren, richtigeren und lei stungsfahigeren Theorien moglich ist? Eine wesentliche Schwierigkeit, um dabei weiterzukommen, besteht darin, dafS es keine Moglichkeit zu geben scheint, eine Theorie zu bewerten, zu entscheiden, welche von zwei Theorien "wahrscheinlicher, richtiger, besser oder leistungs fahiger" ist. Wenn es geiange, eine numerische Bewertung von Hypothesen und Theorien in dieser Richtung zu finden, so ware damit auch ein Weg gewiesen, die Entwicklung der Theorien nicht nur zu rekon struieren, sondern vielleicht auch zu lei ten. Die Bewertung einer Theorie im Sinne ihrer Richtigkeit ist bisher nicht gelungen. Wenn POPPER, insbesondere in seinen spaten Arbeiten ("Objective Knowl edge"), die Auffassung vertritt, dafS die Entwicklung der Wissen schaften im Sinne einer immer grofSeren Wahrheitsahnlichkeit von statten gehe, so ist das bei ihm ein reiner Glaube, der auf Grund seines Modells von Versuch und Irrtum postuliert wird. (shrink)

Justice, Sustainability, and Security not only enhances our knowledge of these issues, but it teases out our moral dimensions and offer prescriptions for how governments and global actors might craft their policies to better consider their effects on the global human condition.

This junior/senior level text is devoted to a study of first-order logic and its role in the foundations of mathematics: What is a proof? How can a proof be justified? To what extent can a proof be made a purely mechanical procedure? How much faith can we have in a proof that is so complex that no one can follow it through in a lifetime? The first substantial answers to these questions have only been obtained in this century. The most (...) striking results are contained in Goedel's work: First, it is possible to give a simple set of rules that suffice to carry out all mathematical proofs; but, second, these rules are necessarily incomplete - it is impossible, for example, to prove all true statements of arithmetic. The book begins with an introduction to first-order logic, Goedel's theorem, and model theory. A second part covers extensions of first-order logic and limitations of the formal methods. The book covers several advanced topics, not commonly treated in introductory texts, such as Trachtenbrot's undecidability theorem. Fraissé's elementary equivalence, and Lindstroem's theorem on the maximality of first-order logic. (shrink)

It is an assumption common to many theories of rationality that all practical reasons are based on a person's given desires. I shall call any approach to practical reasons which accepts this assumption a "Humean approach". In spite of many criticisms, the Humean approach has numerous followers who take it to be the natural and inevitable view of practical reason. I will develop an argument against the Humean view aiming to explain its appeal, as well as to expose its mistake. (...) I focus on just one argument in favour of the Humean approach, which I believe can be constructed as the background idea of many Humean accounts: the argument from motivation. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that a person can have a reason to do what she cannot do. In a nutshell, the argument is that a person can have derivate reasons relating to an action that she has a non-derivative reason to perform. There are clear examples of derivative reasons that a person has in cases where she cannot do what she (non-derivatively) has reason to do. She couldn’t have those derivative reasons, unless she also had the non-derivative reason to (...) do what she cannot do. I discuss a number of objections to this view, in particular two: (1) The objection that if there were reasons to do what one cannot do, many of those would be ‘crazy reasons’, and (2) the worry that if there were such reasons, then agents would have reasons to engage in futile deliberations and tryings. I develop an explanation of ‘crazy reasons’ that shows that not all reasons to do the impossible are crazy and only those that are need to be filtered out, and, regarding the second objecting, I show that the reasons for trying as well as for taking the means to doing something—instrumental reasons in a broad sense—are different from the reasons for performing the action in the first place. They are affected by impossibility, and we can explain why that is so. The view I argue for is that a person may have a reason to do what she cannot do, but she does not have a reason to try to do so or to take means to realizing the impossible. (shrink)

Machine learning has become a key component of contemporary information systems. Unlike prior information systems explicitly programmed in formal languages, ML systems infer rules from data. This paper shows what this difference means for the critical analysis of socio-technical systems based on machine learning. To provide a foundation for future critical analysis of machine learning-based systems, we engage with how the term is framed and constructed in self-education resources. For this, we analyze machine learning tutorials, an important information source for (...) self-learners and a key tool for the formation of the practices of the machine learning community. Our analysis identifies canonical examples of machine learning as well as important misconceptions and problematic framings. Our results show that machine learning is presented as being universally applicable and that the application of machine learning without special expertise is actively encouraged. Explanations of machine learning algorithms are missing or strongly limited. Meanwhile, the importance of data is vastly understated. This has implications for the manifestation of social inequalities through machine learning-based systems. (shrink)

Many of the things we do in the course of a day we don't do intentionally: blushing, sneezing, breathing, blinking, smiling—to name but a few. But we also do act intentionally, and often when we do we act for reasons. Whether we always act for reasons when we act intentionally is controversial. But at least the converse is generally accepted: when we act for reasons we always act intentionally. Necessarily, it seems. In this paper, I argue that acting intentionally is (...) not in all cases acting for a reason. Instead, intentional agency involves a specific kind of control. Having this kind of control makes it possible to modify one's action in the light of reasons. Intentional agency opens the possibility of acting in the light of reasons. I also explain why when we act with an intention we act for reasons. In the second part of the paper, I draw on these results to show that the dominant view of reasons to intend and the rationality of intentions should be rejected. (shrink)

Einleitung. A. Das Problem eines Systems der Philosophie als solchen - B. Das System der Philosophie von 1800 bis 1804 im Grundriss - C. Methodischer Ausgangspunkt und sachliche Problematik der Darstellung dieses Systems Erster Teil. Logik und Metaphysik als Grundlegung des Systems - A. Die Einleitung - B. Die Logik - C. Die Metaphysik Zweiter Teil. Philosophie der Natur als sachlicher und methodischer Schwerpunkt der Entfaltung des Systems - A. Der Naturbegriff als Grundbegriff des Systems nach den Ausserungen der Jahre (...) 1801-1802 - B. Die zusammenhangende Entfaltung der Naturphilosophie von 1803/04 und von 1804 - C. Die Begrenzung der systematischen Bedeutung der Naturphilosophie auf Grund ihrer zusammenhangenden Entfaltung Dritter Teil. Die Entwicklung von der Philosophie der Intelligenz zur Philosophie des Geistes als Ausgangspunkt fur den Umbildungsprozess des Systems im ganzen - A. Der Plan der Philosophie der Intelligenz als in sich begrenzter Gegenseite zur Philosophie der Natur in den Jahren 1800-1801 - B. Die Entfaltung des praktischen Teils der Philosophie der Intelligenz als Naturrecht (1802-1803) - C. Die Entstehung der Philosophie des Geistes aus der Philosophie der Intelligenz und der Philosophie des Absoluten in den Fragmenten des Systementwurfs von 1803/04 Vierter Teil. Philosophie des Absoluten als Abschluss des Systems in sich selbst - A. Die spekulative Erfassung der Wahrheit der Religion als Voraussetzung fur die Philosophie des Absoluten (1800-1801) - B. Die Anschauung des sich selbst gestaltenden Absoluten in Kunst und Spekulation im Anschluss an Schellings Systemkonzeption (1801-1803) - C. Das Sichbegreifen des Absoluten als absolutes Bewusstsein innerhalb der Philosophie des Geistes (1803/04) Schluss. A. Das System von 1800-1804 als Entwicklung zur Abgeschlossenheit des Denkens in sich selbst - B. Die Philosophie als System und die Frage nach der Philosophie uberhaupt Anhang. Zum Verhaltnis von Geschichte und Philosophie im D". (shrink)

The buck-passing account of values offers an explanation of the close relation of values and reasons for action: of why it is that the question whether something that is of value provides reasons is not ”open.” Being of value simply is, its defenders claim, a property that something has in virtue of its having other reason-providing properties. The generic idea of buck-passing is that the property of being good or being of value does not provide reasons. It is other properties (...) that do. There are, however, at least three versions of the account which differ in their understanding of those “other properties.” The first two versions both assume that non-normative properties provide reasons, the difference being that the second allows that normative properties also provide reasons. Both run into difficulties, which I explain, in trying to defend the claim that non-normative properties provide reasons for action. The third version of the buck-passing account which explains being of value in terms of more specific evaluative properties that are reason-providing remains unpersuasive as well. Once we understand the relation between general and specific properties as a difference in degree, there is no space for a reduction of the one kind of properties to the other. In section II I sketch an alternative account of the relation between reasons and values, which is based on a thesis that I call the Conceptual Link and the claim that values are not just co-extensive with reasons, but explain them. (shrink)

The explanation of promising is fraught with problems. In particular the problem that promises can be valid even when nothing good comes of keeping the promise (the problem of ‘bare wrongings’), and the bootstrapping problem with explaining how the mere intention to put oneself under an obligation can create such an obligation have been recognized since Hume’s famous discussion of the topic. There are two influential accounts of promising, and promissory obligation, which attempt to solve the problems: The expectation account (...) and the practice account. While those accounts solve both the bootstrapping problem and the problem of bare wrongings, it turns out that they encounter numerous problems of their own. (shrink)

Luck, Value, and Commitment comprises eleven new essays which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929-2003).

Adaptation to novel visuomotor transformations for example when navigating a cursor on a computer monitor by using a computer mouse, can be explicit or implicit. Explicit adjustments are made when people are informed about the occurrence and the type of a novel visuomotor transformation and intentionally modify their movements. Implicit adjustments, in contrast, are made without reportable knowledge of a novel visuomotor transformation and without a change intention. The relation of implicit adjustments to explicit adjustments needs further clarification. Here we (...) show that these two types of adjustment occur at the same time and remain functionally independent. The size of total adjustment turned out to be the sum of explicit and implicit adjustments measured in isolation, even when both processes produce opposite outcomes. In perspective our results demonstrate that automatic, implicit processes of motor control are not superseded by intentional, explicit ones, but only superposed. (shrink)

In Thomas Thomson's System of chemistry of 1802 Bergman and Scheele are actually considered as creators of the analytical concept of an element. With regard to this, a detailed investigation of the work of Bergman and Scheele shows that Thomson's statement contains mistakes as well as inadmissable simplifications and generalizations. It is correct, however, that Bergman in 1774–1777 specifically anticipated in essential aspects the analytical element concept proposed by Lavoisier in 1787–1789.

It appears to be a feature of our ordinary understanding of morality that we ought not to act in certain ways at all. We ought not to kill, torture, deceive, break our promises (say)—exceptional circumstances apart. Many moral duties are thought of in this way. Killing another person would be wrong even if it achieved a great good, and even if it led to preventing the deaths of several others. This feature of moral thinking is at the core of deontological (...) ethics. But while it is also part and parcel of ordinary moral thought, it seems puzzling, because it requires an agent to act (or to abstain from acting) in certain ways, even if by violating the duty she could achieve a better outcome in terms of the very restriction that she is required to heed. If the explanation of the duty not to kill were that it preserves human life it would be hard to understand why killing is not morally permitted when it leads to preserving a greater number of lives. Moreover, why should we not violate a restriction if doing so leads to fewer violations of that very restriction? There are two questions here. (1) Why not violate a restriction whose point it is to preserve lives, if doing so leads to preserving a greater number of lives? (2) Why not violate a restriction if doing so minimizes the violation of that very restriction? The latter question concerns what is sometimes called ‘the paradox of deontology’ or the problem of ‘minimizing violations’. The former may concern the so-called trolley cases, for instance. After all, a trolley hurtling towards a number of innocent people is not about to violate the moral restriction on killing innocent people, as it is not the kind of thing that can be subject to such a restriction. In this paper I am concerned only with (2): the paradox of deontology. To put it in Nozick’s terms: ‘How can a concern for the nonviolation of C [i.e. some deontological constraint] lead to refusal to violate C even when this would prevent other more extensive violations of C? -/- Samuel Scheffler, puzzled by the same idea, put it in terms of ‘agent-centred restrictions’ (ACR), because the restriction requires an agent (not) to act in certain ways, contrasting thereby with a requirement that certain actions not be done. The restriction is thus an agent-relative rather than an agent-neutral one. Scheffler ended up rejecting the idea of agent-centred restrictions, as even on close investigation the puzzle would not dissolve. Scheffler maintains that ACRs have ‘an air of paradox’ to them, as they violate what he calls maximizing rationality. ACRs appear to clash with the idea of maximizing rationality, because they require an agent to choose the option that worse achieves her goal of not harming people. I call this, following common parlance, the paradox of deontology, even though it is not strictly speaking a paradox. Exploring whether there is really a problem here, and how it might be solved, is the main objective of this paper. I begin by explaining the puzzlement about agent-centred restrictions in more detail. I then discuss promising as an example of a kind of action which is thought to be subject to agent-centred restrictions. It turns out that they are surprisingly easy to explain. The difficult case is killing—and that should put us on guard. I argue that the problem is not with the very idea of deontological restrictions, but with puzzling aspects of the ethics of killing. (shrink)

The explanation of promising is fraught with problems. In particular the problem that promises can be valid even when nothing good comes of keeping the promise , and the bootstrapping problem with explaining how the mere intention to put oneself under an obligation can create such an obligation have been recognized since Hume’s famous discussion of the topic. In part 1, I showed that two main views of promising which attempt to solve these problems fall short of explaining the promissory (...) obligation nonetheless. In this second part, I will explain what it takes to show that there is such an obligation to keep one’s promises, and discuss a further account of promissory obligation – the normative powers account – which perhaps stands a chance to solve both the bootstrapping and the bare wrongings problem , and to successfully explain promissory obligation. It comes in at least two different forms: one which regards the normative power to promise as based on our ability to form special relationships, and another which regards the promisee’s ‘authority interest’ as the basis. (shrink)

This is one of the most important books on quantum mechanics ever written for lay readers, in which an eminent physicist and successful science writer, Heinz Pagels, discusses and explains the core concepts of physics without resorting to complicated mathematics. "Can be read by anyone. I heartily recommend it!" -- New York Times Book Review. 1982 edition.

The buck-passing account of value (BPA) is very fertile ground that has given rise to a number of interpretations and controversies. It has originally been proposed by T.M. Scanlon as an analysis of value: according to it, being good ‘is not a property that itself provides a reason to respond to a thing in certain ways. Rather, to be good or valuable is to have other properties that constitute such reasons’. Buck-passing stands in a complicated relation to the fitting-attitude analysis (...) of normativity that reaches back to the work of Brentano and Ewing. Proponents of FA-analysis hold that, as a matter of the conceptual analysis of ‘good’, something is good if it is fitting to have pro-attitudes of a certain kind towards it. The ambition of FA-analysis is to explain all practical normativity in terms of the fittingness of attitudes, which – while being itself a normative concept – is the only normative concept which grounds all others. Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen welcomed BPA as a contemporary version of FA-analysis, and others have followed this suggestion. But whether BPA should be regarded as a version of FA-analysis is a moot point. In section I, I show that BPA is not as obviously a successor of the fitting-attitude analysis of value as some have thought. The much discussed wrong-kind-of-reasons (for short: WKR) problem afflicts buck-passing only in so far as it incorporates a version of FA analysis, or at any rate is expressed in terms of reasons for attitudes. There can be a buck-passing account of value which is not affected by the problem: one that limits the account to reasons for actions (rather than attitudes). However, insofar as BPA does inherit elements of FA analysis, it also has a WKR problem. In section II, I discuss this problem and its solution. I show that it has been misidentified in the current literature, and that – once we understand the problem correctly – its solution is likely to be unavailable to the buck-passer. Hence we should reject any account of BPA that incorporates FA analysis. That leaves us with versions which do not: versions that formulate BPA in terms of reasons for actions only, rather than reasons for attitudes. Finally, in section III, I discuss why buck-passing seemed to be appealing to begin with, and whether a version of BPA that does not incorporate FA analysis is a viable contender of the account – beyond the WKR problem. (shrink)

Is the wrongness of an action a reason not to perform it? Of course it is, you may answer. That an action is wrong both explains and justifies not doing it. Yet, there are doubts. Thinking that wrongness is a reason is confused, so an argument by Jonathan Dancy. There can’t be such a reason if ‘ϕ-ing is wrong’ is verdictive, and an all things considered judgment about what (not) to do in a certain situation. Such judgments are based on (...) all the relevant reasons for and against ϕ-ing. If that ϕ-ing is wrong, while being an all things considered verdict, would itself be a reason, it would upset the balance of reasons: it would be a further reason which has not yet been considered in reaching the verdict. Hence, the judgment wasn’t ‘all things considered' after all. I show that the argument against wrongness being a reason is unsuccessful, because its main assumption is false. Is main assumption is that a consideration which necessarily does not affect the balance of reasons is not a reason. I also argue that there can be no deontic buck-passing account. (shrink)

Die hundertste Wiederkehr des Geburtstages Max Schelers war im Jahre 1974 der Anlaß zu zahlreichen Gelegenheitsveröffentlichungen, die jedoch wahrscheinlich lediglich als ein kurzes Auffiammen des Interesses an der Philosophie dieses Denkers eingeschätzt werden dürfen. Sowohl die Reichhaltigkeit wie die Vielseitigkeit seines Werkes dürfte der vornehmlichste Grund für die Tatsache sein, daß nur wenige Denker und um Darstellung bzw. Interpretation bemühte Forscher sich ein gehend und umfassend mit Schelers Philosophie befaßt haben. Hinzu kommt die Unvollendetheit dieses Schaffens, die einerseits auf seinen (...) frühen Tod zurückzuführen ist, die andererseits aber wesentlich in der Eigenart seines Philosophierens verankert ist. Es besteht jedoch die berechtigte Hoffnung, daß die Herausgabe des unveröffentlichten Nach lasses diese Unvollendetheit zwar nicht aufheben, sie aber in ihren Grenzen präziser als bisher möglich umreißen wird, und dies insbeson dere in bezug auf die von ihm geplante Metaphysik und Anthropologie. Vorliegender Arbeit lag der Versuch zugrunde, zwei der wesentlich sten Grundpfeiler dieser Philosophie freizulegen und somit zur Ausar beitung der diesem Denken "noch fehlenden architektonischen Ordnung" beizutragen. Abgesehen von einigen geringfügigen Änderungen für den Druck wurde diese Arbeit im Juni 1974 von der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universite Catholique de Louvain als Doktoratsthese angenommen. Für die Ausarbeitung dieser Dissertation steht der Autor in tiefster Dankesschuld vor allem bei seinem Promotor, Herrn Professor Dr. (shrink)