Uma boa entrevista precisa de uma entrada? Necessitamos aqui, realmente de uma apresentação de nosso entrevistado? Se sim, seremos sintéticos, porque estamos convencidos de que importa a fala de Renato Noguera. Deixaremos que a entrevista diga “algo” sobre ele que não possa ser pinçado rapidamente de seu currículo lattes, produção bibliográfica, palestras e bancas de trabalhos acadêmicos, não sem dizer, contudo, que Noguera é daqueles pensadores que aproximam o conhecimento das pessoas. Não escreve e nem fala como se estivesse em (...) uma Catedral, engomado e asséptico. Noguera é pop: dá entrevistas em programas de televisão com a mesma competência com a qual orienta seus estudantes, desenvolve pesquisas e escreve livros. Já há algum tempo, Renato Noguera é sinônimo de produção inovadora que contraria o epistemicídio negro e rasura as lacunas da filosofia. Nosso entrevistado engrossa as reflexões presentes nesta edição da revista Odeere/UESB, cujo tema central é “Afrofilosofias e saberes diaspóricos: Filosofias pretas nas palmas das mãos”, questionando silêncios de uma ciência branca-cis-euro-hetero-usa-normativa, pouco comprometida com a luta antirracista e a equanimidade. A ele agradecemos por nos conceder um pouco de seu tempo, tendo a internet nos servido de elo. A você dedicamos este trabalho, convidando-a a trilhar um percurso de leitura, o qual, se estivermos de acordo, apresentará: i) reflexão e avanço de conhecimento sobre uma filosofia negra; ii) outros caminhos para a filosofia, mais ao “sul”; iii) reinvenções de percurso de pesquisa, pois, ora, o entrevistado tem se voltado à filosofia para a infância. E por quê? Porque Erês, Ibejis, Exu Mirim, o menino Kiriku dão o que filosofar, tanto quanto Pinóquio, Mickey Mouse, Riquinho Rico ou o Pateta, não é mesmo? Esta entrevista não serve apenas aos estudiosos de filosofia, aos pesquisadores de categorias como raça, etnicidade e justiça cognitiva. Serve aquelxs interessadxs em ensinar e aprender filosofias negras, com vistas a denegrir a Vida numa articulação proativa e biocêntrica em favor da Comunidade. Em uma palavra: Ubuntu! Palavras chave: Filosofia; Afrocentricidade; África. (shrink)

Este texto quer examinar como Kant a partir da sua concepção de _cogito_ procura refutar o idealismo problemático de Descartes. Em primeiro lugar, quer verificar se Kant, ao entender a consciência de si como dependente da consciência de objeto, não estaria assumindo pressupostos metafísicos e epistemológicos diferentes dos assumidos por Descartes em sua concepção de _cogito_. Em segundo lugar, tenta formular o problema do alcance das noções de representação e reflexividade em cada um dos referidos filósofos. Para enfrentar essa problemática, (...) elege como metodologia de investigação a análise da Refutação do Idealismo da Analítica dos Princípios da _Crítica da Razão Pura_, bem como de alguns textos de Descartes que explicitam a sua concepção de _cogito_. (shrink)

Sob o patrocínio da CAPES, PROPP da Universidade Federal de Uberlândia-MG/ UFU, FAPEMIG, FAPESP e Fundação Fausto Castilho, esforços conjuntos da UFU, da Academia Polonesa de Ciências, da Universidade do Salento e da Universidade de Nápoles possibilitaram a realização, no final de 2017, da I Bienal Internacional de Filosofia de Uberlândia. Além da XX Semana de Filosofia da UFU, organizada em torno do tema A propósito da humanidade, cinco eventos compuseram a nossa primeira Bienal: o III Congresso Internacional “Vico” – (...) A língua de/em Vico; o III Colóquio Nacional “Kant” – As faculdades do ânimo: intuição e objetividade; o I Simpósio Internacional “Aristóteles” – Lógica e epistemologia; a I Jornada Nacional sobre escritores da Roma Antiga – Sêneca e, por fim, o III Seminário Internacional “Descartes” – A ideia de homem em Descartes. Por tal envergadura, esta Bienal reuniu muitos pesquisadores brasileiros e estrangeiros dos mais diversos campos da Filosofia e das Humanidades. O material que ora publicamos consiste em boa parte em textos das conferências do Seminário “Descartes”, posteriormente aperfeiçoados e desenvolvidos tanto em virtude dos debates iniciados na própria Bienal, quanto da interlocução e colaboração intelectual fomentadas a partir dela. [...] Apoio e financiamento: CAPES, FAPEMIG, PROPP/UFU, FAPESP, Fundação Fausto Castilho, Academia Polonesa de Ciências, Universidade do Salento e Universidade de Nápoles. (shrink)

Considerações sobre a impossibilidade de definir o homem a partir de Descartes Procuramos, neste texto, pensar o significado da rejeição da tradicional definição de homem efetuada por Descartes, quando tenta entender o que somos. Essa rejeição é resultado de um novo método de filosofar, que poderíamos designar como via das ideias – aquela que parte das forças do próprio espírito para examinar tudo o que ocorre nele e em qualquer outra coisa, evitando usar de pressuposições. A fim de marcar essa (...) diferença de perspectiva e a reiterada disposição do filósofo francês em elaborá-la, apontamos a limitação da noção de conceito – seja aquela da tradição aristotélica-escolástica, seja a pós-cartesiana, fortemente marcada pela representação científica – para dar conta da problemática do fenômeno humano. Nesse sentido, insistimos na riqueza e amplitude da noção de ideia – elaborada e reelaborada ao longo dos anos pelo filósofo – para enfrentar esse complexo fenômeno. Uma vez que o homem não é uma substância, a manifestação dos seus aspectos é sempre adjetiva, podendo qualificá-lo sem, contudo, propiciar a sua compreensão. Essa dificuldade de apreensão exige, portanto, que o estudo da ideia de homem explore até o limite a própria racionalidade humana Palavras-chave: Descartes; Homem; Ideia; Conceito; Definição. Considerations on the impossibility of defining man based on Descartes Abstract: The aim of this text is to reflect on the meaning of the rejection of the traditional definition of man performed by Descartes when he attempts to understand what we are. This rejection is the result of a new method of philosophizing, which we may designate as the way of ideas—that which emerges from the forces of one’s own spirit to examine all that occurs within it and in any other thing, avoiding the use of presuppositions. To highlight this difference of perspective and the reiterated willingness of this French philosopher in elaborating it, we indicate the limitation of the notion of concept—whether that of the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition or the post-Cartesian tradition, strongly characterized by scientific representation—to deal with the problematic of the phenomenon of the human. In this respect, we stress the richness and amplitude of the notion of idea, elaborated and re-elaborated over years by this philosopher, to address this complex phenomenon. Since man is not a substance, the manifestation of his aspects is always adjectival, allowing qualification without, however, providing comprehension. This difficulty of perception therefore requires that the study of the idea of man explore human rationality itself to the greatest extent. Keywords: Descartes; Man; Idea; Concept; Definition. Considérations sur l'impossibilité de définir l'homme à partir de Descartes Resumé: On se propose, dans ce texte, de réfléchir sur le sens du rejet de la définition traditionnelle de l'homme faite par Descartes, lorsqu'il tente de comprendre ce que nous sommes. Ce rejet est le résultat d'une nouvelle méthode de philosopher, que nous pourrions désigner comme la voie des idées - celle qui part des forces de l'esprit lui-même pour examiner tout ce qui se passe en lui et en toute autre chose, en évitant d'utiliser des présupposés. Pour marquer cette différence de perspective et la disposition réitérée du philosophe français dans son élaboration, nous soulignons la limitation de la notion de concept - soit celle de la tradition aristotélicienne-scolastique, soit celle post-cartésienne, fortement marquée par la représentation scientifique - pour rendre compte de la problématique du phénomène humain. En ce sens, nous insistons sur la richesse et l'amplitude de la notion d'idée - élaborée et retravaillée au fil des années par Descartes - pour faire face à ce phénomène complexe. Une fois l'homme n'est plus une substance, la manifestation de ses aspects reste toujours adjective, pouvant le qualifier sans toutefois favoriser sa compréhension. Cette difficulté d'appréhension exige donc que l'étude de l'idée de l'homme explore jusqu'à la limite la rationalité humaine elle-même. Mots-clés: Descartes; Homme; Idée; Concept; Définition. (shrink)

Este estudo busca discutir e analisar a construção da opinião pública no Twitter, tomando como estudo de caso a nomeação de Alexandre de Moraes para substituir Teori Zavascki como ministro do Supremo Tribunal Federal. A base teórica é formada a partir das relações entre o conceito de esfera pública e os sites de redes sociais. Para realizar esta análise, foram adotados métodos mistos, baseados na análise de contingência e na análise de redes. O corpus deste estudo é composto por (...) 15.125 tweets, coletados do Twitter utilizando “Alexandre de Moraes” como termo de coleta. Os dados foram analisados por meio das coocorrências entre os conceitos dos tweets, sendo possível observar os principais assuntos discutidos e posicionamentos dos usuários, em sua maioria contrários à indicação de Moraes. (shrink)

What proper role should considerations of risk, particularly to research subjects, play when it comes to conducting research on human enhancement in the military context? We introduce the currently visible military enhancement techniques (1) and the standard discussion of risk for these (2), in particular what we refer to as the ‘Assumption’, which states that the demands for risk-avoidance are higher for enhancement than for therapy. We challenge the Assumption through the introduction of three categories of enhancements (3): therapeutic, preventive, (...) and pure enhancements. This demands a revision of the Assumption (4), alongside which we propose some further general principles bearing on how to balance risks and benefits in the context of military enhancement research. We identify a particular type of therapeutic enhancements as providing a more responsible path to human trials of the relevant interventions than pure enhancement applications. Finally, we discuss some possible objections to our line of thought (5). While acknowledging their potential insights, we ultimately find them to be unpersuasive, at least provided that our proposal is understood as fully non-coercive towards the candidates for such therapeutic enhancement trials. (shrink)

According to a common philosophical intuition, the deep nature of things is hidden from us, and the world as we know it through perception and science is, just like a dream, shadows, or a computer simulation, somehow shallow and lacking in reality. This “intuition of unreality” clashes with a strong, but perhaps more naive, intuition to the effect that the world as we know it seems perfectly real. Shadows, dreams, or informational structures appear too unreal to be identical to the (...) world as we know it! This clash between the two intuitions forms the basis of the “problem of reality.” In the late nineteenth century psychiatrists encountered patients they referred to as “metaphysician doubters” who constantly questioned the reality of the world. This essay draws on studies of these patients in order to reject, and indeed diagnose, the intuition of unreality and recent metaphysical doctrines drawing on it, such as structuralism, digitalism, and virtual realism. (shrink)

Depersonalization is a pathological condition consisting in a deep modification of the way things appear to a subject, leading him to feel estranged from his body, his actions, his thoughts, his mind and even from himself. In this article, I argue that the study of depersonalization raises three challenges for recent theories of the sense of bodily ownership. These challenges—which I call the centrality challenge, the dissociation challenge and the grounding challenge— thwart most of these theories and suggest that the (...) sense of bodily ownership hinges on a phenomenal mark of mineness that can not be accounted for in terms of our sensory, interoceptive, agentive, cognitive or affective dispositions and that is psychologically primitive. In short: that mineness is first. (shrink)

This collection of six essays centers on Professor Koyre's great theme: the relative importance of metaphysics and observation, with controlled experiment a kind of marriage between the two. Professor Koyre's thesis might be summed up as a claim that when one is seeking to explain the scientific revolution, attention must be concentrated on the philosophical outlook of the scientist and away from speculative theories. At the time of his death, Alexandre Koyre was a professor at the Ecole Pratique des (...) Hautes Etudes (Sorbonne) and a memeber of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. (shrink)

In a previous article on cosmological arguments, I have put forward a few examples of complete infinite and circular explanations, and argued that complete non-wellfounded explanations such as these might explain the present state of the world better than their well-founded theistic counterparts (Billon, 2021). Although my aim was broader, the examples I gave there implied merely causal explanations. In this article, I would like to do three things: • Specify some general informative conditions for complete and incomplete non-wellfounded causal (...) explanations that can be used to assess candidate explanations and to generate new examples of complete non-wellfounded explanations. • Show that these conditions, which concern chains of causal explanations, easily generalize to chains of metaphysical, grounding explanations and even to chains involving other “determination relations” such as supervenience. • Apply these general conditions to the recent debates against the existence of nonwellfounded chains of grounds and show, with a couple of precise examples, that the latter can be complete, and that just like in the case of causal explanations, non-wellfoundedness can in fact be an aset rather than a liability. (shrink)

Computational reproducibility possesses its own dynamics and narratives of crisis. Alongside the difficulties of computing as an ubiquitous yet complex scientific activity, computational reproducibility suffers from a naive expectancy of total reproducibility and a moral imperative to embrace the principles of free software as a non-negotiable epistemic virtue. We argue that the epistemic issues at stake in actual practices of computational reproducibility are best unveiled by focusing on software as a pivotal concept, one that is surprisingly often overlooked in accounts (...) of reproducibility issues. Software is not only about designing and coding but also about maintaining, supporting, distributing, licensing, and governance; it is not only about developers but also about users. We focus on openness debates among computational chemists involved in molecular modeling software packages as empirical grounding for our argument. We then identify and analyse four epistemic characteristics as key to the role of software in computational reproducibility. (shrink)

. Computational chemistry grew in a new era of “desktop modeling,” which coincided with a growing demand for modeling software, especially from the pharmaceutical industry. Parameterization of models in computational chemistry is an arduous enterprise, and we argue that this activity leads, in this specific context, to tensions among scientists regarding the epistemic opacity transparency of parameterized methods and the software implementing them. We relate one flame war from the Computational Chemistry mailing List in order to assess in detail the (...) relationships between modeling methods, parameterization, software and the various forms of their enclosure or disclosure. Our claim is that parameterization issues are an important and often neglected source of epistemic opacity and that this opacity is entangled in methods and software alike. Models and software must be addressed together to understand the epistemological tensions at stake. (shrink)

Patients suffering from depersonalization complain of feeling detached from their body, their mental states, and actions or even from themselves. In this chapter, I argue that depersonalization consists in the lack of a phenomenal feature that marks my experiences as mine, which is usually called “mineness,” and that the study of depersonalization constitutes a neglected yet incomparable probe to assess empirically the scope, role, and even the nature of mineness. Here is how I will proceed. After describing depersonalization (§2) and (...) arguing that it involves a lack of mineness (§3) I will confront a series of objections (§4). I will then spell out what depersonalization can teach us about the scope of mineness (§5), about its role and psychological function (§6) and even about its nature (§7). (shrink)

Using emotional film clips is one of the most popular and effective methods of emotion elicitation. The main goal of the present study was to develop and test the effectiveness of a new and comprehensive set of emotional film excerpts. Fifty film experts were asked to remember specific film scenes that elicited fear, anger, sadness, disgust, amusement, tenderness, as well as emotionally neutral scenes. For each emotion, the 10 most frequently mentioned scenes were selected and cut into film clips. Next, (...) 364 participants viewed the film clips in individual laboratory sessions and rated each film on multiple dimensions. Results showed that the film clips were effective with regard to several criteria such as emotional discreteness, arousal, positive and negative affect. Finally, ranking scores were computed for 24 classification criteria: Subjective arousal, positive and negative affect (derived from the PANAS; Watson & Tellegen, 1988), a positive and a negative affect scores derived from the Differential Emotions Scale (DES; Izard et al., 1974), six emotional discreteness scores (for anger, disgust, sadness, fear, amusement and tenderness), and 15 “mixed feelings” scores assessing the effectiveness of each film excerpt to produce blends of specific emotions. In addition, a number of emotionally neutral film clips were also validated. The database and editing instructions to construct the film clips have been made freely available in a website. (shrink)

According to what we will call subjectivity theories of consciousness, there is a constitutive connection between phenomenal consciousness and subjectivity: there is something it is like for a subject to have mental state M only if M is characterized by a certain mine-ness or for-me-ness. Such theories appear to face certain psychopathological counterexamples: patients appear to report conscious experiences that lack this subjective element. A subsidiary goal of this chapter is to articulate with greater precision both subjectivity theories and the (...) psychopathological challenge they face. The chapter’s central goal is to present two new approaches to defending subjectivity theories in the face of this challenge. What distinguishes these two approaches is that they go to great lengths to interpret patients’ reports at face value – greater length, at any rate, than more widespread approaches in the extant literature. (shrink)

Corporate social responsibility has become a much-discussed subject in the business world. The Internet has become one of the main tools for CSR information disclosure, allowing companies to publicise more information less expensively and faster than ever before. As a result, corporations are increasingly concerned with communicating ethically and responsibly to the diversity of stakeholders through the web. This paper addresses the main question as whether CSR information disclosure on corporate websites is influenced by country of origin and/or industry sector. (...) Analysing the websites of 127 corporations from emerging countries, such as Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Thailand and South Africa, it becomes evident that both country of origin and industry sector have a significant influence over CSR information disclosure on the web . Based on the data studied, country of origin has a stronger influence over CSRIDOW than industry sector. (shrink)

This paper focuses on one particular case that connects climate justice and climate economics. Its contribution is twofold. First, it aims at providing a sound normative foundation for carbon pricing mechanisms around the notions of a ‘right to energy’, the ‘duty not-to-harm’ and an argument for ‘restricted compensation’. Second, it identifies the normative elements from theories of climate justice that should guide the design of market-based instruments for climate change mitigation. This will cast light on the particular moral relevance of (...) the act of internalizing a negative externality and of the funds generated by putting a price on carbon. (shrink)

O presente artigo examina como a obra historiográfica _Revoluções Cisplatinas_, de 1915, do político, diplomata e historiador Alfredo Augusto Varella, representa tanto disputa política como uma forma de escrita da história sobre a Farroupilha. A partir da hipótese de que na Primeira República, no Rio Grande do Sul, houve uma hegemonia social e política do PRR quer se investigar como a obra de Varella articulou-se com o seu contexto. Portanto, o objetivo é analisar como foi construída a narrativa sobre a (...) Farroupilha no contexto de disputas em torno do borgismo. Para atingir tal objetivo, usa-se o conceito de operação historiográfica de Michel de Certeau, isto é, como a partir de uma análise do lugar social, da prática científica e da escrita do texto pode-se perceber as transformações na escrita da história sobre a Farroupilha. Por fim, percebe-se que a obra analisada foi um objeto tanto de luta política como de virada interpretativa na escrita da Farroupilha. (shrink)

Depersonalization consists in a deep modification of the way things appear to a subject, leading him to feel estranged from his body, his actions, his thoughts, and his mind, and even from himself. Even though, when it was discovered at the end of the 19th century, this psychiatric condition was widely used to probe certain aspects of bodily awareness, and more specifically the sense of bodily ownership (SBO), it has been strangely neglected in contemporary debates. In this chapter, I argue (...) that because of three specific features, depersonalization raises some important challenges for current theories of the SBO. The first feature — call it “generality” — is that depersonalization does not only affect the sense of bodily ownership but also, typically, the sense of ``mental ownership’’ (SMO), the sense of agency or ``action ownership’’ (SOA), and the subject’s core sense of herself (CSS), that is, her awareness of herself as an I. The second feature is that except for the symptoms of depersonalization, depersonalized patients are hard to distinguish, psychologically, from normal subjects. This makes it hard to find psychological features that might explain their condition. The last feature, call it “fundamentality” is that the psychological features that do seem abnormal among depersonalized patients seem more likely to be explained by depersonalization than to explain it. These three features raise three challenges — the centrality challenge, the dissociation challenge, and the grounding challenge. Taken together, I will argue, these challenges suggest that the SBO depends on a form of phenomenal “mineness” that would mark my mental states as mine and that cannot be accounted for in sensorimotor, cognitive, or even affective terms. A phenomenal mineness that indeed seems to be psychologically primitive, and only accountable in neurophysiological terms. (shrink)

Natural modalities are often analysed from an abstract point of view where they are associated with putative laws of nature. However, the way possibilities are represented in physics is more complex. Lagrangian mechanics, for instance, involves two different layers of modalities: kinematical and dynamical possibilities. This paper examines the status of these two layers, both in the classical and quantum case. The quantum case is particularly problematic: we identify four possible interpretive options. The upshot is that a close inspection of (...) the way possibilities are represented in physics could lead to new ways of thinking about natural modalities. (shrink)

Several advocates of the lively field of “metaphysics of science” have recently argued that a naturalistic metaphysics should be based solely on current science, and that it should replace more traditional, intuition-based, forms of metaphysics. The aim of the present paper is to assess that claim by examining the relations between metaphysics of science and general metaphysics. We show that the current metaphysical battlefield is richer and more complex than a simple dichotomy between “metaphysics of science” and “traditional metaphysics”, and (...) that it should instead be understood as a three dimensional “box”, with one axis distinguishing “descriptive metaphysics” from “revisionary metaphysics”, a second axis distinguishing a priori from a posteriori metaphysics, and a third axis distinguishing “commonsense metaphysics”, “traditional metaphysics” and “metaphysics of science”. We use this three-dimensional figure to shed light on the project of current metaphysics of science, and to demonstrate that, in many instances, the target of that project is not defined with enough precision and clarity. (shrink)

Este artigo tem como objetivo estabelecer as relações entre as habilidades sociais e as vivências acadêmicas necessárias à adaptação ao contexto universitário. A pesquisa foi realizada com 200 estudantes do curso de Psicologia de instituições públicas e privadas. Os dois instrumentos utilizados (IHS-Del Prette, 2001 e QVA de Villar, 2003) foram aplicados em conjunto em consonância com as normas do QVA. Os resultados permitem aÞ rmar que os alunos de instituições públicas apresentam melhor adaptação acadêmica do que os de instituições (...) privadas. Foram encontradas correlações entre adaptação acadêmica e habilidades sociais. Para os alunos de instituições públicas as habilidades sociais se relacionam principalmente com as dimensões pessoal e contextual e para os de instituições particulares, com a dimensão de realização. (shrink)

Of all the themes running through the Sophist, in this paper I am interested in focusing on the definitions, particularly on the seventh of these, as in its attempt to hunt the sophist and distinguish his own particular activity, Plato may therein make important references to the "technique of producing images" (eidolopoiike techne). It is in the context of this seventh definition of the sophist as a 'wizard' (goes) and 'imitator' (mimetes), belonging to the "genre of the illusionists" who perform (...) illusions in their discourses, where Plato mentions the examination of such a productive human technique of an imitative nature (mimetike) and, what interests me, the explanation of its potential divisions (eikastike and phantastike) in order to include the sophist in one of these. The drama of the original and the image that the Sophist stages, and whose inclusion leads to a new reworking in the domain of mimetics, will allow us, in making it extensive in the specific case of poetic mimesis, to corroborate from another perspective the counterpoint between poetic paradigms (traditional and platonic) which can be deduced from books II, III and X of The Republic. (shrink)

This paper aims to present an approach to Frege and Husserl’s theories of meaning in order to integrate meaning in the broader context of intentionality. Intentionality and reference are two notions with affinities, despite their pertaining to different but not separated areas... When comparing Frege and Husserl’s theories of meaning and intentionality we may provide a fruitful and enriching perspective: some problems and concepts of Husserl’s thought may be elucidated if confronted with those of Frege. On the other hand, Husserl’s (...) theories of meaning and intentionality provide a broader and far-reaching scope to Frege’s ideas on meaning.. Husserl’s concept of intentionality provides a new perspective which allows to overcome some of the impasses of Frege’s theory of meaning. (shrink)

In this paper, we put forward a new account of emergence called “transformational emergence”. Such an account captures a variety of emergence that can be considered as being diachronic and weakly ontological. The fact that transformational emergence actually constitutes a genuine form of emergence is motivated. Besides, the account is free of traditional problems surrounding more usual, synchronic versions of emergence, and it can find a strong empirical support in a specific physical phenomenon, the fractional quantum Hall effect, which has (...) long been touted as a paradigmatic case of emergence. (shrink)

This article discusses the acquisition of a physical impairment/disability through voluntary body modification, or transability. From the perspectives of critical genealogy and feminist intersectional analysis, the article considers the ability and cis*/trans* axes in order to question the boundaries between trans and transabled experience and examines two assumptions impeding the conceptualization of their placement on the same continuum: 1) trans studies assumes an able-bodied trans identity and able-bodied trans subject of analysis; and 2) disability studies assumes a cis* disabled identity. (...) The perception of transsexuality and transability as mutually exclusive phenomena results from a nonintersectional analysis of transsexuality as an issue of sex/gender, but not of ability, and of transability as an issue of ability, but not of sex/gender. Difficulty recognizing continuities between these phenomena thus stems from an ableist interpretation of sex/gender and a cisnormative* interpretation of ability. This article aims to: 1) enrich intersectional analysis in trans and disability studies and transability scholarship; 2) complicate disability studies, in which disabilities are often presumed to be “involuntary,” and encourage the decentering of a cis* subject; 3) encourage trans studies to decenter an able-bodied subject; and 4) advocate for increased dialogue and the creation of alliances between trans and disability studies and movements. (shrink)

This chapter addresses the claim that, as new types of neurointervention get developed allowing us to enhance various aspects of our mental functioning, we should work to prevent the use of such interventions from ever becoming the “new normal,” that is, a practice expected—even if not directly required—by employers. The author’s response to that claim is that, unlike compulsion or most cases of direct coercion, indirect coercion to use such neurointerventions is, per se, no more problematic than the pressure people (...) all find themselves under to use modern technological devices like computers or mobile phones. Few people seem to believe that special protections should be introduced to protect contemporary Neo-Luddites from such pressures. That being said, the author acknowledges that separate factors, when present, can indeed render indirect coercion to enhance problematic. The factors in question include lack of safety, fostering adaptation to oppressive circumstances, and having negative side effects that go beyond health. Nonetheless, the chapter stresses that these factors do not seem to be necessary correlates of neuroenhancement. (shrink)

Cet article propose une analyse croisée du discours médical sur la masturbation et sur la lecture en France au XVIIIe siècle. Son but est d’interroger la construction de la définition « naturalisante » des qualités attribuées à l’un et l’autre sexe. A partir de traités physiologiques sur les maladies des femmes, la réflexion porte sur trois points principaux. Pourquoi la lecture et la masturbation sont-ils devenus des problèmes médicaux? Comment un médecin neutralise-t-il le danger, pour une femme, de lire un (...) traité sur un sujet tel que la masturbation? Comment le discours sur la lecture et la masturbation fonctionne-t-il comme système discriminant entre les sexes? (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper puts forward a normative framework to differentiate between the climate-related responsibilities of different countries in the aftermath of the Paris Agreement. It offers reasons for applying the chief moral principles of ‘historical responsibility’ and ‘capacity’ to climate finance instead of climate change mitigation targets. This will provide a normative basis to realize the goal of climate change mitigation while allowing for developing and newly industrialized countries to develop economically and offer an account of the distributive principles that can (...) regulate climate finance. This is a real-world interpretation of the 1992 UNFCCC principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ that takes into account the progress accomplished at the COP21 in Paris and offers a solution to the still unsolved problem of differentiated responsibilities. This paper offers an application of this proposal to the Green Climate Fund. (shrink)

Patients suffering from the Cotard syndrome can deny being alive, having guts, thinking or even existing. They can also complain that the world or time have ceased to exist. In this article, I argue that even though the leading neurocognitive accounts have difficulties meeting that task, we should, and we can, make sense of these bizarre delusions. To that effect, I draw on the close connection between the Cotard syndrome and a more common condition known as depersonalisation. Even though they (...) are not delusional, depersonalised patients seem to have experiences that are quite similar to those of Cotard patients. I argue that these experiences are essentially characterised by a lack of subjective character and of two other structural features of experience, which I call ‘the present character’ and ‘the actual character’. Cotard's nihilistic delusions simply consist in taking these anomalous experiences at face value. (shrink)

This paper offers an overview of the prospects and ethics of using AI to achieve human enhancement, and more broadly what we call intellectual augmentation (IA). After explaining the central notions of human enhancement, IA, and AI, we discuss the state of the art in terms of the main technologies for IA, with or without brain-computer interfaces. Given this picture, we discuss potential ethical problems, namely inadequate performance, safety, coercion and manipulation, privacy, cognitive liberty, authenticity, and fairness in more detail. (...) We conclude that while there are very significant technical hurdles to real human enhancement through AI, and significant ethical problems, there are also significant benefits that may realistically be achieved in ways that are consonant with a rights-based ethics as well. We also highlight the specific concerns that apply particularly to applications of AI for "sheer" IA (more realistic in the near term), and to enhancement applications, respectively. (shrink)