Does Duns Scotus identify the natural will with the affectio commodi ? This identifica- tion has become the standard view. In this paper, I will challenge this view through an analysis of some key texts. The main thesis of the paper is that Scotus allows for two scenarios related to the will’s dual affections. The first is the real situation of the created will: the will is a free potency and possesses two affections. The second is a hypothetical case; Scotus (...) suggests the fictive case of a will that only possesses the affectio commodi. Accordingly, it can be concluded that: (i ) when considering the will in its real condi- tion, both affections belong to the will’s free appetite; (ii) in the hypothetical case the natural will, the intellectual appetite and the affectio commodi are all identified; (iii ) in the real condition of the will, the natural will is a passive inclination to receive perfection. (shrink)

The most common way of proving decidability in propositional modal logic is to shew that the system in question has the finite model property. This is not however the only way. Gabbay in [4] proves the decidability of many modal systems using Rabin's result in [8] on the decidability of the second-order theory of successor functions. In particular [4, pp. 258-265] he is able to prove the decidability of a system which lacks the finite model property. Gabbay's system is however (...) complete, in the sense of being characterized by a class of frames, and the question arises whether there is a decidable modal logic which is not complete. Since no incomplete modal logic has the finite model property [9, p. 33], any proof of decidability must employ some such method as Gabbay's. In this paper I use the Gabbay/Rabin technique to prove the decidability of a finitely axiomatized normal modal propositional logic which is not characterized by any class of frames. I am grateful to the referee for suggesting improvements in substance and presentation.The terminology I am using is standard in modal logic. By aframeis understood a pair 〈W, R〉 in whichWis a class (of “possible worlds”) andR⊆W2. To avoid confusion in what follows, a frame will henceforth be referred to as aKripkeframe. By contrast, ageneral frameis a pair 〈,Π〉 in whichis a Kripke frame andΠis a collection of subsets ofWclosed under the Boolean operations and satisfying the condition that ifAis inΠthen so isR−1“A. A model on a frame (of either kind) is obtained by adding a functionVwhich assigns sets of worlds to propositional variables. In the case of a general frame we require thatV(p) ∈Π. (shrink)

Formalized physical theories are not, as a rule, stated in intensional languages. Yet in talking about them we often treat them as if they were. We say for instance: 'Consider what would happen if instead of p's being true q were. In such a case r would be likely.' If we say this sort of thing, p, q and r appear to stand for the meanings of sentences of the theory, but meanings in some intensional sense. Now it is very (...) easy to extend the syntax of the formal theory by adding all sorts of intensional operators, e.g. a modal operator; and it is possible to extend the semantics by adding a set of possible worlds and evaluating the modal formulae in the usual way. But this procedure is open to the criticism that we are extending the theory by adding something which is not already there. In particular the criticism will be that the possible worlds required by the semantics seem to have no connection with the intended interpretations of the original physical theory. The aim of this paper is to shew how a set of possible worlds is already implicit in the intended interpretations of a formally presented physical theory and that these interpretations induce, in a comparatively direct way, an intensional semantics which corresponds to the original one. (shrink)

In 1945 J.C.C. McKinsey produced a ‘semantics’ for modal logic based on necessity defined in terms of validity. The present papers looks at how to update F.R. Drake’s completeness proof for McKinsey’s semantics by comparing McKinsey ‘models’ with the now standard Kripke models. It also looks at the motivation behind the system McKinsey called S4.1, but which we now call S4M; and use this motivation to produce a McKinsey semantics for that system. One lesson which emerges from this work is (...) an appreciation of the superiority of the current possible worlds semantics based on frames and models, both in terms of an intuitive understanding of modality, and also in terms of the ease of working with particular systems. (shrink)

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

That space and time should be integrated into a single entity, spacetime, is the great insight of Einstein's special theory of relativity, and leads us to regard spacetime as a fundamental context in which to make sense of the world around us. But it is not the only one. Causality is equally important and at least as far as the special theory goes, it cannot be subsumed under a fundamentally geometrical form of explanation. In fact, the agent of propagation of (...) causal influence is electromagnetic radiation. In this examination, the authors find support for a rationalist approach to physics, never neglecting experimentation, but rejecting a simple empiricist or positivist view of science. (shrink)

I am idebted to members of the Wellington Logic Seminar for useful discussions of work of which this essay forms part, in particular to M. J. Cresswell for comments in the earlier stages of the investigation and to R. I. Goldblatt who suggested the definition ofB infD supu and made numerous other suggestions.

The best philosophy of science during the last generation has been highly historical; and the best history of science, highly philosophical. No one has better exemplified this intimate relationship between history and philosophy than has Robert E. Butts in his work. Through out his numerous writings, science, its philosophy, and its history have been treated as a seamless web. The result has been a body of work that is sensitive in its conception, ambitious in its scope, and illuminat ing in (...) its execution. Not only has his work opened new paths of inquiry, but his enthusiasm for the discipline, his encouragement of others (particularly students and younger colleagues), and his tireless efforts to build an international community of scholars, have stimulated the growth of HPS throughout Europe and North America. Many of the essays in this volume reflect that influence. Our title, of course, is deliberately ambiguous. The essays herein are by colleagues and former students, all of us wishing to honour an intimate friend. Happy Birthday, Bob! IX INTRODUCTION The essays herein cover a variety of concerns: from Descartes to reduction, from Galileo to gambling, from Freud's psychoanalysis to Kant's thing-in-itself. But under this diversity there is an approach common to them all. Things are largely done with a concern for and a sensitivity to historical matters (including contemporary history, of course). (shrink)

The author of the acclaimed Gay Fiction Speaks brings us new interviews with twelve prominent gay writers who have emerged in the last decade. Hear Us Out demonstrates how in recent decades the canon of gay fiction has developed, diversified, and expanded its audience into the mainstream. Readers will recognize names like Michael Cunningham, whose Pulitzer Prize-winning novel The Hours inspired the hit movie; and others like Christopher Bram, Bernard Cooper, Stephen McCauley, and Matthew Stadler. These accounts explore the vicissitudes (...) of writing on gay male themes in fiction over the last thirty years--prejudices of the literary marketplace; social and political questions; the impact of AIDS; commonalities between gay male and lesbian fiction... and even some delectable bits of gossip. (shrink)

According to the thought experiment most commonly used to argue against reliabilism, Mr. Truetemp is given an unusual but reliable cognitive faculty. Since he is unaware of the existence of this faculty, its deliverances strike him as rather odd. Many think that Truetemp would not have justified beliefs. Since he satisfies the reliabilist conditions for justified belief, reliabilism appears to be mistaken. I argue that the Truetemp case is underdescribed and that this leads readers to make erroneous assumptions about Truetemp's (...) epistemic situation. After examining empirical studies of actual subjects who, like Truetemp, have received new perceptual faculties, I show that Truetemp must have been endowed with all of the reorganized neural circuitry and cognitive skills that subjects with new perceptual faculties normally acquire during a long and difficult process of adaptation and development. When readers realize how much more the designers of Truetemp's new faculty had to do than simply slip an artificial device under Truetemp's scalp, I find that they no longer think his beliefs would be unjustified. Because the thought experiment fails to support anti-reliabilist intuitions when further details of the case are made explicit, the Truetemp thought experiment does not constitute a clear and decisive counterexample to reliabilism. (shrink)

In this article, Lucas maintains the falseness of Mechanism - the attempt to explain minds as machines - by means of Incompleteness Theorem of Gödel. Gödel’s theorem shows that in any system consistent and adequate for simple arithmetic there are formulae which cannot be proved in the system but that human minds can recognize as true; Lucas points out in his turn that Gödel’s theorem applies to machines because a machine is the concrete instantiation of a formal system: therefore, for (...) every machine consistent and able of doing simple arithmetic, there is a formula that it can’t produce as true but that we can see to be true, and so human minds and machines have to be different. Lucas considers as well in this article some possible objections to his argument: for any Gödelian formula we could, for instance, construct a machine able to produce it or we could put the Gödelian formulae that we had proved as axioms of a further machine. However - as Lucas underlines - for every of such machines we could again formulate another Gödelian formula, the Gödelian formula of these machines, that they are not able to proof but that we can recognize as true. More general arguments, such as the possibility to escape Gödelian argument by suggesting that Gödel’s theorem applies to consistent systems while we could be inconsistent ones, are moreover refuted by Lucas by maintaining that our inconsistency corresponds to occasional malfunctioning of a machine and not to his normal inconsistency; indeed, a inconsistent machine is characterized by producing any statement, on the contrary human being are selective and not disposed to assert anything. (shrink)

Although there is a high degree of consensus in the existing literature regarding the importance of respect in mental health care, a realistic appraisal suggests that there is something of a disconnect between what is espoused in policy documents and what actually occurs in practice. As a result, this article seeks to explore and advance our understanding of the phenomenon of respect in mental health care and draws on real practice situations to illustrate this schism. To this end, the authors (...) present three case studies that focus on the following: “use of seclusion,” “respecting professional boundaries,” and “horizontal workplace violence.” The authors advance the, perhaps for some, provocative argument that it is relatively easy to write/speak about respect, while the reality of communicating respect to others is more difficult, challenging, and makes significant demands on the individual psychiatric/mental health nurse. (shrink)

In this 1970 introduction to philosophy Mr Taylor concentrates on two central topics - explanation and meaning. He takes the argument far enough to acquaint the reader first-hand with the methods and approach of analytical philosophy, and yet because of the scope of these two topics he is able to introduce many of the traditional philosophical problems in epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, and logic. By this approach he avoids the dangers both of superficiality and of undue technicality. Philosophers are concerned (...) to analyse and describe certain concepts and modes of argument, not to establish facts or conclusions of any sort that can be tested by formal demonstration or controlled observation; their findings cannot be conveniently categorized or graded into a comprehensive and progressive course of studies. Mr Taylor meets this difficulty with his extended discussions of specific topics and questions which have implications over the whole subject. (shrink)

This paper addresses the definition and the operational use of intuitions in philosophical methods in the form of a research study encompassing several regions of the globe, involving 282 philosophers from a wide array of academic backgrounds and areas of specialisation. The authors tested whether philosophers agree on the conceptual definition and the operational use of intuitions, and investigated whether specific demographic variables and philosophical specialisation influence how philosophers define and use intuitions. The results obtained point to a number of (...) significant findings, including that philosophers distinguish between intuitions used to formulate (discovery) and to test (justification) philosophical theory. The survey results suggest that strategies implemented to characterise philosophical intuition are not well motivated since, even though philosophers do not agree on a single account of intuition, they fail to capture a preferred usage of intuitions as aspects of discovery. The quantitative summary of survey findings informs the debate on this topic, and advances more defined routes for subsequent approaches to the study of intuitions. (shrink)