Some scholars believe thot Cognitive Science is the attempt to achieve in artificial systems what has already been achieved in the brain. Others, by contrast, argue that the study of ideal adaptive mechanisms could go on without reference to the brain. The author points out that the brain may not be the ideal cognitive device because of biological limitotions on its capacity. Although it may not be ideal, it is still of major interest to cognitive scientists because of the great (...) interest in the human mind, and, in addition, because at this moment the brain is the most important single reservoir of odoptive mechanisms.The paper discusses several areas of neuroscience which are likely to shed light on mechanisms of adaptation. The study of simple nervous systems is likely to reveal important design principles of cognitive devices. The study of complex nervous systems will, of course, exert a major influence. The study of such systems leads to certain general principles concerning the neural circuits involved in complex odoptive behaviors: (1) There exist innate specialized systems for the learning of many specific behaviors that at first might appeor to be purely cultural. (2) There is no evidence for the existence of any all‐purpose computer in the brain. (3) There are many surprising dissociations manifested by the specialized systems in the brain, e.g., a special system for recognition of faces as against other visual patterns. (4) The study of the nervous system enables one to formulate more precise mechanisms for the role of emotion in cognitive function.(5) Some human behoviors con probably be understood poorly or not at all if the neural substrate is not considered. (6) The cognitive systems designed for dealing with ottentionol processes may be among the most complex neural structures which underlie behavior.There are certain other properties of brains that should be kept in mind by the cognitive scientists who are studying human behovior: (1) Brains differ from each other in structure, and it is very likely that the strategy for the solution of certain problems differs from person to person. (2) The presence of certain innate cognitive strategies in the brain may prevent that organism from employing other strategies which might be optimal for other problems. (3) Any theory about a particular cognitive strategy will have implications as to the particular mode of breakdown that might be expected after brain lesions. The study of disordered function from brain disease may thus be a valuable way to test certain cognitive theories. (shrink)

Deleuze’ün Spinozacı yaşam tahayyülünde ‘ne yapmalıyız?’ sorusuna normatif, ahlaki ya da siyasi bir yanıt bulamıyoruz ama varoluşu düşünmenin içkin bir olanağını keşfediyoruz. Düşünmeye 'dışarıdan' yani dünyadan başlamak insani (kurgusal) bir dünyaya değil, içinde yaşadığımız gerçek dünyaya inanmak demektir. İçkinliğin politik anlamı düşünceyi dünyaya getirmektir.

Исследование посвящено философскому осознанию природы духовности человека. Автор рассматривает духовность внутреннего мира человека как единство высших чувств души и нравственного сознания. Для специалистов в области философии, методологии науки.

How do we refer to people in everyday conversation? No matter the language or culture, we must choose from a range of options: full name ('Robert Smith'), reduced name ('Bob'), description ('tall guy'), kin term ('my son') etc. Our choices reflect how we know that person in context, and allow us to take a particular perspective on them. This book brings together a team of leading linguists, sociologists and anthropologists to show that there is more to person reference than meets (...) the eye. Drawing on video-recorded, everyday interactions in nine languages, it examines the fascinating ways in which we exploit person reference for social and cultural purposes, and reveals the underlying principles of person reference across cultures from the Americas to Asia to the South Pacific. Combining rich ethnographic detail with cross-linguistic generalizations, it will be welcomed by researchers and graduate students interested in the relationship between language and culture. (shrink)

The first thorough study in English of the multi-faceted system of Mou Zongsan, this book examines key influences on the New Confucian thinker and introduces his Kantian- and Mahāyāna Fo-inflected moral metaphysical reading of the Lu-Wang Learning of the Mind.

Health care in France falls almost exclusively under theresponsibility of the Social Security department, which coversalmost all the expenditures related to health care,whether hospitalization or medication is concerned.For severe diseases or surgery the coverage is likelyto reach as much as 100%. The medical expendituresfor several severe diseases, such as cancer, myocardialinfarction, or neurodegenerative diseases are 100% coveredfor a period of time as long as three months. For some procedures, full coverage may be achieved by usinga subscription to private health care (...) insurance.Access to cover by the state has recently been openedto anyone living in France, after passage of a special law. There is still a lack of intensive care and hospice beds, given the rapidly increasing number of elderly who cannot be maintainedat home. There is a tendency to reduce the number ofbeds in private and public hospitals due to thegreat number of such institutions and the generalconcern that a low volume of procedures, associatedwith inexperienced health care professionals, is likelyto increase morbidity and mortality as well as publichealth care expenditure. Patients are still free tochoose doctors and hospitals (whether privateor public), provided that beds are available and thatspecific procedures can be carried out in thevicinity. So far no waiting list is needed, exceptfor specific procedures performed by a few specialists of high repute. Health care expenses are increasingcontinuously, which results in a very expensive systemin France. (shrink)

In this age of DNA computers and artificial intelligence, information is becoming disembodied even as the "bodies" that once carried it vanish into virtuality. While some marvel at these changes, envisioning consciousness downloaded into a computer or humans "beamed" _Star Trek_-style, others view them with horror, seeing monsters brooding in the machines. In _How We Became Posthuman,_ N. Katherine Hayles separates hype from fact, investigating the fate of embodiment in an information age. Hayles relates three interwoven stories: how information lost (...) its body, that is, how it came to be conceptualized as an entity separate from the material forms that carry it; the cultural and technological construction of the cyborg; and the dismantling of the liberal humanist "subject" in cybernetic discourse, along with the emergence of the "posthuman." Ranging widely across the history of technology, cultural studies, and literary criticism, Hayles shows what had to be erased, forgotten, and elided to conceive of information as a disembodied entity. Thus she moves from the post-World War II Macy Conferences on cybernetics to the 1952 novel _Limbo_ by cybernetics aficionado Bernard Wolfe; from the concept of self-making to Philip K. Dick's literary explorations of hallucination and reality; and from artificial life to postmodern novels exploring the implications of seeing humans as cybernetic systems. Although becoming posthuman can be nightmarish, Hayles shows how it can also be liberating. From the birth of cybernetics to artificial life, _How We Became Posthuman_ provides an indispensable account of how we arrived in our virtual age, and of where we might go from here. (shrink)

We argue that the appraisal of models in social epistemology requires conceiving of them as argumentative devices, taking into account the argumentative context and adopting a family-of-models perspective. We draw up such an account and show how it makes it easier to see the value and limits of the use of models in social epistemology. To illustrate our points, we document and explicate the argumentative role of epistemic landscape models in social epistemology and highlight their limitations. We also claim that (...) our account could be fruitfully used in appraising other models in philosophy and science. (shrink)