This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
46 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
  1. Bert Baumgaertner (2014). Yes, No, Maybe So: A Veritistic Approach to Echo Chambers Using a Trichotomous Belief Model. Synthese 191 (11):2549-2569.
    I approach the study of echo chambers from the perspective of veritistic social epistemology. A trichotomous belief model is developed featuring a mechanism by which agents will have a tendency to form agreement in the community. The model is implemented as an agent-based model in NetLogo and then used to investigate a social practice called Impartiality, which is a plausible means for resisting or dismantling echo chambers. The implementation exposes additional factors that need close consideration in an evaluation of Impartiality. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Betsy Jane Becker (1996). Discourse Synthesis in Meta-Analysis. Social Epistemology 10 (1):89 – 105.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Endre Begby (2013). The Epistemology of Prejudice. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):90-99.
    According to a common view, prejudice always involves some form of epistemic culpability, i.e., a failure to respond to evidence in the appropriate way. I argue that the common view wrongfully assumes that prejudices always involve universal generalizations. After motivating the more plausible thesis that prejudices typically involve a species of generic judgment, I show that standard examples provide no grounds for positing a strong connection between prejudice and epistemic culpability. More generally, the common view fails to recognize the extent (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  4. Gregor Betz (forthcoming). Truth in Evidence and Truth in Arguments Without Logical Omniscience. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv015.
    Science advances by means of argument and debate. Based on a formal model of complex argumentation, this article assesses the interplay between evidential and inferential drivers in scientific controversy, and explains, in particular, why both evidence accumulation and argumentation are veritistically valuable. By improving the conditions for applying veritistic indicators , novel evidence and arguments allow us to distinguish true from false hypotheses more reliably. Because such veritistic indicators also underpin inductive reasoning, evidence accumulation and argumentation enhance the reliability of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. Gregor Betz, Michael Baurmann & Rainer Cramm (2013). Is Epistemic Trust of Veritistic Value? Ethics and Politics 15 (2):25-41.
    Epistemic trust figures prominently in our socio-cognitive practices. By assigning different degrees of competence to agents, we distinguish between experts and novices and determine the trustworthiness of testimony. This paper probes the claim that epistemic trust furthers our epistemic enterprise. More specifically, it assesses the veritistic value of competence attribution in an epistemic community, i.e., in a group of agents that collaboratively seek to track down the truth. The results, obtained by simulating opinion dynamics, tend to subvert the very idea (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Luc Bovens & Wlodek Rabinowicz (2004). Voting Procedures for Complex Collective Decisions. An Epistemic Perspective. Ratio Juris 17 (2):241-258.
    Suppose a committee or a jury confronts a complex question, the answer to which requires attending to several sub-questions. Two different voting procedures can be used. On one, the committee members vote on each sub-question and the voting results are used as premises for the committee’s conclusion on the main issue. This premise-based procedure can be contrasted with the conclusion-based approach, which requires the members to directly vote on the conclusion, with the vote of each member being guided by her (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  7. Thomas Boyer (2014). Is a Bird in the Hand Worth Two in the Bush? Or, Whether Scientists Should Publish Intermediate Results. Synthese 191 (1):17-35.
    A part of the scientific literature consists of intermediate results within a longer project. Scientists often publish a first result in the course of their work, while aware that they should soon achieve a more advanced result from this preliminary result. Should they follow the proverb “a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush”, and publish any intermediate result they get? This is the normative question addressed in this paper. My aim is to clarify, to refine, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Peter Brössel & Anna-Maria A. Eder (2014). How to Resolve Doxastic Disagreement. Synthese 191 (11):2359-2381.
    How should an agent revise her epistemic state in the light of doxastic disagreement? The problems associated with answering this question arise under the assumption that an agent’s epistemic state is best represented by her degree of belief function alone. We argue that for modeling cases of doxastic disagreement an agent’s epistemic state is best represented by her confirmation commitments and the evidence available to her. Finally, we argue that given this position it is possible to provide an adequate answer (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  9. Justin Bruner & Cailin O'Connor (forthcoming). Power, Bargaining, and Collaboration. In T. Boyer, C. Mayo-Wilson & M. Weisberg (eds.), Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge.
    Collaboration is increasingly popular across academia. Collaborative work raises certain ethical questions, however. How will the fruits of collaboration be divided? How will the work for the collaborative project be split? In this paper, we consider the following question in particular. Are there ways in which these divisions systematically disadvantage certain groups? -/- We use evolutionary game theoretic models to address this question. First, we discuss results from O'Connor and Bruner (unpublished). In this paper, we show that underrepresented groups in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Fabrizio Cariani (2016). Local Supermajorities. Erkenntnis 81 (2):391-406.
    This paper explores two non-standard supermajority rules in the context of judgment aggregation over multiple logically connected issues. These rules set the supermajority threshold in a local, context sensitive way—partly as a function of the input profile of opinions. To motivate the interest of these rules, I prove two results. First, I characterize each rule in terms of a condition I call ‘Block Preservation’. Block preservation says that if a majority of group members accept a judgment set, then so should (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (forthcoming). Probabilistic Opinion Pooling. In A. Hajek & C. Hitchcock (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Probability. Oxford University Press
    Suppose several individuals (e.g., experts on a panel) each assign probabilities to some events. How can these individual probability assignments be aggregated into a single collective probability assignment? This article reviews several proposed solutions to this problem. We focus on three salient proposals: linear pooling (the weighted or unweighted linear averaging of probabilities), geometric pooling (the weighted or unweighted geometric averaging of probabilities), and multiplicative pooling (where probabilities are multiplied rather than averaged). We present axiomatic characterisations of each class of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2010). The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory. Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3.
    How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to filling this gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of propositional attitude aggregation and prove two new theorems. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (10 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  13. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2008). Judgement Aggregation Under Constraints. In T. Boylan & R. Gekker (eds.), Economics, Rational Choice and Normative Philosophy. Routledge
    In solving judgment aggregation problems, groups often face constraints. Many decision problems can be modelled in terms the acceptance or rejection of certain propositions in a language, and constraints as propositions that the decisions should be consistent with. For example, court judgments in breach-of-contract cases should be consistent with the constraint that action and obligation are necessary and sufficient for liability; judgments on how to rank several options in an order of preference with the constraint of transitivity; and judgments on (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14. Franz Dietrich & Christian List (2004). A Model of Jury Decisions Where All Jurors Have the Same Evidence. Synthese 142 (2):175 - 202.
    Under the independence and competence assumptions of Condorcet’s classical jury model, the probability of a correct majority decision converges to certainty as the jury size increases, a seemingly unrealistic result. Using Bayesian networks, we argue that the model’s independence assumption requires that the state of the world (guilty or not guilty) is the latest common cause of all jurors’ votes. But often – arguably in all courtroom cases and in many expert panels – the latest such common cause is a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  15. Simon J. Evnine (2005). Containing Multitudes: Reflection, Expertise and Persons as Groups. Episteme 2 (1):57-64.
    The thesis of the paper is that persons are similar to a kind of group: multiple-expert epistemic unities (MEUs). MEUs are groups in which there are multiple experts on whom other members of the group model their opinion. An example would be a group of children playing Telephone. Any child nearer the source is an 'expert' for any child further away. I argue that, with certain important qualifications, it is both rational and necessary for persons to treat their future selves (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  16. Georgi Gardiner (2014). The Commutativity of Evidence: A Problem for Conciliatory Views of Peer Disagreement. Episteme 11 (1):83-95.
    Conciliatory views of peer disagreement hold that when an agent encounters peer disagreement she should conciliate by adjusting her doxastic attitude towards that of her peer. In this paper I distinguish different ways conciliation can be understood and argue that the way conciliationism is typically understood violates the principle of commutativity of evidence. Commutativity of evidence holds that the order in which evidence is acquired should not influence what it is reasonable to believe based on that evidence. I argue that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  17. Randall Harp & Kareem Khalifa (2015). Why Pursue Unification? A Social-Epistemological Puzzle. Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 30 (3):431-447.
    Many have argued that unified theories ought to be pursued wherever possible. We deny this on the basis of social-epistemological and decision-theoretic considerations. Consequently, those seeking a more ubiquitous role for unification must either attend to the scientific community’s social structure in greater detail than has been the case, and/or radically revise their conception of unification.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18. James Hawthorne, Voting in Search of the Public Good: The Probabilistic Logic of Majority Judgments.
    I argue for an epistemic conception of voting, a conception on which the purpose of the ballot is at least in some cases to identify which of several policy proposals will best promote the public good. To support this view I first briefly investigate several notions of the kind of public good that public policy should promote. Then I examine the probability logic of voting as embodied in two very robust versions of the Condorcet Jury Theorem and some related results. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Remco Heesen & Pieter van der Kolk (forthcoming). A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement. Erkenntnis:1-24.
    In this paper we propose and analyze a game-theoretic model of the epistemology of peer disagreement. In this model, the peers’ rationality is evaluated in terms of their probability of ending the disagreement with a true belief. We find that different strategies—in particular, one based on the Steadfast View and one based on the Conciliatory View—are rational depending on the truth-sensitivity of the individuals involved in the disagreement. Interestingly, the Steadfast and the Conciliatory Views can even be rational simultaneously in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. Matthew Kopec (2015). A New Group Dutch Book Argument. Ratio 28 (4).
    In this essay, I repair the group Dutch Book argument presented by Donald Gillies. I then examine what additional assumptions would be needed for the argument to generate genuinely normative prescriptions for groups of inquirers. Although the resulting norms will apply to fewer groups than Gillies originally intended, they are still an important addition to the normative landscape in social epistemology.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Christian List (2012). Judgment Aggregation: A Short Introduction. In U. Maki (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics. Elsevier
    The aim of this article is to introduce the theory of judgment aggregation, a growing interdisciplinary research area. The theory addresses the following question: How can a group of individuals make consistent collective judgments on a given set of propositions on the basis of the group members' individual judgments on them? I begin by explaining the observation that initially sparked the interest in judgment aggregation, the so-called "doctinal" and "discursive paradoxes". I then introduce the basic formal model of judgment aggregation, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Christian List (2012). Collective Wisdom: Lessons From the Theory of Judgment Aggregation. In Helene Landemore & Jon Elster (eds.), Collective Wisdom: Principles and Mechanisms. Cambridge University Press
    Can collectives be wise? The thesis that they can has recently received a lot of attention. It has been argued that, in many judgmental or decision-making tasks, suitably organized groups can outperform their individual members. In this paper, I discuss the lessons we can learn about collective wisdom from the emerging theory of judgment aggregation, as distinct from the literature on Condorcet’s jury theorem.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Christian List (2011). Group Communication and the Transformation of Judgments: An Impossibility Result. Journal of Political Philosophy 19 (1):1-27.
    While a large social-choice-theoretic literature discusses the aggregation of individual judgments into collective ones, there is much less formal work on the transformation of judgments in group communication. I develop a model of judgment transformation and prove a baseline impossibility theorem: Any judgment transformation function satisfying some initially plausible conditions is the identity function, under which no opinion change occurs. I identify escape routes from this impossibility and argue that the kind of group communication envisaged by deliberative democats must be (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (16 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  24. Christian List (2005). The Probability of Inconsistencies in Complex Collective Decisions. Social Choice and Welfare 24 (1):3-32.
    Many groups make decisions over multiple interconnected propositions. The “doctrinal paradox” or “discursive dilemma” shows that propositionwise majority voting can generate inconsistent collective sets of judgments, even when individual sets of judgments are all consistent. I develop a simple model for determining the probability of the paradox, given various assumptions about the probability distribution of individual sets of judgments, including impartial culture and impartial anonymous culture assumptions. I prove several convergence results, identifying when the probability of the paradox converges to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   9 citations  
  25. Christian List (2005). Group Knowledge and Group Rationality: A Judgment Aggregation Perspective. Episteme 2 (1):25-38.
    The Ostrogorski paradox and the discursive dilemma are seemingly unrelated paradoxes of aggregation. The former is discussed in traditional social choice theory, while the latter is at the core of the new literature on judgment aggregation. Both paradoxes arise when, in a group, each individual consistently makes a judgment, or expresses a preference, (in the form of yes or no) over specific propositions, and the collective outcome is in some respect inconsistent. While the result is logically inconsistent in the case (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   16 citations  
  26. Christian List (2004). On the Significance of the Absolute Margin. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):521-544.
    Consider the hypothesis H that a defendant is guilty , and the evidence E that a majority of h out of n independent jurors have voted for H and a minority of k:=n-h against H. How likely is the majority verdict to be correct? By a formula of Condorcet, the probability that H is true given E depends only on each juror’s competence and on the absolute margin between the majority and the minority h-k, but neither on the number n, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (13 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  27. Christian List (2003). Distributed Cognition: A Perspective From Social Choice Theory. In M. Albert, D. Schmidtchen & S. Voigt (eds.), Scientific Competition: Theory and Policy, Conferences on New Political Economy. Mohr Siebeck
    Distributed cognition refers to processes which are (i) cognitive and (ii) distributed across multiple agents or devices rather than performed by a single agent. Distributed cognition has attracted interest in several fields ranging from sociology and law to computer science and the philosophy of science. In this paper, I discuss distributed cognition from a social-choice-theoretic perspective. Drawing on models of judgment aggregation, I address two questions. First, how can we model a group of individuals as a distributed cognitive system? Second, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28. Christian List (2003). A Possibility Theorem on Aggregation Over Multiple Interconnected Propositions. Mathematical Social Sciences 45 (1):1-13.
    Drawing on the so-called “doctrinal paradox”, List and Pettit (2002) have shown that, given an unrestricted domain condition, there exists no procedure for aggregating individual sets of judgments over multiple interconnected propositions into corresponding collective ones, where the procedure satisfies some minimal conditions similar to the conditions of Arrow’s theorem. I prove that we can avoid the paradox and the associated impossibility result by introducing an appropriate domain restriction: a structure condition, called unidimensional alignment, is shown to open up a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  29. Christian List & Franz Dietrich, Judgment Aggregation with Consistency Alone. Maastricht University.
    All existing impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation require individual and collective judgment sets to be consistent and complete, arguably a demanding rationality requirement. They do not carry over to aggregation functions mapping profiles of consistent individual judgment sets to consistent collective ones. We prove that, whenever the agenda of propositions under consideration exhibits mild interconnections, any such aggregation function that is "neutral" between the acceptance and rejection of each proposition is dictatorial. We relate this theorem to the literature.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. Christian List & Robert E. Goodin (2001). Epistemic Democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (3):277–306.
    This paper generalises the classical Condorcet jury theorem from majority voting over two options to plurality voting over multiple options. The paper further discusses the debate between epistemic and procedural democracy and situates its formal results in that debate. The paper finally compares a number of different social choice procedures for many-option choices in terms of their epistemic merits. An appendix explores the implications of some of the present mathematical results for the question of how probable majority cycles (as in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (14 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   22 citations  
  31. Christian List & Philip Pettit (2004). An Epistemic Free-Riding Problem? In Philip Catton & Graham Macdonald (eds.), Karl Popper: Critical Appraisals. Routledge
    One of the hallmark themes of Karl Popper’s approach to the social sciences was the insistence that when social scientists are members of the society they study, then they are liable to affect that society. In particular, they are liable to affect it in such a way that the claims they make lose their validity. “The interaction between the scientist’s pronouncements and social life almost invariably creates situations in which we have not only to consider the truth of such pronouncements, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  32. Christian List & Philip Pettit (2002). Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result. Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):89-110.
    Suppose that the members of a group each hold a rational set of judgments on some interconnected questions, and imagine that the group itself has to form a collective, rational set of judgments on those questions. How should it go about dealing with this task? We argue that the question raised is subject to a difficulty that has recently been noticed in discussion of the doctrinal paradox in jurisprudence. And we show that there is a general impossibility theorem that that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   71 citations  
  33. Christian List & Adrian Vermeule (2014). Independence and Interdependence: Lessons From the Hive. Rationality and Society 26:170-207.
    There is a substantial class of collective decision problems whose successful solution requires interdependence among decision makers at the agenda-setting stage and independence at the stage of choice. We define this class of problems and describe and apply a search-and-decision mechanism theoretically modeled in the context of honeybees and identified in earlier empirical work in biology. The honeybees’ mechanism has useful implications for mechanism design in human institutions, including courts, legislatures, executive appointments, research and development in firms, and basic research (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Leslie Marsh & Christian Onof (eds.) (2005). Volume 1, Issue 3. Edinburgh University Press.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Leslie Marsh & Christian Onof (eds.) (2004). Volume 1, Issue 1. Edinburgh University Press.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Leslie Marsh & Christian Onof (eds.) (2004). Volume 1, Issue 2. Edinburgh University Press.
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Conor Mayo-Wilson, Kevin J. S. Zollman & David Danks (2011). The Independence Thesis: When Individual and Social Epistemology Diverge. Philosophy of Science 78 (4):653-677.
    In the latter half of the twentieth century, philosophers of science have argued (implicitly and explicitly) that epistemically rational individuals might compose epistemically irrational groups and that, conversely, epistemically rational groups might be composed of epistemically irrational individuals. We call the conjunction of these two claims the Independence Thesis, as they together imply that methodological prescriptions for scientific communities and those for individual scientists might be logically independent of one another. We develop a formal model of scientific inquiry, define four (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  38. Conor Mayo-Wilson, Kevin Zollman & David Danks (2013). Wisdom of the Crowds Vs. Groupthink: Learning in Groups and in Isolation. International Journal of Game Theory 42 (3):695-723.
    We evaluate the asymptotic performance of boundedly-rational strategies in multi-armed bandit problems, where performance is measured in terms of the tendency (in the limit) to play optimal actions in either (i) isolation or (ii) networks of other learners. We show that, for many strategies commonly employed in economics, psychology, and machine learning, performance in isolation and performance in networks are essentially unrelated. Our results suggest that the appropriateness of various, common boundedly-rational strategies depends crucially upon the social context (if any) (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  39. L. Moretti & N. J. L. L. Pedersen (2013). Epistemic Transmission and Interaction. Synthese 190 (13):2477-2479.
  40. Ryan Muldoon (2013). Diversity and the Division of Cognitive Labor. Philosophy Compass 8 (2):117-125.
    In epistemology and the philosophy of science, there has been an increasing interest in the social aspects of belief acquisition. In particular, there has been a focus on the division of cognitive labor in science. This essay explores several different models of the division of cognitive labor, with particular focus on Kitcher, Strevens, Weisberg and Muldoon, and Zollman. The essay then shows how many of the benefits of the division of cognitive labor flow from leveraging agent diversity. The essay concludes (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  41. Andrés Páez (2013). Una aproximación pragmatista al testimonio como evidencia. In Carmen Vásquez (ed.), Estándares de prueba y prueba científica. Ensayos de epistemología jurídica. Marcial Pons 215-238.
    El testimonio es nuestra mayor fuente de creencias. La gran mayoría de nuestras creencias han sido adquiridas a partir de las palabras de otros y no a través de la observación directa del mundo. Una de las peculiaridades de la mayor parte de las creencias testimoniales es que son aceptadas sin ninguna deliberación consciente. Mientras el testimonio sea consistente con nuestras creencias y la fuente sea confiable, la reacción más corriente es la aceptación automática de la información (Thagard 2004, 2005). (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  42. Jeffrey Sanford Russell, John Hawthorne & Lara Buchak (2015). Groupthink. Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1287-1309.
    How should a group with different opinions (but the same values) make decisions? In a Bayesian setting, the natural question is how to aggregate credences: how to use a single credence function to naturally represent a collection of different credence functions. An extension of the standard Dutch-book arguments that apply to individual decision-makers recommends that group credences should be updated by conditionalization. This imposes a constraint on what aggregation rules can be like. Taking conditionalization as a basic constraint, we gather (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. Miriam Schoenfield (2013). Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief. Noûs 47 (1):193-218.
    In this paper, I begin by defending permissivism: the claim that, sometimes, there is more than one way to rationally respond to a given body of evidence. Then I argue that, if we accept permissivism, certain worries that arise as a result of learning that our beliefs were caused by the communities we grew up in, the schools we went to, or other irrelevant influences dissipate. The basic strategy is as follows: First, I try to pinpoint what makes irrelevant influences (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   11 citations  
  44. Harvey Siegel (2004). Epistemology and Education: An Incomplete Guide to the Social-Epistemological Issues. Episteme 1 (2):129-137.
    Recent work in epistemology has focused increasingly on the social dimensions of knowledge and inquiry. Education is one important social arena in which knowledge plays a leading role, and in which knowledge-claims are presented, analyzed, evaluated, and transmitted. Philosophers of education have long attended to the epistemological issues raised by the theory and practice of education . While historically philosophical issues concerning education were treated alongside other philosophical issues, in recent times the former set of issues have been largely neglected (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  45. Roger Stanev (2012). Modelling and Simulating Early Stopping of RCTs: A Case Study of Early Stop Due to Harm. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 24 (4):513-526.
    Despite efforts from regulatory agencies (e.g. NIH, FDA), recent systematic reviews of randomised controlled trials (RCTs) show that top medical journals continue to publish trials without requiring authors to report details for readers to evaluate early stopping decisions carefully. This article presents a systematic way of modelling and simulating interim monitoring decisions of RCTs. By taking an approach that is both general and rigorous, the proposed framework models and evaluates early stopping decisions of RCTs based on a clear and consistent (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  46. Paul D. Thorn & Gerhard Schurz (2012). Meta-Induction and the Wisdom of Crowds. Analyse & Kritik 34 (2):339-366.
    Meta-induction, in its various forms, is an imitative prediction method, where the prediction methods and the predictions of other agents are imitated to the extent that those methods or agents have proven successful in the past. In past work, Schurz demonstrated the optimality of meta-induction as a method for predicting unknown events and quantities. However, much recent discussion, along with formal and empirical work, on the Wisdom of Crowds has extolled the virtue of diverse and independent judgment as essential to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation