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Forthcoming articles
  1.  46
    Jamin Asay (forthcoming). Putting Pluralism in its Place. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Pluralism about truth is the view that there are many properties, not just one, in virtue of which things are true. Pluralists hope to dodge the objections that face traditional monistic substantive views of truth (such as the correspondence theory), as well as those facing deflationary theories of truth. More specifically, pluralists hope to advance an explanatorily potent understanding of truth that can capture the subtleties of various realist and anti-realist domains of discourse, all while avoiding the scope problem. (...)
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  2.  45
    Michael Cholbi (forthcoming). Grief's Rationality, Backward and Forward. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Grief is our emotional response to the deaths of intimates, and so like many other emotional conditions, it can be appraised in terms of its rationality. A philosophical account of grief’s rationality should satisfy a contingency constraint, wherein grief is neither intrinsically rational nor intrinsically irrational. Here I provide an account of grief and its rationality that satisfies this constraint, while also being faithful to the phenomenology of grief experience. I begin by arguing against the best known account of grief’s (...)
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  3.  32
    Elijah Chudnoff (forthcoming). Epistemic Elitism and Other Minds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Experiences justify beliefs about our environment. Sometimes the justification is immediate: seeing a red light immediately justifies believing there is a red light. Other times the justification is mediate: seeing a red light justifies believing one should brake in a way that is mediated by background knowledge of traffic signals. How does this distinction map onto the distinction between what is and what isn’t part of the content of experience? Epistemic egalitarians think that experiences immediately justify whatever is part of (...)
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  4.  14
    Errol Lord (forthcoming). On the Intellectual Conditions for Responsibility: Acting for the Right Reasons, Conceptualization, and Credit. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    In this paper I'm interested in the prospects for the Right Reasons theory of creditworthiness. The Right Reasons theory says that what it is for an agent to be creditworthy for X-ing is for that agent to X for the right reasons. The paper has a negative goal and a positive goal. The negative goal is to show that a class of Right Reasons theories are doomed. These theories all have a Conceptualization Condition on acting for (...)
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  5.  78
    Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way (forthcoming). What is Good Reasoning? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    What makes the difference between good and bad reasoning? In this paper we defend a novel account of good reasoning - both theoretical and practical - according to which it preserves fittingness or correctness: good reasoning is reasoning which is such as to take you from fitting attitudes to further fitting attitudes, other things equal. This account, we argue, is preferable to two others that feature in the recent literature. The first, which has been made prominent by John Broome, holds (...)
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  6.  59
    Adam Pautz (forthcoming). Propositions and Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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  7. Douglas W. Portmore (forthcoming). Precis of Commonsense Consequentialism and Replies to Gert, Hurley, and Tenenbaum. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    For a symposium on Douglas W. Portmore's Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality.
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  8.  19
    Douglas W. Portmore (forthcoming). Maximalism and Moral Harmony. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Maximalism is the view that an agent is permitted to perform a certain type of action (say, baking) if and only if she is permitted to perform some instance of this type (say, baking a pie), where φ-ing is an instance of ψ-ing if and only if φ-ing entails ψ-ing but not vice versa. Now, the aim of this paper is not to defend maximalism, but to defend a certain account of our options that when combined with maximalism results in (...)
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  9.  32
    Darrell P. Rowbottom (forthcoming). What Is (Dis)Agreement? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    When do we agree? The answer might once have seemed simple and obvious; we agree that p when we each believe that p. But from a formal epistemological perspective, where degrees of belief are more fundamental than beliefs, this answer is unsatisfactory. On the one hand, there is reason to suppose that it is false; degrees of belief about p might differ when beliefs simpliciter on p do not. On the other hand, even if it is true, it is too (...)
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  10. Nicholas Silins (forthcoming). Experience and Defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  11.  84
    Patrick Todd (forthcoming). Manipulation Arguments and the Freedom to Do Otherwise. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    I provide a manipulation-style argument against classical compatibilism – the claim that freedom to do otherwise is consistent with determinism. My question is simple: if Diana (the designer) really gave Ernie (the designed) free will, why isn’t she worried that he won’t use it precisely as she would like? Diana’s non- nervousness, I argue, indicates Ernie’s non-freedom. Arguably, the intuition that Ernie lacks freedom to otherwise is stronger than the direct intuition that he is simply not responsible; this result highlights (...)
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  12.  75
    Jason Konek (forthcoming). Epistemic Conservativity and Imprecise Credence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Unspecific evidence calls for imprecise credence. My aim is to vindicate this thought. First, I will pin down what it is that makes one's imprecise credences more or less epistemically valuable. Then I will use this account of epistemic value to delineate a class of reasonable epistemic scoring rules for imprecise credences. Finally, I will show that if we plump for one of these scoring rules as our measure of epistemic value or utility, then a popular family of decision rules (...)
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  13. John Gimbel (forthcoming). Mechanisms, Causes, and the Layered Model of the World. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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  14.  99
    Jennifer Hornsby (forthcoming). Dealing with Facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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  15. J. Lackey (forthcoming). Knowing From Words. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
     
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  16. Francis Saparshott (forthcoming). Review of Evaluating Art. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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  17. Sydney Shoemaker (forthcoming). Commentary in Symposium on Chalmers= The Conscious Mind. Forthcoming In. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
     
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