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Forthcoming articles
  1.  52
    Michael Cholbi (forthcoming). Grief's Rationality, Backward and Forward. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Grief is our emotional response to the deaths of intimates, and so like many other emotional conditions, it can be appraised in terms of its rationality. A philosophical account of grief’s rationality should satisfy a contingency constraint, wherein grief is neither intrinsically rational nor intrinsically irrational. Here I provide an account of grief and its rationality that satisfies this constraint, while also being faithful to the phenomenology of grief experience. I begin by arguing against the best known account of grief’s (...)
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  2. Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Brentano's Dual-Framing Theory of Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Brentano’s theory of consciousness has garnered a surprising amount of attention in recent philosophy of mind (Thomasson 2000, Caston 2002, Hossack 2002, 2006, Kriegel 2003, 2009, Thomas 2003, Smith 2004, Zahavi 2004, Drummond 2006, Textor 2006, 2013). Here I argue for a novel interpretation of Brentano’s theory that casts it as more original than previously appreciated and yet quite plausible upon inspection. According to Brentano’s theory, as interpreted here, a conscious experience of a tree is a mental state that can (...)
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  3.  38
    Clayton Littlejohn (forthcoming). Do Reasons and Evidence Share the Same Residence? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    This is part of an authors meets critics session on Daniel Star's wonderful book, Knowing Better. I discuss a potential problem with Kearns and Star's Reasons as Evidence thesis. The issue has to do with the difficulties we face is we treat normative reasons as evidence and impose no possession conditions on evidence. On such a view, it's hard to see how practical reasoning could be a non-monotonic process. One way out of the difficulty would be to allow for (potent) (...)
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  4.  24
    Trenton Merricks (forthcoming). Replies to Wang, Speaks, and Pautz. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Replies for a symposium on Propositions.
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  5.  13
    Trenton Merricks (forthcoming). Precis of Propositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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  6.  99
    Adam Pautz (forthcoming). Propositions and Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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  7. Douglas W. Portmore (forthcoming). Precis of Commonsense Consequentialism and Replies to Gert, Hurley, and Tenenbaum. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    For a symposium on Douglas W. Portmore's Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality.
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  8. Darrell P. Rowbottom (forthcoming). What Is (Dis)Agreement? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    When do we agree? The answer might once have seemed simple and obvious; we agree that p when we each believe that p. But from a formal epistemological perspective, where degrees of belief are more fundamental than beliefs, this answer is unsatisfactory. On the one hand, there is reason to suppose that it is false; degrees of belief about p might differ when beliefs simpliciter on p do not. On the other hand, even if it is true, it is too (...)
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  9. Nicholas Silins (forthcoming). Experience and Defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  10.  32
    Daniel Star (forthcoming). Précis of Knowing Better. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  11.  19
    Daniel Star (forthcoming). Replies to Cuneo, Driver, and Littlejohn. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  12.  84
    Jason Konek (forthcoming). Epistemic Conservativity and Imprecise Credence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Unspecific evidence calls for imprecise credence. My aim is to vindicate this thought. First, I will pin down what it is that makes one's imprecise credences more or less epistemically valuable. Then I will use this account of epistemic value to delineate a class of reasonable epistemic scoring rules for imprecise credences. Finally, I will show that if we plump for one of these scoring rules as our measure of epistemic value or utility, then a popular family of decision rules (...)
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  13. John Gimbel (forthcoming). Mechanisms, Causes, and the Layered Model of the World. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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  14. Jennifer Hornsby (forthcoming). Dealing with Facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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  15. J. Lackey (forthcoming). Knowing From Words. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
     
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  16. Francis Saparshott (forthcoming). Review of Evaluating Art. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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  17. Sydney Shoemaker (forthcoming). Commentary in Symposium on Chalmers= The Conscious Mind. Forthcoming In. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
     
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