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Forthcoming articles
  1.  29
    Michael Cholbi (forthcoming). Grief's Rationality, Backward and Forward. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Grief is our emotional response to the deaths of intimates, and so like many other emotional conditions, it can be appraised in terms of its rationality. A philosophical account of grief’s rationality should satisfy a contingency constraint, wherein grief is neither intrinsically rational nor intrinsically irrational. Here I provide an account of grief and its rationality that satisfies this constraint, while also being faithful to the phenomenology of grief experience. I begin by arguing against the best known account of grief’s (...)
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  2.  4
    Brie Gertler (forthcoming). Self-Knowledge and Rational Agency: A Defense of Empiricism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    How do we know our own beliefs, intentions, and other attitudes? According to empiricism, such self-knowledge is based in empirical justification or warrant. Agentialists charge that empiricism portrays us as mere observers of a passing cognitive show, and thereby neglects the fact that believing and intending are things we do, for reasons. They maintain that our capacity for self-knowledge derives from our rational agency—our ability to conform our attitudes to our reasons, and to commit ourselves to those attitudes through avowals (...)
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  3.  12
    Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way (forthcoming). What is Good Reasoning? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    What makes the difference between good and bad reasoning? In this paper we defend a novel account of good reasoning - both theoretical and practical - according to which it preserves fittingness or correctness: good reasoning is reasoning which is such as to take you from fitting attitudes to further fitting attitudes, other things equal. This account, we argue, is preferable to two others that feature in the recent literature. The first, which has been made prominent by John Broome, holds (...)
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  4. Douglas W. Portmore (forthcoming). Precis of Commonsense Consequentialism and Replies to Gert, Hurley, and Tenenbaum. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    For a symposium on Douglas W. Portmore's Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality.
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  5.  53
    Susanna Schellenberg (forthcoming). Perceptual Particularity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Perception grounds demonstrative reference, yields singular thoughts, and fixes the reference of singular terms. Moreover, perception provides us with knowledge of particulars in our environment and justifies singular thoughts about particulars. How does perception play these cognitive and epistemic roles in our lives? I address this question by exploring the fundamental nature of perceptual experience. I argue that perceptual states are individuated by particulars and explore epistemic, ontological, psychologistic, and semantic approaches to account for perceptual particularity.
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  6. Susanna Siegel (forthcoming). How is Wishful Seeing Like Wishful Thinking? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    This paper makes the case that when wishful thinking ill-founds belief, the belief depends on the desire in ways can be recapitulated at the level of perceptual experience. The relevant kinds of desires include motivations, hopes, preferences, and goals. I distinguish between two modes of dependence of belief on desire in wishful thinking: selective or inquiry-related, and responsive or evidence-related. I offers a theory of basing on which beliefs are badly-based on desires, due to patterns of dependence that can found (...)
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  7. Nicholas Silins (forthcoming). Experience and Defeat. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  8.  67
    Weng Hong Tang (forthcoming). Transparency and Partial Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    How should we account for self-knowledge of our inner lives? Some have argued that just as we have various senses that allow us to perceive the environment, we have an inner sense that allows us to perceive our inner lives. But others find such a view implausible and think that there are other ways to account for self-knowledge. With respect to all-or-nothing beliefs, some have held that we may account for self-knowledge by appealing to the claim that such beliefs are (...)
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  9.  30
    Justin Tiehen (forthcoming). Physicalism Requires Functionalism: A New Formulation and Defense of the Via Negativa. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    How should ‘the physical’ be defined for the purpose of formulating physicalism? In this paper I defend a version of the via negativa according to which a property is physical just in case it is neither fundamentally mental nor possibly realized by a fundamentally mental property. The guiding idea is that physicalism requires functionalism, and thus that being a type identity theorist requires being a realizer-functionalist. In §1 I motivate my approach partly by arguing against Jessica Wilson’s no fundamental mentality (...)
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  10.  12
    Owen Ware (forthcoming). Fichte on Conscience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    There is no question that Fichte’s theory of conscience is central to his system of ethics. Yet his descriptions of its role in practical deliberation appear inconsistent, if not contradictory. Many scholars have claimed that for Fichte conscience plays a material role by providing the content of our moral obligations—the Material Function View. Some have denied this, however, claiming that conscience only plays a formal role by testing our moral convictions in any given case—the Formal Function View. My aim in (...)
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  11.  66
    Jason Konek (forthcoming). Epistemic Conservativity and Imprecise Credence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Unspecific evidence calls for imprecise credence. My aim is to vindicate this thought. First, I will pin down what it is that makes one's imprecise credences more or less epistemically valuable. Then I will use this account of epistemic value to delineate a class of reasonable epistemic scoring rules for imprecise credences. Finally, I will show that if we plump for one of these scoring rules as our measure of epistemic value or utility, then a popular family of decision rules (...)
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  12.  13
    John Gimbel (forthcoming). Mechanisms, Causes, and the Layered Model of the World. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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  13.  92
    Jennifer Hornsby (forthcoming). Dealing with Facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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  14. J. Lackey (forthcoming). Knowing From Words. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
     
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  15. Francis Saparshott (forthcoming). Review of Evaluating Art. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
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  16. Sydney Shoemaker (forthcoming). Commentary in Symposium on Chalmers= The Conscious Mind. Forthcoming In. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
     
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