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  1. David Leech Anderson (2009). A Semantics for Virtual Environments and the Ontological Status of Virtual Objects. APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 9 (1):15-19.
    Virtual environments engage millions of people and billions of dollars each year. What is the ontological status of the virtual objects that populate those environments? An adequate answer to that question requires a developed semantics for virtual environments. The truth-conditions must be identified for “tree”-sentences when uttered by speakers immersed in a virtual environment (VE). It will be argued that statements about virtual objects have truth-conditions roughly comparable to the verificationist conditions popular amongst some contemporary antirealists. This does not mean (...)
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  2. Christian Barth & Holger Sturm (eds.) (2012). Brandoms Expressive Vernunft. Historische und Systematische Untersuchungen. Mentis.
  3. Matteo Bianchin (2012). Bildung, Meaning, and Reasons. Verifiche: Rivista Trimestrale di Scienze Umane 41 (1-3):73-102.
    By endorsing that Bildung is a condition for thought, McDowell explicitly sets out to revive a theme in classical german philosophy. As long as the concept of Bildung is intended to play a role in McDowell’s theory of meaning and reasons, however, it is best understood in the light of its distinctive combination of neo-Fregeanism about content and Wittgensteinianism about rule-following. The Fregean part is there to warrant that reasons are objective, the Wittgensteinian move is to account for our grasping (...)
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  4. David Bourget (2010). The Representational Theory of Consciousness. Dissertation, Australian National University
    A satisfactory solution to the problem of consciousness would take the form of a simple yet fully general model which specifies the precise conditions under which any given state of consciousness occurs. Science has uncovered numerous correlations between consciousness and neural activity, but it has not yet come anywhere close to this. We are still looking for the Newtonian laws of consciousness. -/- One of the main difficulties with consciousness is that we lack a language in which to formulate illuminating (...)
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  5. Berit Brogaard (2010). Centered Worlds and the Content of Perception: Short Version. In David Sosa (ed.), Philosophical Books (Analytic Philosophy).
    0. Relativistic Content In standard semantics, propositional content, whether it be the content of utterances or mental states, has a truth-value relative only to a possible world. For example, the content of my utterance of ‘Jim is sitting now’ is true just in case Jim is sitting at the time of utterance in the actual world, and the content of my belief that Alice will give a talk tomorrow is true just in case Alice will give a talk on the (...)
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  6. Eric Dietrich (1993). The Ubiquity of Computation. Think (Defunct) 2 (June):27-29.
    For many years now, Harnad has argued that transduction is special among cognitive capacities -- special enough to block Searle's Chinese Room Argument. His arguments (as well as Searle's) have been important and useful, but not correct, it seems to me. Their arguments have provided the modern impetus for getting clear about computationalism and the nature of computing. This task has proven to be quite difficult. Which is simply to say that dealing with Harnad's arguments (as well as Searle's) has (...)
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  7. Neil Feit (2010). Selfless Desires and the Property Theory of Content. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):489-503.
    The property theory of content takes the content of each cognitive attitude (each belief, desire, and so on) to be a property to which the subject of the attitude is related in the appropriate psychological way. This view is motivated by standard cases of de se belief and other attitudes. In this paper, I consider a couple of related objections to the property theory of content. Both objections have to do with the possible non-existence of the subject. More specifically, the (...)
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  8. Chris Fraser (2008). Wc-Wtl, the Background, and Intentionality. In Bo Mou (ed.), Searle's Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement. Brill. 27--63.
    John Searle’s “thesis of the Background” is an attempt to articulate the role of nonintentional capacities---know-how, skills, and abilities---in constituting intentional phenomena. This essay applies Searle’s notion of the Background to shed light on the Daoist notion of w’u-w’ei---“non-action” or non-intentional action---and to help clarify the sort of activity that might originally have inspired the w’u-w’ei ideal. I draw on Searle’s work and the original Chinese sources to develop a defensible conception of a w’u-w’ei-like state that may play an intrinsically (...)
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  9. Jane Friedman (2013). Question‐Directed Attitudes. Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1):145-174.
    In this paper I argue that there is a class of attitudes that have questions (rather than propositions or something else) as contents.
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  10. Gabor Forrai George Kampis (ed.) (2005). Intentionality: Past and Future. Rodopi NY.
  11. Mikkel Gerken (2007). A False Dilemma for Anti-Individualism. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (4):329-42.
    It is often presupposed that an anti-individualist about representational mental states must choose between two accounts of no-reference cases. One option is said to be an ‘illusion of thought’ version according to which the subject in a no-reference case fails to think a first-order thought but rather has the illusion of having one. The other is a ‘descriptive’ version according to which one thinks an empty thought via a description. While this presupposition is not uncommon, it rarely surfaces in an (...)
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  12. Simone Gozzano (2013). Reconsidering the Logic of Emotion. Philosophia 41 (3):787-794.
    It is customarily assumed that propositional attitudes present two independent components: a propositional component and a psychological component, in the form of an attitudes. These two components are caught by means of two different methods: propositions by some model theoretic theory, psychological attitudes by making appeal to their functional or psychological role. Some authors have seek a convergence by individuating propositions by some Functional role semantics. In this paper I show that when it comes to emotional attitudes with propositional content, (...)
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  13. Mitchell S. Green (2009). Speech Acts, the Handicap Principle and the Expression of Psychological States. Mind and Language 24 (2):139-163.
    Abstract: One oft-cited feature of speech acts is their expressive character: Assertion expresses belief, apology regret, promise intention. Yet expression, or at least sincere expression, is as I argue a form of showing: A sincere expression shows whatever is the state that is the sincerity condition of the expressive act. How, then, can a speech act show a speaker's state of thought or feeling? To answer this question I consider three varieties of showing, and argue that only one of them (...)
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  14. Alex Grzankowski (2012). Not All Attitudes Are Propositional. European Journal of Philosophy.
    Most contemporary philosophical discussions of intentionality start and end with a treatment of the propositional attitudes. In fact, many theorists hold that all attitudes are propositional attitudes. Our folk-psychological ascriptions suggest, however, that there are non-propositional attitudes: I like Sally, my brother fears snakes, everyone loves my grandmother, and Rush Limbaugh hates Obama. I argue that things are as they appear: there are non-propositional attitudes. More specifically, I argue that there are attitudes that relate individuals to non-propositional objects and do (...)
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  15. Katherine Hawley & Fiona Macpherson (eds.) (2011). The Admissible Contents of Experience. Wiley-Blackwell.
  16. Mark Jago (2012). The Content of Deduction. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):317-334.
    For deductive reasoning to be justified, it must be guaranteed to preserve truth from premises to conclusion; and for it to be useful to us, it must be capable of informing us of something. How can we capture this notion of information content, whilst respecting the fact that the content of the premises, if true, already secures the truth of the conclusion? This is the problem I address here. I begin by considering and rejecting several accounts of informational content. I (...)
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  17. Benjamin Jarvis (2012). Norms of Intentionality: Norms That Don't Guide. Philosophical Studies 157 (1):1-25.
    More than ever, it is in vogue to argue that no norms either play a role in or directly follow from the theory of mental content. In this paper, I present an intuitive theory of intentionality (including a theory of mental content) on which norms are constitutive of the intentional properties of attitude and content in order to show that this trend is misguided. Although this theory of intentionality—the teleological theory of intentional representation—does involve a commitment to representational norms, these (...)
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  18. Max Kölbel (2014). Relativism 1: Representational Content. Philosophy Compass (1):1-14.
    In the pair of articles of which this is the first, I shall present a set of problems and philosophical proposals that have in recent years been associated with the term “relativism”. All these problems and proposals concern the question of how we should represent thought and speech about certain topics. The main issue here is whether we should model such mental states or linguistic acts as involving representational contents that are absolutely correct or incorrect, or whether, alternatively, their correctness (...)
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  19. Peter Lasersohn (2007). Expressives, Perspective and Presupposition. Theoretical Linguistics 33 (2):223-230.
    I compare Potts’ use of a ‘‘judge’’ parameter in semantic interpretation with the use of a similar parameter in Lasersohn (2005). The latter technique portrays the content of expressives as constant across speakers, while Pott’s technique does not. The idea that the content of expressives is a kind of presupposition is also briefly defended, and a technical problem in the ‘‘dynamics’’ of Pott’s formalism is pointed out.
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  20. Fiona Macpherson (ed.) (2011). The Admissible Contents of Experience. Wiley-Blackwell.
  21. Chauncey Maher, Normative Functionalism. Normative Functionalism and the Pittsburgh School.
  22. Mohan Matthen (2014). Image Content. In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception Have Content? Oxford University Press. 265-290.
    The senses present their content in the form of images, three-dimensional arrays of located sense features. Peacocke’s “scenario content” is one attempt to capture image content; here, a richer notion is presented, sensory images include located objects and features predicated of them. It is argued that our grasp of the meaning of these images implies that they have propositional content. Two problems concerning image content are explored. The first is that even on an enriched conception, image content has certain expressive (...)
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  23. Mohan Matthen & Edwin Levy (1984). Teleology, Error, and the Human Immune System. Journal of Philosophy 81 (7):351-372.
    The authors attempt to show that certain forms of behavior of the human immune system are illuminatingly regarded as errors in that system's operation. Since error-ascription can occur only within the context of an intentional/teleological characterization of the system, it follows that such a characterization is illuminating. It is argued that error-ascription is objective, non-anthropomorphic, irreducible to any purely causal form of explanation of the same behavior, and further that it is wrong to regard all errors of the immune system (...)
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  24. Carlos Muñoz-Suárez, Transparency, Revelation and Sensory Knowledge. Gauging the Explananda to a Theory of Phenomenal Presence.
    There are two arguments in contemporary philosophy of consciousness and perception with which every theory of sensory awareness and phenomenal presence must deal: the Argument from Transparency and the Argument from Revelation. The first one is about the intentionality of sensations or conscious sensory states and the second one is about their epistemic role. These both arguments depend, on the one hand, on specific interpretations of ‘transparency’ and ‘revelation’ and, on the other hand, on specifying the formal structures that they (...)
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  25. Sergeiy Sandler, Is There Such a Thing as “Semantic Content”?
    The distinction between the semantic content of a sentence or utterance and its use is widely employed in formal semantics. Semantic minimalism in particular understands this distinction as a sharp dichotomy. I argue that if we accept such a dichotomy, there would be no reason to posit the existence of semantic contents at all. I examine and reject several arguments raised in the literature that might provide a rationale for assuming semantic contents, in this sense, exist, and conclude that Ockham’s (...)
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  26. Heidi Savage, The Truth and Nothing but the Truth: The Habits of Sherlock Holmes.
    If names from fiction, names like ‘Sherlock Holmes’, fail to refer, and if all simple predicative sentences including a sentence like ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ are true if and only if the referent of the name has the property encoded by the predicate, then ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ could not be literally true -- call this “non-literalism” about fictional discourse. Still, natural language speakers engage in sensible conversations using these kinds of sentences, and convey information to one another in doing so. What (...)
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  27. Susanna Schellenberg (2010). The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19 - 48.
    I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational views can easily satisfy the (...)
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  28. Nicholas Shea (2014). Reward Prediction Error Signals Are Meta‐Representational. Noûs 48 (2):314-341.
    1. Introduction 2. Reward-Guided Decision Making 3. Content in the Model 4. How to Deflate a Metarepresentational Reading Proust and Carruthers on metacognitive feelings 5. A Deflationary Treatment of RPEs? 5.1 Dispensing with prediction errors 5.2 What is use of the RPE focused on? 5.3 Alternative explanations—worldly correlates 5.4 Contrast cases 6. Conclusion Appendix: Temporal Difference Learning Algorithms.
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  29. David Sosa (ed.) (2010). Philosophical Books (Analytic Philosophy). Wiley-Blackwell.
    THE PROBLEM OF EVIL by M. B. Ahern.MORALITY AND RELIGION by W. W. Bartley III.ROLES AND VALUES: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL ETHICS by R. S. Downie.THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE by D. W. Hamlyn.ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD by John Hick.THE LOGIC OF EDUCATION by P. H. Hirst and R. S. Peters.METALOGIC: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE METATHEORY OF STANDARD FIRST ORDER LOGIC by Geoffrey Hunter.ETHICAL KNOWLEDGE by J. J. Kupperman.LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS IN ARISTOTLE by Walter Leszl.MEMORY by Don Locke.JOHN STUART (...)
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  30. Pierre Steiner (2012). Boundless Thought. The Case of Conceptual Mental Episodes. Manuscrito 35 (2):269-309.
  31. Jonathan Y. Tsou (2012). Distinguishing Non-Conceptual Content From Non-Syntactic Propositions: Comment on Fuller. Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (2):53-57.
  32. Bartosz Więckowski (2012). A Constructive Type-Theoretical Formalism for the Interpretation of Subatomically Sensitive Natural Language Constructions. Studia Logica 100 (4):815-853.
    The analysis of atomic sentences and their subatomic components poses a special problem for proof-theoretic approaches to natural language semantics, as it is far from clear how their semantics could be explained by means of proofs rather than denotations. The paper develops a proof-theoretic semantics for a fragment of English within a type-theoretical formalism that combines subatomic systems for natural deduction [20] with constructive (or Martin-Löf) type theory [8, 9] by stating rules for the formation, introduction, elimination and equality of (...)
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