This essay examines the most recent justifications for a people's exclusive right to resources as part of a territorial right. Divided into eight parts, the discussion covers contemporary philosophical discussion regarding: the conception of natural resources, the conception of resource rights, the general form of arguments supporting resource rights, arguments from self-determination, objections to arguments from self-determination, arguments from residence, arguments from improvement, and new directions for research in the future.

In the presence of anthropogenic climate change, gross environmental degradation, and mass abject poverty, many political theorists currently debate issues such as people's right to water, the right to food, and the distribution of rights to natural resources more generally. However, thus far many theorists either focus (somewhat arbitrarily) only on one particular resource (e.g. water) or they treat all natural resources alike, meaning that many relevant distinctions within the group of natural resources are overlooked. Hence, the paper (...) will start with an analysis of the various forms which natural resources can take and how this might influence one's conception of resource rights. In so doing, the paper argues that we have to carefully distinguish between the actual physical resources people might control and how we distribute these, and the life-sustaining benefits each and every person draws from sustainable and functioning ecosystems. Based on this distinction, the paper will argue for a right to the benefits of life-sustaining ecosystem services as a universal basic right every person has. Further distributive claims with respect to particular physical resources would thus be limited by the requirements of such a basic right. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Is territorial jurisdiction over natural resources justified? This paper argues that a freedom-based account of self-determination coupled with ‘functionalist’ justifications of territorial right support territorial jurisdiction over natural resources. This justification simultaneously gives rise to limits on the permissible exercise of the right: the principles of reciprocity and generality, and of equal freedom. This ‘reciprocal’ view on territorial jurisdiction over natural resources, defended here, differs from two alternatives: the traditional sovereignty view on the one hand and the transnational jurisdiction view—which (...) favours the transfer of sovereignty over natural resources from states to transnational institutions—on the other hand. (shrink)

This paper argues that land and resource rights are often essential in overcoming colonial inequality and devaluation of indigenous populations and cultures. It thereby criticizes global welfare egalitarians that promote the abolition of national sovereignty over resources in the name of increased equality. The paper discusses two ways in which land and resource rights contribute to decolonization and the eradication of the associated inequality. First, it proposes that land and resource rights have acquired a (...) status-conferring function for colonized peoples so that possession of full personhood and relational equality is partially expressed through the possession of land and resource rights. Second, it suggests that successful internal decolonization depends on access to and control over land and resources, especially for indigenous peoples. (shrink)

In Sharing Territories, Cara Nine defends a river model of territorial rights. On a river model, groups are assumed to be interdependent and overlapping. Drawing on natural law philosophy, Nine's theory argues for the establishment of foundational territories around geographical areas like rivers.

The U.S. Supreme Court declared procreation to be a fundamental right in the early twentieth century in a case involving Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, an act that permitted unconsented sterilization of individuals convicted of certain crimes. The right that the Court articulated in that case is a negative right: it requires that the government not place unjustified roadblocks in the way of people seeking to procreate, but it does not require the government to take positive steps to help people (...) procreate if they wish to. I argue that a positive legal right is morally necessary in the United States, given the profound significance of procreation, the current barriers to access to care, and the related issues of individual and societal justice. I assume at the outset that the right to procreate should be expansive enough to include a right to noncoital reproduction. The absence of a positive right to procreate reflects not just constitutional tradition but also a governmental and societal commitment to a longstanding set of reproductive hierarchies by which those who fall outside of the traditional framing of family too frequently find their procreative dreams hindered. Reconceiving procreative rights to include a positive right would create greater opportunities to argue and lobby for increased access to technologies that are out of reach for many. (shrink)

In “Property Rights and the Resource Curse” Leif Wenar argues that the purchase and sale of resources from certain countries constitutes a violation of property rights, and the priority in reforming global trade should be on protecting these property rights. Specifically, Wenar argues that the U.S. and other western liberal democracies should not be complicit in the trade of so-called cursed resources, and the extant legal system can be used to end the trade in cursed resources (...) by prohibiting the importation of cursed resources, litigating against companies that operate in resource-cursed countries, and imposing trade tariffs on third party countries’ exports if they trade in cursed resources. In this paper, I show that while Wenar is correct that the trade in cursed resources is morally objectionable and therefore creates additional moral obligations for participants in that trade, his normative assessment fails to take account of the complexity of the resource curse and his prescriptive proposal for clean trade will not reduce harm in resource-cursed countries. I suggest that the reduction of harm, rather than the enforcement of property rights, should be the normative and practical focus in evaluating and reforming trade in natural resources. (shrink)

The paper argues that members of future generations have an entitlement to natural resources equal to ours. Therefore, if a currently living individual destroys or degrades natural resources then he must pay compensation to members of future generations. This compensation takes the form of “primary goods” which will be valued by members of future generations as equally useful for promoting the good life as the natural resources they have been deprived of. As a result of this policy, each generation inherits (...) a “Commonwealth” of natural resources plus compensation. It is this inherited “Commonwealth” which members of that generation must then pass on to members of the next generation. Once this picture is accepted, the standard bundle of property rights is problematic, for it takes the owner of a constituent of the Commonwealth to have the right to “waste, destroy or modify” that item at will. This paper therefore presents a revised set of property rights which takes seriously the idea that each generation has an equal claim on the resources that nature has bequeathed us, whilst allowing certain effects on those natural resources by each generation, and a degree of exclusive use of those natural resources owned by an individual. (shrink)

forthcoming in Philosophy & Public Affairs [2008].

The current statist order assumes that states have a right to make rules involving the transfer and/or extraction of natural resources within the territory. Cosmopolitan theories of global justice have questioned whether the state is justified in its control over natural resources, typically by pointing out that having resources is a matter of good luck, and this unfairness should be addressed. This paper argues that self-determination does generate a right over resources, which others should not interfere with. It does not (...) entail, however, that there is no obligation on rich countries to redistribute to poor countries. Indeed, in some rare instances, it might be necessary for a particular political community to use its resources, but the presumption is that the collectively self-determining group should have the right to decide that. (shrink)

In “Property Rights and the Resource Curse” Leif Wenar argues that the purchase and sale of resources from certain countries constitutes a violation of property rights, and the priority in reforming global trade should be on protecting these property rights. Specifically, Wenar argues that the U.S. and other western liberal democracies should not be complicit in the trade of so-called cursed resources, and the extant legal system can be used to end the trade in cursed resources (...) by prohibiting the importation of cursed resources, litigating against companies that operate in resource-cursed countries, and imposing trade tariffs on third party countries’ exports if they trade in cursed resources. In this paper, I show that while Wenar is correct that the trade in cursed resources is morally objectionable and therefore creates additional moral obligations for participants in that trade, his normative assessment fails to take account of the complexity of the resource curse and his prescriptive proposal for clean trade will not reduce harm in resource-cursed countries. I suggest that the reduction of harm, rather than the enforcement of property rights, should be the normative and practical focus in evaluating and reforming trade in natural resources. (shrink)

Over the years, companies have adopted hiring algorithms because they promise wider job candidate pools, lower recruitment costs and less human bias. Despite these promises, they also bring perils. Using them can inflict unintentional harms on individual human rights. These include the five human rights to work, equality and nondiscrimination, privacy, free expression and free association. Despite the human rights harms of hiring algorithms, the AI ethics literature has predominantly focused on abstract ethical principles. This is problematic (...) for two reasons. First, AI principles have been criticized for being vague and not actionable. Second, the use of vague ethical principles to discuss algorithmic risks does not provide any accountability. This lack of accountability creates an algorithmic accountability gap. Closing this gap is crucial because, without accountability, the use of hiring algorithms can lead to discrimination and unequal access to employment opportunities. This paper makes two contributions to the AI ethics literature. First, it frames the ethical risks of hiring algorithms using international human rights law as a universal standard for determining algorithmic accountability. Second, it evaluates four types of algorithmic impact assessments in terms of how effectively they address the five human rights of job applicants implicated in hiring algorithms. It determines which of the assessments can help companies audit their hiring algorithms and close the algorithmic accountability gap. (shrink)

This is the third volume of King's College Studies in medical law and ethics and covers the following topics: AIDS; contraception and family planning; human rights and the role of the judiciary in medical law; a national commission for medical ethics; defensive medicine and medical malpractice; the ethics of the allocation of resources in health care; and the legal status of the unborn. Within these diverse themes challenging ideas about rights and resources in contemporary society and medical practice (...) are introduced and explored. The essays summarise existing debates and go on to discuss further these vital issues in medical law and ethics. (shrink)

The so-called resource curse raises moral issues. Who, if anyone, is morally responsible for it? This article argues that this question amounts to: who is blameworthy for the violations of people's property rights? The international oil companies are blameworthy for the violations of property rights only in the case of complicity, not in the normal purchase case. Yet the international community has to take action against massive violations of property rights. The article discusses different measures, and (...) criticizes voluntary initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative for not making the states accountable to their people. In this line of thought, it argues for an extension of the mandate of the International Criminal Court: massive violations of property rights should be prosecuted at the international level. (shrink)

In a recent line of cases, senior judges in the UK have been called upon to adjudicate in complaints over the failure of health and local authorities to meet the welfare needs of citizens. Local authorities claimed that the disputes had been precipitated by a lack of resources allocated by central government to meet local demand. This article examines the role of the courts in resolving a fundamental tension between central government policy of financial cost-cutting on the one hand and (...) welfarist principles embodied in legislation for the delivery of public services on the other. Questions are raised about the relevance and appropriateness of rights-based adjudication in welfare needs contexts and about the reluctance of courts to intervene in the resolution of resource allocation disputes even where fundamental rights, particularly in areas such as health, community care, and education where notions of rights are inextricably bound up with use of financial resources. These key cases have arisen prior to the implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998. Where relevant, the likely impact of the Act on welfare needs disputes is considered. (shrink)

This article considers the extent to which the debate about animal rights can be enriched by Richard Rorty’s theory of rights. Although Rorty’s work has enjoyed a lot of scholarly attention, commentators have not considered the implications of his arguments for animals. Nor have theorists of animal rights engaged his approach to rights. This paper argues that Rorty’s thinking holds a number of attractions for proponents of animal rights. It also considers some of its drawbacks. (...) It is further argued that Rorty’s thinking about rights avoids many of the problems that animal ethic of care theorists have found in rights discourse being applied to animals. Rorty’s work thus provides a valuable resource for bringing these two major strands within the animal ethics literature into closer theoretical kinship. (shrink)

The question of resource allocation is particularly pertinent to the realisation of socioeconomic rights. Perceptions of the place of resource allocation impact the adjudication of these rights. This article departs from the premise that with the adoption of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights allowing individual communications and the establishment of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, there will be an increase in resource allocation (...) questions for adjudication. The article interrogates the experience of national courts and examines potential lessons that can be adopted at the international level to overcome the reluctance that supra-national tribunals may have when adjudicating on states obligations to fulfil. (shrink)

he article combines Elinor Ostrom’s design principles for common-pool resources and human rights provisions, including subsequent clarifications and jurisprudence. It analyses whether stronger local self-governance, embedded in the natural resource dimension of peoples’ rights to self-determination is a recommendable approach. Two changes in understanding are noted. First, the universal approval of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination as specified in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Second, the wide endorsement of the specific principle of (...) free and prior informed consent. As the exercise of peoples’ rights to self-determination is done on a collective level, it is important to have awareness of whether particularly affected and marginalized households and individuals are included or not included in the decision-making process. The article then reviews a range of new instruments adopted by the OECD and the UN for improved human rights awareness and compliance in the context of economic investments. The article finds that these instruments are still underutilized. Finally, the article identifies the role of human rights in bilateral investment treaties. It finds that there are less jurisdictional restrictions – as many treaties have a wide understanding of applicable law – than cognitive restrictions – as human rights competence is rarely sought when establishing tribunals mandated to solve investments disputes. (shrink)

If world poverty is truly a global problem that engages the responsibility of all property owners worldwide, good governance at the domestic level is also required not only for reasons of efficiency, but also for reasons of justice. Though taxpayers and political leaders of rich countries must feel themselves under a duty of justice with regard to world poverty, no measures against poverty that are to be not merely effective, but also just, can ignore the requirements of good governance. The (...) ‘pact of civilization’ binds all human beings, but the obligations it imposes should not displace those that arise from the domestic social compact. (shrink)

The author addresses Robert Nozick's claim that: “The particular rights over things fill the space of rights, leaving no room for general rights to be in a certain material condition.” Hence Nozick insists that rights are violated if citizens are compelled to contribute to others' welfare, however urgent their needs may be. The author argues that it is characteristic of libertarian theories that they invoke the moral sanctity of private property against welfarist or egalitarian conceptions of (...) social justice. Nozick's version of the libertarian critique has three conceptual pillars–“right,”“thing” and “space.” On that basis Nozick claims that talk of welfare “rights” can be condemned on the plane of rights. This is true, Nozick maintains, even of “the right to life.” The author contends that this argument fails. It equivocates over the idea of “rights”; and it misconceives crucial features of property. Nozick deploys exclusive “domain rights,” whilst attacking “important‐interest rights.” His historical‐entitlement theory fails as a justification of private property. The author argues that, so far as material objects are concerned, private property institutions depend upon trespassory rules which do not impose morally binding obligations unless basic needs are catered for. Furthermore, private property institutions also comprise monetary resources to which the spatial metaphor of exclusive rights does not apply. Holdings vested in any particular person at any particular time are stamped, morally, with a mix of contestable and mutable property‐specific justice reasons. Hence it is fallacious to suppose that ownership rights together exhaust all normative space over “things.”The major objection to speaking of everyone's having a right to various things such as equality of opportunity, life, and so on, and enforcing this right, is that these “rights” require a substructure of things and materials and actions; and other people may have rights and entitlements over these. [≡] The particular rights over things fill the space of rights, leaving no room for general rights to be in a certain material condition. (Nozick 1974, 238). (shrink)

This article attempts to answer two basic questions. First, can body parts be the subject of property rights? This requires us to start with a definition of property rights, and this is set out in the first section. In the second section, it will be argued that rights in relation to body parts can come within this definition of property rights. However, as explained in the third section, the fact that body parts can be the subject (...) of property rights does not mean that they should. To answer the question of whether body parts should be the subject of property rights we need to consider policy arguments. This article will develop an argument in favour of the recognition of property rights in body parts which focuses on the notion of scarcity of resources. (shrink)

Historically attempts to use the courts as a means of challenging decisions to refuse NHS resources have met with little success. However two recent developments, that of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the development of European Union law through the application of Article 49 of the EC Treaty have provided the prospect for a challenge to this position. This article examines the impact of a recent case that of Watts v Bedford PCT in which a woman sought to (...) by-pass NHS waiting lists by seeking treatment in France and then claimed reimbursement of the cost of the operation and the possible impact of this case in the context of patients’s rights and resource allocation. (shrink)

How do we weigh the claims of current and future people when current exercise of rights to property conflict with sustainability? Are property rights over theseresources more limited due to the claims of posterity? Lockean property rights allow no right to degrade resources when doing so threatens the basic needs offuture generations. A stewardship conception of property rights can be developed, providing a justification for sustainable management legislation even whensuch law conflicts with the rights an (...) owner would have, were the resource under more full-blown ownership. A protection indicator can be developed that is sensitive to a range of empirical factors such as scarcity, renewability, importance of the resource, and seriousness and reversibility of potential harm. The stewardship conception of rights over environmental resources can be applied in policy settings, for example, in decisions over emissions limits and land-use patterns. Such harnessing of Lockean intuitions to argue for environmental protection is in sharp contrast to Locke’s usual employment by those keen to show that such protection violates owners’ rights. (shrink)

Los derechos de conquista, descubrimiento y ocupación, y la libertad de los mares: una genealogía de la injusticia sobre los recursos naturales Este artículo analiza los orígenes coloniales de tres principios del derecho internacional: el derecho de conquista, el derecho de descubrimiento y ocupación, y la libertad de los mares. Argumento que cada uno de estos derechos se estableció como principio jurídico internacional para facilitar la colonización de pueblos lejanos, sus territorios y tierras, y con el fin de acumular sus (...) recursos naturales. El artículo analiza cómo se justificaron estos derechos, qué conjunto de facultades e inmunidades exclusivas conferían, y cómo están vinculados a tres regímenes jurídicos modernos distintos de derechos sobre el espacio natural y sus recursos: la soberanía territorial, los derechos de propiedad privada sobre tierras extranjeras y los bienes marítimos comunes mundiales. En tanto expongo los orígenes moralmente arbitrarios de cada uno de estos principios de derecho internacional, que reflejan las condiciones y los objetivos específicos de determinados proyectos coloniales, también sostengo que los regímenes de derechos sobre los recursos naturales que estos institucionalizaron son convergentes en el sentido de que permitieron una apropiación y una explotación distintivamente injustas de los recursos naturales. El artículo también señala las formas en que la lógica y el funcionamiento de estos regímenes siguen dando forma al uso injusto de los recursos naturales hasta el día de hoy. (shrink)

There is a growing feeling in many Western countries that every human being has a right to health, or a right to health care. This feeling is reflected in a declaration of the World Health Organization (WHO) from 1976, which states: The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition. Our intention in the following is to use the (...) WHO declaration as a basis for considering the allocation of resources in health care. We shall first argue that most of the criteria suggested as grounds for fair allocation of scarce medical resources have their difficulties if one tries to apply them one by one to medical practices. We shall then go on to claim that, if we take the right of all human beings to health or health care even moderately seriously, increasing the resources would in most cases be more ethical than attempting to allocate them ‘fairly’. (shrink)

In an important recent article, "Contemporary Property Rights, Lockean Provisos, and the Interests of Future Generations, "Clark Wolf argues that sometimes the interests of future generations should take precedence over the claims of current property rights holders. Wolfs arguments concentrate on the genesis and nature of defensible property rights in various natural resources, and on the conditions under which morally unacceptable harm is caused to others. In this paper I explore two central sets of issues. First, I (...) investigate how the argument holds up when labor is involved in discovering, developing, or preparing natural resources for appropriation. I consider some persuasive reasons why one might think Wolfs arguments lose force in such cases. I also indicate how to accommodate these concerns without diminishing the force of Wolf s main arguments. Second, I show how either the examples Wolf uses do not support the conclusion he is pressing, or the argument has extremely far-reaching implications. I argue that either of these conclusions is problematic for Wolfs argument as thus far developed. (shrink)

Businesses interface with the natural world through rights to property. The shape of these rights and the responsibilities we assign to managers are important determinants of both patterns of resource use and pollutant levels. Consequently, conflicts have arisen between regulating bodies, indigenous groups, and corporations over the entitlements of businesses in the use of their property when that property is ecologically sensitive or significant. In this paper I develop an account of the ethical responsibilities of managers regarding (...) their treatment of the environment and their use of natural resources. This account is based on a philosophical examination of the nature of property rights. After a tour of traditional arguments employed to defend the institution of private property, I develop a new conception of property rights over objects that have a high natural resource component. I show that in today’s world, ethical concerns that motivated John Locke will yield property rights that are insufficiently strong to override a democratic say in overall use patterns and must be sensitive to factors such as need, scarcity, and the interests of stakeholders. I show a similar result for utilitarian arguments for property. On this foundation I develop a conception of property in key environmental resources that includes a stewardship element. To embody this, I suggest a set of ethical responsibilities for managers over certain natural resources that springs from it. I argue for obligations restricting harmful use patterns as a way of including the other goals (eg public participation, sustainability) that we care about, in a manner which clashes least with the liberty of owners and the efficiency of production. The outcome is a set of rights and responsibilities that take global environmental interests into account, but preserve the thrust of what is good about the institution of private property: that it rewards labour and facilitates a stable and efficient free exchange system. As a version of private property, it retains many of the advantages of global capitalism while attaching responsibilities to business decision makers. (shrink)

Hans Morten Haugen offers an analysis of the intersection of intellectual property with health, traditional knowledge and biodiversity against a backdrop of established and emerging human rights. How those rights interface and who decides are among the most difficult issues in international intellectual property, and there is no doubt that there is room for fresh ideas on how to simultaneously achieve the goals of innovation, development and access. 0Also part of series: Library of Human Rights; 2.

This paper contrasts conceptions of global distributive justice focused on natural resources with human rights–based approach. To emphasize the advantages of the latter, the paper analyzes three areas: (1) the methodology of normative theorizing about natural resources, (2) the category of natural resources, and (3) the view of the system of sovereignty over natural resources. Concerning the first, I argue that global justice conceptions misconstrue the claims made to natural resources and offer conceptions which are practically unfeasible. Concerning the (...) second, I show that contemporary philosophy of justice downplays the plurality of meanings resources have for collectives and argue that conflicts over natural resources can best be accounted for using human rights. Finally, the paper looks at sovereignty over natural resources and argues that rather than dismissing it as unjustifiable on moral grounds, it should be reformed in line with valid principles of international law, most importantly with human rights. (shrink)

National governments in almost all developing countries have begun to decentralize policies and decision making related to development, public services, and the environment. Existing research on the subject has enhanced our understanding of the effects of decentralization and thereby has been an effective instrument in the advocacy of decentralization. But most analyses, especially where environmental resources are concerned, have been less attentive to the political coalitions that prompt decentralization and the role of property rights in facilitating the implementation of (...) decentralized decision making. By comparing decentralization in four cases in South Asia—Forest Councils in Kumaon in India, Joint Forest Management in India, the Parks and People Program in Nepal's Terai, and Community Forestry legislation in Nepal—this article provides answers to two questions: When do governments decentralize environmental decision making? and Which types of property rights must be devolved if decentralized decision making is to be effective? (shrink)

The existence of sovereign rights over genetic resources is today well recognized in international law. However, the legal status of such resources in terms of property rights is still unclear. The consideration of this issue requires a clear distinction between physical and intangible property. Legislation in developed countries has extended patent protection to genetic resources, in addition to the protection of plant varieties via breeders' rights. The extension of protection and the implementation of the TRIPs Agreement may (...) have important implications for breeding programs and trade in seeds. While intellectual property protection of genetic resources is rapidly advancing, considerable work is still to be done to ensure the compensation for the informal innovations made by local and indigenous communities. (shrink)

Certain scarce resources seem indivisible, unlike, e.g., land and cattle. But some such resources can be, and have been, turned into private property. In offshore fishing grounds, individual tranferable quotas have been issued to fishing firms that have, as a result, become custodians of fish stocks in those grounds. In the eel fishery on the Danish coast owners of farms by the coast had traditional rights to lay eeltraps leasing those rights out to professional fishermen. In the 1920’s (...) in the U.S., individual firms were gradually being granted, by court decision, exclusive broadcasting rights in a certain area and on a certain frequency. Grazing rights in Iceland were, from the beginning, allocated by quotas belonging to individual farmers. Fishing rights in Icelandic salmon rivers were also alocated by tradition to individual farmers.Certaines ressources rares semblent être indivisibles, contrairement à la terre et aux bovins par exemple. Mais de telles ressources peuvent devenir, et sont devenues, des biens privés. Dans le domaine des zones de pêche offshore, des quotas individuels transférables ont étés accordés aux entreprises de pêche qui sont devenues les gardiennes des stocks de poissons dans ces zones. Dans les pêcheries d’anguilles sur les côtes danoises, les propriétaires des fermes côtières avaient traditionnellement des droits pour poser des pièges et pouvaient louer ces droits à des pêcheurs professionnels. Dans les années 20 aux Etats Unis, des décisions de justice ont graduellement accordé à des entreprises individuelles des droits exclusifs de radiodiffusion sur certaines zones et sur certaines fréquences. Les droits de pâturage en Islande furent originellement alloués par quotas à des fermiers individuels. Les droits de pêche dans les rivières peuplées de saumons en Islande furent aussi alloués de manière traditionnelle à des fermiers individuels. (shrink)

We can observe a connection between some serious environmental problems caused by the overexploitation of environmental resources and the particular conceptions of property rights that are claimed to hold with regard to these resources. In this paper, I investigate whether Kant’s conception of property rights might constitute a basis for justifying property regimes that would overcome some of these environmental problems. Kant’s argument for the right to property, put forward in his Doctrine of right, is complex. In Section (...) 2, I attempt an interpretation. Section 3 works out the defining characteristics of the conception of property rights that Kant’s argument establishes and investigates their implications for determining property regimes in environmental resources. Kant proposes a minimalist notion of the right to property as a triadic relation between persons with regard to an object, justified only on the condition that it is universalizable in the given circumstances. I argue that this notion offers a promising account for determining property relations with regard to environmental resources. By way of illustration, in Section 4, I focus on an example of Kantian property rights in one type of environmental resource: the marine fisheries. (shrink)

Recent debate has focused on the use of intellectual property regimes for the protection of indigenous resources. Both domesticated crops and useful wild plants are shaped by indigenous knowledge and by their uses within indigenous cultures. This implies that the preservation of cultural systems is as important as the conservation of the associated biological resources. Intellectual property has been suggested as a means to protect indigenous resources from misappropriation, and to create increased investment in their conservation. Four recent books that (...) discuss the problems that arise from the application of IPR for the protection of indigenous resources highlight a salient issue: that current IPR systems may conflict and undermine the culture, social structure, and knowledge systems of indigenous societies. In order to support conservation through indigenous management of biodiversity, a number of steps are required for the negotiation of intellectual property systems that are more compatible with indigenous people's value systems and concepts of ownership. (shrink)