This essay explores the connection between post-truth and fear, arguing that the latter may be used as a tool to control information and thus manipulate public opinion. Furthermore, it discusses the role of law in regulating post-truth (among others, by a better regulation of Information Society providers). Eventually, some solutions are proposed.

The focus of the book, which consists in three studies, can be described in the following aspects: Considerations on Aristotle's universals, reconstruction of Aristotle's critics to Plato' s ideas in Aristotle's lost work “On Ideas”, analysis of Aristotle's substance in the works Categories, Metaphysics, On the Soul, Posterior Analytics, Physics. My point of view is that Aristotle refuses every aspect of Plato's ideas in a radical way. I analyze Aristotle's conditions for a synonymy of predication and compare them with the (...) condition for a not-homonymy of predication in the Argument from Relatives of “On Ideas”. My reflections on substance plead for the presence of a plurality of values of substance in the works of Aristotle: substance can be, for instance, the individual biological entity or the essence/nature/form of a biological entity; a coexistence of both values can be noticed in the different works of Aristotle. (shrink)

Despite society’s increasing sensitivity toward green production, companies often struggle to find effective communication strategies that induce consumers to buy green products or engage in other environmentally friendly behaviors. To add clarity to this situation, we investigated the effectiveness of negative versus positive message framing in promoting green products, whereby companies highlight the detrimental versus beneficial environmental consequences of choosing less versus more green options, respectively. Across four experiments, we show that negatively framed messages are more effective than positively framed (...) ones in prompting consumers to engage in pro-environmental behaviors. More importantly, we find that anticipated shame is the emotion responsible for this effect. Furthermore, both environmental concern and the type of product promoted serve as moderators; thus, the mediating role of anticipated shame is attenuated when environmental concern is low and the product is a luxury one. Finally, we discuss the theoretical and managerial implications of our work, along with its limitations and some directions for future research. (shrink)

We reconsider the pragmatic interpretation of intuitionistic logic [21] regarded as a logic of assertions and their justi cations and its relations with classical logic. We recall an extension of this approach to a logic dealing with assertions and obligations, related by a notion of causal implication [14, 45]. We focus on the extension to co-intuitionistic logic, seen as a logic of hypotheses [8, 9, 13] and on polarized bi-intuitionistic logic as a logic of assertions and conjectures: looking at the (...) S4 modal translation, we give a de nition of a system AHL of bi-intuitionistic logic that correctly represents the duality between intuitionistic and co-intuitionistic logic, correcting a mistake in previous work [7, 10]. A computational interpretation of cointuitionism as a distributed calculus of coroutines is then used to give an operational interpretation of subtraction.Work on linear co-intuitionism is then recalled, a linear calculus of co-intuitionistic coroutines is de ned and a probabilistic interpretation of linear co-intuitionism is given as in [9]. Also we remark that by extending the language of intuitionistic logic we can express the notion of expectation, an assertion that in all situations the truth of p is possible and that in a logic of expectations the law of double negation holds. Similarly, extending co-intuitionistic logic, we can express the notion of conjecture that p, de ned as a hypothesis that in some situation the truth of p is epistemically necessary. (shrink)

This paper investigates some of the main problems concerning the normativity of aesthetic judgments in Kant’s Critique of Judgment. Kant’s attempt to provide a transcendental foundation to aesthetic judgments clashes with the impossibility to find a determined conceptual rule under which they could be subsumed. This paper aims to discuss and clarify the set of problems derived from this attempt, focusing especially on the artistic perspective. In order to do that, it will be necessary to deal with the following notions: (...) eautonomy, sensus communis aestheticus and genius. From this analysis it will emerge the importance of exemplarity as concept that allow us to highlight some implicit and usually neglected aspects of Kant’s aesthetic theory. (shrink)

This book consists in a collection of studies composed by different researchers; every study focuses on an author or on some authors of the history of philosophy who has/have analysed, endorsed or criticized the concept of substance. Both positions for and against the ontology of substance are presented in the book.

Different phases of the restoration of Michelangelo's Sistine Chapel frescoes are discussed, including the techniques used to remove foreign matter deposited or applied in the course of time. Huge scientific and technical support is used for this project in contrast to the age?old operations of previous restorers and the simplicity of their equipment.

We consider a “polarized” version of bi-intuitionistic logic [5, 2, 6, 4] as a logic of assertions and hypotheses and show that it supports a “rich proof theory” and an interesting categorical interpretation, unlike the standard approach of C. Rauszer’s Heyting-Brouwer logic [28, 29], whose categorical models are all partial orders by Crolard’s theorem [8]. We show that P.A. Melliès notion of chirality [21, 22] appears as the right mathematical representation of the mirror symmetry between the intuitionistic and co-intuitionistc sides (...) of polarized bi-intuitionism. Philosophically, we extend Dalla Pozza and Garola’s pragmatic interpretation of intuitionism as a logic of assertions [10] to bi-intuitionism as a logic of assertions and hypotheses. We focus on the logical role of illocutionary forces and justification conditions in order to provide “intended interpretations” of logical systems that classify inferential uses in natural language and remain acceptable from an intuitionistic point of view. Although Dalla Pozza and Garola originally provide a constructive interpretation of intuitionism in a classical setting, we claim that some conceptual refinements suffice to make their “pragmatic interpretation” a bona fide representation of intuitionism. We sketch a meaning-asuse interpretation of co-intuitionism that seems to fulfil the requirements of Dummett and Prawitz’s justificationist approach. We extend the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation to bi-intuitionism by regarding co-intuitionistic formulas as types of the evidence for them: if conclusive evidence is needed to justify assertions, only a scintilla of evidence suffices to justify hypotheses. (shrink)

general, abstract situation. On the other side, I know that graduate students and all mathematicians sometimes falter because their intuitive, ..

The essays in this volume, written by well-known economists and other social scientists from North America, Europe and Australia, share to an unusual degree a common concern with the competitive mechanisms that underlie collective decisions and with the way they are embedded in institutional settings. This gives the book a unitary inspiration whose value is clear from the understanding and insights its chapters provide on important theoretical and practical issues such as the social dimension and impact of trust, the management (...) of information in bureaucratic settings, the role of political parties in constitutional evolution, inter-level rivalry and reassignments of powers in federal and unitary systems of government, the impact of ethnicity and nationalism on federal institutions or arrangements, and the response of governments and overarching institutions of globalization. The essays were written in honour of Albert Breton, a pioneer in this field of investigation. (shrink)

This paper deals with the strategy of defence that Aristotle dedicates to the principle of contradiction; the analysis is concentrated on passages of Metaphysics Gamma 4. The main thesis of the paper is that Aristotle’s strategy is an ontological, and therefore not only a logical, one: the principle is defended on the basis of the, from an ontological point of view, unacceptable consequences which would arise in case of the absence of the principle itself. These consequences are, for instance, the (...) disappearance of properties, of essences, of individual entities and of the plurality of essentially distinguishable entities, since the contents of the properties, the role of properties as essences and the constitution of the individual entities cannot hold, if the principle of contradiction does not hold. The principle of contradiction is, therefore, not only a logical principle: it is the ontological presupposition of the whole reality; without it there is no entity. (shrink)

The sovereignty of states to enact and enforce laws within their jurisdictions has been recognized since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. There are now, however, accepted global legal norms that transcend national sovereignty and hold states accountable for not including their domestic legal regimes. This volume is the first book-length treatment to describe and explain how legal orders can be interwoven, and what to do about it. Coining the term 'inter-legality', this volume provides essays on the history, primary areas (...) of inter-legality, the concept of jurisdiction, and normative developments prompted by inter-legality. Bringing together a wide range of contributors who stem from a variety of different academic backgrounds, this book aims to answer three questions: does inter-legality occur with some regularity? How does it affect traditional legal concepts such as 'jurisdiction' or 'legal order' or 'responsibility'? And what are the normative implications? (shrink)

The essay consists in the analysis of the problem of the evil in the man and in the analysis of the remedies which the man can find against the evil. Plato affirms the presence of an active principle of evil in the soul of every man, which coincides with some instincts of the appetitive soul; the opposite principle to the evil is the reason, which needs, though, a correct education in order to be able to fight efficiently against the evil (...) in us. The man can be seen as a battle field of these opposite forces. Plato describes the presence of the evil in us in some passages of Republic Book 9, where he compares the appetitive part of the soul with a monster. The destiny of every person in her earthly existence consists in the continuing control of the appetitive part of the soul, if the status of ethical education is to be reached and maintained. The man who remains in the realm of the opinion, that is, in the realm of the doxa is an individual who only disposes of unstable opinions and who as a consequence do not have authentic remedies against the appetitive part. On the contrary, the individual who can ascend to the realm of being through the hard education represented by arithmetic, geometry, stereometry, astronomy, harmony and, finally, dialectic is really able to contrast the force of the evil within the individual. Ethics is really possible only through the complete education which passes through these disciplines: the more the individuals is theoretically educated, the more the individual is ethically educated. The knowledge of ideas is the only authentic therapy against the evil in us. (shrink)

This paper attempts to show that mathematical knowledge does not grow by a simple process of accumulation and that it is possible to provide a quasi-empirical (in Lakatos's sense) account of mathematical theories. Arguments supporting the first thesis are based on the study of the changes occurred within Eudidean geometry from the time of Euclid to that of Hilbert; whereas those in favour of the second arise from reflections on the criteria for refutation of mathematical theories.

The present article aims at showing that it is possible to construct a realist philosophy of mathematics which commits one neither to dream the dreams of Platonism nor to reduce the word ''realism'' to mere noise. It is argued that mathematics is a science of patterns, where patterns are not objects (or properties of objects), but aspects, or aspects of aspects, etc. of objects. (The notion of aspect originates from ideas sketched by Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations.).

Roy Harris’ view on language can be compared to Antonio Gramsci’s definition of political hegemony as the capacity to create linguistic structures accepted by the majority and to make them become public. If the creation of meaning is rooted in the practical solution of problems, every creation of meaning is also the result of a power negotiation.

The present paper aims at showing that there are times when set theoretical knowledge increases in a non-cumulative way. In other words, what we call ‘set theory’ is not one theory which grows by simple addition of a theorem after the other, but a finite sequence of theories T1, ..., Tn in which Ti+1, for 1 ≤ i < n, supersedes Ti. This thesis has a great philosophical significance because it implies that there is a sense in which mathematical theories, (...) like the theories belonging to the empirical sciences, are fallible and that, consequently, mathematical knowledge has a quasi-empirical nature. The way I have chosen to provide evidence in favour of the correctness of the main thesis of this article consists in arguing that Cantor–Zermelo set theory is a Lakatosian Mathematical Research Programme (MRP). (shrink)

This book contains seminal discussions of central issues in the philosophy of language, mathematics, mind, religion and time. Is common language conceptually prior to idiolectics? What is a theory of meaning? Does constructivism provide a satisfactory account of mathematics? What are indefinitely extensible concepts? Can we change the past? These are only some of the very important questions addressed here. Both the papers written by the contributors and Dummett's replies provide a great wealth of stimulating ideas for those who currently (...) do research in the respective areas touched upon without making the reading exceedingly tedious. This feature, common to most of the papers in this book, makes it possible to use the material presented in undergraduate courses at university level. (shrink)

The present collection of essays aims at casting light on important elements of Wittgenstein's thought and intellectual development. Some of Wittgenstein's ideas are here discussed using the «Tractatus» as a frame of reference, others by relating them to the views of G. Frege, G.E.M. Anscombe and D. Davidson.

Bertrand Russell's contributions to last century's philosophy and, in particular, to the philosophy of mathematics cannot be overestimated.Russell, besides being, with Frege and G.E. Moore, one of the founding fathers of analytical philosophy, played a major rôle in the development of logicism, one of the oldest and most resilient1 programmes in the foundations of mathematics.Among his many achievements, we need to mention the discovery of the paradox that bears his name and the identification of its logical nature; the generalization to (...) the whole of mathematics of Frege's idea that it is not possible to draw a demarcation line between logic and arithmetic; the programme, carried out with Whitehead, of derivation of mathematics from the logical system of Principia Mathematica ; and the ramified theory of types, devised by Russell to protect the system of PM from the known paradoxes.Although there is an ample literature on these topics, it is quite important to reconsider Russell's contributions to the foundations of mathematics at a time when, as a consequence of the crisis of the classical programmes in the foundations of mathematics, new trends are beginning to develop within the philosophy of mathematics. These are trends which move in a very different direction from that of logicism, intuitionism, and Hilbert's programme.To see this we need to consider that, in spite of profound disagreements on the nature of mathematical activity, on the relationship existing between logic and mathematics, on the causes of and therapies for the paradoxes, etc., logicism, intuitionism, and Hilbert's programme share an important metaphor: the idea that mathematics is an edifice built on unshakable foundations,2 an edifice which makes possible only a cumulative growth of mathematical knowledge.Such a metaphor—which, together with more specific theses belonging to these schools of thought, remained unsupported …. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;The central position defended in this work is that Analytical philosophy is the best realization so far of Descartes' concern for the construction of a method of scientific investigation in philosophy. ;In Frege, the father of Analytical philosophy, such concern was embodied in his Conceptual Notation, which should have provided philosophy with a rigorous and powerful deductive system, and in the 'linguistic turn', i.e. the study of the structure (...) of thought conducted by means of an analysis of the structure of language. This 'linguistic turn' should have produced, in Frege's view, definitive conclusions about the limits of what is thinkable not by setting up arbitrary systems of Pure Reason, but through the controllable investigation of the logical structure of an entity--language--of which we have conceptual experience. ;Wittgenstein's later philosophy is seen here as an attack against the aims and tenets of Analytical philosophy. In fact, what Wittgenstein shows in Philosophical Investigations is, among other things, that by means of an investigation of language it is impossible to justify the assumption that language is an expression of thought. But, if this were true, it would follow that we were not justified in assuming that there exists an isomorphism between language and thought. That there is such an isomorphism is the presupposition which lies at the basis of Frege's 'linguistic turn'. ;In conclusion I attempt to prove that there is no solution to Wittgenstein's objections unless the original exclusively linguistic Analytical philosophy model is modified by a 'pragmatic turn'. The key element of the 'pragmatic turn' is that the truth of certain assumptions--and therefore the justification for their introduction--can be confirmed by the impact that the system based on them has on reality in controlling and transforming it successfully through techniques which are logically dependent on the system. (shrink)

In this paper we intend to argue that: the question ‘True V or not True V’ is central to both the philosophical and mathematical investigations of the foundations of mathematics; when posed within a framework in which set theory is seen as a science of objects, the question ‘True V or not True V’ generates a dilemma each horn of which turns out to be unacceptable; a plausible way out of the dilemma mentioned at is provided by an approach to (...) set theory according to which this is considered to be a science of structures. (shrink)

Ratio Juris, Volume 34, Issue 2, Page 121-138, June 2021.