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  1. N. M. L. Nathan (2011). Substance Dualism Fortified. Philosophy 86 (2):201-211.
    You have a body, but you are a soul or self. Without your body, you could still exist. Your body could be and perhaps is outlasted by the immaterial substance which is your soul or self. Thus the substance dualist. Most substance dualists are Cartesians. The self, they suppose, is essentially conscious: it cannot exist unless it thinks or wills or has experiences. In this paper I sketch out a different form of substance dualism. I suggest that it is not (...)
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  2. N. M. L. Nathan (2010). Exclusion and Sufficient Reason. Philosophy 85 (3):391-397.
    I argue for two principles by combining which we can construct a sound cosmological argument. The first is that for any true proposition p's if 'there is an explanation for p's truth' is consistent then there is an explanation for p's truth. The second is a modified version of the principle that for any class, if there is an explanation for the non-emptiness ofthat class, then there is at least one non-member ofthat class which causes it not to be empty.
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  3. N. M. L. Nathan (2010). Murder and the Death of Christ. Think 9 (26):103-107.
    Some people believe that God made it a condition for His forgiveness even of repentant sinners that Jesus died a sacrificial death at human hands. Often, in the New Testament, this doctrine of Objective Atonement seems to be implied, as when Jesus spoke of his blood as ‘shed for many for the remission of sins’ , or when St Paul said that ‘Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures’ . And for many centuries the doctrine was indeed accepted (...)
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  4. N. M. L. Nathan (2008). Being Reasonable About Religion William Charlton Ashgate: Aldershot, 2006, Pp. 170, £45. Philosophy 83 (1):145-149.
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  5. N. M. L. Nathan (2006). Jewish Monotheism and the Christian God. Religious Studies 42 (1):75-85.
    Some Christians combine a doctrine about Christ which implies that there is more than one divine self with the doctrine that God revealed to the Jews a monotheism according to which there is just one divine self. I suggest that it is less costly for such Christians to achieve consistency by abandoning the second of these doctrines than to achieve it by abandoning the first.
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  6. N. M. L. Nathan (2005). Direct Realism: Proximate Causation and the Missing Object. [REVIEW] Acta Analytica 20 (36):3-6.
    Direct Realists believe that perception involves direct awareness of an object not dependent for its existence on the perceiver. Howard Robinson rejects this doctrine in favour of a Sense-Datum theory of perception. His argument against Direct Realism invokes the principle ‘same proximate cause, same immediate effect’. Since there are cases in which direct awareness has the same proximate cerebral cause as awareness of a sense datum, the Direct Realist is, he thinks, obliged to deny this causal principle. I suggest that (...)
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  7. N. M. L. Nathan & Gabriel Uzquiano (2005). Metaphysics. Philosophical Books 46 (3):268-271.
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  8. N. M. L. Nathan (2004). Stoics and Sceptics: A Reply to Brueckner. Analysis 64 (283):264–268.
  9. N. M. L. Nathan (2001). Book Review. The Nature of Perception John Foster. [REVIEW] Mind 110 (438):455-460.
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  10. N. M. L. Nathan (2001). Knowledge and its Limits by Timothy Williamson, Oxford University Press, 2000, Pp. XI + 340, £25. Philosophy 76 (3):460-475.
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  11. N. M. L. Nathan (2001). The Price of Doubt. Routledge.
    Are any of our beliefs justified? Are they rational? The skeptic thinks that our epistemic justifications are undeserved. Nicholas Nathan confronts the skeptic and questions the value of his argument. Skeptical arguments are against justified and rational belief as well as for ignorance. Nathan argues that the truth value of trivial arguments are a matter of indifference. He tests this conjecture with a varied collection of counterexamples: arguments for ignorance, neo-Cartesian and infinite regress arguments, and also more critically with arguments (...)
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  12. N. M. L. Nathan (2001). Vicious Regression and the Value of Belief. Philosophia 28 (1-4):369-372.
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  13. N. M. L. Nathan (1997). Admiration: A New Obstacle: Discussion. Philosophy 72 (281):453-459.
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  14. N. M. L. Nathan (1997). Naturalism and Self-Defeat: Plantinga's Version. Religious Studies 33 (2):135-142.
    In "Warrant and Proper Function" Plantinga argues that atheistic Naturalism is self-defeating. What is the probability that our cognitive faculties are reliable, given this Naturalism and an evolutionary explanation of their origins? Plantinga argues that if the Naturalist is modest enough to believe that it is irrational to have any belief as to the value of this probability, then he is irrational even to believe his own Naturalism. I suggest that Plantinga's argument has a false premise, and that even if (...)
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  15. N. M. L. Nathan (1997). Self and Will. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1):81 – 94.
    When do two mental items belong to the same life? We could be content with the answer -just when they have certain volitional qualities in common. An affinity is noted between that theory and Berkeley's early doctrine of the self. Some rivals of the volitional theory invoke a spiritual or physical owner of mental items. They run a risk either of empty formality or of causal superstition. Other rivals postulate a non-transitive and symmetrical relation in the set of mental items. (...)
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  16. N. M. L. Nathan (1997). Admiration: A New Obstacle. Philosophy 72 (281):453 - 459.
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  17. N. M. L. Nathan (1997). True and Ultimate Responsibility. Philosophy 72 (280):297 - 302.
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  18. N. M. L. Nathan (1996). Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press.
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  19. N. M. L. Nathan (1996). Weak Materialism. In Howard Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press.
     
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  20. N. M. L. Nathan (1995). The Good and the True. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2):494-496.
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  21. N. M. L. Nathan (1994). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Mind 103 (412):565-568.
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  22. N. M. L. Nathan (1994). The Multiplication of Utility. Utilitas 6 (02):217-.
    Some people have supposed that utility is good in itself, non-in-strumentally good, as distinct from good because conducive to other good things. And in modern versions of this view, utility often means want-satisfaction, as distinct from pleasure or happiness. For your want that p to be satisfied, is it necessary that you know or believe that p, or sufficient merely that p is true? However that question is answered, there are problems with the view that want-satisfaction is a non-instrumental good. (...)
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  23. N. M. L. Nathan (1993). Democracy. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93:123 - 137.
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  24. N. M. L. Nathan (1992). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Mind 101 (403):565-568.
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  25. N. M. L. Nathan (1992). Will and World. Oxford University Press.
    Beneath metaphysical problems there often lies a conflict between what we want to be true and what we believe to be true. Nathan provides a general account of the resolution of this conflict as a philosophical objective, showing that there are ways of thinking it through systematically with a view to resolving or alleviating it. The author also studies in detail a set of interrelated conflicts about the freedom and the reality of the will. He shows how difficult it is (...)
     
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  26. N. M. L. Nathan (1991). Mctaggart's Immaterialism. Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165):442-456.
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  27. N. M. L. Nathan (1989). Democracy and Impartiality. Analysis 49 (2):65 - 70.
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  28. N. M. L. Nathan (1988). Explicability and the Unpreventable. Analysis 48 (1):36 - 40.
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  29. N. M. L. Nathan (1988). Freedom and Belief. Philosophical Books 29 (1):48-50.
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  30. N. M. L. Nathan (1987). Evidential Insatiability. Analysis 47 (2):110 - 115.
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  31. N. M. L. Nathan (1987). Projectivist Utilitarianism: Reply to Gordon. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 26 (1):129 - 130.
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  32. N. M. L. Nathan (1984). A New Incompatibilism. Mind 93 (369):39-55.
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  33. N. M. L. Nathan (1983). `Egalitarianism'. Mind 92 (367):413-416.
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  34. N. M. L. Nathan (1983). Projectivist Utilitarianism. Erkenntnis 20 (2):207 - 211.
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  35. N. M. L. Nathan (1982). Conscious Belief. Analysis 42 (March):90-93.
  36. N. M. L. Nathan & J. J. Valberg (1982). Necessity, Inconceivability and the "A Priori". Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 56:117 - 155.
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  37. N. M. L. Nathan (1981). On an Argument of Peacocke's About Physicalism and Counterfactuals. Analysis 41 (3):124-125.
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  38. N. M. L. Nathan (1980). COHEN, G. A. "Karl Marx's Theory of History". [REVIEW] Mind 89:628.
     
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  39. N. M. L. Nathan (1980). Evidence and Assurance. Cambridge University Press.
    A systematic study of rational or justified belief, which throws fresh light on current debates about foundations and coherence theories of knowledge, the validation of induction and moral scepticism. Dr Nathan focuses attention on the largely unsatisfiable desires for active and self-conscious assurance of truth liable to be engendered by philosophical reflection about total belief-systems and the sources of knowledge. He extracts a kernel of truth from the doctrine that a regress of justification is both necessary and impossible, contrasts the (...)
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  40. N. M. L. Nathan (1977). What Vitiates an Infinite Regress of Justification? Analysis 37 (3):116 - 126.
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  41. N. M. L. Nathan (1976). On the Non-Causal Explanation of Human Action. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 6 (3):241-243.
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  42. N. M. L. Nathan (1975). Compatibilism and Natural Necessity. Mind 84 (April):277-280.
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  43. N. M. L. Nathan (1975). Materialism and Action. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 35 (4):501-511.
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  44. N. M. L. Nathan (1974). Scepticism and the Regress of Justification. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75:77 - 88.
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  45. N. M. L. Nathan (1971). A Difficulty About Justice. Mind 80 (318):227-237.
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  46. N. M. L. Nathan (1971). Brentano's Necessitarianism. Ratio 13 (1):44.
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  47. N. M. L. Nathan (1971). On the Justification of Democracy. The Monist 55 (1):89-120.
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  48. N. M. L. Nathan (1971). The Concept of Justice. London,Macmillan.
  49. N. M. L. Nathan (1971). Common Sense Metaphysics. Philosophy 46 (176):152 - 157.
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  50. N. M. L. Nathan (1970). History, Literature and the Classification of Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):213 – 233.
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