Developments in Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing (NIPT) and cell-free fetal DNA analysis raise the possibility that antenatal services may soon be able to support couples in non-invasively testing for, and diagnosing, an unprecedented range of genetic disorders and traits coded within their unborn child’s genome. Inevitably, this has prompted debate within the bioethics literature about what screening options should be offered to couples for the purpose of reproductive choice. In relation to this problem, the European Society of Human Genetics (ESHG) (...) and American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG) tentatively recommend that any expansion of this type of screening, as facilitated by NIPT, should be limited to serious congenital and childhood disorders. In support of this recommendation, the ESHG and ASHG cite considerations of distribution justice. Notably, however, an account of justice in the organization and provision of this type of screening which might substantiate this recommendation has yet to be developed. This paper attempts to redress this oversight through an investigation of Norman Daniels’ theory of Just health: meeting health needs fairly. In line with this aim, the paper examines what special moral importance (for Just health) screening for the purpose of reproductive choice might have where concerning serious congenital and childhood disorders in particular. The paper concludes that screening for reproductive choice where concerning serious congenital and childhood disorders may be important for providing women with fair opportunity to protect their health (by either having or not having an affected child). (shrink)

One widely held view of prenatal screening is that its foremost aim is, or should be, to enable reproductive choice; this is the Pure Choice view. The article critiques this position by comparing it with an alternative: Public Health Pluralism. It is argued that there are good reasons to prefer the latter, including the following. Public Health Pluralism does not, as is often supposed, render PNS more vulnerable to eugenics-objections. The Pure Choice view, if followed through to its logical (...) conclusions, may have unpalatable implications, such as extending choice well beyond health screening. Any sensible version of Public Health Pluralism will be capable of taking on board the moral seriousness of abortion and will advocate, where practicable, alternative means of reducing the prevalence of disease and disability. Public Health Pluralism is at least as well-equipped as the Pure Choice model to deal with autonomy and consent issues. (shrink)

In the near future developments in non-invasive prenatal testing may soon provide couples with the opportunity to test for and diagnose a much broader range of heritable and congenital conditions than has previously been possible. Inevitably, this has prompted much ethical debate on the possible implications of NIPT for providing couples with opportunities for reproductive choice by way of routine prenatal screening. In view of the possibility to test for a significantly broader range of genetic conditions with NIPT, (...) the European Society of Human Genetics and American Society of Human Genetics recommend that, pending further debate, prenatal screening for reproductive choice should only be offered where concerning serious congenital conditions and childhood disorders. In support of this recommendation, the ESHG and ASHG discuss a number of ethical issues on which they prompt further debate: the informational privacy of the future child, the trivialization of abortion, the risk of information overload, and issues of distributive justice. This paper responds to this call with further reflection on each ethical issue and how it relates to the moral justification of providing couples with opportunities for meaningful reproductive choice. The paper concludes that whilst there may be good reasons for qualifying the scope of any unsolicited prenatal screening offer to serious congenital conditions and childhood disorders, if prenatal screening is justified for providing couples with opportunities for meaningful reproductive choice, then health services may have obligations to empower couples with the same opportunity where concerning other conditions. (shrink)

Prenatal screening can significantly benefit parents and the community. However, it has created a dilemma for women as it requires them to quickly decide whether to continue a pregnancy or terminate it should the test indicate a foetal abnormality. This can be psychologically traumatic for women torn between their connection to an unborn child with all its possible imperfections, and a desire to prevent its suffering as a disabled child in later life. A woman must also consider her own (...) and her family's future welfare. Extensive research into the physical aspects of prenatal screening has not explored the meaning of the experience for women or whether termination is the most appropriate option. This article examines recent qualitative studies, concluding that women who terminate a pregnancy following prenatal screening may experience an acute grief reaction or be plagued by guilt and fear that can precipitate marital breakdown. Additionally, there is a risk that through striving to eradicate congenital disability, a community risks promoting a cult of perfectionism that may have discriminatory effects on disabled people. (shrink)

Prenatal screening, consisting of maternal serum screening and nuchal translucency screening, is on the verge of expansion, both by being offered to more pregnant women and by screening for more conditions. The Society of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists of Canada and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists have each recently recommended that screening be extended to all pregnant women regardless of age, disease history, or risk status. This screening is commonly justified by appeal to the value of autonomy, or (...) women's choice. In this paper, I critically examine the value of autonomy in the context of prenatal screening to determine whether it justifies the routine offer of screening and the expansion of screening services. I argue that in the vast majority of cases the option of prenatal screening does not promote or protect women's autonomy. Both a narrow conception of choice as informed consent and a broad conception of choice as relational reveal difficulties in achieving adequate standards of free informed choice. While there are reasons to worry that women's autonomy is not being protected or promoted within the limited scope of current practice, we should hesitate before normalizing it as part of standard prenatal care for all. (shrink)

Probably the main purpose of reproductive technologies is to enable people who choose to do so to avoid the birth of a baby with a disabling condition. However the conditions women want information about and the ‘price’ they are willing to pay for obtaining that information vary enormously. Individual women have to arrive at their own prenatal testing choices by ‘trading off’ means and ends in order to resolve the dilemmas facing them. We know very little about how (...) individuals make these trade-offs, so it is difficult to predict how new technologies will affect their choices and preferences. Uptake decisions can be expected to change, especially in the group of women who now are put off by some aspect of the current screening approach, where the avoidance of miscarriage risk may have provided a kind of ‘psychological shelter’, protecting a lot of people from having to make other decisions. Technologies such as Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis may remove a second ‘psychological shelter’ because they offer the means of avoiding the birth of an affected child without terminating a pregnancy. Even if new technologies will make some decisions easier in terms of their cognitive demands, they will also create new dilemmas and decision making will not necessarily become less stressful in emotional terms. Key challenges concern information and decision-making. (shrink)

An increase in autonomy and freedom is often considered one ofthe main arguments in favour of a broad use of genetic testing.Starting from Gerald Dworkin's reflections on autonomy and choicethis article examines some of the implications which accompanythe increase in choices offered by prenatal genetic diagnosis.Although personal autonomy and individual choice are importantaspects in the legitimation of prenatal genetic diagnosis, itseems clear that an increase in choice offered by prenatalgenetic diagnosis also leads to various implications that maynegatively (...) influence the freedom of the persons involved. (shrink)

Background: Although maternal serum screening for Down’s syndrome has become routinely available in most obstetric clinics in many countries, few studies have addressed the reasons why women agree to undergo the MSS test.Objectives: The aims of this study were to describe the circumstances in which MSS was offered to pregnant women and their reasons for undertaking it.Methods: Participant observation and in depth interviews were used in this study; specifically, the experiences of women who had a positive result for MSS and (...) who then followed this up with amniocentesis were examined. The interviewees were twenty six mothers aged between 22 and 35 years. The interviews were audio taped and transcribed for analysis. The results were analysed by the constant comparative method.Results: This study identified the reasons on which pregnant women appeared to base their decisions when undergoing MSS. The reasons were first, the recognition that the procedure was a prenatal routine procedure; second, the need to avoid the risk of giving birth to a baby with Down’s syndrome, and third, a trust in modern technology and in the professional authorities.Conclusions: This study offers insights into the informed choice made by women with a positive MSS result. The reasons for undergoing MSS might help health professionals and policy makers to reflect on their practice and this may, in turn, improve the quality of prenatal care during MSS. (shrink)

In 2004, prenatal risk assessment (PRA) was implemented as a routine offer in Denmark, in order to give all pregnant women an informed choice about whether to undergo prenatal testing. PRA is a non-invasive intervention performed in the first trimester of pregnancy and measures the risk of a fetus having Down's syndrome or other chromosomal disorders. The risk figure provides the basis for action, i.e. the decision about whether or not to undergo invasive fetal testing via the maternal (...) route (amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling), which, however, involves the risk of inducing a miscarriage. On the basis of ethnographic fieldwork in an ultrasound clinic in Denmark and interviews with pregnant women and their partners, this paper investigates how ideals such as autonomy and non-directiveness are practised in processes of decision-making. We view such ideals as forming social practice rather than neutral instruments to reach a certain goal. Focusing on one couple's trajectory through the clinical practices of PRA and the process through which a decision is reached, we call into question the assumption that more choice and more objective information is a source of empowerment and control. We make evident how decisions are made through a complicated process of meaning-making, which emerges through the relationship between professionals, the clinical setting and the social life of the couples. In the face of complex risk knowledge, PRA users are reluctant to make choices and seek to re-install authority in the health professionals. However, when assumptions about autonomy and self-determination are inscribed into the social practice of PRA, authority is transferred to the couple undergoing PRA and a new configuration of responsibility evolves between the couple and their relationship to the fetus. It is argued that PRA performs a form of government that works not through compulsion or persuasion but through choice. An ethic of a shared responsibility for PRA and its outcome between pregnant women and health professionals would be more in agreement with how decisions are actually made. (shrink)

An enduring ethical dispute accompanies prenatal screening and testing (PST) technologies. This ethical debate focuses on notions of reproductive choice. On one side of the dispute are those who have supported PST as a way to empower women’s reproductive choice, while on the other side are those who argue that PST, particularly when made a routine part of prenatal care, limits deliberate choice. Empirical research does not resolve this ethical debate with evidence both of women for whom PST (...) enhances their choices but also persistent evidence of recurrent problems between PST and women’s autonomous decision-making. While there have been attempts to remove challenges to reproductive choice, it has been argued that these challenges cannot be removed entirely. In this paper I provide a historical review of PST technologies’ development and in doing so provide a detailed insight into the root causes of this tension between the opposing sides of this debate. This historical account provides evidence that those who championed the early use of these technologies did so in order to achieve a number of wholly different goals other than women’s choice and empowerment. These different aims focus on scientific discovery and eugenic goals and, I argue, areirreconcilablewith women’s choice and empowerment. It thus may not be surprising that the resulting practice of PST continues to resist compatibility with women’s choice and empowerment. Ultimately, by understanding the historical foundations of PST we can more effectively assess how toreconcilewomen’s reproductive autonomy with routine prenatal screening. (shrink)

In 2004 prenatal risk assessment was implemented as a routine offer to all pregnant women in Denmark. It was argued that primarily the new programme would give all pregnant women an informed choice about whether to undergo prenatal testing. On the basis of ethnographic fieldwork in an ultrasound clinic in Denmark and interviews with pregnant women and their partners, we call into question the assumption underlying the new guidelines that more choice and more objective information is a source (...) of empowerment and control. We focus on one couple's experience of PRA. This case makes it evident how supposed choices in the context of PRA may not be experienced as such. Rather, they are experienced as complicated processes of meaning-making in the relational space between the clinical setting, professional authority and the social life of the couples. PRA users are reluctant to make choices and abandon health professionals as authoritative experts in the face of complex risk knowledge. When assumptions about autonomy and self-determination are inscribed into the social practice of PRA, authority is transferred to the couple undergoing PRA and a new configuration of responsibility evolves between the couple and their relationship to the foetus. It is argued that al-though the new programme of prenatal testing in Denmark presents itself in opposition to quasi-eugenic and paternalistic forms of governing couples' decisions it represents another form of government that works through the notion of choice. An ethics of a shared responsibility of PRA and its outcome would be more in agreement with how decisions are actually made. (shrink)

Prenatal screening for foetal abnormalities such as Down's syndrome differs from other forms of population screening in that the usual aim of achieving health gains through treatment or prevention does not seem to apply. This type of screening leads to no other options but the choice between continuing or terminating the pregnancy and can only be morally justified if its aim is to provide meaningful options for reproductive choice to pregnant women and their partners. However, this aim should not (...) be understood as maximizing reproductive choice per se. Only if understood as allowing prospective parents to avoid suffering related to living with (a child with) serious disorders and handicaps can prenatal screening be a publicly or collectively funded programme. The alternative of moving prenatal testing outside the healthcare system into the private sector is problematic, as it makes these tests accessible only to those who can afford to pay for it. New developments in prenatal screening will have to be assessed in terms of whether and to what extent they either contribute to or undermine the stated aim of providing meaningful options for reproductive choice. In the light of this criterion, this article discusses the introduction of the new non‐invasive prenatal test (NIPT), the tendency to widen the scope of follow‐up testing, as well as the possible future scenarios of genome‐wide screening and ‘prenatal personalised medicine’. The article ends with recommendations for further debate, research and analysis. (shrink)

A new landscape of prenatal testing is presently developing, including new techniques for risk-reducing, non-invasive sampling of foetal DNA and drastically enhanced possibilities of what may be rapidly and precisely analysed, surrounded by a growing commercial genetic testing industry and a general trend of individualization in healthcare policies. This article applies a set of established ethical notions from past debates on PNT for analysing PNT screening-programmes in this new situation. While some basic challenges of PNT stay untouched, the new (...) development supports a radical individualization of how PNT screening is organized. This reformation is, at the same time, difficult to reconcile with responsible spending of resources in a publicly funded healthcare context. Thus, while the ethical imperative of individualization holds and applies to PNT, the new landscape of PNT provides reasons to start rolling back the type of mass-screening programmes currently established in many countries. Instead, more limited offers are suggested, based on considerations of severity of conditions and optimized to simultaneously serve reproductive autonomy and public health within an acceptable frame of priorities. The new landscape of PNT furthermore underscores the ethical importance of supporting and including people with disabilities. For the very same reason, no ban on what may be analysed using PNT in the new landscape should be applied, although private offers must, of course, conform to strict requirements of respecting reproductive autonomy and what that means in terms of counselling. (shrink)

Traditionally, two main rationales for the provision of prenatal testing and screening are identified: the expansion of women’s reproductive choices and the reduction of the burden of disease on society. With the number of prenatal tests available and the increasing potential for their widespread use, it is necessary to examine whether the reproductive autonomy model remains useful in upholding the autonomy of pregnant women or whether it allows public health considerations and even eugenic aims to be smuggled (...) in under the smokescreen of autonomy. In this article I argue that if we are serious about upholding women’s autonomy in the context of prenatal testing, what is needed is a model based on a more robust conception of reproductive autonomy, such as the one defended by Josephine Johnston and Rachel Zacharias as ‘reproductive autonomy worth having’. While Johnston and Zacharias put forward a basic outline of this conception, I apply it to the specific case of prenatal testing and show how it responds to objections levelled against the reproductive autonomy model. I argue that adopting this kind of conception is necessary to avoid fundamental challenges to women’s autonomy when it comes to prenatal screening and testing. (shrink)

Prenatal screening pathways, as nowadays offered in most Western countries consist of similar tests. First, a risk‐assessment test for major aneuploides is offered to pregnant women. In case of an increased risk, invasive diagnostic tests, entailing a miscarriage risk, are offered. For decades, only conventional karyotyping was used for final diagnosis. Moreover, several foetal ultrasound scans are offered to detect major congenital anomalies, but the same scans also provide relevant information for optimal support of the pregnancy and the delivery.Recent (...) developments in prenatal screening include the application of microarrays that allow for identifying a much broader range of abnomalities than karyotyping, and non‐invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) that enables reducing the number of invasive tests for aneuploidies considerably. In the future, broad NIPT may become possible and affordable.This article will briefly address the ethical issues raised by these technological developments. First, a safe NIPT may lead to routinisation and as such challenge the central issue of informed consent and the aim of prenatal screening: to offer opportunity for autonomous reproductive choice. Widening the scope of prenatal screening also raises the question to what extent ‘reproductive autonomy’ is meant to expand. Finally, if the same test is used for two different aims, namely detection of foetal anomalies and pregnancy‐related problems, non‐directive counselling can no longer be taken as a standard. Our broad outline of the ethical issues is meant as an introduction into the more detailed ethical discussions about prenatal screening in the other articles of this special issue. (shrink)

Noninvasive prenatal testing promises to enhance women's reproductive autonomy by providing genetic information about the fetus, especially in the detection of genetic impairments like Down syndrome. In practice, however, NIPT provides opportunities for intensified manipulation and control over women's reproductive decisions. Applying Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice to prenatal screening, this article analyzes how medical professionals impair reproductive decision-making by perpetuating testimonial injustice. They do so by discrediting positive parental testimony about what it is like to raise (...) a child with DS. We argue that this testimonial injustice constitutes a twofold harm: people with DS and their family members who claim that parenting a child with DS may be a rewarding and joyous experience are harmed when they are systematically silenced, disbelieved, and/or denied epistemic credibility by medical professionals, and pregnant women are harmed since they might make poorly informed choices without access to all relevant information. The broader implication of the analysis is that epistemic justice is a precondition of reproductive autonomy. We conclude by calling for federal oversight of the acquisition and dissemination of information that prospective parents receive following a positive diagnosis of DS to ensure that it is comprehensive and up to date. (shrink)

Prenatal screening for foetal abnormalities such as Down's syndrome differs from other forms of population screening in that the usual aim of achieving health gains through treatment or prevention does not seem to apply. This type of screening leads to no other options but the choice between continuing or terminating the pregnancy and can only be morally justified if its aim is to provide meaningful options for reproductive choice to pregnant women and their partners. However, this aim should not (...) be understood as maximizing reproductive choice per se. Only if understood as allowing prospective parents to avoid suffering related to living with serious disorders and handicaps can prenatal screening be a publicly or collectively funded programme. The alternative of moving prenatal testing outside the healthcare system into the private sector is problematic, as it makes these tests accessible only to those who can afford to pay for it. New developments in prenatal screening will have to be assessed in terms of whether and to what extent they either contribute to or undermine the stated aim of providing meaningful options for reproductive choice. In the light of this criterion, this article discusses the introduction of the new non-invasive prenatal test , the tendency to widen the scope of follow-up testing, as well as the possible future scenarios of genome-wide screening and ‘prenatal personalised medicine’. The article ends with recommendations for further debate, research and analysis. (shrink)

Prenatal screening pathways, as nowadays offered in most Western countries consist of similar tests. First, a risk-assessment test for major aneuploides is offered to pregnant women. In case of an increased risk, invasive diagnostic tests, entailing a miscarriage risk, are offered. For decades, only conventional karyotyping was used for final diagnosis. Moreover, several foetal ultrasound scans are offered to detect major congenital anomalies, but the same scans also provide relevant information for optimal support of the pregnancy and the delivery. (...) Recent developments in prenatal screening include the application of microarrays that allow for identifying a much broader range of abnomalities than karyotyping, and non-invasive prenatal testing that enables reducing the number of invasive tests for aneuploidies considerably. In the future, broad NIPT may become possible and affordable. This article will briefly address the ethical issues raised by these technological developments. First, a safe NIPT may lead to routinisation and as such challenge the central issue of informed consent and the aim of prenatal screening: to offer opportunity for autonomous reproductive choice. Widening the scope of prenatal screening also raises the question to what extent ‘reproductive autonomy’ is meant to expand. Finally, if the same test is used for two different aims, namely detection of foetal anomalies and pregnancy-related problems, non-directive counselling can no longer be taken as a standard. Our broad outline of the ethical issues is meant as an introduction into the more detailed ethical discussions about prenatal screening in the other articles of this special issue. (shrink)

Hilary Bowman-Smart et al. (2023) have rightly pointed out that one of the recurring criticisms of the use of noninvasive prenatal testing (NIPT) for non-medical trait prediction is the probabilist...

In this article, I confront Flanigan’s recent attempt to show, not merely that women have a right to commit prenatal injury, but also that women who act on this right are praiseworthy and should not be criticized for this injury. I show that Flanigan’s arguments do not work, and I establish presumptive grounds against any such right, namely: prenatal injury, by definition, involves intentional or negligent harm and, as such, may be subsumed under a wider class of actions (...) that are presumptively wrong. (shrink)

Prenatal diagnosis utilizes invasive procedures such as amniocentesis, chorionic villus sampling, cord blood sampling and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis. These techniques can diagnose serious foetal illnesses and this therefore provides valuable information to couples, helping them to prepare for the birth of an affected child. It also affords women the freedom to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy. The selective termination of foetuses with serious disabilities does not represent disability discrimination because women and parents are actually rejecting the disability, rather (...) than the foetus itself More significantly, the choice to abort a foetus with a serious illness or disability is an intensely private and personal exercise that does not and cannot be reflective of a wider public morality. Exactly the same can be said of the choice to selectively abort foetuses based solely on their sex. The private choice of women in this respect does not amount to the social devaluation of women. Firstly, it is an erroneous assumption that women in Australia prefer male babies. Secondly, even if there is a preference for male babies, banning prenatal sex selection would be treating just one of many symptoms of sexism, rather than curing the primary causes. The moral right of all women to reproductive freedom is an embodiment of their equal value in society. (shrink)

Inflicting harm is generally preferable to inflicting death. If you must choose between the two, you should generally choose to harm. But prenatal harm seems different. If a mother must choose between harming her fetus or aborting it, she may choose either, at least in many cases. So it seems that prenatal harm is particularly objectionable, sometimes on a par with death. This paper offers an explanation of why prenatal harm seems particularly objectionable by drawing an analogy (...) to the all-or-nothing problem. It then argues that this analogy offers independent support for the ‘voluntarist’ view that at least some parental role obligations are grounded in the choice to be a parent. (shrink)

The scope of noninvasive prenatal testing (NIPT) could expand in the future to include detailed analysis of the fetal genome. This will allow for the testing for virtually any trait with a genetic contribution, including “non-medical” traits. Here we discuss the potential use of NIPT for these traits. We outline a scenario which highlights possible inconsistencies with ethical decision-making. We then discuss the case against permitting these uses. The objections include practical problems; increasing inequities; increasing the burden of choice; (...) negative impacts on the child, family, and society; and issues with implementation. We then outline the case for permitting the use of NIPT for these traits. These include arguments for reproductive liberty and autonomy; questioning the labeling of traits as “non-medical”; and the principle of procreative beneficence. This summary of the case for and against can serve as a basis for the development of a consistent and coherent ethical framework. (shrink)

The scope of noninvasive prenatal testing (NIPT) could expand in the future to include detailed analysis of the fetal genome. This will allow for the testing for virtually any trait with a genetic contribution, including “non-medical” traits. Here we discuss the potential use of NIPT for these traits. We outline a scenario which highlights possible inconsistencies with ethical decision-making. We then discuss the case against permitting these uses. The objections include practical problems; increasing inequities; increasing the burden of choice; (...) negative impacts on the child, family, and society; and issues with implementation. We then outline the case for permitting the use of NIPT for these traits. These include arguments for reproductive liberty and autonomy; questioning the labeling of traits as “non-medical”; and the principle of procreative beneficence. This summary of the case for and against can serve as a basis for the development of a consistent and coherent ethical framework. (shrink)

In contrast to most Western countries, routine offer of prenatal screening is considered problematic in the Netherlands. The main argument against offering it to every pregnant woman is that women would be brought into a moral dilemma when deciding whether to use screening or not. This paper explores whether the active offer of a prenatal screening test indeed confronts women with a moral dilemma. A qualitative study was developed, based on a randomised controlled trial that aimed to assess (...) the decision-making process of women when confronted with a test offer. A sample of 59 women was interviewed about the different factors balanced in decision-making. Participants felt themselves caught between a need for knowledge and their unwillingness to take on responsibility. Conflict was reported between wishes, preferences and ethical views regarding parenthood; however, women did not seem to be caught in a choice between two or more ethical principles. Participants balanced the interests of the family against that of the fetus in line with their values and their personal circumstances. Therefore, we conclude that they are not so much faced with an ethical dilemma as conflicting interests. We propose that caregivers should provide the opportunity for the woman to discuss her wishes and doubts to facilitate her decision. This approach would help women to assess the meaning of testing within their parental duties towards their unborn child and their current offspring. (shrink)

Seemingly ever improving medical technology and techniques portend the possibility of prenatally enhancing otherwise healthy, normal children—seamlessly enhancing or adding to a child’s natural abilities and characteristics. Though parents normally engage in enhancing children, i.e., child rearing, these technologies present radically new possibilities. This sort of enhancement, I argue, is morally problematic for the parent: the expectations of the enhancing parent necessarily conflict with attitudes of acceptance that moral parenting requires. Attitudes of acceptance necessitate that parents are open to the (...) essentially-individual choices of the child that will determine the kind of person he or she becomes. However, the intentional act of enhancing contradicts this openness by setting expectations on who the child becomes. Because of this, there is strong moral weight against parents’ prenatally enhancing their children. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Research groups around the world are developing non‐invasive methods of prenatal genetic diagnosis, in which foetal cells are obtained by maternal blood test. Meanwhile, an increasing number of genetic tests are sold directly to the public. I extrapolate from these developments to consider a scenario in which PNGD self‐testing kits are sold directly to the public. Given the opposition to over‐the‐counter genetic tests and the continuing controversy surrounding PNGD, it is reasonable to expect objections to PNGD self‐testing kits. (...) I focus on one potential objection, that PNGD self‐testing kits would undermine the autonomy of potential test subjects. More specifically, that ‘direct to the public’ PNGD would fail to ensure that consumers exercise autonomy in the following PNGD‐related choices: • Should I use PNGD? • Based on the results of the PNGD test, should I continue or terminate my pregnancy? Under the current system, PNGD is provided by health care practitioners, who are required to counsel women both before and after the test. In contrast, ‘direct to the public’ PNGD would allow women to make their PNGD‐related decisions outside the context of the health care system. I compare these two decision‐making contexts, arguing that the health care system is not unequivocally better at promoting the autonomy of potential test subjects. Therefore the promotion of autonomy does not constitute a strong argument against such test kits. Other objections may be more persuasive, so I do not offer an overall assessment of the acceptability of ‘direct to the public’ PNGD. (shrink)

In current practice, decisions regarding whether or not to resuscitate infants born at the limits of viability are generally made with expectant parents during a prenatal consultation with a neonatologist. This article reviews the current practice of prenatal consultation and describes three areas in which current practice is ethically problematic: (1) risks to competence, (2) risks to information, and (3) risks to trust. It then reviews solutions that have been suggested in the literature, and the drawbacks to each. (...) Finally, it suggests that the model of prenatal consultation be altered in three ways: (1) that the prenatal consultation be viewed as a process over time, rather than a onetime event; (2) that decision making in the prenatal consultation be framed as a choice between nonresuscitation and a trial of neonatal intensive care, rather than a choice between “doing nothing” and “doing everything”; and (3) that the prenatal consultation process devote serious attention to both the transfer of information and the non-informational needs of families, rather than focus on the transfer of information alone. (shrink)

Since the 1970s, prenatal testing has been integrated into many health care systems on the basis of two competing and largely irreconcilable rationales. The reproductive autonomy rationale focuses on nondirective counseling and consent as ways to ensure that women's decisions about testing and subsequent care are informed and free of undue pressures. It also represents an easily understandable and ethically convincing basis for widespread access to prenatal testing, since the value of autonomy is well established in Western bioethics (...) and widely recognized by funders of health care. In contrast, the public health rationale approaches prenatal testing as designed to reduce the incidence of certain conditions in the population to reduce the burden of disease. This rationale emphasizes the societal consequences of reproduction and the aggregate impact of women's individual reproductive decisions on the overall health of future populations. In this essay, I argue that, despite what could be seen as a persistent failure to meet the ideals of reproductive autonomy, resisting the public health rationale as a basis for prenatal screening is ethically and pragmatically crucial. I recommend policy mechanisms that can enhance reproductive autonomy at a societal level to support choice at the individual level. (shrink)

Informed consent is a key condition for prenatal screening programmes to reach their aim of promoting reproductive autonomy. Reaching this aim is currently being challenged with the introduction of non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) in first-trimester prenatal screening programmes: amongst others its procedural ease—it only requires a blood draw and reaches high levels of reliability—might hinder women’s understanding that they should make a personal, informed decision about screening. We offer arguments for a renewed recognition and use of informed (...) consent compared to informed choice, and for a focus on value-consistent choices and personalized informational preferences. We argue for a three-step counselling model in which three decision moments are distinguished and differently addressed: (1) professionals explore women’s values concerning whether and why they wish to know whether their baby has a genetic disorder; (2) women receive layered medical-technical information and are asked to make a decision about screening; (3) during post-test counselling, women are supported in decision-making about the continuation or termination of their pregnancy. This model might also be applicable in other fields of genetic (pre-test) counselling, where techniques for expanding genome analysis and burdensome test-outcomes challenge counselling of patients. (shrink)

Informed consent is a key condition for prenatal screening programmes to reach their aim of promoting reproductive autonomy. Reaching this aim is currently being challenged with the introduction of non‐invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) in first‐trimester prenatal screening programmes: amongst others its procedural ease—it only requires a blood draw and reaches high levels of reliability—might hinder women’s understanding that they should make a personal, informed decision about screening. We offer arguments for a renewed recognition and use of informed (...) consent compared to informed choice, and for a focus on value‐consistent choices and personalized informational preferences. We argue for a three‐step counselling model in which three decision moments are distinguished and differently addressed: (1) professionals explore women’s values concerning whether and why they wish to know whether their baby has a genetic disorder; (2) women receive layered medical‐technical information and are asked to make a decision about screening; (3) during post‐test counselling, women are supported in decision‐making about the continuation or termination of their pregnancy. This model might also be applicable in other fields of genetic (pre‐test) counselling, where techniques for expanding genome analysis and burdensome test‐outcomes challenge counselling of patients. (shrink)

It may be most convenient to respond to Dr Andreae’s points in turn. Unless the claim that a child should determine its own genetic characteristics before it is conceived or born is intended to be flippant, it is logically incoherent. Conception is a decision that only a prospective parent can make. The editorial argument is that denial of choice of sex contributes to preventable maternal mortality and morbidity, particularly in developing countries. ….

Empirical evidence suggests that some health professionals believe consent procedures for the emerging technology of non-invasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD) should become less rigorous than those currently used for invasive prenatal testing. In this paper, we consider the importance of informed consent and informed choice procedures for protecting autonomy in those prenatal tests which will give rise to a definitive result. We consider whether there is anything special about NIPD that could sanction a change to consent procedures for (...) prenatal diagnosis or otherwise render informed decision-making less important. We accept the claim that the absence of risk of miscarriage to some extent lessens the gravity of the decision to test compared with invasive methods of testing. However, we also claim that the definitive nature of the information received, and the fact that the information can lead to decisions of great significance, makes NIPD an important choice. This choice should only be made by means of a rigorous and appropriately supported decision-making process (assuming that this is what the pregnant woman wants). We conclude that, on balance, consent procedures for NIPD should mirror those for invasive testing, albeit without the need to emphasise procedure-related risk. (shrink)

The development and implementation of prenataldiagnosis has changed the experience of pregnancy for many women. How women make decisions about prenatal diagnosis PD is an important question that challenges us both individually and as a community. The questionof care is central to many women's decision-making process. How much care a child will require, how much care a woman feels confident to provide, and the level of care available for children with genetic conditionsand families from their communities all impact on (...) women's decisions to undertake prenatal diagnosis as well as how to use the information available from testing. Interviews with women making these decisions explored, among otherthings, the role that caring and access to care played in women's ethical deliberations. Before PD can widen women's reproductive choices and counter criticisms that its use is eugenically oriented, the central role that provision of, and access to, care holds for participants in PD programmes must be acknowledged and addressed. (shrink)

This article presents a set of moral arguments regarding the selective abortion of fetuses on the basis of prenatal screening for late onset genetic diseases only, and for Huntington's Disease* in particular. After discussion of human suffering, human perfection and the distinctive features of the lives of people confronting late onset genetic disease, the author concludes that selective abortion is difficult to justify ethically, although it must remain a matter of personal choice.

The application of genetic technologies in China, especially in the area of prenatal genetic testing, is rapidly increasing in China. In the wealthy regions of China, prenatal genetic testing is already very widely adopted. We argue that the government should actively promote prenatal genetic testing to the poor areas of the country. In fact, the government should prioritize resources first to make prenatal genetic testing a standard routine care with an opt-out model in these area. Healthcare (...) professions would be required to inform pregnant women about the availability of genetic testing and provide free testing on a routine basis unless the parents choose not to do so. We argue that this proposal will allow parents to make a more informed decision about their reproductive choices. Secondarily, this proposal will attract more healthcare professionals and other healthcare resources to improve the healthcare infrastructures in the less-developed regions of the country. This will help to reduce the inequity of accessing healthcare services between in different regions of China. We further argue that this policy proposal is not practicing eugenics. (shrink)

International guidelines recommend that prenatal screening for fetal abnormalities should only be offered within a non-directive framework aimed at enabling women in making meaningful reproductive choices. Whilst this position is widely endorsed, developments in cell-free fetal DNA based Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing are now raising questions about its continued suitability for guiding screening policy and practice. This issue is most apparent within debates on the scope of the screening offer. Implied by the aim of enabling meaningful reproductive (...) class='Hi'>choices is the idea that screening services should support women in accessing prenatal tests that best enable them to realize the types of reproductive choice that they find important. However, beyond whatever options meet the quality standards required for facilitating an informed decision, the remaining criteria of facilitating autonomous choice is strictly non-directive. As a result, policy makers receive little indication prior to consultation with each individual woman, about what conditions should be prioritized during the offer of screening. In this paper we try to address this issue by using the capabilities approach to further specify the non-directive aim of enabling meaningful reproductive choice. The resulting framework is then used to assess the relative importance of offering prenatal screening where concerning different types of genetic condition. We conclude that greater priority may be ascribed to offering prenatal screening for conditions that more significantly diminish a woman’s central capabilities. It follows that serious congenital and earlier-onset conditions are more likely to fulfill these criteria. (shrink)

BackgroundThe introduction and wide application of non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) has triggered further evolution of routines in the practice of prenatal diagnosis. ‘Routinization’ of prenatal diagnosis however has been associated with hampered informed choice and eugenic attitudes or outcomes. It is viewed, at least in some countries, with great suspicion in both bioethics and public discourse. However, it is a heterogeneous phenomenon that needs to be scrutinized in the wider context of social practices of reproductive genetics. In (...) different countries with their different regulatory frameworks, different patterns of routines emerge that have different ethical implications.This paper discusses an ethics of routines informed by the perspectives of organizational sociology and psychology, where a routine is defined as a repetitive, recognizable pattern of interdependent organizational actions that is carried out by multiple performers. We favour a process approach that debunks the view – which gives way to most of the concerns – that routines are always blindly performed. If this is so, routines are therefore not necessarily incompatible with responsible decision-making. Free and informed decision-making can, as we argue, be a key criterion for the ethical evaluation of testing routines. If free and informed decision-making by each pregnant woman is the objective, routines in prenatal testing may not be ethically problematic, but rather are defensible and helpful. We compare recent experiences of NIPT routines in the context of prenatal screening programmes in Germany, Israel and the Netherlands. Notable variation can be observed between these three countries (i) in the levels of routinization around NIPT, (ii) in the scope of routinization, and (iii) in public attitudes toward routinized prenatal testing.ConclusionAn ethics of routines in the field of prenatal diagnostics should incorporate and work with the necessary distinctions between levels and forms of routines, in order to develop sound criteria for their evaluation. (shrink)

International guidelines recommend that prenatal screening for fetal abnormalities should only be offered within a non-directive framework aimed at enabling women in making meaningful reproductive choices. Whilst this position is widely endorsed, developments in cell-free fetal DNA based Non-Invasive Prenatal Testing are now raising questions about its continued suitability for guiding screening policy and practice. This issue is most apparent within debates on the scope of the screening offer. Implied by the aim of enabling meaningful reproductive (...) class='Hi'>choices is the idea that screening services should support women in accessing prenatal tests that best enable them to realize the types of reproductive choice that they find important. However, beyond whatever options meet the quality standards required for facilitating an informed decision, the remaining criteria of facilitating autonomous choice is strictly non-directive. As a result, policy makers receive little indication prior to consultation with each individual woman, about what conditions should be prioritized during the offer of screening. In this paper we try to address this issue by using the capabilities approach to further specify the non-directive aim of enabling meaningful reproductive choice. The resulting framework is then used to assess the relative importance of offering prenatal screening where concerning different types of genetic condition. We conclude that greater priority may be ascribed to offering prenatal screening for conditions that more significantly diminish a woman’s central capabilities. It follows that serious congenital and earlier-onset conditions are more likely to fulfill these criteria. (shrink)

A statewide program in California to detect neural tube and other birth defects may revive enthusiasm for mass prenatal screening. Participation in the program is voluntary, but all expectant mothers are asked to sign a statement of “informed consent/refusal.” So far California's program seems to be working well, but questions for the future include the level of participation, the possibility that normal fetuses will be aborted, the kinds of information given to women, and the elusive nature of free choice.

The introduction of non-invasive prenatal testing in healthcare systems around the world offers an opportunity to reconsider funding policies for prenatal screening. In some countries with universal access healthcare systems, pregnant women and their partners are asked to pay for NIPT. In this paper, we discuss two important rationales for charging women for NIPT: to prevent increased uptake of NIPT and to promote informed choice. First, given the aim of prenatal screening, high or low uptake rates are (...) not intrinsically desirable or undesirable. Using funding policies to negatively affect uptake, however, is at odds with the aim of screening. Furthermore, copayment disproportionally affects those of lower socioeconomic status, which conflicts with justice requirements and impedes equal access to prenatal screening. Second, we argue that although payment models may influence pregnant women’s choice behaviours and perceptions of the relevance of NIPT, the copayment requirement does not necessarily lead to better-informed choices. On the contrary, external influences on women’s personal choices for or against prenatal screening should ideally be avoided. To improve informed decision-making, healthcare systems should instead invest in adequate non-directive, value-focused pretest counselling. This paper concludes that requiring copayments for NIPT in universal access healthcare systems fails to promote reproductive autonomy and is unfair. (shrink)

Noninvasive prenatal screening using cell-free DNA, which analyzes placental DNA circulating in maternal blood to provide information about fetal chromosomal disorders early in pregnancy and without risk to the fetus, has been hailed as a potential “paradigm shift” in prenatal genetic screening. Commercial provision of cell-free DNA screening has contributed to a rapid expansion of the tests included in the screening panels. The tests can include screening for sex chromosome anomalies, rare subchromosomal microdeletions and aneuploidies, and most recently, (...) the entire fetal genome. The benefits of this screening tool are generally framed, by both providers and commercial laboratories, as enhancing reproductive autonomy and choice by providing an earlier, simpler, and more accurate screening while potentially reducing the need for invasive follow-up testing. The majority of the literature has explored these issues empirically or conceptually from a European or North American vantage point, one that assumes normative priorities such as individual reproductive autonomy and the clinical availability of maternal health care or prenatal screening programs within which cell-free DNA screening is offered. While its implementation has raised both challenges and opportunities, very little is known about real-world experiences and the implications of the rapid introduction of cell-free DNA screening outside of North America and Europe, especially in low- and middle-income countries. To begin addressing this gap in knowledge, we organized a four-day international workshop to explore the ethical, legal, social, economic, clinical, and practical implications of the global expansion of cell-free DNA screening. We describe eight key insights that arose from the workshop. (shrink)

To what extent should parents be able to choose the kind of child they have? The unfortunate phrase 'designer baby' has become familiar in debates surrounding reproduction. As a reference to current possibilities the term is misleading, but the phrase may indicate a societal concern of some kind about control and choice in the course of reproduction. Typically, people can choose whether to have a child. They may also have an interest in choosing, to some extent, the conditions under which (...) they do so, such as whether they have a child with a serious disability or disease. The purpose of this book is to explore the difficult and controversial question of the appropriate ethical and legal extent of reproductive autonomy in this context. The book examines ethical, legal and public policy issues in prenatal screening, prenatal diagnosis (PND), selective abortion and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). It explores the ethics of these selection practices and the ability of current ethical guidelines and legal mechanisms, including the law on selective abortion and wrongful birth, to deal with advances in genetic and other knowledge in these areas. Unlike in the United States, in England the relevant law is not inherently rights-based, but the impact of the Human Rights Act 1998 inevitably raises questions about the proper scope of reproductive autonomy in this context. The implications of the analysis are considered for the development of relevant law, public policy and ethical guidelines and will be of interest to academics in medical law and ethics, health professionals, lawyers, those working on public policy and students with an interest in these issues. (shrink)