In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Between Deleuze and DerridaMary Beth MaderPaul Patton and John Protevi, editors. Between Deleuze and Derrida. New York: Continuum, 2003. Pp. ix + 207. Cloth, $105.00. Paper, $29.95.One of the many provisions of Gilles Deleuze's prodigious philosophical invention, Difference and Repetition, is an ontological account of how invention is actual. That book itself is an instance of that of which it offers an account. An element of this account (...) is the notion of an intensive system. The intensive system is proposed as a way in which novelty and movement come about. It requires as its basic constituents two heterogeneous organized series which are put into communication through their differences, producing a resonance internal to the system which then yields a novel forced movement. Several of the essays in Between Deleuze and Derrida so put the work of Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida into communication as to themselves amount to intensive systems: movement and novelty emerge in our grasp of the separate oeuvres of the two philosophers.Essays by Daniel W. Smith and Leonard Lawlor tackle in detail the task of comparative explication. Since Deleuze and Derrida treat many of the same philosophical topics, often employing identical terms, these clear cases for their divergences and similarities are especially useful. Smith's historical situation of Deleuze and Derrida relative to the thought of Duns Scotus, Spinoza, Kant and Nietzsche is exemplary. Dense with connections, Lawlor's decisive expositions pursue the implications of his interpretative distinctions rigorously to their ends, tracing the divergent constructions of the two thinkers to a common source in the notion of a simulacrum. Smith and Lawlor themselves part company, however, over the issue of whether Derrida and Deleuze are best characterized as philosophers of immanence or transcendence. Paul Patton crafts a sophisticated cross-reading of their shared vision of philosophy as a "utopian vocation," without homogenizing the differing voices they hear in this call or its unshared ontology.Branka Arsiæ's imaginative contribution on the topic of passive events and Melville's Bartleby is enlightening even without mention of Deleuze's notion of static ordinal genesis. The essays of John Protevi and Tamsin Lorraine are also rich in philosophical imagination. Protevi's extension of Derrida's aporias of the gift and friendship to an "aporia of love" illuminates Derrida's own evolution while refusing a version of undecidability that remains in static indecision. His discussion of Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the girl, with its isotropic implications for sexuality per se, is one of the best in print. Lorraine displays the novelty of Deleuze and Derrida's post-Heideggerian thought on the temporality of sense and the limits of representation in readings of Alice in Wonderland and Hamlet that clarify by example some of the more forbiddingly elaborate proposals in the philosophy of time that these thinkers offer.Arkady Plotnitsky's chapter addresses the crucial questions of Deleuze's and Derrida's relations to various sub-fields of mathematics and happily considers Derrida, with his deployment of a notion of undecidability, as a legatee of Gödel. It is confusing, however, that this stimulating essay treats Deleuze's and Derrida's invocations of algebra, geometry and topology by means of the "tropes" of "algebra, geometry and topology." This is especially puzzling in the case of Deleuze, whose use of mathematics in Difference and Repetition is avowedly not metaphorical. Further, although algebra is said to be the prime instrument of Plotnitsky's analysis, it turns out that "the general quasi-algebraic inscriptive structure or operation" (111; my italics) is most fundamental to that analysis. For this reason, it would be preferable to locate in both Deleuze and Derrida a post-structuralist concern with structure itself, making "algebra" another in the Derridean syntagmatic chain of names for a descendent of "structure."The book does contain some disappointing stretches. Eric Alliez's chapter does not read well despite its reliable translation. Alphonso Lingis's ruminations of a blithely bewildered Western roamer ("you" and then "me") on his "detour into exoticism" thanks to the "willing" concupiscence of an Asian female bed-mate ("she" and never "you" or "me") make one regret the era of easy... (shrink)

1. Parmenides bis Hegel -- 2. Das 19. und 20. Jahrhundert.

Marx’s polemic against Proudhon represents a crucial stage in the development of his dialectical method and his conception of history and progress. The critique of Proudhon demonstrates Marx’s hostility towards the very teleological account of social change of which he has himself been accused. In order to redress this imbalance, the break with Proudhon is presented here as a result of Marx’s rejection of the speculative Hegelian dialectic. This rejection is an exercise in self-criticism that is highly relevant to our (...) understanding of Marxian theory in general. (shrink)

Wenn die Rede auf den Fortschritt kommt, geht es um die Verbesserung der menschlichen Lebensverhältnisse. Doch die Erfahrungen modernen Gesellschaften mit Tyrannei, Kriegen, Wirtschaftskrisen und Umweltzerstörung haben das Vertrauen in die Überwindung natürlicher Abhängigkeiten und sozialer Über erschüttert. Viele sehen heute im Fortschritt eine bloße Illusion oder einen Mythos. Es scheint mir angesichts der allgegenwärtigen scharfen Kritik an der Fortschrittsidee im zeitgenössischen Denken angebracht, von einer Psychologie des Fortschritts zu sprechen. Damit meine ich nicht das Fühlen und Verhalten, das Fortschritt (...) bedingt oder umgekehrt durch ihn hervorgerufen wird; ich meine die Psychologisierung des Fortschritts: die Annahme, er sei eine reine Kopfsache, etwas Ausgedachtes oder Erhofftes, das sich durch seine Projektion auf historische oder soziale Prozesse zu einer gefahrvollen Erzählung verfestigt. "Psychologisierung des Fortschritts" ist also meine Chiffre für die projektivistische Fortschrittskritik, die ich hier ihrerseits kritisiere und der ich ein kulturalistisches Menschenbild entgegensetze. (shrink)

The modern idea of progress assumes that time will bring a steady improvement in all things human. This idea was always a contested one. However, since the mid-20th century at the latest philosophical thought about progress has been almost exclusively critical. The present paper introduces the standard arguments of progress’s detractors, particularly the notion that progress should be understood dialectically as the transformation of good intentions into their opposite. It attempts to sketch a more timely conception of progress in opposition (...) to this line of thought. (shrink)

In the Transcendental Aesthetic (TA), Kant is typically held to make negative assertations about “things in themselves,” namely that they are not spatial or temporal. These negative assertions stand behind the “neglected alternative” problem for Kant’s transcendental idealism. According to this problem, Kant may be entitled to assert that spatio-temporality is a subjective element of our cognition, but he cannot rule out that it may also be a feature of the objective world. In this paper, I show in a new (...) way how Kant’s view (focusing on his conclusions about space) is not subject to this objection, by showing that he does not make the denial about mind-independent reality that he is typically held to make. The argument develops consequences of a new reading of Kant’s expression “an sich selbst” (‘in itself’; ‘in themselves’). I argue that “an sich selbst” or “per se” has a special, judgment-level role, so that this expression does not form new noun-terms adjectivally. It follows that the conceptual unit of Kant’s “Conclusions” in the TA is simply “things” (Dinge), since “things in themselves” is not a nominal expression; Kant adopts the Wolffian ontological use of “thing” as the basic kind-term for any existent. The arguments that things per se are not in space are arguments that space cannot be a necessary property or relations of things as a kind. I show that this does not involve the positive claim about mind-independent reality that inspires the neglected alternative objection. (shrink)

Die hier versammelten Beiträge analysieren Typen und Funktionen der Ambiguität an Beispielen aus der mittelalterlichen bis zur zeitgenössischen Kunst.

While the idea of philosophy as conceptual analysis has attracted many adherents and undergone a number of variations, in general it suffers from an authority problem with two dimensions. First, it is unclear why the analysis of a concept should have objective authority: why explicating what we mean should express how things are. Second, conceptual analysis seems to lack intersubjective authority: why philosophical analysis should apply to more than a parochial group of individuals. I argue that Hegel’s conception of social (...) ontology, focused on his concept of “ethical life” (Sittlichkeit), helps to explain how concepts (and their explication) have both objective and intersubjective authority in the social domain. Hegel claims that modern institutions are the product of self-conscious purposes, so that they are conceptually constituted. Concepts do not just represent these objects and so depend on a contingent relation to them. As many contemporary social ontologists agree, this means that our concepts of these institutions are uniquely epistemically “transparent.” They have objective authority. Concepts have intersubjective authority in the modern world as well, according to Hegel. However, I show that this feature of Hegel’s account does not rely on the solution to a philosophical problem. Rather, since the concepts of modern ethical life are “essentially contested,” their content depends on the practical and political agreement of modern subjects. This means that concepts can only have objective authority if some prior intersubjective agreement has been reached. The role of philosophy as conceptual analysis is thus importantly dependent on political developments. (shrink)

This masterful work on Kant's Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason explores Kant's treatment of the Idea of God, his views concerning evil, and the moral grounds for faith in God. Kant and Religion works to deepen our understanding of religion's place and meaning within the history of human culture, touching on Kant's philosophical stance regarding theoretical, moral, political, and religious matters. Wood's breadth of knowledge of Kant's corpus, philosophical sharpness, and depth of reflection sheds light not only on (...) Kant, but also on the fate of religion and its relation to philosophy in the modern world. (shrink)

De Interpretatione is among Aristotle's most influential and widely read writings; C. W. A. Whitaker presents the first systematic study of this work, and offers a radical new view of its aims, its structure, and its place in Aristotle's system. He shows that De Interpretatione is not a disjointed essay on ill-connected subjects, as traditionally thought, but a highly organized and systematic treatise on logic, argument, and dialectic.

The physical sciences include highly developed fields that investigate intensities in the form of intensive quantities like speeds, temperatures, pressures and altitudes. Some contemporary readers of Deleuze interested in the physical sciences at times attribute to Deleuze a common, contemporary scientific concept of intensive magnitude. These readings identify Deleuze's philosophical conception of intensity with an existing scientific conception of intensity. The essay argues that Deleuze does not in fact lift a conception of intensity from the physical sciences to embed it (...) as the fundamental term in his differential ontology. (shrink)

Demonstrates the dramatic interplay of elements that comprise the concepts of norm, bisexuality, and development.

Asperó and Schindler have completely solved the Axiom [Formula: see text] vs. [Formula: see text] problem. They have proved that if [Formula: see text] holds then Axiom [Formula: see text] holds, with no additional assumptions. The key question now concerns the relationship between [Formula: see text] and Axiom [Formula: see text]. This is because the foundational issues raised by the problem of Axiom [Formula: see text] vs. [Formula: see text] arguably persist in the problem of Axiom [Formula: see text] vs. (...) [Formula: see text]. The first of our two main theorems is that Axiom [Formula: see text] is equivalent to Axiom [Formula: see text], and as a corollary we show that Axiom [Formula: see text] fails in all the known models of [Formula: see text]. This suggests that [Formula: see text] actually refutes Axiom [Formula: see text]. Our second main theorem is that the [Formula: see text] Conjecture holds assuming [Formula: see text]. This is the strongest partial result known on this conjecture which is one of the central open problems of [Formula: see text]-theory and [Formula: see text]-logic. These results identify a fundamental asymmetry between the Continuum Hypothesis and any axiom which is both [Formula: see text]-expressible and which implies [Formula: see text], on the basis of generic absoluteness for the simplest of the nontrivial sentences of Third-Order Number Theory. These are the [Formula: see text]-sentences with no parameters. Such sentences are those which simply assert the existence of a set [Formula: see text] for which some property involving only quantification over [Formula: see text] holds. (shrink)

When Carl Friedrich Gethmann announced Poiesis & Praxis in 2001—“A new journal is launched”— this notification came along with high expectations of the addressees with respect to meaning and quality of the content of the newborn journal. The initiative for an “International Journal of Ethics of Science and Technology Assessment” followed the supposed demand for a periodic forum for the rational reflection of the consequences of scientific and technological advance for the individual and social life of the human and its (...) environment—also beyond national perspectives. In the meantime, this broad spectrum was indeed covered with mostly professional articles, which reflected upon the quite different methods of technology assessment and scientific policy advice.Eleven years, nine volumes, and 36 issues later, the world has changed and with it the journal as well: It came up with new topics and challenges of the scientific-technological civilization but also with new perception modes and read. (shrink)

Nietzsche and Foucault have given us the idea of conducting a philosophical genealogy of a practice that varies across history. Foucault's work also implies that we can view some abstraction as a practice. These points jointly imply that we can conduct a genealogy of “abstractive practices.” Indeed, a good deal of Foucault's work can be understood as exactly this sort of investigation. But a genealogy of abstractive practice raises a difficult methodological problem. This is the problem of how to determine (...) which definitions of abstraction to use, from amongst the various theoretical accounts of abstraction that we find in the history of thought, to craft our genealogy of abstractive practices. In other words, what will count as an abstractive practice for the purpose of conducting such a genealogy will depend on what we identify as abstraction. This article seeks to expose this problem to demonstrate the methodological difficulties that must be confronted in order to steer a path between ignoring the historical-epistemological limits to the kinds of abstraction we can employ at any given present, on the one hand, and having our sensitivity to these limits halt our historical-philosophical reflections on abstraction as a historical practice, on the other. (shrink)

The late Jacob Klein’s important book is, remarkably, a lucid presentation of esoteric argument. Dealing with the famed Platonic triad, Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman, Klein settles the dispute about the missing dialogue, "The Philosopher," by first denying that it is missing and second showing that it is unnecessary. He argues, in short, that the triad is a dyad. That argument is reinforced by the distinction Klein strongly implies between the Socratic Theaetetus and the Eleatic Sophist and Statesman. "We can now (...) understand why the conversations of the ‘trilogy’ occur in two, not three, days and why the Sophist, the Statesman, and the Philosopher are dealt with in two, not three, dialogues". (shrink)

Inleidend studieboek op universitair niveau over de Nederlandse rechtswetenschap.

Human beings experience themselves through various kinds of collectively experienced time. Medicine that relies upon precarious forms of ancestral or evolutionary explanation generates such collectively experienced forms of time, which are thus essentially politico-medically instituted versions of kin relations. Kin relations structure our ethical relations to each other rather thoroughly, even in Western modernity, especially through legally sanctioned relations. Hence, an ancestral or evolutionary explanation in medicine should be examined for its ethical import via its structuring of etiologically linked kin (...) relations, even if those relations extend beyond the family, people, population or group context back into cosmic and evolutionary origins. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Simone de Beauvoir Luce Irigaray Colette Guillaumin Hélène Cixous Julia Kristeva Monique Wittig Sarah Kofman Michèle Le Doeuff Christine Delphy Conclusion.

The paper treats several ontological questions about certain nineteenth-century and contemporary medical and scientific conceptualizations of hereditary relation. In particular, it considers the account of mid-nineteenth century psychiatric thought given by Foucault in Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1973–1974 and Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974–1975 . There, Foucault argues that a fantastical conceptual prop, the ‘metabody,’ as he terms it, was implicitly supposed by that period’s psychiatric medicine as a putative ground for psychiatric pathology. (...) After presenting the heart of Foucault’s thought on the ‘metabody,’ the paper investigates the possibility that a contemporary version of a ‘metabody’ may operate today as a conceptual analog of the nineteenth-century psychiatric theory and practice that Foucault began to expose in the texts examined here. It speculates that we might identify a contemporary genetic version of a ‘metabody’ in a particular current conception of the gene as replicator, an item marked by an ambiguous temporal ontology. (shrink)

A distinctive feature ofAeneid8 is the constant interplay and fluctuation of registers, with high epic and thegenus grandealternating with the lighter strains or learned allusions associated with thegenus tenue. As one commentator has remarked, ‘Man darf das Buch allein schon wegen seines Reichtums an Aitien als das ‘kallimacheischste’ derAeneisbezeichnen.’ Beyond the emphasis on aetiology—the Cacus myth in particular is presented asaitionfor the consecration of the Ara Maxima—the Callimachean complexion comes out also in several smaller not-so-serious or learned touches, typically at (...) unlikely moments to infuse an element of humour in an otherwise intensely dramatic narrative. The Hercules–Cacus episode conflates high drama and low comedy as the cattle rustler's slightly ridiculous stratagem becomes a gigantic clash resonating with the primal gigantomachy. Among the rudimentary weapons of mass destruction unleashed by Hercules upon Cacus, the hapaxmolaris echoes its Homeric equivalent μύλαξ, itself a hapax, with the recherché term then reappearing at Ovid,Metamorphoses3.59: missiles and diction are equally outlandish. When Hercules in a reprise of the celebrated Empedoclean leap plungesper ignemin pursuit of Cacus, an evocation of the Sicilian philosopher's fiery exit adds a touch of comedy at the heated moment. And from this inferno Virgil moves to Olympus, lowering the tone but raising the temperature as Venus in a domestic comedy seduces the uxorious Vulcan into preparing new armour for Aeneas: now she kindles flames of a different sort in the fire-god in a scene marked by witty double entendre that provides a playful contrast with the unfolding drama at Pallanteum. At moments like these, a lighter strain is audible through the epic thunder,Vergilius ludensis hard at work. (shrink)

Research shows that trained mentors achieve better results than untrained ones. Their training should particularly address their expectations for their future mentoring. Our study involved 190 preservice teachers, potential mentors of ongoing school mentoring for primary and secondary school students of all grades. They were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2-x-2 between-subjects design of mentoring type (traditional mentoring versus e-mentoring) and mentoring context (non-pandemic versus COVID-19 pandemic). Participants assessed mentoring conducted under these four conditions in terms (...) of its appropriateness for achieving four mentoring program targets: learning, key skills, social targets, and problem coping. Participants were also asked to assess the resources available to achieve each program target. Overall, the potential mentors considered the various conditions to be suitable for achieving the four program targets. They were particularly favorable in their assessment of the possibility for the realization of learning targets. Likewise, they assumed that sufficient resources were available to achieve the targets. However, a repeated-measures MANOVA showed that the potential mentors considered more ambitious targets to be possible in traditional mentoring than in e-mentoring and normal (i.e., pre-pandemic) contextual conditions than during the COVID-19 pandemic. In contrast, they estimated the resources available to achieve the targets to be about the same in the four conditions. This indicates a decoupling of mentoring targets from the consideration of the resources needed to achieve them. This assumption was confirmed in correlation analyses and has implications for mentor training. (shrink)