Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 63 Heft: 3 Seiten: 476-496.

Essais sur l'architecture par l'architecte Eisenman.

Au terme d’un parcours éprouvant ponctué par des humiliations et un viol, Mouchette se suicide. Sa vie se clôture en parfaite tonalité avec l’univers dans laquelle elle a vécu. Étant donné cet acte rédhibitoire qui catalyse son existence – une vie marquée par la misère, le mensonge, l’alcoolisme, l’absence de tendresse – nous pourrions douter du salut de l’héroïne. En effet tous ces signes laissent penser que Mouchette est damnée tant nous la voyons se débattre dans cet univers (...) clos, d’une étonnante noirceur, et dans lequel les vertus théologales et de l’esprit des Béatitudes n’arrivent pas à s’imposer. Satan serait le prince de ce monde. Malgré cela, nous démontrerons que la grâce surgit au terme de cette vie, et que Mouchette, enfant humiliée, avant de se suicider a vécu dans son dernier geste, d’une tonalité baptismale, l’expérience de l’agonie qui la configure au Christ. (shrink)

Deux appréciations différentes peuvent être portées quant à l'in­fluence de la cosmologie moderne sur l'héliolâtrie tradition­nelle. Selon la première, la cosmologie moderne a valorisé le Soleil en lui accordant une position cosmologique conforme à son incontestable importance physique, astronomique et sym­bolique. Selon la seconde au contraire, en conduisant au dé­senchantement du monde, elle a mis fin à l'héliolâtrie an­tique. Ces appréciations, apparemment con­tra­dic­toires, contiennent chacune une part de vérité, dans la mesure où la cosmologie moderne se décompose en trois étapes (...) presque simul­tanées, mais aux conséquences bien différentes : 1°) le passage du géocentrisme à l'héliocentrisme, qui opère un renforcement de la symbolique solaire : 2°) la suppression de la bipartition entre monde sublunaire et monde céleste, qui au contraire vient infir­mer la perfec­tion et l'excellence traditionnellement reconnues à l'astre du jour ; et enfin 3°) le passage du monde clos à l'uni­vers infini, qui parachève la désacralisation du Soleil précédem­ment entamée. Cet article est con­sacré à la deuxième de ces trois étapes. Il met notam­ment en évi­dence, d'une part, que le Soleil, maintenant qu'il est connu comme couvert de taches, symbo­lise non plus la divinité, mais l'imperfection inévitable du monde et du genre humain et, d'autre part, que si sa désigna­tion traditionnelle comme étant «l'omnivoyant» reste de mise, c'est dorénavant au sein d'usages comiques et irrévérencieux. –– There are two possible points of view with regards to how modern cosmology has influenced the traditional heliocentric system. The first would say that modern cosmology has given a greater importance to the sun by giving her a place in the universe which is equal to her undeniable physical, astrono­mical and symbolic value. Another possible point of view would be that when the symbolic value of the earth was diminished, the sun suffered the same fate. Both of these two, apparently contradictory, points of view are true in their own way, insofar as modern cosmology can be divided into three stages which although simultaneous, have very different effects. 1) Passing from a geocentric to a heliocentric system strengthened the symbolic value of the sun. 2) However, this movement caused what had been a clear distinction between the sublunary world and the heavens to be lost. This distinction had upheld the excellence of the day star. 3) Finally the world which had been finite and well defined became infinite. The third stage was the final blow in the devaluation of the sun. This article deals with the second of these three stages: that, on the one hand, the sun is covered with marks and can no longer be seen as symbolising divinity but only inevitable imperfection, which reflects the world and mankind itself. On the other hand, if the sun was “all seeing”, this vision is now at best a comic parody, if not strictly irreverent. (shrink)

There is growing evidence from the science of human behavior that our everyday, folk understanding of ourselves as conscious, rational, responsible agents may be mistaken. The new essays in this volume display and explore this radical claim. folk concept of the responsible agent after abandoning the image of a central executive and "decomposing" the notion of the conscious will into multiple interlocking aspects and functions.

The complexity of intracellular molecular pathways can be simplified by the use of Network Biology that breaks down the intricacy of biological processes into components and interactions among them. In the paper we show that any complex interactome, that is, a biological network representing protein-protein, protein-DNA and DNA-RNA interactions, can be decomposed into a conjunction of logical theorems expressed in terms of Zsyntax, a formal language which allows representing biological pathways. This result, illustrated with the case study of melanoma network, (...) opens the possibility for a computable model of the cell expressed in a logical language and shows how a formal way of intending philosophy can be useful to cope with the complexity of the biological world. (shrink)

In this paper we prove that the free algebras in a subvariety equation image of the variety equation image of semi-Heyting algebras are directly decomposable if and only if equation image satisfies the Stone identity.

We discuss in the paper the following problem: Given a function in a given Baire class, into "how many" (in terms of cardinal numbers) functions of lower classes can it be decomposed? The decomposition is understood here in the sense of the set-theoretical union.

In this paper we prove that the free pseudocomplemented residuated lattices are decomposable if and only if they are Stone, i.e., if and only if they satisfy the identity ¬ x ∨ ¬¬ x = 1. Some applications are given.

We prove that if f is a partial Borel function from one Polish space to another, then either f can be decomposed into countably many partial continuous functions, or else f contains the countable infinite power of a bijection that maps a convergent sequence together with its limit onto a discrete space. This is a generalization of a dichotomy discovered by Solecki for Baire class 1 functions. As an application, we provide a characterization of functions which are countable unions of (...) continuous functions with domains of type Πn0, for a fixed n<ω. For Baire class 1 functions, this generalizes analogous characterizations proved by Jayne and Rogers for n=1 and Semmes for n=2. (shrink)

I will assume (without explicitly argue for it here) that the verb’s external argument is not an argument of the verb root itself, but is introduced by a separate head in a neo-Davidsonian way. The content argument can be saturated by DPs denoting the kinds of things that can be believed or reported.

We use Shelah's theory of possible cofinalities in order to solve some problems about ultrafilters. Theorem: Suppose that $\lambda$ is a singular cardinal, $\lambda ' \lessthan \lambda$, and the ultrafilter $D$ is $\kappa$ -decomposable for all regular cardinals $\kappa$ with $\lambda '\lessthan \kappa \lessthan \lambda$. Then $D$ is either $\lambda$-decomposable or $\lambda ^+$-decomposable. Corollary: If $\lambda$ is a singular cardinal, then an ultrafilter is ($\lambda$,$\lambda$)-regular if and only if it is either $\operator{cf} \lambda$-decomposable or $\lambda^+$-decomposable. We also give applications to (...) topological spaces and to abstract logics. (shrink)

This note explains the circumstances under which a type 1 quantifier can be decomposed into a type 1, 1 quantifier and a set, by fixing the first argument of the former to the latter. The motivation comes from the semantics of Noun Phrases (also called Determiner Phrases) in natural languages, but in this article, I focus on the logical facts. However, my examples are taken among quantifiers appearing in natural languages, and at the end, I sketch two more principled linguistic (...) applications. (shrink)

In this paper we distinguish two issues that are often run together in discussions about physicalism. The first issue concerns levels. How do entities picked out by non-physical terminology, such as biological or psychological terminology, relate to physical entities? Are the former identical to, or metaphysically supervenient on, the latter? The second issue concerns physical parts and wholes. How do macroscopic physical entities relate to their microscopic parts? Are the former generally determined by the latter? We argue that views on (...) these two issues are independent of one another and should not be conflated. (shrink)

A common strategy for simplifying complex systems involves partitioning them into subsystems whose behaviors are roughly independent of one another at shorter timescales. Dynamic causal models clarify how doing so reveals a system’s nonequilibrium causal relationships. Here I use these models to elucidate the idealizations and abstractions involved in representing a system at a timescale. The models reveal that key features of causal representations—such as which variables are exogenous—may vary with the timescale at which a system is considered. This has (...) implications for debates regarding which systems can be represented causally. (shrink)

The claim that corporations are not people is perhaps the most frequently voiced criticism of the United States Supreme Court decision Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. There is something obviously correct about this claim. While the nature and extent of obligations with respect to group agents like corporations and labor unions is far from clear, it is manifest in moral understanding and deeply embedded in legal practice that there is no general requirement to treat them like natural persons. Group (...) agents may be denied rights to marry, vote, or run for public office. More generally the need to guard against discrimination, the core injustice in racism and sexism, has no direct application to the case of group agents. There is also something obviously incorrect about the claim that corporations are not people. The legal practice of treating some group agents as persons under law is ancient, found already in Roman law at the time of Justinian. In this essay I propose that reflection on this tension reveals that fundamental revision to the doctrine of legal personhood is needed. More specifically I propose that legal personhood be decomposed into at least two elements—standing and liability—and that legal systems reject the principle that an entity possesses one just in case it possesses the other. The import of this change ramifies broadly. Decomposing legal personhood not only enables a satisfactory account of the status of corporations and labor unions, who as such have liability but not standing, it also enables a satisfactory account of the status of those who as such have standing but not liability: severely mentally disabled persons, very young children, and non-human animals with phenomenal consciousness but lacking capacities to understand reasons and justifications. (shrink)

In this paper we prove that the free pseudocomplemented residuated lattices are decomposable if and only if they are Stone, i.e., if and only if they satisfy the identity ¬x ∨ ¬¬x = 1. Some applications are given.

Many accounts of scientific modelling assume that models can be decomposed into the contributions made by their accurate and inaccurate parts. These accounts then argue that the inaccurate parts of the model can be justified by distorting only what is irrelevant. In this paper, I argue that this decompositional strategy requires three assumptions that are not typically met by our best scientific models. In response, I propose an alternative view in which idealized models are characterized as holistically distorted representations that (...) are justified by allowing for the application of various modelling techniques. (shrink)

Conditionals frequently convey that the antecedent is relevant to the consequent. Recently many authors have argued that this relevance is part of the conventional meaning of conditionals, but this approach fails to account for many examples where a conditional is used to conveyirrelevance of antecedent to consequent. Both types of conditionals are best explained by a conventional meaning with no relevance requirement, and a separate process of coherence establishment among successive clauses in discourse. This account is supported by the distribution (...) of discourse particles and is able to account for experimental studies used to support the conventionalist position. (shrink)

The article traces the motif of decomposition in Derrida’s Geschlecht III. It distinguishes Derrida’s understanding of the way decomposition affects sex, language, humanity and place through a logic of dissemination and divisibility from Heidegger’s reversal of decomposition in the polysemic gathering of the land. It shows how the working of the spectral figure of mother in its link to land through natality in Geschlecht III can be extended in its biodeconstructive formulation to a question of soil as multispecies ecology.

Research into intuitive problem solving has shown that objective closeness of participants’ hypotheses were closer to the accurate solution than their subjective ratings of closeness. After separating conceptually intuitive problem solving from the solutions of rational incremental tasks and of sudden insight tasks, we replicated this finding by using more precise measures in a conceptual problem-solving task. In a second study, we distinguished performance level, processing style, implicit knowledge and subjective feeling of closeness to the solution within the problem-solving task (...) and examined the relationships of these different components with measures of intelligence and personality. Verbal intelligence correlated with performance level in problem solving, but not with processing style and implicit knowledge. Faith in intuition, openness to experience, and conscientiousness correlated with processing style, but not with implicit knowledge. These findings suggest that one needs to decompose processing style and intuitive components in problem solving to make predictions on effects of intelligence and personality measures. (shrink)

This book reads Ernest Becker both as a prophet of modernity and as a sensitive observer of its decline. Situated within the disciplinary approach of 'theology of culture,' the book discerns in dialogue with Becker the contours of modern vision in its depth-dimension. Taking note of Becker's works as a whole, it identifies the two master images of human existence—homo poeta and homo heroica—which articulate this dimension, situating them in scholarly debate and comparing and relating them to the contemporary situation.

This book reads Ernest Becker both as a prophet of modernity and as a sensitive observer of its decline. Situated within the disciplinary approach of 'theology of culture,' the book discerns in dialogue with Becker the contours of modern vision in its depth-dimension. Taking note of Becker's works as a whole, it identifies the two master images of human existence—homo poeta and homo heroica—which articulate this dimension, situating them in scholarly debate and comparing and relating them to the contemporary situation.

We prove the Decomposability Conjecture for functions of Baire class $2$ from a Polish space to a separable metrizable space. This partially answers an important open problem in descriptive set theory.

This paper defends cognitive neuroscience’s project of developing mechanistic explan- ations of cognitive processes through decomposition and localization against objections raised by William Uttal in The New Phrenology. The key issue between Uttal and researchers pursuing cognitive neuroscience is that Uttal bets against the possibility of decomposing mental operations into component elementary operations which are localized in distinct brain regions. The paper argues that it is through advancing and revising what are likely to be overly simplistic and incorrect decompositions that (...) the goals of cognitive neuroscience are likely to be achieved. (shrink)

L'univers de René Girard est un univers complexe dans lequel se mêlent étroitement les éléments biographiques et les différentes disciplines auxquelles il a fait appel pour mener à bien ses travaux. Centrés sur le phénomène du désir mimétique, ces entretiens dévoilent la genèse de sa théorie dans les domaines littéraires et religieux. Le fil conducteur en est le principe des doubles mimétiques qu'il a analysés chez des auteurs comme Stendhal, Proust, Dostoïevski et Shakespeare. Il se réfère également à (...) la Bible, considérant que " la donnée fondamentale de notre temps est la crise du religieux ". Ses ouvrages relèvent à la fois de la littérature comparée, de l'anthropologie et de l'histoire des religions. Il trouve aussi, dans les échanges économiques, la confirmation de sa théorie. En effet, selon lui, le monde moderne est à la recherche du sacré qu'il a perdu, et, dans ce processus, il se retrouve victime d'un mimétisme exacerbé. René Girard déploie son esprit critique à l'encontre de la société de concurrence et de la consommation ; ce faisant, il compare les sociétés française et américaine du point de vue d'un intellectuel français installé au coeur de l'Amérique. (shrink)

In the Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant famously claims that we have an a priori intuition of space as an ‘infinite given magnitude’. Later on, in the Transcendental Analytic, he seems to add that the intuition of space presupposes a synthetic activity of the transcendental imagination. Several authors have recently pointed out that these two claims taken together give rise to two problems. First, it is unclear how the transcendental imagination of a finite mind could (...) ever result in the intuition of an entity that is infinitely large. Second, Kant claims that our intuition of space has a ‘whole-prior-to-its-parts’ structure, such that its parts are given only as limitations of the whole, while synthesis is compositional and has a ‘parts-prior-to-their-whole’ structure, because it consists in first running through and then taking together the parts of a sensible manifold. I will solve these two problems by showing that Kant thought that synthesis does not always have a compositional structure but that there is also a form of ‘decomposing’ synthesis, which has a whole-prior-to-its-parts structure. Building on similarities between Kant, Edmund Husserl and G. W. F. Hegel, I will argue that infinite space is given to us in intuition by precisely such an activity of decomposition, one that allows us to differentiate between finite spatial objects and the unlimited phenomenal horizon in which they appear. (shrink)

The notion of survivance is central to Derrida’s later thinking. Much of that thinking, for example in addressing the non–human in The Animal That Therefore I Am and The Beast and the Sovereign, is more precisely a thinking of the human in relation to the animal. Taking inspiration from the recent turn towards biodeconstruction, this essay works through the implications of survivance beyond the human-animal by considering the synergy between biological and textual survivance. And in so doing, this essay outlines (...) a new way of conceptualizing the living self as a composite form made up of many non-human and even textual others. (shrink)

Points of variation manifested by adjectives crosslinguistically have received much recent attention in the literature. This paper argues that one way in which adjectives may differ is in their projection of a degree argument position in the syntax. Under standard analyses of adjectival meaning, semantic transitivity implies syntactic transitivity. However, the Navajo data presented in this paper suggests that while all Navajo adjectives have a degree argument in their semantics, syntactic projection of the degree argument is only licensed by special (...) morphology on the adjective. (shrink)

Might the world be structured, as Leibniz thought, so that every part of matter is divided ad infinitum? The Physicist David Bohm accepted infinitely decomposable matter, and even Steven Weinberg, a staunch supporter of the idea that science is converging on a final theory, admits the possibility of an endless chain of ever more fundamental theories. However, if there is no fundamental level, physicalism, thought of as the view that everything is determined by fundamental phenomena and that all fundamental phenomena (...) are physical, turns out false, for in such a world, there are no fundamental phenoma, and so fundamental phenomena determine nothing. While some take physicalism necessarily to posit a fundamental level, here I present a thesis of physicalism that allows for its truth even in an infinitely decomposable world. (shrink)

Łukasiewicz implication algebras are {→,1}-subreducts of Wajsberg algebras (MV-algebras). They are the algebraic counterpart of Super-Łukasiewicz Implicational logics investigated in Komori, Nogoya Math J 72:127–133, 1978. The aim of this paper is to study the direct decomposability of free Łukasiewicz implication algebras. We show that freely generated algebras are directly indecomposable. We also study the direct decomposability in free algebras of all its proper subvarieties and show that infinitely freely generated algebras are indecomposable, while finitely free generated algebras can be (...) only decomposed into a direct product of two factors, one of which is the two-element implication algebra. (shrink)

AbstractŁukasiewicz implication algebras are {→,1}-subreducts of Wajsberg algebras (MV-algebras). They are the algebraic counterpart of Super-Łukasiewicz Implicational logics investigated in Komori, Nogoya Math J 72:127–133, 1978. The aim of this paper is to study the direct decomposability of free Łukasiewicz implication algebras. We show that freely generated algebras are directly indecomposable. We also study the direct decomposability in free algebras of all its proper subvarieties and show that infinitely freely generated algebras are indecomposable, while finitely free generated algebras can be (...) only decomposed into a direct product of two factors, one of which is the two-element implication algebra. (shrink)

Might the world be structured, as Leibniz thought, so that every part of matter is divided ad infinitum? The Physicist David Bohm accepted infinitely decomposable matter, and even Steven Weinberg, a staunch supporter of the idea that science is converging on a final theory, admits the possibility of an endless chain of ever more fundamental theories. However, if there is no fundamental level, physicalism, thought of as the view that everything is determined by fundamental phenomena and that all fundamental phenomena (...) are physical, turns out false, for in such a world, there are no fundamental phenomena, and so fundamental phenomena determine nothing. While some take physicalism necessarily to posit a fundamental level, here I present a thesis of physicalism that allows for its truth even in an infinitely decomposable world. (shrink)