Roger Bastide a été un des rares sociologues français de sa génération à ne pas se reconnaître d’emblée héritier de Durkheim, auquel il reprochait son « sociologisme ». Toute l’œuvre de Bastide peut être caractérisée comme une tentative d’articulation du « fait individuel », du fait social et du fait culturel. L’attention qu’il portait à la subjectivité des individus explique l’intérêt qu’il a très tôt éprouvé pour les travaux des chercheurs de l’École de Chicago, qu’il a découverts (...) en grande partie pendant son long séjour au Brésil et qu’il a été un des premiers à faire connaître en France par ses enseignements et ses publications.Roger Bastide was one of the few French sociologists of his generation who did not declare himself to be heir to Durkheim. On the contrary, he criticized the latter for his « sociologism ». All Bastide’s work can be described as an attempt to connect the « individual fact » with social and cultural facts. The attention he paid to the subjectivity of individuals accounts for his interest, early on, in the work of the Chicago School, which he discovered during a long stay in Brazil. Bastide was one of the first to try, through his teaching and writings, to call the attention of French academics to the work of the Chicago School. (shrink)

This book introduces student to the three major figures of modern philosophy known as the rationalists. It is not for complete beginners, but it is an accessible account of their thought. By concerning itself with metaphysics, and in particular substance, the book relates an important historical debate largely neglected by the contemporary debates in the once again popular area of traditional metaphysics. in philosophy. (Do Not USE).

This volume provides a philosophical introduction to and analysis of the study of metaphor. By proceeding from the concrete analysis of complex metaphors, White is able to identify a range of features which are incompatible with standard accounts of the way words function in metaphor.

Introduction -- The mathematical roots of the concept of analogy -- Aristotle : the uses of analogy -- Aristotle : analogy and language -- Thomas Aquinas -- Immanuel Kant -- Karl Barth -- Final reflections.

Synaesthesia is considered a rare perceptual capacity, and one that is not capable of cultivation. However, meditators report the experience quite commonly, and in questionnaire surveys, respondents claimed to experience synaesthesia in 35% of meditation retreatants, in 63% of a group of regular meditators, and in 86% of advanced teachers. These rates were significantly higher than in nonmeditator controls, and displayed significant correlations with measures of amount of meditation experience. A review of ancient texts found reports suggestive of synaesthesia in (...) advanced meditators from India and China. These findings suggest that synaesthesia may be cultivated by meditation, and that laboratory studies of meditators could be rewarding. (shrink)

Can we justify our most basic beliefs about morality, religion and the nature of the world? Can there be a rational and objective way of choosing between alternative societies, modes of life or world-views? Dr Trigg shows how philosophical analysis is relevant to these questions and criticizes the tendency to emphasize notions of commitment and convention at the expense of truth and reason. He draws parallels between issues that are often too isolated from each other and identifies a cluster of (...) related ideas, all of which stress the notion of self-contained conceptual systems that define their own standards of rationality. First published in 1973, this book will interest professional philosophers as a vigorous and distinctive exposition of several fundamental philosophical problems and more especially it can be used as an introduction for students to a wide range of philosophical problems. (shrink)

Although China adopted in 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights largely inspired by her delegate Zhang Pengchun (1892–1957), individual liberty remains a key issue in cultural dialogues between China and Europe. However, culture is an ongoing process with no territorial boundaries, affecting every human being differently. European freedom is becoming increasingly restricted the more it focuses on meeting social and environmental needs. More broadly, the concept of responsibility that expresses solidarity between humans, belongs to all cultures and could provide (...) the common norm of a global ethic. (shrink)

Although China adopted in 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights largely inspired by her delegate Zhang Pengchun (1892–1957), individual liberty remains a key issue in cultural dialogues between China and Europe. However, culture is an ongoing process with no territorial boundaries, affecting every human being differently. European freedom is becoming increasingly restricted the more it focuses on meeting social and environmental needs. More broadly, the concept of responsibility that expresses solidarity between humans, belongs to all cultures and could provide (...) the common norm of a global ethic. (shrink)

Comme son titre l’indique, l’ouvrage, publié en 2012 et édité par Margaret Jolly, Christine Stewart et Carolyn Brewer, vise à réinvestir la question de la violence en Papouasie Nouvelle Guinée (PNG) à partir d’une lecture par le genre : il s’agit de « genrer » (engender) la violence, dans un pays où elle apparaît omniprésente. Les huit chapitres du livre, écrits en majorité par des anthropologues sur un terrain classique de l’anthropologie, s’inscrivent ainsi dans l’abondante littérature prod...

This paper argues for two theses: that degrees of belief are context sensitive; that outright belief is belief to degree 1. The latter thesis is rejected quickly in most discussions of the relationship between credence and belief, but the former thesis undermines the usual reasons for doing so. Furthermore, identifying belief with credence 1 allows nice solutions to a number of problems for the most widely-held view of the relationship between credence and belief, the threshold view. I provide a sketch (...) of a formal framework on which both theses are true. This is a modified Bayesian framework; I argue that despite making credences context-sensitive, the framework lets Bayesians hold on to their signature explanatory successes. The sort of context-sensitivity claimed for credences here mirrors the sort of context-sensitivity I have elsewhere claimed for outright belief: one's credences depend, in part, on the space of alternative possibilities one takes seriously in a context. (shrink)

This is a three-part exchange on the relationship between belief and credence. It begins with an opening essay by Roger Clarke that argues for the claim that the notion of credence generalizes the notion of belief. Julia Staffel argues in her reply that we need to distinguish between mental states and models representing them, and that this helps us explain what it could mean that belief is a special case of credence. Roger Clarke's final essay reflects on the (...) compatibility of the previously discussed views with dualist and monist interpretations of our mental states and our ways of modeling them. (shrink)

I treat you as a thermometer when I use your belief states as more or less reliable indicators of the facts. Should I treat myself in a parallel way? Should I think of the outputs of my faculties and yours as like the readings of two thermometers the way a third party would? I explore some of the difficulties in answering these questions. If I am to treat myself as well as others as thermometers in this way, it would appear (...) that I cannot reasonably trust my own convictions over yours unless I have antecedent reason to suppose that I am more likely than you to get things right. I appeal to some probabilistic considerations to suggest that our predicament as thermometers might not actually be as bad as it seems. (shrink)

This paper defends moral testimony pessimism, the view that there is something morally or epistemically regrettable about relying on the moral testimony of others, against several arguments in Lillehammer. One central such argument is that reliance on testimony is inconsistent with the exercise of true practical wisdom. Lillehammer doubts whether such reliance is always objectionable, but it is important to note that moral testimony pessimism is best understood as a view about the pro tanto, rather than the overall, badness of (...) relying on testimony. One must also be clear about what counts as genuine moral testimony: there will be morally charged occasions when a virtuous person will properly rely on the views of others. It can also plausibly be argued that relying on moral testimony may constitute a lack of full autonomy. After discussing some remaining issues concerning the definition of moral testimony, a possible analogy between lying and relying on testimony, and the implications of untrustworthiness for the truth of moral testimony pessimism, the paper ends with a return to the case against relying on moral testimony, grounded on a conception of the role of knowledge and understanding in virtue. (shrink)